2016 - India Environment Portal

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South Asian Disaster Report 2016

SADR

South A

sia Disaster R

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Lessons from South Asia

Are we Building Back Better?

Contact details:Duryog NivaranW| www.duryognivaran.orgE| [email protected]| +92 51 285 4783

Regional Secretariat:

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Pakistan

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Bangladesh Nepal

Sri Lanka

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South Asia Disaster Report 2016

Copyright 2016 @ Duryog Nivaran Secretariat (www.duryognivaran.org)

Published by

Duryog Nivaran Secretariat

No 05, Lionel Edirisinghe Mawatha, Colombo 05, Sri Lanka

T | + 94 – 11 – 2829412

F | + 94 – 11 – 2856188

W | www.duryognivaran.org

Illustrations by - Amjad Miandad

Cover, layout by - Minidu Abeysekera

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Table of Contents Introduction to the Report 5

Before the Next Cyclone Comes: Is Bangladesh “Building Back Better”? 11

Indian Experience of Building Back Better: Lessons from Recent Disasters 37

Nepal Earthquake of 2015 – Are We Building Better 59

Recurring Monsoon Floods: Pakistan’s Experience of “Building Back Better” 87

Build Back Better and the Experience of Landslide Management in Sri Lanka 111

Protecting Cultural Heritage from Disasters: Recent Initiatives in South Asia 127

Building Back Better: Lessons from South Asia Conclusions 133

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Introduction to the Report

By Mihir R. Bhatt1, Kamran K. Durrani2, Ben Wisner3, Amjad Bhatti4, Muhammad Taher5, Karin Fernando6

1 Director, All India Disaster Mitigation Institute (AIDMI), and Founder Member and current Chair of Duryog Nivaran.

2 Deputy Executive Director, Rural Development Policy Institute (RDPI) Pakistan, and Member of Duryog Nivaran.

3 Visiting Professor, Institute for Risk and Disaster Reduction, University College London, UK and Technical and Editorial Advisor to Duryog NIvaran on past and the current SADR.

4 Technical Advisor to the Board of Trustees, Rural Development Policy Institute (RDPI) Pakistan, Steering Committee Member of Duryog Nivaran

5 Research and Evaluation Consultant and Founder Member and currently a Steering Committee Member of Duryog Nivaran

6 Senior Research Professional, Centre for Poverty Analysis (CEPA) and Steering Committee Member of Duryog Nivaran

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national and international development policy and practices. It stressed on the requirement of thinking beyond mainstreaming and integration to actively consider and adopt only those development policies and infrastructural and non-structural projects that increase disaster resilience of the poor people and contribute in building back better.

“Build Back Better” (BBB) emerged as a theme and a framework during the multi-national recovery effort following the Indian Ocean Tsunami with the intention of using a holistic approach towards reconstruction and recovery where the physical, social, and economic conditions of a community are collectively addressed to create overall improved resilience. In practice, however, BBB framework has been underpinned by numerous challenges at the level of policy, planning, implementation and tracking.

The Sendai Framework of Action (UNISDR, 2016) lists sixteen prerequisites for recovery that leaves people better off in a number of ways, reduces losses from the next hazard event, whatever it might be, and produces outside interventions that, at least, “do no harm”. The sixteen are a mixture of general and specific recommendations based on many years of experience with the recovery process. The recommendations also overlap and are somewhat repetitive. They can be summarized under six themes.

• Government: adequate national scale laws, regulations, codes, institutions, uniform risk and vulnerability assessment procedures

• Economy: provision for economic measures such as insurance and other risk sharing, public-private finance for construction/ re-construction of safe school, hospital and other essential infrastructure, support for business resilience (including tourism) and plans for recovery of lost or interrupted livelihoods

• Ecology: conservation of natural ecosystem including those that support cities, land use planning and measures to reverse land degradation

7 EM-DAT: The OFDA/CRED International Disaster Database. www.emdat.be - UniversitéCatholique de Louvain - Brussels - Belgium”

8 UNESCAP, 2015. Disasters in Asia and the Pacific: 2015 Year in Review – accessed on http://www.unescap.org/sites/default/files/2015_Year%20in%20Review_final_PDF_1.pdf

South Asia continues to be highly prone to disasters. It has been agonized by a variety of natural disasters, including some major events that highlights the

extreme vulnerabilities of South Asian inhabitants. Devastation by recurring disasters, mostly in the form of floods and cyclones, adds insult to injury of those affected and still recovering from previous events. Over the last decade (2005-15), a total of 481 events –were reported7 in South Asia claiming around 135,000 lives, causing heavy economic losses for developing South Asian economies. In 2015, South Asia accounted for 64 per cent of total global fatalities that included 52 disasters and the loss of 14,647 lives8 — over 60% of those lives being lost in a single event – the 7.6 magnitude earthquake that devastated Nepal in April.

Thus South Asia is a region of the world that consistently registers the greatest numbers of lives and assets lost when natural hazards occur. However, these countries also show a good record in building resilience. And this capacity and contradiction is its strength. The region offers many ways of reducing risks spread across time and space and communities. One of these ways of reducing risk is to build additional safety into the process of recovering from a disaster each time such tragedy strikes. The South Asian Disaster Report documents how citizens, citizen-based organisations as well as government play essential roles in Building Back Better (BBB) after each disaster. Their efforts show that disasters are not only avoidable but also an opportunity to build back better.

What Does BBB Mean?While coping with the disasters, the need, importance and action for enhancing disaster resilience of vulnerable populations has been the key subject of consideration by all DRR stakeholders; international, regional, national and local. The SADR 2008 highlighted the misperception of viewing disaster in isolation from

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• HumanSettlement: in situ protection of human settlements and arrangements in advance to act as hosts if necessary to an influx of people displaced from somewhere else, tailoring building and land use codes to be feasible in informal settlements

• SafetyNets&EssentialServices: attention to health care, maternal health care, food security, nutrition and housing

• VulnerableGroups: care of people with special needs such as those with chronic diseases.

The South Asian Disaster Report seeks to provide an overview of the ways in which five countries have begun to approach recovery with attention to these themes. Bangladesh, India, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka have regrettably had a large amount of experience in rebuilding human settlements, institutions and livelihoods following cyclones, floods, earthquakes and tsunami and landslides. They have learned from these experiences, and much of this experience went into the synthesis the UNISDR is now calling BBB. The purpose of this report is to recognize and contribute to current discourse and experience sharing on BBB.

BBB is a critical part of disaster recovery that has to address structural improvements as well as the underlying drivers that lead to the risk at the on-set. However, a little over a decade of attempting to apply the principles of BBB has shown numerous challenges and contradictions. In 2015, the Sendai Framework in its Priority 4 recognised the critical importance of BBB and expressed its commitment to “enhancing disaster preparedness for effective response and to “Build Back Better” in recovery, rehabilitation and reconstruction”.

A host of contextual challenges that compound the application were identified by stakeholders during the consultations leading up to the formulation of the Sendai Framework: poverty, growing urbanisation, lack of institutional mechanisms, lack of predictable financing, and secondary hazards from industrial units, political instability– to name a few.

Approach and Structure of the ReportThis report is not an evaluation, nor a review, but a collaborative thinking on what works and can work better in South Asia. It is a field based appreciation of BBB in real life and real time by sympathetic friends of South Asia. Though at places BBB performance is audited and BBB processes are traced, the aim is to help the local people, and all those who help them, to move on, fast and well. The SADR 2016 aims to analyze: (1) How the BBB recommendations of Sendai Framework will hold up against the institutional, resource, capacity aspects in the countries / context of South Asia; (2) The capability, intent and interest of the existing mechanisms and systems of recovery and reconstruction to deliver on BBB principles and recommendations upheld in the Sendai framework; (3) The role of capital, development agents and other interest groups in operationalising BBB; and (4) How meaningful the BBB recommendations are in relation to prevalent institutional and policy, political interest scenarios in South Asia.

The case studies focusing on BBB cover the Earthquake in Nepal in 2015, the Meeriyabedda Landslide in Sri Lanka in 2014, the Uttarakhand Floods, Cyclone Phailin and Cyclone Hudhud in India in 2013, Cyclone Sidre and Aila in Bangladesh in 2007 and 2011, and the monsoon floods in Pakistan in 2012 and 2013. It also looks across the region at reducing risks to cultural heritage in South Asia.

These chapters narrate country experience, and in each case, the authors focus on some specific historical or recent hazards that because disaster due to the exposure and vulnerability of some of their citizens and their livelihoods. However, despite these diverse experiences of disaster and recovery in each country, the reader will find common themes. These include four sets of challenges and four opportunities.


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• Challenge of gaps and lack of coordination at all scales: regional, national and local

• Challenge of extreme poverty, marginalization and physical isolation

• Challenge of lack of continuity in citizen participation at local scale and difficulties in communicating the benefits voluntary relocation and other ways of reducing risk

• Challenges of new risks produced by top-down approaches to recovery and to mega-projects that lack sufficient social and environmental impact analysis

• Opportunities to include community-based hazard warning systems as part of BBB

• Opportunities to reinforce people’s livelihoods with cash, insurance and in other

• Opportunities to focus on education and children’s well-being

• Opportunities to focus on women’s leadership role in BBB.

Land use planning, hazard and risk mapping and attention to climate change are three of the topics that come up in country chapters that reveal a shift in South Asia that adds to the long-standing “love thy neighbor” approach to disaster response and recovery a new biophilic element: “love thy nature”. More and more ecosystem based BBB such as coastal flood defenses that include mangroves, vegetation, stabilizing slopes etc are emerging as an effective and efficient way to increase resilience. Such scattered examples suggest that BBB might have a role in the future transformation to a green economy. In addition, the report tries to understand the yet not addressed needs of South Asia’s informal housing dwellers in BBB process. There is also a chapter on the protection of national cultural heritage. This might be thought of as motivated by the motto, “love thy culture”. Full psycho-social recovery from a disaster benefits greatly by the reassertion of cultural identity and belonging that landmarks, museums and historic buildings represent.

Deepening and Moving Beyond BBBMany aspects of people’s daily lives require even deeper analysis and proactive inclusion in planning for future recovery. Women, who “hold up half the sky” have skills and knowledge and often emerge as leaders in risk reduction as well as recovery. The gendered dimension of DRM come out in some of the country chapters more strongly than in others. But overall it is clear that the meaningful participation of women is a critical for BBB. A comprehensive disaster management system would be one that recognizes that disasters – at every stage – disaster preparedness and response, recovery and reconstruction – affect men and women differently. This can only be a possibility if disaggregated data by sex, age and disability (SADDD) is available to provide evidence on the capacities, vulnerabilities, levels of exposure, and the priorities of women and men that can inform DRM policies, plans, programmes and monitoring efforts at local and national levels. In order for these plans and programmes to work is also necessary to secure meaningful representation, participation and leadership of women, minorities and marginalized groups who are not just the victims but are also part of the solution. In addition, rigourous monitoring and evaluation and accountability mechanisms are also needed to ensure that the prevailing gender inequality in DRM is reducing.

Nutrition and food is another of these massive realities that need more attention, possibly an entire thematic report. According to the Food and Agricuture Organisaiotn (FAO) the agriculture sector that includes crops, livestock, fisheries and forestry absorbs 22% of the economic losses causes by natural hazards in developing countries. Moreover those that are more vulnerable to disasters, who are less able to recover are also those that are food insecure. However the agriculture sector is not adequately prepared to face disasters or recover from them. Disaster Risk Reduction is not built into programmes on livelihoods and food production. Far more action and ideas are needed on the location of food, nutrition, and agriculture in long term recovery process in South Asia. These questions are linked to issues of local

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and national food sovereignity and the role of food-as-commodity in regional and global markets.

Other big picture themes yet to be explored by BBB approaches are how recovery can take place in conflict areas and how post-disaster BBB might differ in challenges and opportunities from post-conflict BBB. When natural hazards impact people living in a conflict zone, special negotiation skills are often required to provide assess for humanitarian relief and recovery. Access to civilian populations may also be made more difficult by isolation and mountainous terrain. State and non-state institutions need to plan for such contingencies and leaders (including police and military) so that they have the negotiation skills and the logistics of such difficult situations have been thought-through. In post-conflict situations, similar planning and training is required so that recovery does not re-ignite tension due to the perception of inequitable provision of aid in reconstruction. Livelihood recovery is especially important for post-conflict BBB because there are likely to be many former-combatants who need employment and stability. In these ways BBB has a chance.

Actors and AudiencesThough the report is by civil society addressed to civil society, and reviewed by experts and authorities from the region, it is not about the work of civil society alone in BBB. This report is a voice of creative grassroots initiatives and views in South Asia and also the learning that governments and civil servants have achieved over the past few decades. What is observed is a wide range of BBB innovations that are scattered and not captured and even less nurtured in the BBB process.

The highlights of this SADR work, then in progress, was shared at the Asian Ministerial Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction in Delhi, November 2016. The response was overwhelming and urgent to finish this report, share it widely, and think of many uses to which it can be put. This report in a small way creates an evidence base, uses the evidence base to analyse system performance, and pinpoints need to make improvements by analyzing information already available.

Is this report pushing BBB in any direction? Yes. In common with earlier SADR, this report asserts the importance of linking up recovery, risk reduction, mainstream development economic and empowerment of victims in BBB process. A quick review of the six main components of BBB presented at the beginning of this introduction will convince the reader of BBB’s ambition as well as its necessity.


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Before the Next Cyclone Comes: Is

Bangladesh “Building Back Better”?

By Muhammad Taher 1

1 Research and Evaluation Consultant and Founder Member and currently a Steering Committee Member of Duryog Nivaran

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Introduction

Not long ago, news about Bangladesh in the international media would often be dominated by ‘disasters’.

Now news media cover many other issues even though the country continues to be one of the most hazard-prone areas of the globe. A range of climate extremes and ‘natural’ hazards affect the country on a regular basis. This includes flood, cyclone, tornado, drought, river erosion and water logging, among others. The recurrent extreme climate events have often contributed to the displacement and impoverishment of thousands of people and their households. According to one recent estimate nearly 56% of disaster affected households on average have suffered loss and damage by two major disasters, i.e., 35% by floods and 21% by cyclone.2 The country remains one of the most vulnerable in South Asia particularly to these two hazards: cyclones and floods, and there is a looming risk of earthquake as the country is located in a seismically active high-risk region3. On account of slow onset hazards, Bangladesh is now known for growing threats from the adverse impacts of climate change and rising sea level. While the whole of the low-lying delta is almost equally affected by regular occurrences of monsoon floods and impacts of climate change, it is the population group living near the coast, which is subject to the hardest blows from tropical cyclones. The particular geo-physical position of the country in the Bay of Bengal (the funnel shape) is believed to be one of the key reasons for it to receive most of the cyclonic storms brewed up by the ‘depressions’ originating in the Indian Ocean4 (see Figure 1).

A large majority of the people living in the coastal region are extremely disadvantaged and

vulnerable to the vagaries of nature. It is a regular phenomenon for them to see cyclonic storms and water surges battering their lives and livelihoods about once every three years. Some of the major cyclone events in the recent past have claimed thousands of lives and rendered many more utterly destitute. The government, together with national and international development agencies has been engaged in offering many kinds of assistance, notably, helping the communities become resilient and better prepared to withstand the shocks and stresses. Similarly, the government has also put in place some policy instruments, administrative structures and plans in a bid to reduce disaster risks and disaster impacts (partly in keeping with the Hyogo Framework HFA commitments5).

For the South Asia Disaster Report (SADR), cyclones in Bangladesh have been chosen because, the country not only has a long history of battling against cyclones, but also because Bangladesh illustrates how effective Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) initiatives undertaken at local and national level may help to achieve one of the four priorities of action set

2 The Daily Star, Dhaka, 27 June 2016 quoting a report by the Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics.

3 According to the Asia-pacific Disaster Report, 2010, Bangladesh led the top ten countries in the Asia-Pacific region based on absolute physical exposure for floods; 5th, for storms and 8th for earthquakes.

4 To view the inverse ‘funnel shape’, one needs to look at a map of the sub-continent with eastern coasts of India and western coasts of Myanmar.

5 Bangladesh was a signatory to the Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA) as to the SFDRR.

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out in the Sendai Framework, namely to “build back better” following a disaster. Although, the concept of Build Back Better (BBB)6 has not yet been specifically invoked in its different disaster preparedness and recovery work, Bangladesh has taken a number of bold steps in line with this idea.

Cyclones have been chosen as the hazard of focus in this chapter because of their major impacts, second only to flooding. Cyclones affect the southern coastal districts of Bangladesh more than the other hazard. These districts are regarded as some of the most under-developed regions in the country with a high concentration of most disadvantaged groups. Over the past several years, the country has experienced some very devastating cyclones, following which different policies and programmes were undertaken to help the affected people and their communities. This report is intended to review how these initiatives have helped “Enhance(ing) disaster preparedness for effective response and to ‘Build Back Better’ in recovery, rehabilitation and reconstruction” (Priority 4, SFDRR 2015-2030).

The overall conclusion indicates that many past interventions remained focused on short-term relief activities, rather than addressing the inherent socio-economic vulnerabilities of the people. In other words, there were hardly any BBB concerns among the policy planners and practitioners. As just noted, there is a very large concentration of most disadvantaged groups of people living in the coastal districts who are often the first to bear the brunt of cyclones. Women, children and people living with disabilities and older people are among the worst affected. Following Cyclone Sidr in 2007, a major shift in the intervention pattern appeared to have started, including the promotion of community capacity to make effective emergency response and offer “social safety-net” support to the most disadvantaged. Some of these community interventions are highlighted in this report. They include changes effected in the organisational structures, policies and plans, which might serve as examples of BBB approach in disaster management.

Background and ContextDisasterRiskContext

Bangladesh is the largest delta in the world formed mainly by the Ganges-Brahmaputra river systems carrying sediments from the Himalayas in the north and merging with the Bay of Bengal. One of the most densely populated countries of the world (8th most populous), Bangladesh now has over 162 million people living in a landmass of 147,570 square kilometres.7 The coastal zone spans over 580 km where about 28% of the population reside. A higher percentage of the population lives in extreme poverty in the coastal area compared to the rest of the country. According to a recent World Bank study (World Bank, 2016), about 8 million people in this region are exposed to extreme weather conditions, i.e., vulnerable to inundation depths greater than 3 meters due to cyclonic storm surges. With the increase in sea-level rise and population growth, the number may go up to 13.5 million people by 2050 (ibid, p-16). The country as a whole is highly exposed to a range of other natural hazards and climate extremes.8 Disasters have had a significant impact

Income level Low- middle-income country

GDP (current US$) $221.0 billion

GDP per capita(current US$) $1,409

GDP growth rate 6.9%

Population, total 162.9 million

Poverty headcount ratio (% of population in 2013)

31.5%*

Extreme Poor population 12.9 % *

Natural Disasters Risk Index (NDRI)

Extreme risk

Box 1: Bangladesh Development and Disaster Snapshot

*By new estimate income per head @ $1.90 PPPSource: BBS, World Bank, IMF indicators, Oct.2016

6 Priority 4, SFDRR: “Enhancing disaster preparedness for effective response and to “Build Back Better in recovery, rehabilitation and reconstruction”: http://www.preventionweb.net/files/43291_sendaiframeworkfordrren.pdf

7 World Bank 2016, Bangladesh Country Snapshots, The World Bank Group, Dhaka, Bangladesh. http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/579721475673660627/Bangladesh-development-update-sustained-development-progress

Before the Next Cyclone Comes:

Is Bangladesh “Building Back Better”?

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on population groups which are mostly poor and on the economy as a whole (Box 1).

Of the 250 thousand deaths worldwide from cyclones in the twenty years, between 1980 and 2000, 60% occurred in Bangladesh. However, in one exceptional event in 1970, over 300,000 people were killed in the coastal districts of the country9. More recently, Cyclone Sidr in November 2007 caused over 3,400 deaths, destroying over a million tons of rice and resulting in over $1.7 billion in damages and losses10. In May 2009, tidal surges by Cyclone Aila affected more than 3.9 million people in 11 coastal districts, damaged and washed away over 1,742 km of embankments, and caused 190 deaths11.

Among other hazards, flooding during the monsoon season is a regular phenomenon. It often reaches levels high enough to cause massive displacement of people and damage of property and crops, as did in the recent past in 1998, 2004 and 2007. Besides such large monsoonal flooding events, there are many smaller occurrences of flooding almost once every two/three years. Flooding remains the most pervasive and most devastating hazard in Bangladesh. Figure 2 gives a picture of the percentage share of affected households by different hazards where flood is followed by cyclone, thunderstorm, drought, water-logging etc12.

Some of the recent events in Bangladesh serve as a reminder of human-induced urban disasters, and their link to structural deficiencies of buildings and infrastructure. For example, in April 2014, more than 1,000 people died and 2,500 were injured

by the collapse of Rana Plaza building in Dhaka that housed a number of readymade garment (RMG) factories. It was among the deadliest incidents in a series of workplace fire and building collapses.13 The potential for building collapse intensifies with other risks such as earthquakes, heavy rainfall, storms and strong winds. Disasters in urban areas can generally lead to significant casualties and in densely populated areas with poorly constructed infand death can reach horrifying levels.

Despite remarkable economic growth in recent years (an average of 6 percent per year over the last decade),14 Bangladesh still faces considerable development challenges. Poverty remains prevalent in much of the country. Bangladesh is known to be among the 11 countries most at risk of disaster-induced poverty15 (Shepherd et al. 2013). Therefore, without a sustainable and effective disaster risk reduction strategy, the pace of economic progress would be seriously affected. As poverty and disaster risk are integrally linked and mutually reinforcing, a

8 Climate Change Knowledge Portal (CCKP), http://sdwebx.worldbank.org/climateportal/

9 https://www.ipcc.ch/publications_and_data/ar4/wg2/en/ch6s6-5-2.html

10 GoB. 2008. Cyclone Sidr in Bangladesh: Damage, Loss and Needs Assessment for Disaster Recovery and Reconstruction (in ICF, May 2015).

11 UN. 2010. Cyclone Aila Joint UN Multi¬sectorAssessment & Response Framework.

12 The Daily Star, Dhaka dated, 27 June 2016, referring to a report by the Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics (BBS)

13 World Bank. 2015. Urban Resilience Project. Project Appraisal Doc. Report No: PAD1023.

14 According to a Daily Star report (6 Oct 2016), the government forecast for 2017 GDP growth rate is 7.2%, although IMF and ADB puts it to 6.9%.

15 Shepherd A., Mitchell T., Lewis K.,Lenhardt A., Jones L., Scott L, and Muir-Wood R. 2013. The geography of poverty, disasters and climate extremes in 2030. Overseas Development Institute, London [as noted in an evaluation report by ICF International (USA) for Global Facility for Disaster Risk Reduction and Recovery (GFDRR) on its work in Bangladesh, 2015, p.2-2.

Figure 2 : Disaster effects on number of households by types of hazards

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more comprehensive and inclusive DRR approach is very important for the country. The Building Back Better (BBB) approach appears to have elements that can meet the needs of an effective emergency response as well as recovery and reconstruction process.

Cyclone Vulnerability and Disaster RisksAlthough the country has gained a wealth of experience in combating disasters and has thus improved on the level of resilience, the coastal area and most of its people continue to remain underdeveloped, poor and vulnerable. Given the precarious geo-physical location with extremely limited access to basic services and infrastructure, the area became home to some of the most disadvantaged people of the country. Communication links with most of the areas are very poor, while health, power supply and education services are minimal. The impact of climate change has affected the livelihoods of many people who have been dependent on fast declining natural resources such as fish, forest products, crop agriculture and livestock. The following table by the meteorological

department lists some of the devastating cyclones that have affected Bangladesh from 1960 to 1997 and the number of lives claimed by each event (Figure 3)16.

Bangladesh is predominantly a flood plain and a deltaic country that abut the foothills of the Himalayas. The country is crisscrossed by many rivers, mostly flowing down from the north in India to the south into the Bay of Bengal. The coastal areas inhabited by millions of poor people are naturally low, with the average height of land reaching only up to 3 metres. Major cyclonic storms in the recent past have carried tidal surges ranging from 3 to 6 meters high. The country has faced about seventy large cyclones since 1970. The table below together with the one above shows the extent of the loss of lives and property including the few most recent devastating events (Figure 4).

Many people in Bangladesh and overseas believe that the cyclone of 1970 actually claimed more than half a million lives, a significantly higher estimate than the official estimate of 300,00017 (The reason being that there was hardly any system of damage

Figure 3: The coastal zones of Bangladesh and cyclones

16 Death toll figure for 1970 Cyclone is shown here as 200,000 (the lowest), while we have found it to vary frombetween 200,000 to 700,000. Elsewhere in the report, we have used the commonly accepted estimate of 300,000.

17 MoFDM 2013. Emergency Preparedness Plan for Cyclone Bangladesh, April 2013. P-4, Prepared by the Department of Disaster Management, Ministry of Disaster Management and Relief, Dhaka. URI: http://hdl.handle.net/123456789/144



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and loss assessment to confirm the true extent. About twenty years later, in April 1991, another major cyclone hit the coastal districts including the port city of Chittagong when an estimated 143,000 people were killed. However, there is no accurate estimate of damage to property and asset loss. It could perhaps be in millions of dollars because it damaged the Chittagong seaport, a big bridge, and the airport in Chittagong, as well as many ships at anchor on the bay and a number of air force planes parked at the airport.

Date of Cyclonic hit Wind speed Km/hr

Height of Tidal Surge(meter)

No. deaths No. people affected/value of damage.

Roanu, 21 May 2016 102 227 $1.7 million

AILA, 25 May 2009 92 190 1 million

SIDR, 15 Nov 2007 223 5.0 3,500 2 million

19 May 1997 237 3.1-4.6 155

29 April 1991 225 6.0-7.6 138,882

25 May 1985 154 3.0-4.6 11,069

12 November 1970 224 6.0-10.0 300,000

Figure 4: The major recent cyclonic storms in Bangladesh

18 Dasgupta, Susmita. 2016. Coastal Bangladesh in Changing Climate. PPP Slides. World Bank, Dhaka.

Box 2: Bangladesh Coastal Region and its Predicament at a Glance

• Coastal area comprises 19 districts (of total 64) and has 148 sub districts (Upazila).

• Accounts for 32% of the land area of Bangladesh and 26% population.

• Sustains livelihoods of more than 37 million people.

• High incidence of poverty: 11.8 million poor in 2010.

• Cyclones struck 154 times during 1877 and 1995, and 5 severe cyclones struck between 1995 and 2014.

• On average, severe cyclones strike Bangladesh every three years producing storm surges reaching heights up to 10 m (some other estimates put it as 6-9m though).

• High river and soil salinity in the southwest coastal region.

• Salinity levels in coastal rivers are higher in the dry season than in the monsoon.

• Scarcity of drinking/irrigation water serious in the south west coastal region.

• Coastal families face recurring inundations from cyclonic storms.

• Degradation of natural resources from progressive salinization of land.

• Loss of agricultural productivity and loss of fresh water fish species affecting livelihoods of coastal families adversely.

• Economic necessity drives many working-age adults to seek outside earnings (migration).

• Those left behind face a far greater likelihood of extreme vulnerability/poverty.

What Constitutes Vulnerability? Bangladesh’s two major recent cyclonic disasters need to be looked at against the background of its coastal context. Box 2, prepared on the basis of a recent World Bank study on the coastal region and its changing scenario in the face of growing disaster and climate risk (Dasgupta, 2016)18 provides a clear understanding of Bangladesh’s coastal region.

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The marginal character of the coastal districts with limited options for livelihoods and limited economic opportunities in the short-term, has compelled groups of people who are landless, asset-less and poor to take refuge in and around the area. A majority of the people survive as landless agricultural labour, either in crop cultivation or in fishing. With no access to any kind of services, children grow up (if they survive) with ill health and no education. Women in the coastal community have almost no paid work. On the other hand, death from cyclonic storms threaten their existence almost on a regular basis. Most communities living near the coast are dependent on nature for their livelihoods and are mostly poor and vulnerable. They have little or no means to defend themselves adequately against the mighty winds and tidal surges.

Learning from Sidre and AilaOn 15 November 2007, a massive cyclone named Sidr, with wind speeds of 250 kilometres per hour hit the south-western coastal districts carrying along a 5 meter high tidal surge. The devastation was stunning. An initial assessment report by the UN said that about 8.5 million people were affected, a third of whom needed emergency assistance. The death toll rose to 3,500 and the government asked for international assistance of $1 billion to rebuild the area19 (Thomson Reuters, 1 Jan 2008 update). Among other damages, 1.4 million homes were either completely destroyed or partially damaged. 1.25 million head of livestock also perished while 2 million acres of cropland was severely damaged. Many roads and coastal embankments were also destroyed.

While still recuperating from the impact of Sidr, another major cyclone named Aila with a wind speed of 100 kph carrying a 7 metre high surge hit the coastal area on 25 May 2009 triggering a tidal surge and flooding - that killed 190 people. Aila invaded many of the areas which had already seen the devastation caused by its predecessor, Sidr. With

the intrusion of saline water crushing through the embankments, there was flooding and water-logging deep inside the land. According to a study report, an “overwhelming majority of the coastal residents were impoverished and lived in poorly constructed houses, and the cyclone shelters were inadequate to protect them all20. The level of preparedness was not robust enough to protect lives and property in the case of Cyclones Sidr and Aila. Inappropriate and inadequate cyclone shelters, weaker private houses, breaches on the embankments (made by the shrimp farm owners to bring in saline water) and other environmental-degradation activities by local residents were held as responsible for causing a deeper negative impact.

The post-Aila period has also seen some positive change in the method and approach of recovery and reconstruction. This refers to the aftermath of a series of recent devastating cyclones21 in the coastal areas together with the existing slow-onset disaster of salinity incursion caused by climate change impacts and water logging vis-à-vis shrimp cultivation in the south-western part of the country. Varying programmes of work have been undertaken by different agencies to help the affected people and their communities recover. The work includes livelihood development support, building cyclone shelters and cyclone resistant houses, and ensuring food security, particularly for women and children and livelihood development through agricultural support services and micro-credit. Community preparedness systems and contingency plans have been developed, school safety and water and sanitation programmes are continuing among a number of other such interventions by government and non-governmental agencies.

Coordinated efforts by the government and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) have seen significant progress not only in reconstruction and

19 http://news.trust.org/spotlight/cyclone-Sidrsidr/, for Aila: http://news.trust.org/spotlight/cyclone-Aila/

20 Paul, B.K. and Dutt, S. 2010. Hazard Warnings and Responses to Evacuation Orders: The case of Bangladesh’s Cyclone Sidr. The Geographical Review, 100 (3): 336-355 in Ashraf and Shaha, 2016.

21 This list would include: cyclone Sidr (15 November 2007), Aila (25 May 2011), Mahasen (16 May 2013), Komen (31 July 2015), Roanu (21 May 2016)



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rehabilitation with improved housing and shelter provisions, but also with local capacity building through training and contingency planning. Trained community volunteers comprising women and men are now ready to take immediate action with dissemination of early warning messages and are equipped with rescue and first aid materials. They now participate in periodic emergency response drills and know how to evacuate people to safety in case a cyclone warning signal is raised. The communities now have their risk reduction action plans (RRAP) prepared through a risk assessment process known as CRA.

Besides, households have been made aware about adopting different livelihood strategies for survival. They now know how to diversify income sources by seeking second jobs, cultivating saline tolerant varieties of rice and vegetable crops and rearing poultry and livestock using improved methods. According to Ashraf and Shaha (2016, p-36)22, “people with better socio-economic circumstances ….were better prepared to cope with the aftermaths of Aila.” This may not be seen as a surprise to their neighbours in lower socio-economic circumstances, many of whom are now also empowered and educated to find their own ladder for upward mobility. They, however, conclude that with the community based disaster risk management approach, people’s participation in the decision making process was a significant achievement. Their knowledge about new coping mechanisms and adaptation strategies have helped the cyclone affected people to significantly reduce their vulnerability and made them resilient to future disasters.

Figure 4 above might indicate a declining trend in the of death toll rate by successive cyclones in recent years (relative, of course to wind speed and location factors). This may be construed as a result of improved resilience and preparedness of current coastal communities compared to the past. There were almost no disaster risk reduction programmes to prepare people for disasters in the past as was the case in the cyclone of 12

November 1970. News about the cyclone reached the national media about 24 hours after the great tragedy occurred. There may have been an early warning message from the radio station, but the use of radio receivers was not common among the rural people. Lack of detailed information with the local authorities on the loss and damage caused by the Cyclone Bhola made them wait before reaching out to the affected people with emergency assistance.

In 1970 the ‘central government’ run by the military was sitting far away in Pakistan. They failed to show their concern about the tragedy and refused to send the required emergency help demanded by the local authority and political leaders. Meanwhile, an estimated 200,000-500,000 people perished. It was one of the worst disaster experiences in the political history of the sub-continent, immediately before Bangladesh was born. According to many, the level of apathy and lack of preparedness demonstrated by the then government partly influenced the results of the first general election of the country held in December 1970. The mandate of the people of Bangladesh (then East Pakistan) was unequivocally against the government in power and in favour of autonomy sought by the Bengalis. Bangladesh eventually rose “from the ashes” about a year later in December 1971 to found an independent country.

Economic vs. Human CostA disaster in a developed country generally causes higher economic losses with a lower death toll, but it is the opposite for a low-income country (when there is an equivalent disaster). Low-income countries suffer higher death tolls and lower economic loss. This also seems to work on a regional basis. For example, “although the Americas were gravely affected by natural disasters in 2010, especially in terms of fatalities, the number of disaster victims remained by far the highest in Asia. As much as 89.2% of global disaster victims in 2010 were from Asia, compared to 5.6% from the Americas23. The following table of human fatalities since 1950 demonstrates this finding (Figure 5). Bangladesh tops the list of the table with

22 Ashraf, Mirza Ali and Shaha, Satya Brata Satya Brata 2016. Achieving Community Resilience: Case Study of Cyclone Aila Affected Coastal Bangladesh. International Journal of Social Work and Human Services Practice.Vol.4No.2, June 2016, pp-33-41

23 ADSR, 2010 as quoted in Rahman, M. 2011

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300,000 deaths in one single event in 1970 with the lowest economic loss of US$ 90 million. This obviously explains that the most disadvantaged groups of people in the developing countries tend to live in high-risk marginal areas as we find in Bangladesh. The coastal districts remains relatively less accessible and less developed and people live in many kinds of uncertainties of life, where the idea and availability of insurance cover has not penetrated.

Plan to Change the Coastal LandscapeThe above equation of low economic loss and high fatality rate by disasters might take a different turn in the coming years, when Bangladesh hopes to progress to a “middle-income country” from its current low-income status. Bangladesh is a fast growing economy with an average annual GDP growth rate of 6 per cent. In order to maintain the upward momentum of economic growth, the government has adopted plans to make huge investments in infrastructural development through joint venture initiatives with Chinese, Japanese and Indian companies, besides others. A number of such investment plans are likely to change the look of the coastal area with new ports, faster rail and road links with the capital city, new power plants, special economic zones (SEZ) and tourist centres. These would dramatically change the

physical as well as socio-cultural landscape of the coastal area.

The investors would of course secure their investments by adopting adequate safety measures to protect their investment and adopt insurance plans, but how would this affect the local communities and environment? Would the nature of impact by cyclones impact change? Will this plan help reduce the level of vulnerability of the excluded groups there? Will the existing disparity and marginalisation be significantly alleviated? Answers to these questions are difficult to guess at the moment, but advance thinking about these issues is very important from a BBB perspective. This would also be a politically expedient action to avert the kind of controversy generated by the Rampal Power Plant issue24.

Although, the site selected for the coal fired power plant is about 14 km away from the Sundarban forest, according to experts in civil society groups, “The Rampal power plant threatens the biological wealth of Sundarbans as well as the economy of people of Bangladesh and will render the coastline vulnerable to natural disasters like cyclones”. According to Professor Anu Muhammad, who leads a civil society campaign against such projects, claims that the 1300 megawatt capacity Rampal Power plant would emit a huge quantity

Date Event Location Economic Loss (USD)

Insured Loss (USD)

Fatalities

November 1970 Tropical Cyclone Bangladesh 90 million N/A 300,000

July 27, 1976 Earthquake China 5.6 billion N/A 242,769

Dec. 26, 2004 EQ/Tsunami Indonesia 14.0 billion 3.0 billion 227,898

January 12, 2010 Earthquake Haiti 8.0 billion 100 million 222,570

April 1991 Cyclone Gorky Bangladesh 2.0 billion 100 million 138,866

May 2008 Cyclone Nargis Myanmar 10.0 billion N/A 138,366

August 1971 Flooding Vietnam N/A N/A 100,000

May 12, 2008 Earthquake China 85.0 billion 366 million 88,000

October 8, 2005 Earthquake Pakistan 5.2 billion 50 million 88,000

Summer 2003 Drought/Heatwave Europe 13.5 billion 1.1 billion 70,000

Figure 5: Top 10 Global Human Fatality Events (1950-2016)

Source: 2016 Annual Climate Catastrophe Report, p-57, AON Benfield Analytics.

24 There has been a general strikes and street protests by civil society groups against a planned power plant at Rampal, near the Sundarban forest in the south-western coastal zone.



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of CO2 and fly ash to affect the forest severely. Moreover, the plant will use about 12,000 tonnes of coal everyday which will be shipped by 500 boats through the forest. The annual consumption of coal will be 4.7 million tonnes. According to them, studies by UNDP and others have shown that these will have long-term disastrous effects on the forest. An Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) conducted by Khulna University has also reportedly shown that the implementation of the power plant would cause water logging, river erosion, noise pollution, health hazards, decrease in water table, loss of aquaculture and agriculture25.

Resilience Building in the Coastal CommunitiesCyclone disaster management experience at community and national level is quite rich in Bangladesh. There are organised volunteer groups (CPPP26) to communicate early warning signals, transfer people and valuable assets (e.g., livestock animals) to the safety of cyclone shelters and offer other assistance required during and after cyclones. NGOs and CBOs offer capacity building training and provide equipment to community groups, school students, and volunteers to help people save lives and property. Procedures for engaging government officials in relief and recovery activities have been issued through a set of “Standing Orders on Disaster”, while community based CBOs and NGOs assist affected people on restoring livelihoods. Besides having the National Disaster Management Act, policies and plans, the government also has a separate Cyclone Preparedness Plan27. In all of these, there are elements of building back better as evidenced by different studies.

Alongside these, many large and small regular development schemes are being implemented as

a part of the Annual Development Programme (ADP) by the government, such as building new roads, bridges and embankments to improve connectivity between rural and urban centres and the introduction of new health and education support services. Some of these can also be related to building back better ideas although these are not necessarily guided by the particular BBB concept. Nonetheless, these have been able to make a significant contribution to reducing disaster risks. Some of these activities help build resilience of the vulnerable people and help the communities return to a better-than-pre-disaster stage with enhanced capacity to absorb shocks and stresses.

Build Back BetterUnderstandingtheRelevanceofBuildBackBetter

The four priority actions spelled out in the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction (SFDRR) are key to achieving the objectives of this global agreement. Adopted for a timeframe of fifteen years (2015-30), there are seven targets to achieve following a set of guiding principles, but the essence of the entire the SFDRR may be found in its comprehensive goal statement which reads: “Prevent new and reduce existing disaster risk through the implementation of integrated and inclusive economic, structural, legal, social, health, cultural, educational, environmental, technological, political and institutional measures that prevent and reduce hazard exposure and vulnerability to disaster, increase preparedness for response and recovery and thus strengthen resilience.” The pathways to reach the Goal are laid out in the four priority actions of: i) understanding disaster risk, ii) strengthening disaster risk governance, iii) investing in disaster risk reduction, and iv) enhancing disaster preparedness for effective response and to “Build Back Better” in recovery, rehabilitation and reconstruction.

25 Tiasa Adhya. 02 November 2016,correspondent, Down To Earth. For the full interview/report, please check: http://www.anumuhammad.net/article/282-Sundarbanssundarbans-is-no-dumping-ground-for-rejected-technology

26 With about fifty thousand volunteers in 13 coastal districts, the Cyclone Preparedness Programme (CPPP), is implemented by Bangladesh Red Crescent SocietySocirty (BDRCS). http://cpp.gov.bd/

27 GoB 2014. “Emergency Preparedness Plan for Cyclones in Bangladesh”. Ministry of Disaster Management and Relief, Government of Bangladesh, Dhaka.

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The experience from cyclone hazards, as discussed above, show how the ever growing risk of disaster and climate change impact and the increased exposure of people and assets require an enhanced quality of preparedness in anticipation of the events following the principles of the BBB approach. In order to “making the nations and communities resilient to disasters,” the SFDRR (Priority 4, Para 32) offers a check-list of outputs to achieve and to ensure that the Build Back Better approach is prioritised into Bangladesh’s policies, plans and actions. It has a list of 16 recommended actions to be implemented at the local and national level and eight at the regional and global level.

Going by this list of BBB stipulations, Bangladesh, over the past decade and a half, has made significant progress in consolidating its position in disaster management with many positive examples. It has remained attentive to its particular national needs and meeting international obligations on taking some important actions to reducing disaster and climate risks. As a result, the enhanced preparedness of different government agencies and civil society groups would already appear to have made a progress in respect to Build Back Better priority actions. Alongside government agencies, there has been significant complementary contributions made by Community Based Organisations (CBOs) and Civil Service Organisations (CSOs) in building community level capacity in DRR and strengthening community resilience.

Some of the milestones achieved that correspond to the BBB approach are highlighted below.

EnhancedPreparednessandIntegration

“Enhanced disaster preparedness and integration” refers to the statement for Priority 4 under Priorities of Action in SFDRR. This is fundamental to implementing the Building Back Better concept to eventually have a comparatively better quality recovery, rehabilitation and reconstruction. Here, ‘preparedness’ is understood in a rather comprehensive sense, i.e., readiness in systems, policies, programme plans,

administrative arrangements, in the quality of materials and equipment and having an “inter-connection” between all the above. What is the situation like in Bangladesh in this respect? Discussed below is its current preparedness and integration status in light of the foregoing premise.

Starting from re-structuring the administrative and management arrangements, putting policies and legislations in place, strengthening technical capacity of the concerned people and institutions in DRR and connecting vulnerable communities with the process of resilience building, the government of Bangladesh together with different non-government agencies have been active in ensuring an improved national profile in disaster risk reduction. Bangladesh now has trained professionals with advanced academic degrees in disaster management and vulnerability studies, in addition to having started university level study courses at a few eminent national institutions including Dhaka University. There are dozens of field level programmes and projects all over the country implemented by government and national and international NGOs to prepare communities to face disaster events through building individual and community resilience. Besides this, there are several alliances and networks to collectively make effective interventions and avoid overlaps. The government plays a supportive role in facilitating these efforts. One of the key examples for ‘integration’ at the top level may be reflected in the government’s decision to bring disaster management and relief (previously the two were separate) under one Ministry and its active efforts towards mainstreaming disaster and climate change risk reduction into all development plans and programmes. Coordination mechanisms for private sector and establishing an effective disaster response and recovery across the whole country from national to community level and between NGOs, private sector and government agencies have been introduced to achieve an inclusive and sustainable development. An inclusive approach is intended to ensure that women, children, elderly, the disabled and different socially marginalised groups are among the key beneficiaries of all



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disaster management efforts in the country28. Further examples in this respect may be found in some of the following paragraphs as well.

Re-organisationinGovernmentStructure

The level of importance accorded to disaster management by the government in Bangladesh has seen many ups and downs as indicated by organisational changes. Although there was a dedicated Ministry of Relief and Rehabilitation since the birth of the country, it was changed in 1982 when it was merged with the Ministry of Food. The Relief and Rehabilitation (DRR) became one of the two departments of the Ministry, with Food being the other department. The reasoning being that, the instrument of food played a major role in undertaking different types of ‘relief and rehabilitation’ assistance such as ‘Food For Work’ (FFW) for building rural roads and bridges and Test Relief (TR29) to create post disaster employment

opportunities for the poor. However, in the wake of a number of disaster events during the 1980s and the growing importance and activities of this department, a separate Ministry of Relief was formed in 1988. As the nomenclature appeared inadequate to describe longer-term disaster interventions, it was changed to Ministry of Disaster Management and Relief (MoDMR) in 1994. However, this was again unified with the Ministry of Food to now assume the title Ministry of Food and Disaster Management (MoFDM). Following a review (during design of the CDMPII)30 of the organisational structures and the role of the government in assuming an increased coordination role of disaster management activities in the country, the old name MoDMR was restored in 2012, following the enactment of the Disaster Management Act, to again have a dedicated Ministry of Disaster Management and Relief. A Department of Disaster Management (DDM) is now responsible for implementing all different projects and activities related to disaster management. The following organogram (Figure 6) also indicates the two top-

28 GoB 2016. DRR in Seventh (Five Year) Plan (draft document).. Ministry of Disaster Management and Relief, Government of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh. , Bangladesh Secretariat, Dhaka. July, 2016, P 1.

29 “Test Relief” is an old instrument of giving employment support to disaster affected people. This is a mixed food and cash based work typically used for maintenance and repair of rural roads.

30 CDMP: Comprehensive Disaster Management Programme was a 10 year long disaster management project under the Ministry of Disaster Management and Relief.

Figure 6: Organisation of Disaster Management in Bangladesh

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level committees to be convened during the time of emergencies. The National Disaster Management Council (NDMC) is headed by the Prime Minister while the Advisory Council meetings would be convened by the Minister of MoDMR. Apart from the organisational restructuring, the government has gradually placed increased importance on mainstreaming the disaster and climate change risk reduction concept in different development ministries and departments. An official document prepared by the MoDM for inclusion into the Seventh Five year Plan (GoB 2016 op cit) notes that efforts within the government, NGOs and private sector will be undertaken for effective risk reduction. Disaster risk reduction and response mechanism will be introduced across the country to help achieve “sustainable development from national to community level”. It further adds that disaster management efforts will primarily benefit “Women, children, elderly, the disable and other socially marginalised groups”.The Department for Disaster Management is now entrusted to implement the objectives of the Disaster Management Act (2012). The Act empowers the authority (DDM) to oversee the implementation of risk reduction plans and policies. All of these changes through reorganisation and introduction of policies and plans by the government demonstrate a significant progress for the country towards strengthening its capacity in DRR.

PoliciesandPlansonDisasterRiskReductioninBangladesh

Over the last ten years, the government has made significant progress in developing all necessary policies and plans required for disaster risk reduction and adaptation to the impacts of climate change. The box below has a list of the key documents (Box 3): Some of the above documents have just become out of date, however, work to revise them has reportedly been initiated. Some of the policy instruments listed above also require revision and updating. The documents call for active participation of the members of the local government bodies in different DRR and climate risk reduction activities. But it has been observed that the intended level of their participation is often insufficient due to their limited knowledge and

awareness about their roles and responsibilities. It is, therefore, important that there should be increased provision of capacity building training for the members of local government bodies at Union, Upazila and District levels.

The National Plan for Disaster Management (NPDM) is an outcome of national and international commitments made by the Government of Bangladesh to address disaster risks comprehensively. This model is designed with the aim of strengthening national and local government work in DRR. The focus of the model is to enforce implementation of Standing orders on Disaster (SoD) in addressing disaster risks reduction through (re)activation of Disaster Management Committees (DMCs) at district, Upazilla, union, Pourashva (Municipality) and city corporation levels.

Box 3: List of Key Policy and Plan Documents by GoB

DisasterManagement• Disaster Management Act 2012 enacted.• National Plan for Disaster Management

(NPDM) 2010-15• National Policy for Disaster Management

2010-15• Standing Orders on Disasters (SOD),

2005

ClimateChange• Bangladesh Climate Change Strategy and

Action Plan (BCCSAP) 2009• National Adaptation plan of Action (NAPA)

2005 (updated in 2009)• National Environment Management

Action Plan (NEMAP) 1995• Cyclone Preparedness Programme (CPP)

On-going since 1972

DevelopmentPlanning• DRR integrated in the Sixth (national) Five

Year Plan (2011-15)



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TheSocialSafetyNets(SSN)

With a vision to graduate Bangladesh into a “developed” nation (high income country) by 2041, policy makers are putting a lot of emphasis on expanding the size and scope of the macro-economy by adopting many ambitious infrastructural development projects, as revealed by different policy decisions and signing of agreements with foreign investors in the recent past. On the other hand, the existence of a high level of poverty in the country continues to remain a major concern. Disparity between the rich and the poor is very high. The situation with regard to the extreme poor is particularly alarming with lack of food, income security and low levels of nutritional intake (consuming less than 1800 Kcal/day). Under the situation, the government has introduced a number of major social safety-net programmes to especially eradicate ‘extreme poverty31’ from Bangladesh.

The SSN programmes have been instrumental in reducing extreme poverty and vulnerability. According to experts, poverty in general has reduced from 48.9% in 2000 to 24.8% in 2015 at the rate of 1.6 percent decline per year. The extreme poverty rate, which had previously been very ‘obstinate’ for a long time, has also had a slide during the same period from 34.3% to 12.9% (1.4% per year)32. Alongside the Ministry of Disaster Management and Relief (MoDMR), the Ministry of Women and Children’s Affairs (MoWCA) also has SSN programmes aimed at helping destitute women and their families belonging to extreme poor households. They are supported with safety net assistance from the VGD (Vulnerable Group Development) Programme. VGD usually offers (assistance given to 750,000 families in 2015-16) extreme poor households with 30 kg rice per month along with a “development

package,” comprising skill and awareness building support to women beneficiaries. This two year support is expected to help households ‘graduate’ from their extreme vulnerable status33. Some of these programme activities are often inevitably linked with disaster and climate vulnerability of the communities. One such programme is being introduced with support from the UNDP, known as “Women and Girls’ Adaptive Capacity to Climate Change.”

The box below gives a summary view of the SSN programmes undertaken by MoDMR aimed at offering income and/or food support to vulnerable families during and after a disaster (Box 4).

Box4: Key Characteristics of Extreme Poverty in rural Bangladesh

• Lack of any significant productive assets, including land, and dependence on unskilled wage labour, demand for which varies significantly by season. As a result, household income or expenditure is below the lower poverty line.

• Weak social networks and social marginalisation resulting in a lack of ‘voice’ to influence decision-makers and secure basic services and rights. In Bangladesh, 62% of households from indigenous communities are poor and 36% are extremely poor.

• A significant proportion of the extreme poor are chronically ill or physically disabled and dependent on others for their livelihoods and survival.

• Many of the extreme poor live in remote and marginal areas that are exposed to natural disasters and affected significantly by climate change.

Source: DFID, 2015

31 According to GED (General Economics Division), Planning Commission, Ministry of Planning (2015), “Extreme Poverty is calculated by daily calorie intake measure. People having less than 2122 kilo cal per day are considered poor, while those who have less than 1805 Kilo calorie, are extreme poor. Prof. Binayak Sen, quoted in the Daily Prothom Alo, 12 February 2015, p-13

32 Ali, SM Zulfiqar. 2016. Leave No One Behind: Critical Issues to Fight Extreme Poverty. Presentation at the BIDS Critical Conversations 2016, Bangladesh Institute of Development Studies, Dhaka.

33 GoB 2017. MOWCA Annual Report 2015-16. Ministry of Women and Children Affairs.http://www.mowca.gov.bd/site/view/annual_reports/Annual-Report

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Far from adequate though, these are nevertheless useful social protection measures. Indeed, these programmes have significantly contributed to reducing extreme vulnerability and poverty levels in Bangladesh. The key problem that is often highlighted by studies and media reports regards their governance. Often there are allegations of leakage of food, mis-targeting of beneficiary groups and undue political interference.

InstitutionalisationofDisasterPreparedness(CBDP)

For a long time, Bangladeshi communities and government agencies tackled emergencies and disasters in their own way, which were often not very effective and efficient. Handing out of sporadic relief assistance to a section of the victims within reach of local volunteers without having a longer-term recovery and rehabilitation perspective was the norm. This had started to change from the 1990s when the professionalisation of disaster management by trained personnel started. With the turn of the century, knowledge, experience and assistance from different international organisations enabled local and national actors become more organised and systematic in their work approach. Closer linkage and interaction with the UNISDR and Hyogo Framework of Action on disaster risk reduction (HFA) has helped the country to share its own disaster experiences with the broader international community. A multi-year Comprehensive Disaster Management Programme (CDMP) by the government of Bangladesh (MoFDM) with initial support from DFID and UNDP Bangladesh

was launched. It was later turned into a multi-agency support framework on DRR additionally participated by the EU, Australian Aid, NORAD, and SIDA. From inception, it aimed at mainstreaming DRR into the development process.

While necessary national policy and plan instruments were being developed (The Standing Order on Disaster (SOD) was already in place), it was felt that there was a strong need to give ground level work with the communities a more organised and effective shape. For those working at the local level starting from Union, Upazila, and district (and above), a need for a harmonised model of DRR work process was felt. The idea was to connect the institutions at different tiers of the administration and strengthen the capacities of concerned people working within the local and national institutions on DRR. Thus, a continual process of capacity building by institutionalising national Disaster Management systems was put in place.

The BBB principles were unmistakably reflected34 in the objective of this bottom-up approach of Community Based Disaster Preparedness (CBDP). Institutionalisation of the model was aimed at increasing resilience and establishing a culture of disaster risk reduction among communities and institutions vulnerable to hazards in Bangladesh. This model focuses on strengthening the state mechanism for disaster preparedness through Community Based Rural and Urban Disaster

Vulnerable Group Feeding (VGF)

Gratuitious Relief (GR)

Test Relief (TR) Employment Generation Programme for Extreme Poor (EGPP)

This feeding support programme is intended to help the disaster victims with food support for a time during and after a disaster.

This is a mechanism to offer employment support to disaster victims in public works programmes (food for work).

This is a mixed food and cash based employment support to disaster-affected people. The usual work includes maintenance and repair of rural infrastructure (roads, culverts etc.)

People who have lost their livelihood for about five months in a year to disaster are offered a 40/100 days work. Usual work includes raising road or homestead heights to escape flooding, or excavating ponds/ canals.

Box 5: Income and Food Support Programmes

34 Para 32 under Priority 4: “Integrate disaster risk reduction in response preparedness and ensure that capacities are capacities are in place for effective response and recovery at all levels.” SFDRR 2015-30, p-21.



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Preparedness35. At the heart of this approach are the local level Disaster Management Committees (DMCs). The DMCs give leadership to different activities including playing the role of environmental watchdogs.

As the process of developing the model saw a wide-ranging participation of communities in different disaster prone areas and active NGOs, the ownership of the model is almost universal in the country. The participatory CRA (community risk assessment) and RRAP (risk reduction action plans) tools and methods are very effective and are known to be used by others outside the country. However, field level observation shows that there are challenges faced by this model in Bangladesh. One is related to the DMCs and the other concerns risk reduction plans. With the passage of time, if thankfully, there was no immediate disaster event after the plans were adopted and committees were formed, both entities started to become dysfunctional as the level of interest waned, resources and actions dissipated36. The plans often become out of date with relevance gradually declining with time and with change in the local situation. However, because disaster threats and risk level remain mostly unchanged (especially in an era of climate change, demographic and socio-economic changes), there needs to be a mechanism of regular monitoring of these committees and updating the plans and allocation of funds on a periodical (bi-annual) basis.

CyclonePreparedness

For cyclone disaster, the government has shown concern by introducing different support instruments for vulnerable coastal communities. Apart from introducing improved and more rapid early warning methods and response mechanisms, the capacity of the Cyclone Preparedness Programme (CPP) has been further strengthened. CPP continues to be the oldest

and one of the key projects for cyclone preparedness (http://cpp.gov.bd/cpp). It was launched in 1972 after the dreadful experience of the mega cyclone of November 1970. It was initially under the purview of the Bangladesh Red Crescent Society, but was later taken over by the government (see Box-5 below). It is now under the Department of Disaster Management, which ensures rapid dissemination of cyclone warning signals issued by the Meteorology office to communities in 13 coastal districts. It has a large army of about 50,000 volunteers (men and women) who not only help spread the warning messages, but also help in transferring people to shelters, carrying out rescue operations and giving medical first aid services. CPP also works in the early recovery and rehabilitation phase. In many of the vulnerable areas, some NGO programmes have also developed similar volunteer groups for emergency response and equipped community members with relief and rescue materials (e.g. USAID/Proshar [www.acdivoca.org], and the NARRI37 network members). These are mostly intended to fill the gaps, align with and strengthen government initiated programmes and structures for disaster management at different levels of local government bodies (e.g., Union, Upazila). They conduct periodic drills and make people aware of cyclone risk and what needs to be done during an emergency.

Following the devastation caused by Cyclone Sidr in 2007 in the coastal areas, and many other disasters, the government undertook an “Emergency 2007 Cyclone Recovery and Restoration Project” (ECRRP). It had a component titled, “Disaster Risk Mitigation and Reduction”. This helps strengthen capacity of the local Disaster Management Committees (DMCs) through training and simulation exercises. The programme also encourages the communities to develop their respective local DRR action plans.

35 GoB 2016. Community Based Disaster Preparedness Institutionalisation Model. Department of Disaster Management, Ministry of Disaster Management and Relief, Dhaka.http://narri-bd.org/documents/cbdp/CBDP%20Institutionalization%20model%20English%20Final%20June%202014.pdf

36 This is based on author’s own recent experience of visiting different local government institutions in different parts of the country in connection to other studies.

37 http://www.narri-bd.org/

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EmpowermentofWomenandExcludedGroups

Most policy and programme documents in Bangladesh now emphasise the inclusion of a focus on gender and people with disabilities on all issues. Similarly, most DRR and development projects in Bangladesh prioritise women as the direct recipients of different development assistance. Since women play their traditional gender roles of doing key household chores, feeding the family, and looking after the children and aged, the additional responsibilities accorded by development interventions often tend to over-burden them with too many responsibilities. However, development projects have learned this and now have ways to strike a balance. Experience from the field shows that shouldering increased community responsibilities (often linked to a DRR project), has enabled women to demonstrate their new skills and abilities beyond their traditional

household chores. As a result, men have learned to show increased respect to women and now happily involve them in the household decision making process. An Action-Aid Bangladesh case study states, “This was certainly the case for the women of Kolapara [a coastal district], who went to be trained in water and sanitation management, sustainable agriculture, building flood resilient shelters, vegetable gardening, and rehabilitation.” According to Abdul Alim, Manager humanitarian response, DRR and Climate Justice, Action-Aid Bangladesh, women were now demonstrating leadership capabilities in deciding for community actions to cope with disasters38.

The new five-year plan document of the Bangladesh government declares to “Protect and support the most vulnerable groups during disaster and post recovery stages, especially women, children and disabled groups and older

Box 6: The Government adopts an ‘NGO’ Programme - CPP – The Case of Cyclone Preparedness Programme

In the aftermath of the country’s deadliest cyclone of 1970 that claimed a staggering 300,000 lives, the Bangladesh Red Crescent Society (BDRCS) mobilised volunteers in the coastal region under a project named CPP or “Cyclone Preparedness Programme”. This was started in February 1972 with the help of the League of Red Cross. When the League of Red Cross (now known as IFRC –International Federation of Red Cross) withdrew its support in 1973, the new Government of Bangladesh decided to take over its responsibilities in consideration of CPP’s continued relevance and importance for the coastal region and its people. CPP became a joint venture between civil society (BDRCS) and the government. Imbued with courage and dedication, the volunteers of CPP have faced many cyclone emergencies on the frontline to help local people and their communities cope better.

CPP has now grown into a massive programme spread across 13 coastal districts with about 50,000 trained, equipped and registered volunteers. Following the administrative reforms made in 2012, CPP has been better integrated into the country’s formal public administration system. The government now contributes to the sustenance of the programme and the movement it has created. BDRCS continues to manage the technical and operational components, while the government has created Director and Assistant Director level positions to work at district, sub district and Municipal levels. By incorporating the CPP into the Standing Orders on Disasters (SOD) and the National Plan for Disaster Management (2010-2015), the programme now has a more solid status as an important national actor on disaster (emergency) management.

Source: MoDMR 2013, CDMP II Flyer for CPPP 2012.

38 The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2014. The South Asia Women’s Resilience Index: Examining the role of women in preparing for and recovering from disasters. ActionAid, London.



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people.” However, this appears to have assessed the issue of discrimination and marginalisation rather narrowly, because the measures (input indicators) suggested, only include establishing “effective targeting mechanism”. This is an indirect reference to the problem of malpractice in the process of SSN benefits, delivery of food and cash, about which the government is very concerned. But the deeper reasons lie in the lack of the voice of women and other marginalised groups. Even the women leaders of the elected local government bodies are often found to be sidelined by male dominated committees. The official measures to foster gender equality are often mechanically perceived, for example, in allocating seats for women in committees and giving material assistance to them – much of which never reach them. Thus, the underlying causes of vulnerability of women often remain unaddressed. One study conducted after Cyclone Aila found the key reasons for vulnerability of women were lack of access to knowledge, education and resources39. The situation is exacerbated by politicisation of resource distribution, inadequate relief management and constraints on women’s mobility40. Kamal (op.cit) added that in the wake of disaster, women were exposed to risks of sexual harassment and violence as well. Some of these issues often do not get highlighted by the disaster management professionals on the ground.

There have been criticisms about many cyclone and flood shelters that were not very sensitive to the needs of women and differently-abled people. For example, most cyclone shelters did not have any concern about the need of privacy for women (even during an emergency). There were no separate toilet facilities for women and no ramps for wheel chair users or sick and aged people. As a result, many cyclone shelters have been avoided by many families despite receiving storm warning messages. There were also complaints about the

inappropriate locations of the centres – often too far from the villages where poorer people lived. In the new design of shelters, these limitations have been addressed and some of the older shelters, mostly doubling as children’s schools, are seen to have taken steps to overcome these limitations.

CoastalAreaDevelopmentPlan

Following the completion of a coastal development programme named, “Integrated Coastal Zone Management Programme (ICZM-P)” under the ministry of Water Resources, the Government of Bangladesh adopted a Coastal Development Policy and a coastal Development Strategy in 2005. Following on from there, the government, with support from international donors, is now developing a longer term (50 to 100 years) plan to be known as Bangladesh Delta Plan 2100 (BDP). The details are still emerging, but it would have a “holistic vision” and should be linked with the national Five Year Plans (ICCCAD 2015, p-28). Like in the case of ICZM-P, the government of the Netherlands has committed to offer the lead assistance in the process.

Meanwhile, the government of Bangladesh has already signed agreements with different foreign governments and companies to initiate massive infrastructure development projects. This will see building of new rail and road links between Dhaka and the key coastal development zones to connect with a new seaport, power plants and special economic zones. However, it is still not known if/how these will form part of the BDP 2100. Environmentalists have already expressed their concerns about the possible negative impact some of these might have on the local environment and communities. We have previously mentioned how civil society activists in Bangladesh are reacting against the planned Rampal coal-fired power plant to be established near the Sundarbans41.

39 Kamal, Abu Hena. 2015. Vulnerability of women living in coastal region after cyclone Aila. From the “Gobeshona” organised Conference proceedings on research on climate change in Bangladesh, organized by ICCCAD at IUB, Dhaka, January 2015. P-14

40 Kamal, Abu Hena Mostofa, 2015.“Conference Proceedings” of The Gobeshona: Conference for Research on Climate Change in Bangladesh 07-11 January 2015, ICCCAD, Dhaka. P-14.

41 A half-a-day general strike was called on 26th January 2017 by the “National Committee to Protect Oil, Gas and Mineral Resources” protesting against the government decision of establishing a coal-fired power plant at Rampal, near Sundarbans, the largest mangrove forest in the south-western coastal belt and a World Heritage site declared by UNESCO.

30

However, in a plenary discussion session at the 47th Annual Meeting of the World Economic Forum, held in Davos, on 19th January, the Prime Minster of Bangladesh defended the issue by explaining that the project would not affect the forest. This on-going controversy over the Rampal issue might alert the planners to other upcoming projects in coastal areas, so that the environmental and social concerns expressed by the CSOs are considered seriously enough.

BBBandGoodGovernance

In Bangladesh, BBB has generated a lot of enthusiasm among disaster management professionals, legislators and policy planners. A Build Back Better Foundation (BBBF) has been formed and a couple of Parliamentary Meetings were held on the subject in June and November 2015. These meetings were attended by eminent members of the Bangladesh parliament, senior government officials, donor representatives and academics. The head of the Inter Parliamentary Union (IPU) and UNISDR Champion for DRR, Mr. Saber Hossain Chowdhury42 has also taken an active part in these meetings. This may be seen as a very positive development in which the legislators and professionals demonstrate their commitment to executing a policy theme and approach adopted by the international community. This is also good news from the perspective of governance of development interventions and resources allocated for those. Awareness is increasing on the critical importance of management capacity and the vital role of transparency. This rising national awareness comes against the background of allegations about misuse of public funds and prevalence of corrupt practices at a different level. There is a particular case in point that should alert anyone concerned with BBB and DRR. This is related to the Bangladesh Climate Change Trust Fund

(BCCTF) – and one must recall that the most-costly and deadly disasters in Bangladesh are climate-related. In a recent research conference in Dhaka, some of the participants questioned the “ability of Bangladesh to coordinate and implement” internationally agreed DRR and climate policies. They pointed out underlying governance limitations which continue to challenge the country (ICCCAD 2015, p-24)43. Moreover, a recent study by Transparency International Bangladesh (TIB) on “Climate Financing and Local Government Institutions: Good Governance in Project Implementation,” found irregularities in the process of allocating funds from Bangladesh Climate Change Trust Fund (BCCTF). According to the study, “Political influence plays a significant role in allocation of budgets from the BCCTF”. Conducted on six of the 108 projects involving Tk.353 crore ($45.2 million), the study found irregularities at different stages. In a meeting with the press on 23rd January 2017, the TIB chief said, “Due to lack of good governance, projects are approved for areas that are less endangered than other(s)44.”The Trust has rejected the allegations through a rejoinder to the Daily Star, while TIB also stood by their conclusions.

At the end of 2016, a similar dispute between the Bangladesh authorities and the government of the UK had resulted in the cancelling of a £13 million Climate Change Resilience Fund (Bangladesh Climate Change Resilience Fund) which DFID wanted to channel through the World Bank office in Bangladesh. The limited governance capacity of the recipient government was implied as the reason for this. But Bangladesh was concerned that the World Bank would attach unfavourable “strings and conditions”, and thus declined to accept the funds. However, donations to the fund were later known to have been accepted.45 According to a climate change expert, Dr.Salimul

42 MoDMR 2015. Concept Note on “Parliamentary Meeting on Build Back Better in the context of the SFDRR, 28 July 2015, Dhaka”. Brochure of BBBF

43 A discussion point noted in the “Conference Proceedings” of The Gobeshona: Conference for Research on Climate Change in Bangladesh 07-11 January 2015, ICCCAD, Dhaka. P-24.

44 The Daily Star, 2017.“TIB finds mishandling of climate projects”, p-1& 10, Dhaka, 24 January 2017.Following the publication of the news, the BCC Trust sent a rejoinder to the Daily Star saying that the report was not correct and narrowly based on just a small number of projects. TIB however, stood by their report and rejected the BCCT claim.

45 The Guardian, 2016. Climate finance dispute prompts Bangladesh to return £13m of UK aid. 10 November 2016. https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2016/nov/10/climate-finance-dispute-bangladesh-return



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Huq of the International Centre for Climate Change and Development (ICCCD), it was a wrong step. Instead of implying lack of confidence on the Bangladesh counterparts, DFID could have asked for establishment of a more stringent monitoring and evaluation system to ensure that the funds were properly utilised.

Such disputes or allegations often only result in depriving the vulnerable communities living in the coastal areas (in many of the cases) and affected by the impacts of disasters or climate change. It is therefore; very important that the country must do enough to overcome these challenges on a priority basis. If not, its progress and achievements in many other fields as noted in this report, are likely to be tarnished.

ConclusionsBangladesh appears to have a lot of interest and preparedness to meet the SFDRR Priority of BBB. Its preparedness in disaster response and resilience-building looks very strong, with systems, structures, policies and plans in place. What it now needs is to concentrate on specifically building BBB elements into the recovery, rehabilitation and reconstruction plans and tools. The country has a good level of experience and preparedness to face cyclone disasters compared to the past. However, poverty and marginalisation for many people living in the coastal areas continues to keep them at a vulnerable level. The impact of climate change is now adding new challenges to the coastal people who have to battle with salinity incursion resulting in lower crop production and shrinking employment opportunities. This is particularly true for the communities living along the south-western part of the coast. Without any remedial action, this slow-onset disaster is likely to spread to other parts of the country. Scarcity of water for drinking and irrigation purposes has made life very difficult. Hence, vulnerability reduction for these most disadvantaged communities must continue to be the key priority.

Community level preparedness and the process and tools for it remain one of the most impressive achievements in Bangladesh’s recent past, where

women and marginal groups play an important role. However, the plans lose relevance over time and need updating, and committee membership must be renewed, especially in the light of outmigration. It is hard to maintain the motivation of committee members unless the relevance of what they are doing is made obvious. This requires strategy and resources to keep the committees alive and active“ before the next cyclone comes.”

Alleged governance inadequacies in managing DRR and Climate Funds require urgent attention to make those more productive and free from complaints. This is a challenge to the positive image the country has built over many years in this field of work. Strong monitoring and supervision systems must be put in place so that there are no loopholes left to allow further complaints.

When Bangladesh plans to undertake massive infrastructural and industrial development projects, policy makers and planners need to be extra cautious about potential environmental and social costs. The longer-term interests of the country through the preserving of its environment and eco-system must be taken into account with utmost earnestness. This will ensure avoiding the kind of controversy currently existing between the government and CSOs.

Although we have not reviewed the action points for global and regional levels in this report/chapter (there are eight action points under Priority 4 /BBB for this), there is a general impression from the review of literature that South Asian regional cooperation and coordination is not very strong and effective. The amount of regional exchanges of knowledge, information and practical collaboration appear to be very limited, compared to some of the other regions in the world. Established methods and mechanisms to support this process seem to be lacking as well. In this context, we believe that regional initiatives like SAARC Disaster Management Centre (SDMC) and Duryog Nivaran (DN) have a lot of scope and opportunity of cooperation and collaboration.

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Families lost their houses to Cyclone Raonu, May 2016

Houses destroyed by cyclone “Roanu” at Banshkhali, Chittagong

‘It is not always easy to convince people about the graveness of danger posed by natural

calamities. Sometimes people do not want to move out.’“However,

when the tide water started entering their area, they realised

the graveness of the danger and they started looking for the

volunteers,” he added.

Red Crescent volunteers use loudspeakers to call people to evacuate before “Roanu” hit in Cox’s Bazar

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A new design of a cyclone shelter by CPP

A cyclone shelter in use near a coastal area

Hundreds of thousands of people have been marooned by flash flood triggered by cyclone ‘Roanu’ in the coastal Barguna district

34



ReferencesGoB 2015. Bangladesh: Towards Resilience HFA and Beyond, CDMP, Department of Disaster Management, Ministry of Disaster Management and Relief, Dhaka, March 2015.GoB 2006.

Women’s Resilience Index, The Economist Intelligence Unit, London, UK.

ICZMP 2006. State of the Coast 2006. Integrated Coastal Zone Management Programme (ICZMP), Water Resource Planning Organisation (WARPO), Ministry of Water Resources, Dhaka.

AON 2017. “2016 Annual Climate Catastrophe Report”, p-57, AON Benfield Analytics, Plc. http://thoughtleadership.aonbenfield.com/sitepages/display.aspx?tl=638

Rahman, M. Mizanur, 2011. NARRI: A national platform for disaster risk reduction. The Daily Star, June 17, 2011. Dhaka.

Heimann, Thorsten and Mallick, Bishawjit 2016. Understanding Climate Adaptation Cultures in Global Context: Concept Paper and a Proposal for an Explanatory Framework, 9 December 2016

Bishawjit Mallick 2016. Cyclone shelters and their locational suitability: an empirical analysis from coastal Bangladesh. Institute of Regional Science, Karlsruhe Institute of Technology, Germany

Shamsuddoha, M. Raihan, S and Hossain, Tanjir. 2012. Displacement and Migration from Climate Hot-spots in Bangladesh: Causes and Consequences. ActionAid Bangladesh, Dhaka.

Mallick, Bishawjit & Vogt, Joachim 2014. ‘Population displacement after cyclone and its consequences: empirical evidence from coastal Bangladesh’. Natural Hazards Journal of the International Society for the Prevention and Mitigation of Natural Hazards ISSN 0921-030X Volume 73 Number 2 Nat Hazards (2014) 73:191-212

Zakia Sultana and Bishawjit Mallick 2015. Adaptation Strategies after Cyclone in Southwest Coastal Bangladesh – Pro Poor Policy Choices. American Journal of Rural Development, 2015, Vol. 3, No. 2, 24-33

EIU 2014, The South Asia Women’s Resilience Index, The Economist Intelligence Unit, London, UK.

Hallegatte, Stephane, Adrien Vogt-Schilb, Mook Bangalore, and Julie Rozenberg. 2017. Unbreakable: Building the Resilience of the Poor in the Face of Natural Disasters. Climate Change and Development Series. Washington, DC: World Bank.

Ashraf, Mirza Ali and Shaha, Satya Brata 2016. ‘Achieving Community Resilience: Case Study of Cyclone Aila Affected Coastal Bangladesh’. International Journal of Social Work and Human Services Practice. Vol.4 No.2, June 2016, pp-33-41.

GoB/DDM 2016. Community Based Disaster Preparedness Institutionalization Model. Supported by NARRI Consortium. http://www.narri-bd.org/

MOEF-GOB, 2009. Bangladesh Climate Change Strategy and Action Plan 2009, Ministry of Environment and Forest (MOEF), Government of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh (GOB), Dhaka.

DIFID 2015 Assessment and Scoping Mission Report for DFID Bangladesh’s New Climate Change Programme by Ruth Phillips Itty, Federica Chiappe and Dr Ahsan Uddin Ahmed, April 2015.

BBS 2011 Household Income and Expenditure Survey (HIES) 2010

http://sdwebx.worldbank.org/climateportal/

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http://www.preventionweb.net/files/43291_sendaiframeworkfordrren.pdf

Flood Forecasting and Warning Centre

Bangladesh Meteorological Department

JDS Programme

e-Library on DM

Disaster Management Act 2012

Standing Orders on Disaster-2010

National Plan for Disaster Management 2010-15

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rampal_Power_Station_(Proposed)

Protest in India too: http://www.thedailystar.net/backpage/Rampal-power-plant-protest-india-too-1300690

https://www.facebook.com/nationalcommittee.bd/

https://nationalcommittee.wordpress.com/

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37


Indian Experience of Building Back Better: Lessons from Recent

Disasters

By Mihir R. Bhatt1 and Mehul Pandya2


2 Senior Coordinator, All India Disaster Mitigation Institute (AIDMI)

38

AbbreviationsADB Asian Development Bank

AMCDRR Asian Ministerial Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction

BBB Building Back Better

CAG Comptroller and auditor general of India

CBFEWS Community-based Flood Early Warning System

CBRN Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear

CCA Climate Change Adaptation

CDKN Climate and Development Knowledge Network

CRM Climate Risk Management

CRPF Central Reserve Police Force

DIA Disaster Impact Assessment

EIA Environmental Impact Assessment

EWS Early Warning System

GEERP Gujarat Emergency Earthquake Reconstruction Project

GoO Government of Odisha

GSDMA Gujarat State Disaster Management Authority

HICAP Himalayan Climate Change Adaptation Programme

HTL High Tide Line

IAF Indian Air Force

IBEF India Brand Equity Foundation

JICA Japan International Cooperation Agency

MGNREGA Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act

NCRMP National Cyclone Risk Mitigation Project

NDCs Nationally Determined Contributions

NDMA National Disaster Management Authority

NDMP National Disaster Management Plan

NDRF National Disaster Response Force

NIDM National Institute of Disaster Management

ODRAF Odisha Disaster Rapid Action Force

ODRP Odisha Disaster Recovery Project

OSAP Odisha State Armed Police

OSDMA Odisha State Disaster Management Authority

PMNRF Prime Minister’s National Relief Fund

RCDC Regional Centre for Development Cooperation

SFDRR Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction

UDRI Uttarakhand Disaster Recovery Initiative

UNFCCC United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change

USAC Uttarakhand Space Applications Centre

USDMA Uttarakhand State Disaster Management Authority

Indian Experience of Building Back

Better: Lessons from Recent Disasters

39


Disasters in India - Country ContextIndia is one of ten worst disaster prone countries of the world. Out of 35 states and union territories in the country, 27 are disaster prone. Almost 58.6 per cent of the landmass is prone to earthquakes of moderate to high and very high intensity; over 40 million hectares (12 per cent of land) is prone to floods and river erosion; of the 7,516 km long coastline, nearly 5,700 km is prone to cyclones and tsunamis; 68 per cent of the cultivable area is vulnerable to drought and hilly areas are at risk from landslides and avalanches3.‘Disaster risks in India are further compounded by increasing vulnerabilities related to changing demographics and socio-economic conditions, unplanned urbanisation, development within high-risk zones, environmental degradation, climate change, geological hazards, epidemics and pandemics’4.

In India, risk in terms of both human and economic exposure to disasters is extremely high. A report on global disaster risks5 ranks India second in the world in terms of human exposure to droughts, floods, and cyclone, fourth in terms of cyclone and tsunami, and eighth in terms of earthquake. The report ranks India fourth in the world in terms of economic exposure to floods, ninth in terms of cyclone and landslides, 16th in terms of tsunami and 25th in terms of earthquake. And, with the impact of global warming, it is likely that both, human and economic exposure to disaster risks

will only increase. Even vulnerability to disasters or emergencies of Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) origin have increased on account of socio-economic development6.

In the decade 1990-2000, an average of about 4344 people lost their lives and about 30 million people were affected by disasters each year7. According to UNICEF, 65 million people on an average in India were affected by disasters every year between 2000 and 20098. Data from the (EM-DAT) OFDA/CRED International Disaster Database for the period of 1990-20149 shows that while earthquakes, floods and storms are the biggest killers in India, droughts and floods affect most people in India. Further analysis of data from EM-DAT shows that both, in terms of frequency and economic damage, floods top the list with highest economic damages in India followed by storms and earthquakes. According to India’s Twelfth Five Year Plan, natural disasters in the decade of 2001-2010 claimed 21,975 lives and damaged 1, 50,22,070 houses10.

Analysis of data related to human and economic losses in India between 1980 and 2010 show that natural disasters have killed 4614 people and affected 49, 087,940 people each year, including average economic damage of (US$ x 1000)1,550,44611. India’s average annual economic loss due to disasters is estimated to be $9.8 billion. This includes more than $7 billion loss on account of floods12. The most severe disasters in the country and their impact in terms of people affected, lives lost and economic damage is given below.

3 Ministry of Home Affairs (MoHA), Government of India (GoI), Disaster Management in India, 2011. MoHA: New Delhi.

4 NDMA. N.d. Vulnerability Profile, http://www.ndma.gov.in/en/vulnerability-profile.html

5 India Risk Profile, Source of Data: 2009 Global Risk Assessment Report, http://www.preventionweb.net/english/countries/statistics/risk.php?iso=IND

6 Ministry of Home Affairs (MoHA), Government of India (GoI), Disaster Management in India, 2011. MoHA: New Delhi.

7 Ministry of Home Affairs, GoI. 2005. Disaster Management in India, http://www.unisdr.org/2005/mdgs-drr/national-reports/India-report.pdf

8 UNICEF, UNICEF in Emergencies, http://www.unicef.org/india/emergencies.html

9 CRED EM-DAT: The OFDA/CRED - International Disaster Database www.emdat.be Universitécatholique de Louvain Brussels - Belgium., http://www.preventionweb.net/countries/ind/data/

10 Planning Commission, Government of India, Twelfth Five Year Plan (2012–2017) Faster, More Inclusive and Sustainable Growth (volume I), http://planningcommission.nic.in/plans/planrel/fiveyr/12th/pdf/12fyp_vol1.pdf

11 PreventionWeb. ND. India – Disaster Statistics. http://www.preventionweb.net/english/countries/statistics/?cid=79

12 Thakur P. 2015. Disasters cost India $10bn per year: UN report, http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Disasters-cost-India-10bn-per-year-UN-report/articleshow/46522526.cms

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Recognising the critical need for having stronger legislation to promote and protect human rights during disasters, the government of India enacted The Disaster Management Act in 2005. The Act deals with provisions regarding protection of human rights by virtue of providing specific guidelines with reference to minimum standards of relief and number of other administrative measures for reducing disaster risks in India. These legal provisions are considered to be sacrosanct legislative measures as the intent of enacting this Act is to provide for the effective management of disasters and to uphold the human rights of the disaster affected people13.

The Act makes it obligatory for the country to evolve a more organised disaster risk governance system and shift its approach from post-disaster relief and rehabilitation to pre-disaster and pro-active preparedness and mitigation by formation of the

national, state and district level authorities with clear plans and guidelines. In this structure, at the apex level, the National Disaster Management Authority has the responsibility for formulation of policy and guidelines for all disaster management work in the country. The state authorities further lay down guidelines for departments of the state and the districts falling in their respective jurisdictions. Similarly, district authorities direct civil administration, departments and local authorities such as the municipalities, police department and civil administration. The State Executive Committees are responsible for development of state disaster management plans and execution of the tasks envisaged therein.

The recently released National Disaster Management Plan (NDMP) on 1 June 2016 by the Government of India, fulfils one of the key

Disaster type Disaster subtype Events count Total deaths Total affected Total damage (‘000 US$)

Drought Drought 5 20 351175000 2041122

Earthquake

Ground movement 12 32911 7832486 4122000

Tsunami 1 16389 654512 1022800

Epidemic

Bacterial disease 10 1155 55032 0

Parasitic disease 4 121 30135 0

Viral disease 19 1867 171453 0

Extreme temperature

Cold wave 19 3186 25 0

Heat wave 14 9522 25 400000

Severe winter conditions 2 320 0 0

Flood

Riverine flood 132 24367 297272962 39504729

Flash flood 21 2530 15943526 322000

Coastal flood 4 569 11500000 275000

-- 35 8834 230943112 7923600

Landslide

Landslide 24 1542 1332748 4500

Avalanche 6 532 10256 50000

Storm

Convective storm 30 1637 699639 2387000

Tropical cyclone 42 17940 52613655 14419012

Wildfire Forest fire 1 6 0 0

Peopleaffected,liveslostandeconomicdamageduetoDisastersinIndiabetween1990to2015

Source: “EM-DAT: The OFDA/CRED International Disaster Database

13 C.E.Pratap on 09 February 2012, Disaster Management and Law - A Human Rights Perspective, http://www.lawyersclubindia.com/articles/Disaster-Management-and-Law-A-Human-Rights-Perspective-4497.asp#.UeZuPvWqnps



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requirements of Section 11 of the 2005 Disaster Management Act14 and complies with the global Sendai Framework for disaster risk reduction. The NDMP is an opportunity to integrate climate action and India’s Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) as it not only lays down guidelines for preparation of state-level disaster management plans and plans by each central ministry and department, but also provides for horizontal and vertical integration of government agencies and departments at various levels15. However, ‘the national plan needs to be supplemented by appropriate roadmaps for disaster resilience with clear goals, targets, timeframe, and measures about how resources shall be mobilised for its implementation’16.

Indian Experience of Building Back BetterUttarakhandFloods201317

In mid-June 2013, the Indian state of Uttarakhand was hit by torrential rains. In some parts of the state, massive flash floods and landslides resulted in widespread devastation. To make things worse, the rains coincided with the peak tourist and pilgrimage season, causing an even greater number of human causalities amid wide-spread destruction. Worst affected were the districts of Bageshwar, Chamoli, Pithoragarh, Rudraprayag, and Uttarkashi. On 9 May 2014, according to the National Institute of Disaster Management (NIDM),

the Uttarakhand state government reported 169 people dead as well as 4,021 missing and presumed dead. Among the 4,200 affected villages, more than 200,000 people engaged in agriculture, horticulture, and animal husbandry lost their livelihoods, with 11,091 livestock lost and 2,513 houses destroyed18.

After the mid-June disaster, the central government sanctioned INR11.14 billion ($171,993,356), and the Prime Minister’s National Relief Fund(PMNRF) contributed INR1.54 billion ($23,776,460). In December 2013, a Cabinet Committee on Uttarakhand(CCU), formed under the Uttarakhand Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Plan and headed by the Prime Minister, allocated INR73.46 billion($113,416,803) for relief and rehabilitation of flood-hit Uttarakhand19. This package includedINR18.85 billion ($291,030,051) for centrally sponsored schemes; INR 12 billion ($185,271,120) went to the National Disaster Response Force (NDRF); INR 31.61 billion ($488,035,009) was allocated for spending on externally aided projects; and INR 11 billion ($169,831,860) was disbursed under Special Plan Assistance.

The private sector extended generous support to complement government initiatives by participating in government measures such as cash transfers and pursuing their own initiatives in such key sectors as agriculture, animal husbandry, and micro-enterprise recovery. Keeping in view the likelihood of increased demand for public works employment due to the floods, the central Government provided additional financial assistance for up to 50 days of employment in Financial Year 2013–14 under Mahatma

14 Ministry of Law and Justice 2005, The Disaster Management Act, 2005, http://www.ndma.gov.in/images/ndma-pdf/DM_act2005.pdf

15 Prime Minister’s Office 2016.The plan aims to make India disaster resilient and reduce loss of lives, Press Release, http://pib.nic.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=145840

16 PG Dhar Chakrabarti 2016. The new National Disaster Management Plan has several flaws, http://www.hindustantimes.com/analysis/the-new-national-disaster-management-plan-has-several-flaws/story-LrHOFHXg9gwrtOgYjXJDrK.html

17 Information relating to response and short-term measures is readily available. But reconstruction and recovery is not well documented. Although some pointers of consideration for building back better are available in planning documents of larger scale recovery and reconstruction projects by the World Bank and ADB, it is difficult to determine their success in Uttarakhand and Odisha as these initiatives are still underway. However, efforts were made to collect latest information and data from state authorities and included to the extent possible. Due to availability of limited resources at authors disposal, full-fledged field investigation was not possible.

18 National Institute of Disaster Management (NIDM): Uttarakhand disaster 2013 (New Delhi, NIDM, 2015),http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/ukd-p1.pdf.

19 The Hindu: “Centre approves INR 7,346 crore compensation package for Uttarakhand” (11 December 2013), http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/other-states/centre-approves-rs-7346-crore-compensation-package-for-uttarakhand/article5444877.ece [accessed 14 July 2015].

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Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (MGNREGA)20. Assuming primary responsibility for compensation and reconstruction, the state government provided the following assistance to victims of the crisis:21

• allocated INR200,000 ($3,088) for damage to or loss of home or a proportionately higher amount for the loss of commercial properties;

• set rent payments at INR2,000 per month ($31), later revised to INR3,000 ($46), for those rendered homeless;

• exempted payment of water tax, electricity dues, and interest on agriculture loans extended by cooperative banks for the remainder of the financial year; and

• declared a one-year moratorium on repayment of loans to state credit agencies.

In May 2014, the Uttarakhand government launched the Tourism Accommodation Scheme for Disaster Affected Districts of Rudrapryag, Chamoli, Uttarkashi, Pithoragarh, and Bageshwarin (GoU 2014).22 The scheme provides a capital subsidy of up to 50 per cent, or a maximum of INR2.5 million ($38,598), for the construction of tourism infrastructure and accommodation, at normal bank interest rates. The scheme was launched with immediate effect for a duration of about five years (till March 2019).

Major international contributions to Uttarakhand’s recovery and development included support from the Government of Japan, the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank (ADB). Immediately after the flood, the Government of Japan provided an emergency grant aid of $ 200,000 (INR 12,953,988) through the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies to support the distribution of

relief items and other relief operations to help flood victims. On 12 November 2013, the Government of Japan provided a second batch of assistance, aiming to assist the citizens of the Himalayan region of India in overcoming this disaster, and pledging $150 million (INR 9,715,491,545) to support reconstruction in the state of Uttarakhand. On April 11, 2014, the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) signed a Japanese ODA loan agreement with the Government of India in New Delhi to provide up to 11,390 million yen for the Uttarakhand Forest Resource Management Project23. The initiative is hosted and executed by Uttarakhand’s Forest Department, and will be completed by March 2022.

The state government is currently implementing the World Bank-assisted Uttarakhand Disaster Recovery Project, with primary focuses on restoring roads and bridges; reconstruction of public buildings; and technical assistance and building government capacity in risk mitigation and response. The Uttarakhand Disaster Recovery Initiative (UDRI) reports that the government is also implementing the ADB-supported Uttarakhand Emergency Assistance Project, which focuses on restoring roads and bridges; enhancing government capacity in urban water supply risk mitigation and response; restoration of tourism infrastructure in five of the affected districts; and improving disaster preparedness through civil aviation facilities for effective evacuation and emergency relief operations24.

20 MoRD(New Delhi, 2013),http://nrega.nic.in/Netnrega/WriteReaddata/Circulars/Special_DispensationRela_notified_flood_affected_UK.pdf [accessed 14 July 2015].

21 NIDM, op. cit.

22 GoU: A letter from UmakantPawar, Secretary, Tourism, and CEO, Uttarakhand Tourism and Development Board, Govt. of Uttarakhand (Dehradun, 8 May 2014), http://uttarakhandtourism.gov.in/utdb/sites/default/files/tenders/document/tourism_accommodation_scheme_for_disaster_affected_districts_24_5_14.pdf[accessed 27 September 2015].

23 Japan International Cooperation Agency(JICA):“Signing of a Japanese ODA loan agreement with the Government of India – Support for forestry management, together with recovery of the disaster-stricken areas in the state of Uttarakhand”, press releases (11 April 2014), http://www.jica.go.jp/english/news/press/2014/140411_01.html[accessed 16 July 2015].

24 Uttarakhand Disaster Recovery Initiative (UDRI): Projects (n.d.), http://ukdisasterrecovery.in/[accessed 7 October 2015].



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Cyclone Phailin 2013Cyclone Phailin which made landfall at the coast of Odisha near Gopalpur in Ganjam district on October 12, 2013left 44 people dead, damaged about 256,600 homes and affected about 13.2 million people in over 18,370 villages. Eighteen of the thirty districts in the state were affected by the storm and subsequent floods. The cyclone

preparedness of the Government of Odisha (GoO) and the coastal communities and their resolve to ensure zero casualties resulted in prompt action to the warning of the cyclone. Around one million people along with their livestock resources were evacuated to nearby cyclone/flood shelters and to other identified safe buildings. This was one of the largest evacuations ever undertaken in recorded history of disaster management in India25.

25 Government of Odisha, ADB and World Bank. 2013. INDIA Cyclone Phailin in Odisha: Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment Reporthttp://www.osdma.org/Publication.aspx?vchGlinkId=GL005

26 Source: Government of Odisha, ADB and World Bank. 2013. INDIA Cyclone Phailin in Odisha: Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment Reporthttp://www.osdma.org/Publication.aspx?vchGlinkId=GL005

State Government Response to Cyclone Phailin26

The GoO was proactive and well prepared to deal with the impending cyclone. In addition to the updates from IMD, the path, intensity and magnitude of the cyclone were continuously tracked at OSDMA and a range of preparatory activities were launched to face the cyclone with a zero casualty approach. Prior to landfall, the OSDMA conducted mock drills at all the cyclone shelters and also checked and replaced equipment available at many of these shelters. Cyclone and Flood Shelter Management and Maintenance Committees were activated in order to facilitate the evacuation of vulnerable populations. All 14 cyclone prone districts were provided with satellite phones for communication in case of failure in telecommunication lines. In addition, the state government ensured that 4,197 free kitchen centers were opened from October 11 onwards that covered more than 2 million affected people. In addition, 185 medical teams and 338 medical relief centers were also opened. As the disasteroccurred during the Indian festive season of ‘Dussehra’ all government employee holidays were cancelled and all field offices were kept open. About 30 nodal NGOs were also engaged in various vulnerable blocks of the coastal and flood prone districts.

To ensure zero casualties, the GoO ordered all people living in low lying areas and kutcha houses or tin roof houses within 0-10 km of the coastline to be evacuated to nearby cyclone shelters or other identified safe buildings. Similar steps were undertaken to shift the livestock to safer places. Over 1 million people were evacuated within 36 hours preceding the landfall of Cyclone Phailin, which is one of the largest emergency evacuations carried out in a record timeframe. These efforts were made in close collaboration with the Odisha Disaster Rapid Action Force (ODRAF), National Disaster Response Force (NDRF), Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF), Odisha State Armed Police (OSAP) and the Indian Air Force (IAF). Cyclone Phailin and the floods that followed after heavy rainfall caused extensive devastation in the affected districts, uprooting vast number of trees, damaging roads, public buildings and disrupting telecommunications and power.

Due to the effective pre-positioningof men, machinery and materials, and the able coordination among State, National and Local agencies, the restoration of connectivity was carried out in an impressive manner. Major roads were cleared within 24 hours. About 5.7 metric tonsof dry food were airdropped by IAF helicopters to inaccessible areas. Over 0.5 million families were provided with temporary shelter and elaborate arrangements were made for safe drinking water and power supply. Medical teams and sanitation kits were also deployed to all affected areas.

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The severe cyclonic storm followed by floods in October, 2013 adversely affected about 132.35 lakh people in 171 blocks, 44 ULBs, 2,164 GPs and 18,374 villages in 18 districts of the state. Large areas of agricultural lands were sand cast due to floods / flash floods in several affected districts. An area totalling about 11 lakh ha. of agricultural crop lands was affected with an estimated loss of about Rs.2,300 crore. Of the total croplands affected, crop damage was over 6.51 lakh ha. amounting to about 50 percent. About 5.41 lakh houses were damaged. The destruction and damage to livelihoods, economy, agricultural and physical infrastructure was of gigantic magnitude. Agriculture production was severely affected resulting in negative growth of the agriculture sector during the year 2013-1427. By various estimates, the 2013 Cyclone Phailin in Odisha resulted in massive economic losses to the state. This also implied that distress migration from rural sites to urban centers also increased. Disasters are so enmeshed in the fabric of society that they have profound impacts on the social and economic aspects of the communities they strike.

Preparedness for Effective Response and to “Build Back Better” in Recovery, Rehabilitation and Reconstruction

‘Disasters have demonstrated that the recovery, rehabilitation and reconstruction phase, which needs to be prepared ahead of a disaster, is acritical opportunity to “Build Back Better”, including through integrating disaster risk reduction into development measures, making nations and communities resilient to disasters’28.The Uttarakhand flash floods and Cyclone Phailin revealed both infirmities as well as strengths in certain areas of our response and reconstruction. Some of the important lessons learnt from the Indian experience of managing these two calamities and building back better are reviewed in this section.

Preparedness policies, plans and programmes

The Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction (SFDRR) requires countries to prepare or review and periodically update disaster preparedness and contingencypolicies, plans and programmes, including strengthening of national laws and procedures on international cooperation. India has a wide range of disaster management related legislation, policies and plans at various levels. At national level, India has a Disaster Management Act of 2005, National Policy on Disaster Management 2009 and National Disaster Management Plan (NDMP) of 2016. At state level, various state governments have their own disaster management acts, policies and plans. Since, the NDMP was only made available recently, the state disaster management plans of Uttarakhand and Odisha require to be revisited, reviewed and updated as per the requirements laid down by the NDMP.

Lack of disaster preparedness in Uttarakhand was widely criticised. As pointed out by theComptroller and auditor general of India(CAG), the Uttarakhand government in the wake of Uttarakhand tragedy admitted that it had fallen short of the disaster preparedness standards laid down by the NDMA29. NIDM interaction with district, block and local administration revealed that at many places a DM plan existed but most officials were not aware of its contents and were ignorant about their duties and responsibilities as these plans had not been updated for a long period and SOPs were not available30. This lack of understanding resulted in weak sub-optimal coordination at state, district and local levels. It became clear that having DM plans was not enough. They needed to be updated and should have been complimented with SOP for various departments to respond in time and effectively. Under the World Bank

27 Government of Odisha 2015. Odisha Economic Survey, 2014 -15, http://www.odisha.gov.in/pc/Download/Economic_Survey_2014-15.pdf

28 UNISDR 2015: Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015 - 2030. Geneva: Switzerland, http://www.preventionweb.net/files/43291_sendaiframeworkfordrren.pdf

29 Monish G. 2013. DNA. Uttarakhand: Falling woefully short of disaster management standards, http://www.dnaindia.com/india/report-uttarakhand-falling-woefully-short-of-disaster-management-standards-1852393

30 NIDM 2015. Uttarakhand Disaster 2013. http://nidm.gov.in/PDF/pubs/ukd-p3.pdf



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supported project draft rules and a structure for the Uttarakhand State Disaster Management Authority (USDMA)were prepared, which have been approved31.

On the other hand, Odisha was well-prepared with most aspects of responding to the Cyclone from warning to evacuations and emergency response. However, the ‘need [for]constant monitoring of critical infrastructures for safety standards in consonance with worldwide safety benchmarks and strengthen, where deficient’ in Odisha32.

People-centred multi-hazard, multi-sectoral forecasting and early warning systems

Strengthening of a people-centred multi-hazard early warning mechanism is one of the key components of Building Back Better (BBB). Although the IMD provided warning of ‘heavy to very heavy rain’ in Uttarakhand, there was little inkling that the rain could induce such a massive disaster. The lack of a warning system for flash floods and the inability to predict area specific precipitation were evident. Mr. Anand Sharma, Director, Meteorological Centre, Dehra Dun explained that although accurate warning was issued 72 hours in advance to the authorities and pilgrims, communication was poor and the tragedy was not averted33. An effective early warning system necessitates that various hydro-met data inputs are seamlessly available for accurate modelling of flash floods or rain induced landslides, which was lacking in Uttarakhand. Thus, Uttarakhand requires to review its early

warning system in its entirety34. ICIMOD is working with the Indian Institute of Technology in Assam to fine tune its award winning Community-based Flood Early Warning System35.

31 Uttarakhand Disaster Recovery Initiative. ND. Technical Assistance & Capacity Building for Disaster Risk Management. http://ukdisasterrecovery.in/index.php/projects/udrp1/ta-cbdrm

32 NIDM 2014, India Disaster Report, http://nidm.gov.in/PDF/pubs/India%20Disaster%20Report%202013.pdf

33 Menon M. 2014. All weather communication need of the hour in Uttarakhand, http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/other-states/all-weather-communication-need-of-the-hour-in-uttarakhand/article6275478.ece


35 Menon M. 2014. All weather communication need of the hour in Uttarakhand, http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/other-states/all-weather-communication-need-of-the-hour-in-uttarakhand/article6275478.ece

36 ICIMOD 2016. Outscaling Community Based Flood Early Warning System in Assam, http://www.icimod.org/?q=24081

37 Note: The system consists of a water level sensor, signal processor, transmitter, receiver, alarm siren and batteries with solar panel. When the water level reaches at pre-defined maximum risk level, the siren automatically produces, warning signal. This message is communicated by mobile phones to the downstream communities. For more information please visit: http://www.icimod.org/?q=12758

ICIMOD’s experience with Community-based Flood Early Warning System (CBFEWS)36

In 2013, ICIMOD and Aaranyak installed CBFEWS in the Jiadhal and Singora rivers in Assam37, India under the Himalayan Climate Change Adaptation Programme (HICAP). During the floods, the CBFEWS in the Jiadhal River warned community members in Dihiri of the approaching floods, helping them save assets, including livestock valued at USD 3,300. The following year at the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) Conference of Parties (COP) 20/CMP10, UNFCCC awarded ICIMOD and Aaranyak the Momentum for Change 2014 Lighthouse Activity Award under the ICT Solutions category. ICIMOD, together with the local government and partners, have continued to outscale CBFEWS along the Koshi River in Nepal and Dushi River in Afghanistan.

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‘Investments in infrastructure development related to weather, glacial lakes, river flow monitoring, etc. are fundamental for improving the accuracy of risk mapping, thereby allowing more lead-time for warnings provided by IMD, CWC, GSI, NRSC, etc’38. Currently, with assistance from the World Bank, the state is strengthening Hydro-Meteorological Network and Early Warning System (EWS) by modernising of the hydromet observation and information systems39. Uttrakhand can learn lessons from community-based early warning system of Terai region in Nepal, which

is soaked by three major river systems, the Kosi, Narayani and Karnali and exposed to floods annually. Practical Action Nepal has been working on establishing EWS in the Terai region of Nepal since 2002. The approach developed by Practical Action combines all the key aspects of effective early warning system such as risk awareness, monitoring and warning, dissemination of warning and community response and the following lessons are transferable to the Uttarakhand context as well as to other flood prone regions of India.

In the case of Cyclone Phailin, tracking of cyclone, early warning and evacuations were most effective. IMD, state authorities and non-state actors all played crucial roles in minimising loss of life and financial losses.After the IMD issued the first warnings on October 8, 2013, the Government of Odisha and Odisha State Disaster Management Authority (OSDMA) immediately commenced a wide-range of preparatory activities with a zero causality goal such as alerting all the districts and planning evacuations and emergency response, including provision of emergency aid. Timely warning, effective coordination and communication right upto the last-mile were key to evacuating over one million people in 36 hours to safety.

Resilienceofnewandexistinginfrastructure

Disaster recovery and reconstruction provide a window of opportunity to promote resilience of new and existing public-private infrastructure such as power, bridges, dams, roads and urban infrastructure development. According to India Brand Equity Foundation (IBEF) ‘India needs Rs 31 trillion (US$ 454.83 billion) to be spent on infrastructure development over the next five years, with 70 per cent of funds needed for power, roads and urban infrastructure segments’41. Around 70%

Learning and experience of establishing a Community Based Early Warning System in Nepal40

• Investment in EWS is a cost effective use of limited resources where risk can be anticipated and measured. Vulnerable communities have a right to such warning.

• High tech/high cost systems are not only inappropriate but also unsustainable. Use of local resources both cuts costs and ensures greater ownership.

• Systems should provide information, not warnings per se. Making information intelligible and user friendly are fundamental to any system.

• Users of information should be active participants in systems, not beneficiaries of them only. Systems must be established which put users first and at their centre.

• Systems should be based on the principle of “demand for”, not “supply of” information.

• Successful EWS are the product of effective person to person communication and efficient social networks communication technologies merely complement these.

• Systems should dictate the technology and not technology the system.



40 Practical Action 2009. Early Warning Saving Lives. http://practicalaction.org/docs/region_nepal/early-warning-saving-lives.pdf

41 IBEF 2016. Infrastructure sector in India, http://www.ibef.org/industry/infrastructure-sector-india.aspx



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of infrastructure in India is yet to be developed which is a huge opportunity for integrating disaster risk mitigation and climate resilience in future infrastructure development (TERI: 2)42.The ‘Make in India’ initiative of Government of India ‘intends to develop industrial corridors and build smart cities with state-of-the-art technology and high-speed communication’43. Keeping in view the multi-hazard scenario and vulnerability of a particular area, governments are required to ensure that critical infrastructure such as water, health, power, transportation, telecommunications and educational facilities remain safe, effective and operational during and after disasters. This aspect of BBB is not only important to ensure provision of basic services in the post-disaster phase, but also to safeguard rights of disaster victims.

Rights of disaster victims are protected by international human rights instruments as well as national constitutions and laws. For instance, Article 21 of the Constitution of India guarantees all its citizens the right to survival44. Although, both government and humanitarian agencies are obligated - legally, morally and politically to ensure that recovery efforts are consistent with the human rights of victims45, in reality, human rights protection remains a secondary concern for humanitarian agencies (both national and international) as it is the national government that is charged with the primary responsibility of protecting the rights of its citizens46. Recognising the critical need for having stronger legislation to promote and protect human rights during disasters, the government of India enacted the Disaster Management Act in 2005. The Act deals

with the provisions regarding protection of human rights by virtue of providing specific guidelines with reference to minimum standards of relief and a number of other administrative measures for reducing disaster risks in India. These legal provisions are considered to be sacrosanct legislative measures as the intent of the legislature in enacting this law is to provide for the effective management of disasters and to uphold the human rights of the disaster affected people47.

Experience shows that human rights concerns during disasters can be better addressed with policies and plans that recognise the importance of rights-based frameworks and approaches. Wide spread damage and destruction to housing and infrastructure, including livelihoods, especially in Uttarakhand warranted a comprehensive and careful planning for recovery with the ‘build back better’ approach. The state government initiated a comprehensive reconstruction and rehabilitation programme with assistance from the Central Government and the World Bank, including support from ADB and others.The World Bank assisted Uttrakhand Disaster Recovery Project is restoring roads and bridges, resilient housing and public buildings and technical assistance and capacity building. The Project design incorporated lessons learned from previous national and global post-disaster recovery projects to ensure that the recovery is targeted, effective and is built back “smarter”48. The owner driven construction of resilient houses aimed to support reconstruction of 2499 houses. Under the ADB assisted Uttarakhand Emergency Assistance Project the state government is rebuilding and strengthening roads and bridges, urban water supply, tourism and civil aviation infrastructure. The project is restoring basic public

42 TERI (2014) Climate Proofing Indian Cities: A Policy Perspective. India: New Delhi. Available at: http://www.teriin.org/policybrief/docs/Urban.pdf

43 Government of India 2016. MAKE IN INDIA: THE VISION, NEW PROCESSES, SECTORS, INFRASTRUCTURE AND MINDSET, http://www.makeinindia.com/article/-/v/make-in-india-reason-vision-for-the-initiative

44 AIDMI 2013. Towards HFA 2: Emerging Insights from the Grassroots, Issue no. 94, http://www.preventionweb.net/files/34468_3446894snethfa2.pdf

45 Lewis, Hope, “Human rights and natural disaster: the Indian Ocean tsunami” (2006). School of Law Faculty Publications. Paper 3. http://hdl.handle.net/2047/d20001074

46 The Brookings Institution – University of Bern and All India Disaster Mitigation Institute, Protecting and Promoting Rights in Natural Disasters in South Asia: Prevention and Response, Summary Report, April 2009, Chennai

47 C.E.Pratap on 09 February 2012, Disaster Management and Law - A Human Rights Perspective, http://www.lawyersclubindia.com/articles/Disaster-Management-and-Law-A-Human-Rights-Perspective-4497.asp#.UeZuPvWqnps

48 Uttarakhand Disaster Recovery Initiative. ND.World Bank Assisted, Uttrakhand Disaster Recovery Project. http://ukdisasterrecovery.in/

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and social infrastructure and raising the design and construction standards for the physical infrastructure by focusing on build back better49.

A massive evacuation effort ahead of cyclone Phailin in 2013 in Odisha was enabled by investment in emergency roadways and cyclone shelters by the state government under the National Cyclone Risk Mitigation Project (NCRMP). The states of Odisha and Andhra Pradesh are adding 1,000 km of new evacuation roads, 23 bridges to better connect communities, 285 new cyclone shelters, and 140km improvements to existing coastal embankments under NCRMP50. These developments are important but the importance of feeder roads for creating quick access to markets and main roads and availability of cyclone shelters in adequate numbers seems to be key to emergency evacuation and rapid economic recovery. Following the cyclone Phailin, the OSDMA approved policy guidelines for post cyclone Phailin Resilient Housing’ taking up World Bank supported disaster resilient housing projects in the Phailin affected areas of Ganjam, Puri and Khorda districts. The Policy Guidelines aimed at establishing the framework for providing safer housing to about 30,000 affected households in compliance with relevant environmental and social safeguards of the Bank and applicable statutory provisions51. Based on these guidelines about 30,000 disaster resilient houses were taken up with World Bank support under the Odisha Disaster Recovery Project (ODRP) within

5 km from the High Tide Line (HTL) in Ganjam, Khordha&Puri Districts of Odisha52.

IncorporationofDRMintopost-disasterrecoveryandreconstruction

A crucial aspect of BBB is the incorporation of DRM into post-disaster recovery and reconstruction processes to reduce future risks. Disaster recovery operations are largely guided by post-disaster recovery and reconstruction guidelines, plans and schemes issued by governments. Post-disaster recovery and reconstruction are essentially developmental issues. Thus, guidelines on land-use planning, building codes and construction techniques, including use of materials and other non-structural measures such as insurance play an important role. India’s 2009 National Policy on Disaster Management advocates the need for incorporating disaster resilient features with ‘build back better’ as the guiding principle.

In spite of having the Uttarakhand Flood Plain Zoning Act of 2012, many of new buildings were constructed in the flood zone. These were badly affected during the floods. Thus, the Government of Uttarakhand needs to ensure that provision of the Act regulating construction within the flood plain of river are prohibited and all the old encroachments are removed53.

49 Uttarakhand Disaster Recovery Initiative. ND. Uttarakhand Emergency Assistance Project, http://ukdisasterrecovery.in/index.php/projects/ueap/adbrb

50 The World Bank 2014. Disaster Planning Pays of in Odisha, India. http://www.worldbank.org/en/results/2014/10/07/disaster-planning-pays-off-odisha-india

51 OSDMA 2013. Policy Guidelines for Post Cyclone Phailin Resilient Housing. http://www.osdma.org/Download/Policy_Housing.pdf

52 OSDMA 2014. Odisha Disaster Recovery Project. file:///C:/Users/Mehul/Downloads/ODRP-Website_30.01.15.pdf


Flood Plain Zoning Flood Plain Zoning Act has been enacted by the Govt. of Uttarakhand & Uttarakhand state will be the first state to implement the act. IRI Roorkee has been nominated as the liaising authority to prepare the flood plain zoning maps of two reaches of River Ganga & River Bhagirathi as pilot projects. Flood plain zoning/ map of both the reaches for a 25 year return period flood has been completed and provided to concerned flood plain zoning authorities, headed by District Magistrates. Transferring of data corresponding to flood plain boundary for a flood of 25 years return period on to the ground is in progress.

Source: Government of Uttarakhand 2016. Irrigation Department, Uttarakhand.http://uttarakhandirrigation.com/uploads/documents/doc_982_final_newsletter_1_issue_1_dec.pdf



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The state also requires that landslide risk zonation mapping is undertaken and followed and illegal mining of the riverbeds is stopped and repair and construction of roads is done in a scientific manner keeping in view evacuation requirements and durability during disasters. ‘For clearance of all hydro-power and other mega projects in ecologically sensitive regions like Uttarakhand, the Disaster Impact Assessment (DIA) should also be made compulsory besides Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA)’.54 Following the June 2013 floods in Uttarakhand, the apex court ordered the formation of a committee, which recommended in its April 2014 report that at least 23 hydropower projects be scrapped to save the ecologically fragile region.55 Another 11-member committee was subsequently formed in June 2015 by the Environment Ministry to assess the cumulative impact of hydroelectric projects on the upper reaches of the Ganga river in Uttarakhand.

Since 1999, Odisha has improved its disaster preparedness and management capacity significantly by incorporating DRM into post-disaster recovery and reconstruction. It has built 200 multi-purpose cyclone shelters in which, the government runs schools, anganwadis and community centres to ensure regular maintenance, and several new cyclone shelters are being built under the NCRMP56. School buildings in the vulnerable areas are being constructed in a manner that these could be put to use as community shelters during emergencies; 9664 primary school buildings have been strengthened and 5683 new buildings have been constructed57. Considering the high vulnerability to climate risk, Odisha pioneered the Climate Change Action Plan in 2010. While the budget allocation for climate change increased from Rs 1,700.17 crore during 2012-13 to Rs 2,184.35 crore in 2013-14 and to Rs 3,207.26 crore in 2014-15, several adaptive measures such as disaster


55 Aggrawal M. 2015. Panel formed to assess impact of hydropower projects in Uttarakhand. http://www.livemint.com/Politics/1VwXWhGiKKJGcSSrECNbXL/Panel-formed-to-assess-impact-of-hydropower-projects-in-Utta.html

56 Down to Earth. 2013. How Phailin was different from super cyclone 1999, http://www.downtoearth.org.in/news/how-phailin-was-different-from-super-cyclone-1999-42452

57 OSDMA. ND. School Cum Cyclone Shelter, http://www.osdma.org/ViewDetails.aspx?vchglinkid=GL007&vchplinkid=PL041

58 http://cdkn.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/Summary-Report-Assessment-of-Effectiveness1.pdf.

Case example of risk transfer and insurance

Following the 2013 Cyclone Phailin, a study58 examines the experience with disaster insurance in Odisha. 125/160 claims were successfully settled with a combined payout of 400507 INR ranging from 1750 to 17000 INR against yearly premiums of 148 INR. These clients are victims of the 2011 floods and 2013 cyclone Phailin. Risk transfer and insurance emerged as an important theme for build back better. With climate change exacerbating the severity of disasters in the developing world, a tool like insurance is of the utmost importance for poor and vulnerable populations. In cyclone Phailin, it helped low income families to recover from the loss. Disaster insurance can help the vulnerable and poor in developing countries to break the vicious cycle of poverty. The core message from the study on effectiveness of disaster insurance in Odisha was that insurance and other ex-ante mechanisms are crucial to manage disaster risk and adapt to climate change.

The study found that, women are a natural target segment for micro-insurance providers. So far, the contribution from women, particularly in building knowledge on the concept and importance of disaster insurance is very high. Women have been found to be more financially literate and responsible. It has been shown that financial empowerment of women has secondary efforts, including improved self-esteem and respect within communities, decreased violence, and better nutritional care and education for children. The contribution of women in Odisha was very fruitful to achieve the results and build ownership and sustainability of the disaster insurance product.

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preparedness, construction of flood and cyclone shelters, improvement in agricultural productivity including cultivation of climate resilient crop varieties, increasing perennial fruit plantation and adoption of integrated farming systems have been implemented59.

CoordinationandFunding

Clearly defined roles and responsibilities of public institutions and its workers is key for improving coordination and funding mechanisms and procedures for disaster recovery and reconstruction. Funding mechanisms for disasters is well-established in India. India has not only set up Disaster Relief Funds at all levels but also launched the National Disaster Response Fund, which is financed through the levy of a cess (MoEF 2015)60. The Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India has items (these include gratuitous relief, search and rescue operations, relief measures, clearance of affected area, agriculture, animal husbandryassistance to small and marginal farmers, fishery, assistance to artisans, housing, infrastructure, procurement of equipments for response, capacity building and state-specific support) and norms of assistance from the State Disaster Response Fund and the National Disaster Response Fund.

In its response to the Uttarakhand Flash Floods, a Coordination Committee under the leadership of the Chief Secretary was formed.The State Government also established a Missing Persons Cell on June 27, 2013 at theDisaster Mitigation and Management Centre (DMMC) at Dehradun. ‘Despite the most arduous and difficult terrain, inclement weather and lack ofconnectivity, approximately 1,20,000 persons, stranded/ trapped in different locations (which included both pilgrims and local residents) were safely evacuated and taken to the relief camps’61. In Uttarakhand, the impact of flash floods on telecommunication was massive and adversely affected emergency operations. Thus, the

government of Uttarakhand require the setting up of an alternative back up communication system in case of the failure of normal communications during disasters.

Coordination with an approach for building back better will play an important role in the move towards eco-power, eco-tourism, ecology, eco-preneurship, horticulture, and village tourism for development, particularly mountain development. Based on the Uttarakhand floods, it is important to understand that development needs to be holistic keeping in mind the limitations, aspirations and requirements of the communities in the hill as well as in the plains.

The Government of India with UNDP and various state governments have worked to reduce the risk and impact of disasters, empowering over 300 million people in 150,000 villages in 17 states to better understand the warning signs, and take the action needed to protect themselves and their families. Such coordinated efforts build impact in the long run and provide important learning to strengthen thebuild back better approach. The GFDRR’s assessment resulted in a $250 million recovery and resilience project in Uttarakhand with the World Bank. The project is based on the assessment recommendations that aim to ensure sustainable social and economic restoration. The assessment also aimed to give the Government of Uttarakhand ‘build back smarter’ guidelines to incorporate resilience into reconstruction projects62.

The Uttarakhand Disaster Recovery Project was put in place to help with recovery after the 2013 flash floods in Uttarakhand, India. World Bank teams helped communities better understand the recovery policies and engage in the project by communicating more in the local language, promoting transparency and accountability.

59 Business Standards. 2015. Odisha readying climate plan for 2015-20, http://www.business-standard.com/article/current-affairs/odisha-readying-climate-plan-for-2015-20-115052801829_1.html

60 The Ministry of Environment & Forests (MoEF) 2015. India’s Intended Nationally Determined Contributions, http://www4.unfccc.int/submissions/INDC/Published%20Documents/India/1/INDIA%20INDC%20TO%20UNFCCC.pdf


62 http://www.worldbank.org/en/results/2014/07/29/rapidly-assessing-flood-damage-uttarakhand-india.



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Additionally, model pre-engineered houses were constructed in each district headquarters and communities were invited to examine them. With a greater sense of ownership and understanding of available options, more than 50% of the project beneficiaries started rebuilding their own houses within six months of the project cycle63.

The response to Cyclone Phailin was one the best coordinated efforts in the history of India. The Government of Odisha ensured that the response was coordinated with the Odisha Disaster Rapid Action Force (ODRAF), National Disaster Response Force (NDRF), the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF), Odisha State Armed Police (OSAP) and the Indian Air Force (IAF). About 185 medical teams were mobilised, 338 medical relief centres were opened and about 30 NGOs were also engaged in various vulnerable blocks of the coastal and flood-prone districts64.

CapacityDevelopment

SFDRR requires state governments to promote preparedness for emergency response and recovery. This includes capacities for evacuation, providing access to safe shelter, emergency relief as well as capacity for undertaking rapid needs and damage assessments.

The government of Uttarakhand has developed Standard Operating Procedures for its police, Public Works Department, Power Corporation, Agriculture Department, Irrigation Department and Jal Sansthan65, including manuals on warning and evacuation and disaster management information system. But much of these remained on paper and was of little use during the response

to the 2013 flash floods. Management of flash floods in Uttarakhand highlighted the inadequate level of trainings of officials and stakeholders in DM. The mechanism of Incident Response System needs to be established and be dovetailed into the disaster management plans66.

The World Bank Assisted, Uttrakhand Disaster Recovery Project is focusing on building capacity of the state administration in a number of areas such as Risk Assessment, Modelling and Capacity Enhancement of Uttarakhand Space Applications Centre (USAC), slope stabilisation and river morphology, capacity building of USDMA, emergency response, early warning and decision support system67. In 2016 (February 2016- May 2016), the Disaster Mitigation and Management Centre, Government of Uttarakhand organised a series of 10-days search and rescue training programmes for all the hazard prone districts in the state68. The state has also been conducting mock drills on earthquake and chemical/industrial disasters with NDMA since 2011.

The Odisha State Disaster Management Authority is strengthening capacity of the state disaster management administration through development of disaster management plans at state and sub-national levels as per the guidelines laid down by the Disaster Management Act of 2005, including ongoing training and capacity building activities of the state and non-state actors. Capacity of state administration to execute orders and awareness of community about disaster risks, including effective coordination with non-stake actors is being enhanced. On the mainstreaming front, about 18 state departments in Odisha have developed their own departmental disaster management plans69. Recently, under the GoI-UNDP Project on ‘Enhancing Institutional

63 Progress report on Mainstreaming DRM in World Bank Group Operations (March 25, 2016); World Bank. http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DEVCOMMINT/Documentation/23713857/DC2016-0004-DRM.pdf.


65 Official Website Of DISASTER MITIGATION AND MANAGEMENT CENTER, Government of Uttarakhand. ND. http://dmmc.uk.gov.in/pages/display/59-standard-operating-procedures



68 Official Website Of DISASTER MITIGATION AND MANAGEMENT CENTER, Government of Uttarakhand. 2016. http://dmmc.uk.gov.in/files/pdf/Final_proposed_training_new.pdf

69 OSDMA. ND. Departmental Disaster Management Plans, http://www.osdma.org/Download/Departmental_Disaster_ManagementPlan.pdf

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and Community Resilience to Disaster and Climate Change’, OSDMA in partnership with AIDMI has developed training of trainers on ‘Mainstreaming Disaster Risk Reduction and Climate Change Adaptation’70.

Gender

Numerous examples point out that families and communities fare much better in combating natural disasters and effects of climate change when women lead and play a central role. The focus on strengthening capacities of women is likely to enhance the effectiveness of DRR and adaptation actions. Damage, needs, and vulnerability assessments too often fail to capture the differential impacts of disasters and disaster response on men and women, including children. As a result, the contributions of

women to recovery too often go unrecognised. This marginalises their skills and knowledge and limits their opportunities to play a greater role in building back better71. Mainstreaming gender into reconstruction provides for faster and deeper recovery, in addition to the benefits gained in promoting gender equality and addressing gender based vulnerabilities72.

EcosystemforIntegration

It has been demonstrated that ecosystem services can be used for climate change adaptationand disaster risk reduction (IPCC 2012). For example, forests provide flood and landslide regulation services, a phenomenon that is harnessed in watershed management programmes. Ecosystems are not invulnerable to current anthropogenic pressures and are being degraded. At the policy level, the importance of including sustainable ecosystem management for DRR and CCA is recognised. The UNFCCC Paris COP 12 agreement and SFDRR both prominently feature ecosystem based approaches to adaptation and risk reduction. The Uttarakhand disaster triggered acceleration to national and international thought process on the role of ecosystems and their services in terms of DRR and reducing people’s vulnerability. Partnership of Environment and DRR (UN-PEDRR) has evolved a mechanism called Ecosystem approach to DRR, which is now being considered through the state authority created for guiding post-disaster rehabilitation and recovery in Uttarakhand74. Similarly, in Odisha the Regional Centre for Development Cooperation (RCDC) implemented the Paribartanprojectin Kendrapara and Jagatsinghpur following Cyclone Phailin75.

70 AIDMI 2015. Training of Trainers on ‘Mainstreaming Disaster Risk Reduction and Climate Change Adaptation’, http://www.osdma.org//ckeditor/CKFiles/12-Jan-2016Training%20Module%20on%20Mainstreaming%20DRR%20and%20CCA.pdf

71 IRP, UNDP, ISDR, Guidance Note on Recovery Gender, 2010

72 IRP, Knowledge for Recovery Series info kit 1

73 Gareth Price and Mihir Bhatt, HPG Working Paper, The role of the affected state in humanitarian action: A case study on India April 2009, odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/4281.pdf

74 Uttarakhand Disaster 2013 - Floods and Landslides: Lessons of Ecology Not Yet Learnt; http://isebindia.com/13_16/13-10-2.html.

75 Chatterjee J. 2016. Mangrove nurseries protect coasts and livelihoods, http://www.indiawaterportal.org/articles/mangrove-nurseries-protect-coasts-and-livelihoods

Engendering recovery with active participation of women

Following the 2001 Gujarat earthquake, the largest direct focus on women was led by SEWA, which provided relief to 40,000 women and their families in three districts and built 8,000 houses for rural women in 78 villages to assist decision-making on shelter type, location, safety and costs. The shelters are registered in the names of these women and are designed to complement their livelihood efforts. The district federations of SEWA set up learning centres for local women to make their recovery faster and less painful, including tools, techniques and information about government schemes. The centres continued intoearly 2009 and have served as focal points during flood recovery in years since the earthquake73.



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HealthandCommunityResilience

Health care systems provide core capacities in response, build back better and risk reduction. The limited basic health services and infrastructure hugely compound the challenges of disaster response and recovery. Primary health care focuses on basic services to improve health status, which in turn builds community resilience and provides the foundation for responding to emergencies. The strategies need to be flexible enough to take into account the diverse composition of modern communities, and include migrants and people from different ethnic and cultural groups, and with different health seeking behaviour. It is also in line with the SFDRR target – substantially reduce disaster damage to critical infrastructure and disruption of basic services, among them health and educational facilities, including through developing their resilience by 2030.

The Phailin recovery efforts by the state and the World Bank have emphasized urban health infrastructure. The health benefits from urban infrastructure at Berhampur which is the largest component has avoided illnesses and reduced risk of mortality from lack of water and sanitation access. Improved water and sanitation services result in a reduction in the number of infections of several major diseases, including typhoid, cholera, shigellosis, and rotavirus.76

Key ConclusionsFailing to “build back better” can have dire consequences. Hurricane Matthew, which killed at least 1000 people and destroyed thousands of houses in Haiti is another reminder. Since the 2010 earthquake, which claimed 222,750 lives in Haiti, cholera has claimed more than 9000 lives and infected more than 720,000 people due to poor water and sanitation and the failure to control the disease manifested into a current crisis situation in 2016 with a surge of infections in areas hardest hit by Hurricane Matthew.77 Sidelining local stakeholders, about 94% of the US$13.5 billion pledged by the international community after the earthquake went to private contractors, donor nations’ own civilian and military entities, INGOs and UN agencies, which hampered any serious effort to address disaster risk or empower locals to access resources, education, livelihoods and health78. Holding those who contribute to economic development as well as those who receive money for “building back better” accountable for creating new risk and reducing existing ones is thus necessary to make the Sendai Framework a reality.

The 2001 Gujarat recovery experience from India shows that when applied the “building back better” principle has potential to mobilise participation and contribute to people-centred sustainable development. The Gujarat Emergency Earthquake Reconstruction Project (GEERP) claims that, as part of recovery, the state government implemented the world’s largest housing reconstruction project with over 900,000 houses repaired and nearly 200,000 reconstructed79. When the project closed in October 2008, it had invested over $500m in housing construction (61%), roads and highways (14%), irrigation and drainage (13%), state and local public administration (10%), and other social services (2%). The reconstruction investments directly focused on owner-driven shelter reconstruction as well as multi-

76 Odisha Disaster Recovery Project, Project Appraisal document. http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/372771468049771502/pdf/834520PAD0P148010Box382122B00OUO090.pdf.

77 Jason von Meding and Giuseppe Forino 2016. Hurricane Matthew is just the latest unnatural disaster to strike Haiti, http://theconversation.com/hurricane-matthew-is-just-the-latest-unnatural-disaster-to-strike-haiti-66766

78 Jason von Meding and Giuseppe Forino 2016. Hurricane Matthew is just the latest unnatural disaster to strike Haiti, http://theconversation.com/hurricane-matthew-is-just-the-latest-unnatural-disaster-to-strike-haiti-66766

79 Rediff News. 2004. Three Years after Killer quake, Gujarat Emerges Stronger, http://www.rediff.com/news/2004/jan/25quake.htm

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sector rebuilding of social, economic and physical infrastructure to revive the economy and provide the basis for economic recovery80. The Gujarat State Disaster Management Authority (GSDMA), which came into existence following the Gujarat Earthquake was awarded the prestigious UN Sasakawa award 2003 for outstanding work in the field of disaster management and risk reduction.

The Indian experience of building back better confirms that investment in local capacities (both people and institutions) is a long-term disaster reduction strategy and is more effective compared to short-term and top-down or donor driven approaches. The Gujarat earthquake not only saw the world’s largest housing reconstruction project but also resulted in the development of state, district and taluka level disaster management plans, including setting up of disaster preparedness committees in all affected villages with active participation of Panchayats. In the tsunami, where the elected Panchayats were sidelined by the traditional Panchayats and the local community leaders, the risk of entrenching existing caste and gender biases increased81.

Both the states of Uttarakhand and Odisha are highly vulnerable to multiple disasters as well as to the adverse impacts of climate change. In comparison to Uttarakhand, a more experienced and better equipped state administration in Odisha was in a much better position to face a disaster in 2013. Continuous work of the state government and non-state actors since 1999 Super Cyclone in Odisha to improve disaster management system, ensured a much better preparedness and response, including improved management of recovery and reconstruction. The need to further strengthen disaster preparedness for effective response and building back better is widely recognised. Disasters offer unique challenges as well as opportunities for serving people in distress and developing systems for reducing such distress. Relief efforts in a disaster scenario can serve not only to reverse losses but also to spearhead long-term

sustainable recovery. Gradually, in India various state governments have started taking initiatives for building back better. Governments across Asia are taking housing, infrastructure and livelihood recovery on a priority basis and disaster risk management is being integrated in the recovery process with ‘Build Back Better’ accepted as the basic principle of recovery.

The Asia Regional Plan for Disaster Risk Reduction, which has been adopted in the Asian Ministerial Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction (AMCDRR) in New Delhi in November 2016 highlights and incorporates key considerations for building back better in implementation of the Sendai frameworkin Asia to achieve its goals. The ten-point agenda outlined by the Prime Minister of India at AMCDRR reinforces the basic approach and principle of BBB. ‘Post-disaster recovery is an opportunity to not just to ‘build back better’ in terms of physical infrastructure, but also in terms of improved institutional systems for managing risk.’ The lessons listed below are relevant to both, guiding recovery in Nepal as well as ARP implementation in Asia.

1. Focusonpoorandanti-povertyinitiative. Every disaster offers an opportunity to upgrade and improve national disaster management frameworks, policies and plans to reduce and avoid future risks. The government and donors engaged in Nepal recovery and reconstruction must focus on improving an enabling environment for safer recovery to take place. This may include, revising and revisiting existing polices and plans for disaster risk management, including existing structures and decision making hierarchies. Helping and supporting the national government of Nepal in developing specific recovery standards will be an important area for donors and the international community to bring about long-



82 Press Information Bureau, Government of India. 2016. Prime Minister’s address at Asian Ministerial Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction. http://pib.nic.in/newsite/pmreleases.aspx?mincode=3



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term change in preparedness, response and recovery practices. For example, donors need to ensure that the National Building Code of Nepal is enforced properly and its provisions are incorporated in municipalities and urban local bodies which are responsible to issue building permits in Nepal. AIDMI has witnessed in 2001 Gujarat and more recently in Odisha in response to the cyclone Phailin what effective administration and enabling policy environment can do to achieve safer recovery and saving lives.

2. Start from where people are (and notwhere agencies are). Reconstruction of shelters and restarting livelihoods is fundamental for recovery efforts in Nepal. As we have seen in many disasters in last two decades, the level of satisfaction with housing is directly related to participation and ownership of the process and output by the communities. Owner-driven approaches tend to succeed more and score more points in comparison to donor-driven reconstruction. Suitable provision of water and sanitation services in and around households is also important for owner satisfaction. Since access to clean drinking water and sanitation still remains an unfulfilled promise in many areas of Nepal, housing reconstruction offers a new opportunity to make a sizable difference in increasing the number of households with suitable WASH facilities. In South-Asia, home-based work is a way of life for many poor households. For them the house is also a place to work. Thus, housing reconstruction approaches and strategies in Nepal must recognize this link and the process itself must lead to employment opportunities for owners. The unemployment rate in Nepal is as high as 40 percent and agriculture supports more than 70% of the population. Thus, special attention must also be given to agriculture and allied sectors.

3. Childrenandeducationisnotoneofthelastbutoneofthefirstreliefagendaitems. Along with women, elderly, disabled and certain socially and economically excluded groups, children remain most vulnerable

and at risk and suffer the most when a disaster strikes. Disasters can have several direct as well as indirect negative effects on children. The AIDMI, experience of working with UNICEF and Save the Children shows that while short-term needs of disaster affected children such as food, water, health and shelter are easily addressed; long-term needs are often overlooked. Long-term needs of children following a disaster include continued support for education, immunization and nutritional diets, including the development of child-friendly infrastructure and adequate provision of WASH facilities. But all of these require detailed assessment of children specific needs and data. Similarly, the AIDMI experience of working with State Disaster Management Authorities (SDMAs) in India shows that school safety audits are necessary to protect children from disaster risks. Nepal must prioritise safety and education of children as a long-term risk reduction measure.

4. Local solutions are often of more valuethanbestsolutions. A review and overhaul of local district disaster management plans across Nepal, especially of earthquake hotspots is long overdue. A third party review of the plans of key districts is overdue. The AIDMI experience shows that most local disaster management plans are prepared with constraints of necessary knowledge, skills and resources and remain top-down and a single-time exercise. These plans and processes are hardly shared between two districts or made inclusive from the point of view of the poor and marginalised. As envisaged by the SFDRR, government and donors must support development and up-gradation of local disaster management plans in Nepal. Similarly, donors must also consider supporting emergency management exercises, including mock-drills to improve community and system response to natural disasters and climate extremes. Such exercises in India have been well-received and extremely useful to gauge the capacity of response systems and strengthening resilience. It is also important to review how panchayats and other local institutions have been involved in planning and evaluating recovery.

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5. Financialmeasuressuchascashtransfersand insurance help in some instances.Since the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, the overwhelming majority of reviews in South Asia show that cash is an effective option to re-build lives and livelihoods, especially when markets are functional and accessible to communities as they offer important advantages such as speed and flexibility and most importantly to shift the power of decision making to victims. Cash transfers also boost local market recovery.

AIDMI with EU and DFID support used cash transfers in 2001 for the Gujarat earthquake victims and over the years has pursued cash transfers across six states and four types of disasters covering an estimated 18,000 families over ten years, showing when cash works. The AIDMI experience of using cash transfers shows that even though most cash transfer interventions are not envisioned as a long-term economic solution, cash transfers are used beyond the intended use of meeting immediate needs to repair houses and restore critical community infrastructures, including re-starting of micro-enterprises and sending children back to school. The recent drive on using cash transfers for development and disaster recovery spearheaded by the MGNREGS and a number of civil society organisations in India indicates that cash can also be used to support recovery of MSMEs. Cash transfers can keep many community members employed during the recovery phase; our experience shows that cash transfers can effectively be used as an entry point for active women participation in the later stages of reconstruction. Similarly, micro-insurance can be a potentially viable option for protecting the assets of the poor against disasters but is often unavailable to them. Despite its potential, micro-insurance is rarely used in humanitarian contexts and very little is known about how it actually benefits the poor and micro enterprises. AIDMI is currently, piloting a micro-insurance scheme in three cities of India with HIF support to explore who benefits from such arrangements and how. Nepal recovery is an opportunity for the government and donors to introduce risk transfer mechanisms. The housing insurance programme of the government of Gujarat introduced following

the 2001 Gujarat earthquake shows that it is possible for governments to promote such long-term risk reduction measure.

6. Understand and consider using marketbased solutions emerging for recovery,and study why and how they perform. Micro and small enterprises are often among the worst sufferers of disasters. Continuity of their businesses is crucial for promoting a speedy and lasting community recovery. Still, limited knowledge exists on how disasters affect them and what measures can make them more resilient. Thus, it is crucial that government and donors support assessment of disaster impact and risk to micro and small enterprises in Nepal for the crucial requirements for rapid recovery in terms of business continuity, capital requirement for development and growth and risk reduction, including risk transfer and social protection could be mapped and addressed.

7. MainstreamDRRforresilience.Recovery and reconstruction in Nepal should go beyond restoring what is lost or damaged i.e. services and rebuilding houses and infrastructure to incorporate measures to address future risks in the light of existing vulnerabilities and multi-hazards scenario. Integration of Climate Change Adaptation (CCA) and DRR in recovery is an important aspect of addressing the root causes of vulnerability as the scientific community has already warned about a series of more fatal extreme climate and geological events such as earthquakes, volcanoes and tsunamis, including floods and cyclones. AIDMI work on Climate Risk Management (CRM) with Climate and Development Knowledge Network (CDKN) suggest that both governments and donors should approach Nepal recovery as a long-term risk reduction process and not a short-term recovery activity. Mainstreaming DRR in development processes and key sectors for resilience is a long-term goal. Risk arising out of natural disasters and climate extremes needs to be understood and integrated into development plans, sectors, legislation, structures as well as national budgetary



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allocations. Nepal recovery is an opportunity for establishing a more comprehensive and more effective multi-hazard early warning system.

Nepal has a unique opportunity for building back better lives and livelihoods including public infrastructure and essential services. Reconstruction and recovery in Nepal is also an opportunity for testing the implementation modalities for Sendai as well as the recently released Asia Regional Plan in the context of building back better.

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The involvement of women in leadership roles can increase the speed of recovery. A female farmer from Kanmer village in Kutch who has managed the 2001 earthquake recovery (January 2017) (Photo Mihir R. Bhatt. Thanks to Dr. Lyla Mehta)

Disaster and extreme events lead to a large number of vulnerable people migrating in search of food, fuel, and income. A Rabari family of Kutch migrating to South Gujarat in January 2017. (Photo Mihir R. Bhatt)

Women’s leadership is essential to any local sustainable recovery in India. A farmer group leader in Jagatsinghpur in Odisha narrating why preparedness works when women lead, March 2017. (Photo Mihir R. Bhatt)

Communities find ways to adapt to the climatic threats that they face. A womens’ self help group in Philin cyclone affectedvillage in coastal Odisha producing and marketing local organic varieties of vegetables to adapt to salinity ingress, uncertain cyclone and drought conditions, and increasing heat waves. (From CDKN Consultation on Implementing NDCs in India, March 2017.) (Photo Mihir R. Bhatt)

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Nepal Earthquake of 2015 – Are We

Building BetterBy Gehendra B. Gurung1 and Achyut Luitel2

1 Head of Programme, Disaster Risk Reduction and Climate Change, Practical Action South Asia and Member of Duryog Nivaran.

2 Regional Director of the Practical Action South Asia Office and Steering Committee Member of Duryog Nivaran.

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AbbreviationsADB Asian Development Bank

AEPC Alternative Energy Promotion Centre

BCPR Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery - UNDP (BCPR-UNDP)

CBDRR Community-based Disaster Risk Reduction

CBRC Community-based Reconstruction Committee

CBS Central Bureau of Statistics

CEO Chief Executive Officer

CL-PIU Central Level Project Implementation Unit

CNDRC Central Natural Disaster Relief Committee

CNI Confederation of Nepalese Industries

CRED Central Regional Education Directorate

DCA Dan Church Aid

DDC District Development Committee

DEOC District Emergency Operation Centre

DFID Department for International Development of the UK

DPRP Disaster Preparedness and Response Plan

DRR Disaster Risk Reduction

EIA Environment Impact Assessment

EM-DAT Emergency Events Database

GESI Gender and Social Inclusion

GoN Government of Nepal

HI Handicap International

HRRP Housing Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Platform

IFC International Finance Corporation

ILO International Labour Organisation

IOM International Organization for Migration

JICA Japan International Cooperation Agency

LWF Lutheran World Federation

MoEn Ministry of Energy

MoEv Ministry of Environment

MoF Ministry of Finance

MoFSC Ministry of Forest and Soil Conservation

MoHA Ministry of Home Affairs

MoI Ministry of Irrigation

MoIC Ministry of Information and Communication

MoLE Ministry of Labour and Employment

MoLRM Ministry of Land Reform and Management

MoPE Ministry of Population and Environment

MoSTE Ministry of Science, Technology and Environment

Nepal Earthquake of 2015 – Are We Building Better

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MoTCA Ministry of Tourism and Civil Aviation

MoUD Ministry of Urban Development

MoWCSW Ministry of Women, Children and Social Welfare

NDMA National Disaster Management Authority

NEOC National Emergency Operation Centre

NGO Non-governmental Organisation

NPC National Planning Commission

NRA National Reconstruction authority

NSDRM National Strategy for Disaster Risk Management

OFDA Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance

PAF Poverty Alleviation Fund

PDF Post-disaster Framework

PDNA Post-disaster Need Assessment

REFLECT Regenerated Freirean Literacy through Empowering Community Technique

SD Swiss Development

SOP Standard Operating Procedure

SWC Social Welfare Council

UNDP United National Development Programme

UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization

UNFPA United Nations Population Fund

UN-HABITAT United Nations Human Settlements Programme

UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund

UNOPS United Nations Office for Project Services

UNV United Nations Volunteers

UNWOMEN United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women

USAID United States International Development Agency

VDC Village Development Committee

WB World Bank

WCF Ward Citizen Forum

WFP World Food Programme

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Disasters in Nepal - Country Context

Nepal is highly exposed to multi-hazards. In 2015, globally Nepal ranked highest as the country most affected by disaster in

terms of number of lives lost, third from view of economic damage, and fourth according to the number of people affected3. In 2014, Nepal was at the 7th position among the countries which were most adversely affected by climate events4. Nepal is rated as the 4th most vulnerable country in the world according to the climate change vulnerability index5. In 2005, a report by the World Bank ranked Nepal at 11th among the most exposed countries to multi-hazards6, and in 2004, Nepal was ranked at 11th position from an earthquake vulnerability point of view and 30th from flood and landslide disaster point of view7.

Since the year 2000, every year an average of 329 people lost their lives due to various disasters reaching as high as 850 in severe years8. A report published by the then Ministry of Science, Technology and Environment (MoSTE) shows that the direct cost of impacts of water-induced disaster alone ranged from US$270 to 360m per year during a 30 year period (1980-2010) which was 1.5 - 2% of the GDP at 2013 value, reaching to as high as 5% in extreme years; while the indirect cost was as high as 100% of the direct impact9. A short review of these global disasters and risk ratings show that Nepal is among the highest risk and disaster-affected countries in the world. An overview of the past decade shows that

Nepal is becoming more and more risk-prone and disaster-affected as a county.

The main reasons for such high risk and hazard impact are mainly due to high vulnerability because of high susceptibility to hazards, low coping and adaptive capacity10, and the fact that the frequency and magnitude of hazards are also high. Inadequate preparedness and mainstreaming or integration of DRR into development, poor governance and inadequate knowledge, information and education of the known risk are also some of the reasons behind the high vulnerability.

Earthquake of April 2015On April 25, 2015 at 11:56, Nepal was struck by an earthquake of 7.6 Magnitude on the Richter scale with an epicentre at Barpak village of Gorkha district, west from Kathmandu valley11. The same day at 12:30 another quake with a magnitude of 6.6 with its epicentre at Ghyalchowk (Gorkha), some kilometres north from Barpak (Gorkha), hit the country. On April 25, there were 16 aftershocks registering more than 4 on the Richter scale following the first hit (Figure 1). The aftershocks continued for several months ranging from at least one a day to as many as 15 a day. On April 26, an aftershock with a magnitude of 6.9 at Richter scale hit the country again with its epicentre in Bigu (Dolakha). On May 12, two aftershocks hit the country again with magnitudes of 6.8 and 6.2 with their epicentres at Bigu (Dolakha) and Jhyaku (Dolakha) (Tablel 1). The 2015 April earthquake in Nepal was the most destructive one after the earthquake in 1934 which recorded a Richter scale reading of 8.4. The

3 EM-DAT (25th January 2016) : The OFDA/CRED - International Disaster Database www.emdat.be Université catholique de Louvain Brussels - Belgium

4 Sönke Kreft, David Eckstein, Lukas Dorsch & Livia Fischer (2016) GLOBAL CLIMATE RISK INDEX 2016 Germanwatch e.V.

5 Maplecroft (2011). Climate Change Vulnerability Indes accessed at https://maplecroft.com/about/news/ccvi.html

6 World Bank (2005). Natural Disaster Hotspots: A Global Risk Analysis

7 UNDP/BCPR (2004), A Global Report Reducing Disaster Risk-A Challenge for Development, United Nations Development Programme, Bureau for crisis Prevention and Recovery, Geneva

8 Nepal Disaster Report 2015, The Government of Nepal, Ministry of Home Affairs (MoHA) and Disaster Preparedness Network-Nepal (DPNet-Nepal)

9 MoESTE 2014, Economic Impact Assessment of Climate Change in Key Sectors in Nepal

10 Institute for Environment and Human Security (2016) WorldRiskReport, 2016. United Nations University

11 GON, NRA, 2072, Reconstruction and Recovery Policy, 2072


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April 2015 earthquake severely affected 14 districts of Nepal with an additional 17 districts affected with high impacts (Map 1). The total economic loss from the earthquake has been estimated at US$ 7,065m of which the private sector loss is US$ 5,404m and the public sector loss is $ 1,661m. Initially the resources need for rehabilitation and reconstruction was estimated at $6,695m for all sectors12 which has been re-estimated at US$7,534m (approx.) for five years rebuilding13. Table 2 provides brief highlights of the physical impacts of the earthquake.

Table 1: High Scale Aftershocks after the first earthquake of 7.6 at Richter scale

Date Magnitude Epicenter

2015/04/25 7.6 Gorkha

2015/04/25 6.6 Gorkha

2015/04/26 6.9 Dolakha

2015/05/12 6.8 Dolakha

2015/05/12 6.2 Dolakha

Source: http://www.seismonepal.gov.np/

For the medium to long term, the PDNA (Post-

3.8

4.3

4.8

5.3

5.8

6.3

6.8

7.3

7.8

Mag

nitu

de(M

L)

Figure1:OnemonthAfter-shocksfollowingApril25,2015Earthquake,Nepal

12 Post Disaster Need Assessment, GoN, 2015

13 Sectoral Plans and Financial Projection, NRA, May 2016

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Table 2: Summary of impacts of April 2015 earthquake in Nepal

S. No. Particular Impacts in Number

1 Lives loss 8,896

2 Person injured 22,303

3 Private houses - destroyed 498,852

4 Private houses - damaged 256,697

5 Government building - destroyed 2,656

6 Government building - damaged 3,622

7 School building – class room destroyed 19,000

8 School building – class room damaged 11,000

Source: Reconstruction Policy, GoN 2016 (Lives loss and Person injured revisited based on NRA 201714)

14 NRA 2017. Major Progress Report on Reconstruction and Rehabilitation till the first week of Poush 2073 (3rd week of December 2016)


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Disaster Need Assessment) has prioritised and recommended the following:

• improvements in legal and institutional arrangements

• measures to mainstream DRR into the developmental sector, particularly housing, private and public infrastructure, social sectors (health and education), and livelihood and

• measures to improve integration of climate change adaptation and DRR

The Search, Rescue and Relief PhaseDuring the Search, Rescue and Relief phase, pre-earthquake NEOC/SOP- 2072 (2015)15 guided the operation. The Standard Operation of Procedure (SOP) guides the National and District Emergency Centres (NEOC/ DECOs) for prompt communication of the event, mobilising response teams, coordinating nationally and internationally and reporting of the event. Following the earthquake the National Emergency Operation Centre (NEOC) and District Emergency Operation Centres (DEOCs) were activated as per the SOP which played vital roles in disaster information communication, management and stakeholder coordination. Measures for Rescue and Relief for Disaster Affected (2006/07) and National Disaster Response Framework (2013) also guided the government in deciding the relief packages for the disaster affected people. However, the Central Natural Disaster Relief Committee (CNDRC) had to make a number of ad-hoc decisions, especially formation of committees, coordination mechanisms and standardising of relief packages16. Such standardised needs were not reflected in the existing legislation. There was not adequate guidance for the standard of materials and goods to support the victims. The government

decided to implement a “one door” system for rescue and relief in which all humanitarian supports should be closely coordinated with the government to ensure no victim is left out, no one gets repeated supports and no one gets sub-standard packages. However, different partner organisations distributed the goods and materials with different standards as per their institutional standards and decisions; while some tried to follow the international standards17. (There is a need of standardisation of relief materials for the disaster affected communities)

For Search, Rescue and Relief, the government mobilised 66,069 Nepal Army, 41,776 Nepal Police, 24,775 Armed Police Force and 22,500 civil servants within one month18. The government also realised that national capacity was not adequate to address this level of disaster and requested the international community for support in Search, Rescue and Relief, and mobilised 4,521 rescuers from 34 countries who came with 141 canines. There were also 78 international medical teams with over 1,400 members for emergency medical service. Nepal has a relatively well defined National Strategic Action Plan on Search and Rescue19; however, during this disaster it was observed that the implementation aspect of the Action Plan was inadequate. Had the Plan been properly implemented, there would have been trained rescue teams and systems not only at the national level, but also at local levels as well.

15 NEOC/SOP- 2072 (2015)

16 Ministry of Home Affairs, one month report of Search, Rescue and Relief, 2015

17 Ministry of Home Affairs, one month report of Search, Rescue and Relief, 2015

18 Bhandari, B. Nepal Gorkha Earthquake, 2015. Workshop on: Implementing the Sendai Framework for DRR, 1-3 September, 2015. Sri Lanka MoHA organised by Duryog Nivaran (shared through presentations)

19 The Government of Nepal Ministry of Home Affairs, National Strategic Action Plan on Search and Rescue, August 2013

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Disaster Management Legislations in NepalNepal has a relatively good Disaster Risk Management Strategy20. The strategy envisions a National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA) with three high level sub-committees under the coordination of relevant ministers. These sub-committees are namely 1) Preparedness Management Committee, 2) Rescue and Relief Management Committee and 3) Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Committee. It also envisions Regional, District and Local Level Disaster Management Committees for effective implementation of the disaster management programmes and activities by integrating and mainstreaming the DRM into the development process. However, these provisions in the Strategy have not yet been fully materialised. One of the reasons is the lack of legislation for the implementation of National Disaster Risk Management Strategy. The existing Natural Calamity Relief Act 1982 has a limited scope which only covers the Rescue and Relief management activities. The new Disaster Management Bill has been under discussion for the last several years and is still to be endorsed by the government. It is now considered a matter of urgency to finalise and endorse the National Disaster Management Bill, including the lessons from the learning of the April 2015 earthquake as well.

In order to help mainstream and integrate disaster management into development, Nepal has Local Disaster Risk Management Planning Guidelines (LDRMP Guidelines, 2010/2011, MoFALD). The guidelines are helpful in integrating and mainstreaming disaster risk management in development. However, it has been observed that the earthquake affected districts had hardly any LDRM plan. Although some districts had the plans, like Sindhupalchowk, the plan did not explicitly assess the risk and did not inform the development line agencies adequately concerning required level of risk reduction measures. Even where the plans did provide risk reduction recommendations, they did not receive adequate attention in terms of resource mobilisation and capacity building21. Besides that, Nepal has Disaster Preparedness and Response Plan (DPRP) Guidelines (2011). However, the scale of impact of April 2015 earthquake showed that these legal documents were not adequate applied in practice.

20 Government of Nepal, 2009 NSDRM- 2009

21 Practical Action 2014, Impact Assessment of Jure Landslides of Sindhupalchowk


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The Reconstruction and Recovery of NepalAfter the earthquake of April 2015, Nepal has gone through a series of activities for post-disaster reconstruction and recovery. Table 3 gives some of the key activities that took place following the earthquake.

Table 3: A Chronology of Activities after the April 2015 Earthquake of Nepal till one year

Date and Time Event

2015/04/25: 11:56 Local time

An earthquake of 7.6 Richter scale with epicentre at Barpak village of Gorkha district struck NepalImmediately the cabinet meeting decided to release NRs 500m for humanitarian purposes. The government declared a state of emergency in 11 most affected districts, mobilised Nepal Army, Nepal Police, Armed Police Force and Civil Servant of the Government for Search, Rescue and Humanitarian actions. The government also appealed for international support in search, rescue and humanitarian supports.

2015/04/26 Additional one district declared as state of emergency.A coordination committee formed to manage the emergency situation under the Joint-Secretary of office of the Prime-minister

2015/04/30 Two additional districts declared as state of emergency

2015/05/03 Deployment of Joint Secretary to all the earthquake affected districts for the management of the relief activities

2015/05/27 Nepal Rastra Bank released Guidelines for Reconstruction Loan

2015 May Post-disaster Need Assessment conducted

2015/06/25 International Conference on Nepal’s Reconstruction organised

2015/06/28 Cabinet decided on a package for temporary shelter with immediate cash support of NRs 15,000 per household.The cabinet also decided to form a monitoring committee under the coordination of Deputy Prime Minister and the Home Minister and defined the committee’s roles and responsibilities

2015/07/08 Annual Programme of Government (2015-2016) addresses reconstruction of Nepal

2015/08/13 and2015/10/25

CEO of NRA appointed and resigned

2015 August Nepal Recovery and Reconstruction Policy Drafted

2015/10/1-2 Regional Earthquake Recovery Dialogue organised for Building Back Better in Kathmandu

2015/12/20 Reconstruction Act, 2015

2015/12/25 New CEO of NRA appointed

2016 Reconstruction Grant Guidelines

2016/04/11 Non-governmental Organisation (NGO) Mobilisation Procedure

2016 May Post Disaster Recovery Framework finalised

2016/05/20 Budget of 2016/17 speech (addresses the post-earthquake rebuilding)

2016/05/30 Public Procurement Guidelines for reconstruction

2016/05 Sectoral Plans and Financial Projections – Elaboration of Post-disaster Reconstruction Framework for its Implementation

2016 Guidelines for Reconstruction Fund Management

2016 Timber Production, Supply and Management Guidelines for Reconstruction

2016/05/30 Agreement Template between NRA and Intermediary Bank for Reconstruction Grant Management

2016/06/25 Reconstruction Training Delivery Management Guidelines

2016 Community based Reconstruction Committees Guidelines

2016/07/06 Grievance Management Procedure

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National Reconstruction Authority (NRA) is updating its progress through web-posting. Following is the progress so far made until 6 April 2017.

Table 4: Progress of NRA thus far

S. No. Sector Progress Date thus far

1 HOUSING AND COMMUNITY INFRASTRUCTURE

Agreement signed for housing grant (hh) – outside valley 486,164 6 Apr 2017

Agreement signed for housing grant (hh) – inside valley 75,681 6 Apr 2017

No. of identified beneficiaries (hh) – outside valley 532,266 6 Apr 2017

No. of identified beneficiaries (hh) – inside valley 94,459 6 Apr 2017

First tranche grant delivered (hh) – outside valley 477,048 6 Apr 2017

First tranche grant delivered (hh) – inside valley 65,497 6 Apr 2017

Second tranche grant delivered (hh) – outside valley 3,746 6 Apr 2017

Second tranche grant delivered (hh) – inside valley 0 6 Apr 2017

Third tranche grant delivered (hh) – outside valley 420 6 Apr 2017

Third tranche grant delivered (hh) – inside valley 0 6 Apr 2017

No. of Household Surveyed (hh) – outside valley 715,319z 3rd week of Dec 2016

No. of Household Surveyed (hh) – inside valley 108,806 3rd week of Dec 2016

Grievances registered (case) – outside and inside valley 207,453 6 Apr 2017

Grievances settled (case) – outside and inside valley 93,374 6 Apr 2017

Multi-hazard assessments completed (location) 117 23 Aug 2016

2 EDUCATION

Schools under construction (no.) 1,200 23 Aug 2016

Reconstruction tender processes underway (no) 62 23 Aug 2016

Agreement finalized rebuilding schools (no) 600 23 Aug 2016

3 HEALTH

Number of health sector buildings under construction (prefabricated materials)

200 23 Aug 2016

Reconstruction agreements finalized (no) 444 23 Aug 2016

4 TOURISM AND HERITAGE

Reconstruction tender process completed (No.) 51 23 Aug 2016

Heritage structures under reconstruction (No.) 17 23 Aug 2016

Dharahara conceptual design completed 23 Sep 2016

5 PUBLIC BUILDINGS

Reconstruction of prefabricated buildings underway: 178 23 Aug 2016

Reconstruction of Nepal Army buildings underway (1,109 damaged) (No.)

21 23 Aug 2016

Design of Army building underway (No.) 1,088 23 Aug 2016

Police buildings damaged 143: Design underway 143 23 Aug 2016

Armed Police Force buildings damaged 35: Design underway

35 23 Aug 2016

Local government buildings damaged – 4 DDC, 77 municipalities, 172 VDCs (Budget allocated for temporary arrangement of municipality and VDC offices)

23 Aug 2016


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6 HUMAN RESOURCES MOBILISATION

Total staff mobilized for reconstruction: 3,578 23 Aug 2016

NRA Staff (permanent and contract) 125 23 Aug 2016

Ministry of Urban Development CL-PIU* 2,726 23 Aug 2016

Ministry of Federal Affairs and Local Development CL-PIU 476 23 Aug 2016

Ministry of Culture, Tourism and Civil Aviation CL-PIU 83 23 Aug 2016

Ministry of Education of CL-PIU 168 23 Aug 2016

7 BUDGET AND FINANCES

Agreements signed with Development Partners (US$) 2,723,684,500 16 Oct 2016

Agreements signed with NGO for FY 2016/17 (approx. US$)

399,489,966 16 Oct 2016

GON allocation for FY 2016/17 under different ministries (approx.US$)

838,340,390 16 Oct 2016

* CL-PIU: Central Level – Project Implementation Unit

Sources:

GoN/NRA 2016. Fact Sheet (Progress and Plans) as of 23 August 2016

GoN/NRA 2016. Annual Report, 2072/73

GoN/NRA 2017. Progress Report as of 6 April 2017

NRA has started its programme in 17 less affected districts from 3rd of April 2017. The programme started from by handing over the housing grant by the CEO to 50 households in Kaski district. It has planned to launch its programme in the remaining 16 less affected districts from 9th of April 2017. (http://nra.gov.np/news/details/221)

The Disaster Recovery and Reconstruction ProgrammeOne year after the earthquake, the Government of Nepal has laid the ground work for recovery and reconstruction of the nation. Institutional mechanisms and legal foundations have been established. Such prerequisites were needed especially to mobilise government resources and mechanisms. The process took time mainly because of frequent change in the government, the process of formulating a new national constitution, a transit problem at the borders between Nepal and India, and political unrest by some of the political parties who were not fully satisfied with the new constitution. The following paragraphs will provide highlights of the post-earthquake recovery and rebuilding of Nepal. In fact there is very little lesson learning so far, but there are some areas that can be identified as critical for better recovery and

rebuilding based on detailed learning coming from the ongoing development process.

DisasterRecoveryFramework:

The Post-disaster Recovery Framework (PDRF) provided a broad guidance to the reconstruction. The Framework constituted of 6 elements, namely:

1. Setting up of Recovery Vision and Strategic Objectives

2. Policy Needed for Recovery and Reconstruction

3. Institutional Framework for Recovery and Reconstruction

4. Implementation Arrangements for Recovery and Reconstruction

5. Recovery and Reconstruction Financing and Financial Management

6. Steps Towards Implementation of Post-disaster Recovery Framework

This framework is the main document for guiding the rebuilding of Nepal after the April 2015 earthquake. Following the framework, the sectoral plan and financial projection has identified 18 sectors with estimated financial resources needed.

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Table 5 and 6 provide information of these sectors with responsible government line ministries and major development partners for the programme.

To deliver these 18 sectors a total of US$7,535m has been estimated as needed (Table 7).

Table 5: Top Sectors and Responsible Institutions

S. No. Component/ Sector Lead Ministry for Overall Responsibility

Lead Development Partner

Other Development Partners

1 Policy NPC UNDP USAID

2 Institutional Framework NPC World Bank

3 Financial MoF, NPC World Bank IOM, USAID, CNI

4 Implementation, Communications, M&E

MoFALD, NPC, CBS, SD UNDP IOM, UNDP, USAID, WB, CNI

Source: Sector Plans and Financial Projections, May 2016, NRA

Table 6: Major Sectors and Responsible Institutions for Implementation

S. No. Component/ Sector Lead Ministry for Overall Execution

Lead Development Partner

Other Development Partners

1 Housing and Settlement (Rural), and Community Infrastructure

MoUD, MoFALD, MoLRM

World Bank Housing: JICA, DFID, IOM, UNDP, USAID, UN-HABITAT, WB, UNV, CNI, HRRP, Tear Fund, LWFCommunity Infrastructure: UNDP, UNOPS, UNV, WFP, PAF

2 Water and Sanitation MoWs, MoFALD Embassy of Finland, WB

UNICEF, UN-HABITAT, DFID, Practical Action, World Vision, DCA, PAF

3 Environment and Forestry

MoEv, MoFSC UNDP UNDP

4 Transport and Access, Communication

MoPIT, MoFALD, MoIC

ADB WB, WFP, MAF

5 Commerce and Industry

MoI ILO DFID

6 Electricity and Renewable Energy

MoEn, MoLRM, MoPE, AEPC

WB WB, Practical Action

7 Housing and Settlement (Urban)

MoUD, MoFALD, MoLRM

UN-HABITAT UN-HABITAT, DFID, UNDP, UNOPS, CNI

8 Cultural Heritage MoTCA UNESCO

9 Health and Nutrition MoH WHO, UNICEF IOM, UNFPA, UNICEF, WFP, WB

10 Education MoE, MoFALD JICA, ADB UNICEF, UNESCO, UNDP, WB, EU, USAID, DFAT, VSO, Plan International

11 Government Building MoUD, MoE ADB

12 Tourism MoCTCA UNDP IFC, DFID, WFP, CNI

13 Agriculture and Irrigation

MoA, MoIrrigation, MoFALD

FAO FAO, DFID, WFP, Practical Action, LWF, PAF

14 Social Protection MoWCSW, MoFALD

ILO, WB IOM, UNICEF, UNV, Plan International, WFP

15 Employment and Livelihood

MOLE ILO, WFP UNDP, UNWOMWN, CNI, Tear Fund, DCA, PAF

16 Governance PM, MoFALD UNDP UNDP, IOM, PAF


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17 Disaster Risk Management

MoHA UNDP UNDP, ADB, JICA, DFID, IOM, UNICCEF, UNFPA, USAID, UNWOMEN, UNV, WFP, Practical Action, DCA, Save the Children, PAF

18 Gender and Social Inclusion

MoWCSW UNWOMEN UNWOMEN, ADB, IOM, UNDP, UNICEF, UNFPA, WB, HI


Table 7: Major Sector and Estimated Fund Required

S. No. Budget

Five Years Budget (in Million NRs)

Total Budget for five years

Resource available

Funding Gap Remark

FY 16 -17 FY 17-18 FY 18-19 FY 19-20 FY 20-21

1 Heritage 8,302 8,518 7,570 5,821 5,007 35,219 2,875 32,344

2 Education 67,152 52,851 52,485 5,912 2,229 180,628 52,272 128,356

3 Government building

7,342 8,793 6,610 3,959 1,735 28,439 4,828 23,611

4 Health 6,229 5,248 4,373 2,624 1,749 20,223 20,223 0 Gap Calculation is not clear

5 Nutrition 1,504 1,504 1,504 1,504 1,444 7,461 Gap calculation not available

6 Rural Housing and Community Infrastructure

73,340 77,460 68,430 39,245 27,585 286,060 136,408 149,652

7 Urban housing and settlement

19,814 19,475 17,694 17,569 15,507 90,059 20,000 70,059

8 Agriculture, Livestock and Irrigation

6,724 6,724 5,379 5,379 2,689 26,894 Gap calculation not available

9 Tourism 338 313 144 66 56 917 -do-

10 Electricity, Renewable Energy,

3,613 5,196 3,406 2,198 615 15,028 -do-

11 Transport (Strategic and Local Road Network)

3,674 5,770 7,742 5,659 2,079 24,924 3,178 21,746

12 Water, Sanitation and Hygiene

6,453 7,585 3,104 3,103 1,003 21,247 Gap calculation not available

13 Disaster Risk Management

940 980 940 705 684 4,249 1,293 2,956

14 Employment and Livelihood

1,470 1,469 1,175 882 882 5,878 Estimate is not clear and the gap is also not calculated

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15 Environment and Forestry

12,014 11,622 1,790 2,175 850 28,451 Gap calculation not available

16 Gender Equality And Social Inclusion

1,419 2,143 798 140 142 4,642 4,642 -1

17 Governance 655 655 610 585 560 3,065 Gap calculation not available

18 Social Protection

4,634 2,576 548 7,758 20 7,738

Grand Total (NPR)

225,616 218,882 184,302 97,526 64,816 791,142


The reconstruction is largely focused on rebuilding housing and infrastructure that was destroyed by the earthquake. The policies, act and guidelines for reconstruction overall reflect a build back better approach through addressing the following:

• safer building and earthquake resistance,

• decentralisation and coordination mechanisms,

• use of local resources,

• self-driven reconstruction,

• mainstreaming DRR and mobilisation of stakeholders,

• grant uniformity,

• addressing GESI,

• avoiding social dispute and harm to local culture,

• maintain goodwill,

• scaling up and scaling out of learning from good practices during reconstruction

The reconstruction policy and the framework also address the needs for capacity building within the newly-established National Reconstruction Authority (NRA). The reconstruction framework envisions the programme for the period of 5 years, 2016/17 – 2020/21. For the implementation of the framework, the government has approved Reconstruction Policy, Reconstruction Act, Reconstruction Bylaws and different guidelines

and procedures promulgated thereafter by the National Reconstruction Authority using its authority. In this report the reconstruction programme will be highlighted with focus in the following issues across the 18 key sectors.

• Understanding risk including risk of climate change

• Addressing livelihood needs of the people

• Gender and social inclusion

• Decentralisation for local level empowerment.

Understanding the Disaster Risk Including Risk of Climate Change The vision of the reconstruction policy is “establishment of a safe, well-managed and prosperous community”. The primary responsibility of the National Reconstruction Authority (NRA) is reconstruction of the housing and physical infrastructure destroyed and damaged by the April 2015 earthquake22. Therefore the reconstruction programme is basically focused on infrastructure including private, public and government structures and physical infrastructure. However, the recommendations by PDNA cover a much wider range of activities to be addressed including DRR mainstreaming, climate change integration, livelihoods rehabilitation and

22 Reconstruction Act, 2016


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improvements. Disaster risk management is also one of the 18 key sectors identified in the Sector Plans of Reconstruction Framework.

For housing and infrastructural repair and reconstruction including cultural heritage structures and landmarks, schools buildings, health-posts, rural and urban housing, the policies and the follow up documents mandate the programme to adhere to national building codes. Furthermore, the framework also indicates that the international standards for resilient physical infrastructure of cultural heritage sites will be applied. However there is very little information on climate risk assessment and integration of climate risk reduction measures in the sectoral plans on how the risk will be assessed and how it will be integrated or mainstreamed.

TheChallengeofOverlappingandCompetingGuidelines

Disaster risk management and climate change resilience would imply adoption and expanded application of community-based DRR, school-based DRR, multi-hazard risk management, mainstreaming of DRR and climate change across sectors and investments. The further implication is that in addition to tools falling under implication of the Reconstruction Act, other tools, methodologies and legal documents for DRR and climate change resilience should inform the recovery process. Examples include Climate Resilient Planning Tools of NPC23, Local Adaptation Plans of Actions24 under Ministry of Population and Environment, the Disaster Preparedness Framework under Ministry of Home Affairs and Local Disaster Risk Management Plan (LDRMP) preparation guidelines under the MoFALD. There is a need of a single comprehensive guideline to be used during the post-earthquake rebuilding phase that would incorporate these pre-existing guidelines for integration of disaster risk management and climate change adaptation.

In addition, a new set of EIA guidelines has been approved by the government after the earthquake

to be applied for relatively large reconstruction programmes including resettlement, construction of infrastructure like roads, drinking water, high rise building, projects that affect significant areas of forest land, projects that generate significant amount of waste and rubbles, etc. But the EIA guideline is very much focused on the effects of the project activities on environment, very little on the other way round; that is the effects of climate change or near future potential disaster on the sectors.

So the problem is that there are several guiding documents available, but all of them cannot be simultaneously applied. While requesting the use of all of these existing guidelines, there are very likely chances that these documents can be overlooked by practitioners on the ground where they use tools and methodologies as per their convenience and capacity. A consolidated guiding document or framework is required to be used across all reconstruction sectors by all the stakeholders. Such a consolidated guiding document should address the needs of future disasters, very importantly disasters triggered by climate change because climate-related hazards such as floods, landslides, thunderstorms, and extreme weather events will be more frequent and intense according to the scientific consensus (IPCC 2013).

Furthermore, the policy directs integration and mainstreaming of reconstruction programmes into normal development programmes. The government has a 14 step development planning process and the local consultation under this development planning process starts sometime in November each year at VDC level. But it is not clear how the normal development planning process will address reconstruction needs or how the reconstruction programme can be integrated in the development planning process. There is a need to inform the development sectors clearly that they are legally mandated to address the need of reconstruction in the sectoral development

23 NPC, 2011: Climate-Resilient Planning. [WorkingDocument], Government of Nepal, National Planning Commission, Kathmandu, Nepal

24 GoN, 2011. National Framework on Local Adaptation Plans forAction. Government of Nepal, Ministry of Environment, Singhdurbar

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programme. The integration of disaster risk reduction and climate change is essential in all 18 different sectors that have been identified for rebuilding and reconstruction. The sectors need to build their own resilience to disaster and effects of climate change. At the same time, they also contribute to reducing the risk of disaster of the system in which they are part of. Examples include the health as a sector that plays a vital role for humanitarian assistance in post disaster, but also build the resilience of the communities before the disaster. The same example holds true for all the sectors for reconstruction.

The NRA has conducted a multi-hazard risk assessment for 117 settlements of which 57 have been identified for need for relocation25. However the detailed report is yet to be made public together with the detailed tools and methodologies used for the assessment. The NRA has also endorsed a legal procedure for relocation of risk prone settlements26. Regarding individual household assessment, the basic guiding principle is focused on earthquake resilience followed by landslides and floods. Long-run scenario-based resilience building tools and methodologies that addresses needs of DRR and climate change resilience are not in use in the Rebuilding and Recovery Programme. This has already been realised by the organisations engaged in rebuilding programmes on the ground (Goreto Gorkha).

TheIssueofExpertiseandCapacity

Lack of expertise with experience in rebuilding and reconstruction in both government as well as non-government organisations in Nepal has been faced as a challenge too. The challenge to the NRA is the internal limited capacity to address multiple fields. It has to date only about half of the required staff27. In the case of NGOs, conventionally there are two categories of organisations: 1) development organisations and

2) humanitarian organisations. During the emergency period, both types of organisations were involved in disaster response and currently both categories are working for long-term resilience. During the relief and humanitarian phase, the development organisations were lacking in experience of relief and humanitarian work. On the other hand after the event, the humanitarian organisations raised a substantial amount of funds, and are currently involved in reconstruction and rebuilding. However, it is very likely that the humanitarian organisaitons use approaches that are appropriate for humanitarian actions, and not necessarily suitable for long term resilience building. Therefore, the Government should encourage the humanitarian organisations to be prepared for long-term resilience building work whereas development agencies should be prepared for emergency works as well. Alternatively there is a need for coordination and collaboration between the two categories of the agencies.

Furthermore the humanitarian tools may not be appropriate for long-term resilience. Since there is no standard or common tool and methodology, the non-government organisations, especially the International Non-government Organisations are using diverse approaches such as Community Based DRR or School Based DRR for risk assessment. The need for uniformity has already been discussed in the previous section as well.

The affected communities themselves have also been active, having found that existing infrastructure presented problems during the earthquake and its aftermath, particularly access routes. When the houses fell on such routes there was a big problem of access for search and rescue teams. So, for example, people from Harisiddhi village in Lalitpur municipality have decided to widen the access road while they rebuild their houses and infrastructure. Such local initiatives, while praiseworthy, also require technical advice and support. Also at the local scale, the post disaster recovery programme has identified the need for disaster education in schools, but such

25 http://www.nra.gov.np/

26 NRA (2017), Procedure for Relocation and Re-habilitation of Hazard- Risk Settlements

27 WB, personal interview on 1 August 2016


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courses are yet to be designed and made available to the schools.

The World Bank, as the main donor to support the government with Rs200,000 for individual house grants and soft loans has clearly expressed its interest that the grants and the loans should not be used for construction of houses in flood and landslide prone areas. Beneficiaries are free to choose the modus operandus for building their own houses but they are also given suggestions for rain water harvesting, preparation for fire hazards, building of toilet, etc., although these additional structures are not mandatory for accessing the grant and the loan.

After the earthquake, 4,312 new landslides were seen in Nepal28. One of the major problems faced by reconstruction programmes for building safer and resistant infrastructure is the unavailability of sites safe from landslides and floods for those locations where infrastructure like schools and health-posts can be relocated. For resistant structural rebuilding, there is strict application of building codes and designs to be approved by the government of Nepal. However, earthquakes, floods and landslides are mainly few of the hazards potentially faced by people in their everyday lives. Technical assistance is necessary to complement local knowledge in seeking out safe sites for building and reconstruction and also in mapping and planning for other hazards.

There are discussions in some communities about addressing multi-hazards issues including landslides, floods, thunderstorms and others while reconstructing and rebuilding their houses and infrastructure, but there is a lack of technical support at local level to assess the multi-hazards risk and provide technical support. There is very high risk of climate change in Rasuwa from ecological sensitivity point of view29, but this has not been adequately considered in the rebuilding and reconstruction programme. The reconstruction is primarily focused on earthquake resistant houses. Landslides have been considered

as the next important hazard followed by floods. But other hazards like climate change have received little attention.

Addressing Livelihood Needs of the People during Rebuilding and ReconstructionIt has been estimated that around 20% of households have been indebted in the course of coping with the effects of the earthquake in the six months following the event30. This situation can increase the gap between poor and rich families, thereby creating a vicious cycle of poverty among poor households. Remittances played a vital role during the coping phase as a good proportion of the rural population is in foreign employment. The Post Disaster Framework (PDF) has identified Employment and Livelihood as one of the key sectors. It provides broad and good scope for local economic development by focusing on the promotion of local labour and utilisation of local resources during the reconstruction phase. The Framework provides broad guidelines on what livelihood activities, for whom, and where. Use of local resources, skills, material and labour has been mandated in order to promote local livelihoods and the rural economy.

There is an estimated need of around 60,000 artisans for the reconstruction phase, and the government is attempting to train the locals to meet this demand which will generate local employment. As of December 2016, 19,000 artisans have been trained31. The need for capable microfinance institutions was also strongly realised during the humanitarian phase as most of the organisations including the government adopted cash grants and cash-for-work instead

28 Kargel, J.S. et. al. (2015). Geographic and Geologic Controls of Geo-hazards Induced by Nepal 2015 Gorkha Earthquake, Science expressed, 17 December 2015.

29 Ministry of Environment (2010). Climate Change Vulnerability Mapping for Nepal

30 Sector Plans and Financial Project (Working paper), May 2016, NRA

31 NRA (2017). Progress of Re-construction and Re-habilitation as of December 3rd week, 2016 (http://nra.gov.np/uploads/docs/ctQFbclKaF161229054220.pdf)

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of providing goods and materials to the targeted beneficiaries that aimed at local livelihoods and market. Some of the private properties are historic and have architectural value. Restoring of such traditional architecture is too expensive for the local people, so such historic and architectural artefacts like wooden doors and window will most likely be replaced by metal frames because of cost implications if the individuals are not supported. Unavailability of construction material is also another challenge. Currently the NRA is conducting market system assessment in some districts to ensure that construction materials are available in time at the right sites with competitive or cheaper prices.

The NRA works with different sectors and stakeholders including government ministries, private sector, NGOs and international agencies to harness opportunities for income generation and livelihoods support for earthquake affected people. The livelihood programmes include tourism, agriculture sectors including vegetable farming, poultry and livestock rearing, non-farm based activities and skill based activities. Livelihood and employment have been built into all rebuilding sectors to the extent possible. The livelihood recovery strategy follows a two-pronged approach - a livelihood restoration package and employment creation. The reconstruction policy states that entrepreneurship should be promoted and communities should be encouraged to establish co-operatives for self-help and empowerment. Government resources are mostly mobilised towards infrastructure including housing, government infrastructure and cultural heritage sites, and to schools and health post buildings. Whereas most of the non-government organisations are involved in social mobilisation, software training, skill development and livelihoods activities depending on their institutional strategic focuses and expertise. The government has asked and encouraged the NGOs to focus on livelihoods sectors and in some districts like in Gorkha, give less priority to rural housing programmes, especially the hardware aspect32. Therefore, NGOs have been focusing on small irrigation canals,

agriculture, livestock, skill development and livelihood activities together with community infrastructure like trails, health posts and schools. Until now there is very little hardware field work in terms of the housing sector, most of the activities are on software including awareness, assessment and skill building.

Most of the NGOs have also opted for cash-for-work as a support to community livelihood and income generation during the rebuilding and reconstruction phase. Such an approach is adopted when the activities are community infrastructure like rehabilitation of drinking water, small irrigation canals, school building, health post building and other infrastructure similar to these. This encouragement for participation in such activities has targeted socially and economically disadvantaged people and communities. A lack of a youth labour force is apparent due to the increasing outmigration of young people seeking employment. Since young men were hard to find, participation of women is high in skill building trainings and engagement in cash-for-work.

In communities like Harisiddi in Lalitpur, there is evidence of people selling land in order to fulfil cash needs for rebuilding stronger houses which would be expensive compared to the traditional houses. Additionally, people were living in these houses which were originally built a generation or two earlier and costs of the material and labour has now increased significantly. Traditional architecture is now very expensive to restore. So cash-for-work might help communities to minimise the sale of properties and reduce the amount of debt they incur. Cash-for-work will also help people to cope with harsh economic conditions during the period of rebuilding and reconstruction and make funds available for subsequent economic activities in the communities once the construction work has been completed. The government should also introduce innovative cash mechanisms that reach communities to meet needs so people will not have to sell their land and properties.

Sustainability of livelihood activities being initiated during the rebuilding phase is a matter of concern. It is because the interventions have been initiated

32 NRA, Gorkha, personal interview on 8 August 2016


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with little or no assessment of market systems and local resources and capacity. The interventions have been identified on short-term need basis as a coping mechanism to address the immediate problem faced by the communities, with little consideration for the long term livelihood needs and long-term sustainability of the current interventions.

Gender and Social InclusionThe NRA aims to develop solutions that benefit the poorest and ensure that interventions are tailored to meet their needs. The Post-disaster Reconstruction and Recovery Programme(PRRP) focuses on three key points for Gender and Social Inclusion (GESI) consideration – engaging in the decision making process mainly at the implementation level, economic empowerment and social protection. It is stated that particular efforts would be made to organise community groups to support the reconstruction of houses of single women, persons with disabilities, senior citizens, marginalised groups and communities living in remote and inaccessible areas and to help them access recovery assistance from the government and its partners. The Community Based Reconstruction Committee Guidelines33 approved by NRA encourages the inclusion of at least three female members in a committee of 7 members, ensuring that women are represented in local level decision making bodies. Communities are allowed to have all committee members women or socially disadvantaged members if they wish so34. Women have many skills and energy that can be utilised in the recovery process, but this potential is often overlooked by officials if not purposefully addressed. As an example, the women groups in Rasuwa district were found to be very active in the reconstruction and rehabilitation programme. In the Tamang community, women are relatively empowered and most of the male members outmigrate for additional income to the household. So the communities have a higher number of women in the population compared to men. This has led to women being active.

Nepal has relatively good GESI legal documents developed under the Ministry of Children, Women and Social Welfare (MoCWSW). The Ministry of Finance (MoF) has also developed Gender Responsive Budgeting Guidelines (2008)35. Furthermore, most of the relevant ministries and departments have GESI strategies. The rebuilding programme recognises these strategies, guidelines and legal documents, and indicates that they will be applied at the time of the rebuilding phase. However, the capacity of the NRA and the personnel involved in rebuilding needs orientation on the use of these strategies, guidelines and documents. It is also very important for the communities to be aware of GESI considerations. Once all the foundations for rebuilding are ready, it will move relatively fast, and there is a chance that GESI issues could be overlooked. Legislative guidelines are needed to apply the existing approaches through official communications. In this way GESI guidelines will not merely be advisory but have the force of law.

Most of the rebuilding sectors have recognised GESI considerations on the relevant documents. In the School Sector, the specific needs of girls students have been recognised; the Health and Nutrition Sector highlights needs of children, pregnant and lactating women, and women reproductive health; in the Rural Housing Sector, priorities have been given to housing of vulnerable groups and individuals like single woman and elderly people; in the Disaster Risk Reduction Sector, attention has been paid to the needs of vulnerable; in the Forest and Environment Sector, attention has been paid to needs of poor and vulnerable communities and individuals who have forest based livelihoods; the Governance Sector adopts a rights-based approach to gender and disadvantaged groups in the communities during the reconstruction period; the Employment and Livelihood Sector targets vulnerable groups of people as the priority groups; the Social Protection Sector asks all other sectors to consider children

33 Guidelines for formation of Community Based Reconstruction Committee, NRA, 2073 (2016)

34 Guidelines for formation of Community Based Reconstruction Committee, 2016

35 Gender Responsive Budget Formulation Guidelines, Nepal, MoF (2008)

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under five and the most vulnerable people while undertaking the sector implementation plans by making these groups more aware of the programmes and building their capacity to be engaged and to be benefitted.

In some sectors, the GESI considerations are still lacking. For example in the case of government buildings, the sector documents do not detail how government infrastructure will be GESI responsive or friendly. Not only community structures, but also government structures should address the needs of GESI and adhere to Gender Responsive Budgeting Guidelines of the government.

GESI inclusion is complicated by the issue of citizenship. Access to the housing government grant requires a citizenship certificate and a land ownership certificate, but there is a significant number of the population who do not hold such documents. Such people are from disadvantaged and vulnerable groups. Secondly there are absentee household heads because many of the family members are abroad for remittance earning. This situation has created procedural and official difficulties for the beneficiaries. In Nepalese societies, there are joint family systems with members ranging from grandparents to great-grandchildren in which properties and assets have not been separated for generations. The land certificates are only in the name of one of the family members usually the grandfather, or in many cases even if the grandfather has passed away, there is no transfer of ownership, and the records are not up-to-date. There were grievances from some communities that in order to get the government housing grant, one had to spend an amount of money equivalent to the grant for travelling several times from a remote village to update official documents and to collect the instalments of the grant money. Therefore it is imperative that the government provides effective and efficient services at the doorstep of the beneficiaries without their needing to spend significant amount of money in order to receive the government grant.

The majority of the NGOs are aware of GESI and this is reflected in their programmes where

focus and attention have been paid to vulnerable communities including single women, disabled individual, people who lost their family members during the earthquake, children, and socially disadvantaged groups like so-called dalit and janajati. Furthermore they do have their own Gender Strategies which they are applying. Many of them are consistent with government guidelines. But there are potentials for gaps. So, all the development partners should use at least the minimum standard as given by the government guidelines and exceed them if they can. For example, the World Bank supported programme has been promoting women focused training for masons despite the social stigma against women taking the job of masons. Orientations on building resilient houses are being given to women through focused group training and awareness programmes for women.

The implementing partners (local NGOs) have also focused on activities that are directly related to women in order to reach the women beneficiaries such as in the area of women’s hygiene. Women have been encouraged to join newly formed committees for reconstruction and recovery and also to be engaged in the activities that have been implemented such as cash-for-work. Women’s participation in rebuilding activities is high and encouraging. However there are difficulties in registration of women headed families and providing them access to government grants. As noted earlier, the system requires the presence of family member who holds the land ownership certificate for house construction, and usually this is the male member of the family. The government is reviewing this system so that a consent letter from the land owner can authorise the non-owner family member including female member or any member of the family to process the application and access to the government benefits.

Decentralisation and GovernanceThe reconstruction act, policies, and guidance has provisioned for multilayer coordination committees from national to local level. The committees are represented by different relevant government line ministries. Twenty-three ministries and government


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line agencies have been identified as the coordinating and implementing partners of the reconstruction programme. They will coordinate the relevant programmes activities and provide technical support and guidance needed. The government line agencies will be supported by 13 development partners and several Non-Government Organisations through technical and financial assistance. A Housing Reconstruction and Recovery Platform (HRRP) has been set up for coordinating with non-government organisations,

The Reconstruction Policy directs that the local committees be empowered and the central committees remain as the supporter, facilitator, monitor and evaluator36. However, in reality practice does not follow this formal system. It seems that most of the decisions are made at the central level, and the local coordination committees and community-based committees are responsible for delivery of the action plans as supporters of the NRA. At the central level, Consultative Council, Board of Directors and Executive Committee have been formed to guide NRA. At the local level, the coordination mechanism at present exists only for the districts. The District Coordination Committee (DCC) should have at least three members including existing parliamentarians from the respective district, the Chief District Officer and the Local Development Officer. The DCC will be coordinated by the parliamentarian and if there is more than one parliamentarian in the district, they will rotate on a 6 monthly basis as coordinator. Such a rotating system might leave room for a lack of follow up on decisions made by the previous parliamentarian if the subsequent coordinator has a significantly different view or ideology from the previous coordinator. For VDCs and Municipalities levels there is no such coordination mechanisms, a NRA resource centre will manage at this level.

At the local level, the lack of local government has been found to be one of the main bottlenecks to the reconstruction and rebuilding programme. Nepal has no elected local government since 2001. In order to fill this void, the NRA has endorsed guidelines for community-based reconstruction committees (NRA, 2016). However, these committees are not

fully authorised; they have been considered as supporting committees to NRA resource centres and the district level reconstruction coordination committee. So a full decentralisation with local level authorities up to village level is missing.

Since the central level and district level coordination mechanisms are represented by the existing government civil servants and parliamentarians as per the law, there is no room for creating space for representatives suggested by GESI considerations. This seems a major contradiction to implementing the GESI policy in the NRA.

The NGOs had started field level early recovery activities as early as November 2015 after the relief and response phases of about 6 months was completed. They mostly focused on skill development for house repair and reconstruction and livelihood programmes. They started their work with different existing community-based organisations before the promulgation a year after the earthquake of guidelines for Community-based Reconstruction Committees. Some of these pre-existing committees are Ward Citizen Forums (WCFs) which are formal forums formed under the legal provision of MoFALD. The Ward Citizen Forum has been used as a local level committee by several NGOs, and the NGO mobilisation guidelines that also came a year after the earthquake direct NGOs to work with WCFs. Those organisations which focus on infrastructure like personal houses, trails, etc. have coordinated with the Ward Citizen Forums. But organsations that undertake school programmes have coordinated with the existing School Management Committees, and for the Health Post work, Health-Post Management Committees have been the local partners. These are legally formed as per the relevant existing sectorial regulations. However, after the recent promulgation of new School Management Act (2016), the existing school management committees have become defunct. But, on the ground, they are working since there is no new committee formed as per the new Education Act. Those NGOs working on agriculture development have been working with

36 Reconstruction Policy, 2016

80

farmers’ groups and in forestry with Forest Users’ Groups. Women groups are also local community-based groups with whom several NGOs are working for field activity implementation.

So different development organisations are working through different community-based organisations depending on the sector and the institutional approach they had been promoting before the earthquake. It was obvious at the time that standardised national institutional approach and tools and methodologies were not in existence.

Recently the government has promulgated technical monitoring guidelines, especially for housing reconstruction to ensure proper use of grant money and adherence to earthquake resistance standards. However there is no equivalent monitoring and evaluation system for other post-earthquake rebuilding and reconstruction activities that are not covered under government grants.

There are information gaps among the stakeholders at district level as what local NRA offices (District and Area level37) do. The stakeholders feel that the local NRA has not been delegated adequate authority as required, and those powers that are delegated are not clear to stakeholders. Effective communication has been a challenge. It may also be that the media (national and international) has not been able to comprehend the complete structure and progress of the reconstruction process. For instance, various media outlets reported that there were no houses rebuilt. However, it must be understood that this is a lengthy process and various foundations for reconstruction were required such as policy making, training masons and engineers and stock piling of construction materials, etc. The HRRP (Housing Recovery and Reconstruction Platform) helps in sharing and communicating between agencies involved in recovery and reconstruction and to support the

Government of Nepal in coordinating the national reconstruction programme especially with NGOs38.

One of the feedbacks as shared by the beneficiaries is that they are not allowed to receive external supports if they want to receive the government grant for house reconstruction. This has become an obstacle for self-reconstruction and rehabilitation and the communities feel dis-empowered and barred from benefits. This is particularly important. As per the current fund management guidelines, the beneficiaries will receive Rs 300,000 in three instalments of Rs 50,000, Rs 150,000 and Rs 100,000 which is a burdensome process especially for the people from remote villages, as noted earlier. Three visits to the district headquarters on foot for several days to receive reconstruction grant money of Rs 300,000, might cost almost the same amount with the beneficiary finally getting no significant amount in hand. The instalment system is considered burdensome and costly in terms of days of work missed and travel expenses.

For housing reconstruction, the MoUD will provide technical support and the MoFALD will facilitate the financial transaction. NRA is also recruiting technical staff to work at District level and Area Offices at local level. NRA has completed survey in all 14 most affected Districts and has identified 626,695 households as eligible as of 6 April 201739. The main criteria for household survey were 1) low socio-economic status and 2) damage of house. Simultaneously, there are over 200,000 grievance cases concerning missing registration, wrong categorization and missing documents. As of 6 April 2017, 93,374 grievances have been addressed. A grievance hearing and responding mechanism SOPs has been established at VDC, Municipality and District levels. These grievance cases must be taken seriously.

At the time of writing, it has already been 20 months since the earthquake struck Nepal. The NRA progress is significantly delayed because of a border blockade problem between Nepal and India, and

37 Area is a cluster of VDCs, the number of VDC ranges depending on the geography and topography

38 http://hrrpnepal.org/non-nav-pages/about-hrrp.aspx

39 NRA 2017, status of private house reconstruction as of 6 April 2017


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delay in the establishment of the NRA legally and the formulation of new rules and regulations which did not exist. A clear lesson is that national governments everywhere need all the formal structures and necessary legislation to support disaster recovery well before the disaster happens. Local people think the process of the rebuilding is too slow. But from this point onward a good foundation has been established and recovery and reconstruction should speed up. The process of signing agreements with NGOs has been more complicated compared to the process for normal development agreements. To work in recovery, NGOs must go through a process involving VDC, Municipality, DDC, Sectoral Ministry, NRA and Social Welfare Council (SWC). Whereas for development work, the process only involves the DDC and SWC.

There are inadequate guidelines for partnership and sharing among the Non-governmental Organisations (NGOs), and this leaves room for the individual NGOs to work as per their convenience. The HRRP should enhance the coordination for sharing learning and different processes and approaches during the course of rebuilding and reconstruction. As per the NGO mobilisation procedure40 the NGOs have to sign a tripartite agreement with the NRA and the implementing institution of the government at the central level. The NGO will locally coordinate between them and implement with different community groups including Community-based Reconstruction Committees. The projects have to be implemented under the direct monitoring and guidance of the district and area office of NRA or the officer prescribed by that office in the district or resource centre41.The NGO guidelines also ask the NGOs to work in collaboration with Ward Citizen Forum and Local Disaster Management Committees. However NGOs are also using other community approaches based on their organisational models, including REFLECT, CBDRR, Community-based School DRR, and the respective sectors they work in.

ConclusionThe rebuilding and reconstruction programme in Nepal after the earthquake of April 2015, has not yet taken on full-fledged implementation. The rebuilding and reconstruction is expected to be completed in five years. To date, the government has been involved in establishing institutional, policy and legislation foundations for rebuilding. The initial starting activities such as skill training and delivery of government grants have started and are expected to be accelerated. But, there are still some gaps in the NRA for a fully functional reconstruction and rebuilding programme. Some key gaps are that neither funding nor human resource requirements are yet adequate to meet the needs. Additionally, in order to make the reconstruction more DRR, Climate Change and GESI responsive, a consolidated approach must be developed. Currently there exist several tools, methodologies and approaches even within the government ministries, departments and National Planning Commission, and the NRA policies and subsequent documents indicate that these existing policies will be used. But in the absence of a consolidated document, there will be wide variation in the approach being adopted by practitioners. This will make monitoring of progress difficult as there is no standard approach or methodology applied.

The same is also true in case of governance as there is a wide range of community-based approaches including CBDRR, CBRC, REFLECT, WCF, Credit Groups, etc. and implementing partners especially the NGOs are working with different community groups to fit to their programmes.

A well-structured monitoring plan for the NRA is also needed at different scales.

In case of livelihood programmes, assessment of market systems is essential, and the short-term approach that promotes interventions just for

40 Procedures on Mobilization of NGOs for Reconstruction and Rehabilitation, 2016 (2072), NRA

41 Procedures on Mobilization of NGOs for Reconstruction and Rehabilitation, 2016 (2072), NRA

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coping purposes will very likely not meet the need for sustainable livelihoods.

The post-earthquake rebuilding and rehabilitation programme should also consider potential long-term events like climate change and interrelated

hazards while building livelihoods and infrastructure for the communities and households. It should also be thoughtfully carried out under the current ongoing state restructuring process where the local governments own the process by mainstreaming, integrating and mobilising its resources to the efforts.

Coordination and Institutional Mechanism between Government, NRA and other Stakeholders involving in Reconstruction of Nepal

Sectoral Ministry

Sectoral District Office

Sectoral Area Office

Sectoral Community Based organisations

VDC/ Municipality

Community Based Reconstruction Committee

Individual Beneficiary

NRA Area Office NGO Field Office

NRA District Office

NRA Sectoral Unit

District Coordination CommitteeCDO, DDC, NRA

I/NGO District Office

NRA Central Office I/NGO Central Office

Sectoral Department


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Organisational Structure of NRA

84

Pledges and Agreements as of September 2016

Source: NRA Annual Report, 2016 /2017


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Irrigation rehabilitation

Mason training Sanitation Awareness to Women Health Workers

T-shelter for elderly

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Recurring Monsoon Floods: Pakistan’s

Experience of “Building Back

Better”By Kamran K. Durrani1

1 Deputy Executive Director, Rural Development Policy Institute (RDPI) Pakistan, and Member of Duryog Nivaran.

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Disasters in Pakistan - Country ContextPakistan is one of the most populous countries in the world. With an estimated population of 188.93 million2, it is ranked second among South Asian countries, after India, and sixth among the global community. Pakistan’s total land area is 880,000 km2, with a dynamic topography including extended cultivated plains, five deserts, five major rivers, record high mountains of Himalayas including K2 and Nanga Parbat, and a long coastline of about 1,046 kilometres (km) along the Arabian Sea3.

According to Government estimates, a staggering 29.5% of the country’s large population lives below the poverty line4 and the Country “ranks 147 out of 188 countries in the 2015 Human Development

Index (HDI) with most indicators lower than most countries in South Asia”5.

Based on its probable exposure to a number of natural hazards and extreme climates, accompanied by high vulnerability, Pakistan is considered to be one of the highly vulnerable and disaster-prone countries at a global scale as well as among the South Asian countries (Figure 1). “A range of hydro-meteorological, geo-physical and biological hazards including avalanches, cyclones and storms, droughts, floods, glacial lake outburst floods (GLOF), earthquakes, landslides, tsunamis and epidemics pose risks to Pakistani society. Some of these hazards (e.g. floods, landslides etc.) are predominantly seasonal and occur on an annual basis, whereas other hazards such as earthquakes and tsunamis

Figure 1: Pakistan Multi-Hazard Vulnerability and Risk Assessment

Source: UNOCHA

2 United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2015). World Population Prospects: The 2015 Revision, World Population 2015 Wallchart. ST/ESA/SER.A/378.

3 ADB. Islamic Republic of Pakistan: Country Environment Analysis. 2008.

4 World Bank. Pakistan Country Overview. http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/pakistan/overview

5 Ibid


Experience of “Building Back Better”

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are rare events but potentially highly destructive”6. In the World Risk Report7, Pakistan has been ranked at 72 out of the total 171 countries of the world based on the factors of exposure to natural hazards, susceptibility, lack of coping capacities, and lack of adaptive capacities. Making it more alarming, Pakistan stands at number 14 among 171 countries when ranked for lack of adaptive capacities. Pakistan is also among the World’s Top 10 in terms of vulnerability to the impacts of climate change, and the cost of adaptation is estimated at $10.7 billion per year for the next 40-50 years8.

The country of Pakistan has witnessed a vast range of natural disasters over the 70 years’ history of its existence. Some of these brought enormous devastation in terms of human, structural, economic, and environmental losses to the affected districts and the country. These calamities, however, also resulted in highlighting the crucial need to revisit and substantially

improve the national policies and plans for disaster risk reduction and management at federal, provincial and district levels. “On average, in Pakistan between 1980 and 2010, 1.87 million people per annum were affected by disasters resulting in economic damage of USD593 million each year. Pakistan has experienced several major disasters in the last nine years including the earthquake of October 2005 which killed over 73,000 people and the floods of 2010 and 2011 which affected over 18 million and 9 million people respectively”9.

An analysis of the available data shows that the severity of disasters and associated losses have somewhat declined during the past fifteen years from 2001 to 2015(Figure 2)10. The earthquake of 2005 and floods of 2010 were momentous calamities which also resulted in convincing the then Government, institutions, and other stakeholders to come up with a new set of organisations, policies, and plans.

6 NDMA Pakistan. DRR Policy 2013. http://www.ndma.gov.pk/plans/drrpolicy2013.pdf

7 UNU-EHS, BündnisEntwicklungHilft; University of Stuttgart. World Risk Report2016.

8 UNDP. Pakistan Country Profile.http://www.pk.undp.org/content/pakistan/en/home/countryinfo/

9 Abbasi Z, Few R, Jan M, Qazi U, Scott Z, Wooster K. Strategic Research into National and Local Capacity Building for DRM: Pakistan Fieldwork Report. 2014.

10 Data from UNISDR Disaster Information Management System

Figure 2: Losses by Natural Disasters in Pakistan (1981-2013)

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Pakistan’s National Disaster Management SystemDisasters in Pakistan have predominantly been treated with post-hoc relief-driven perspectives. Disaster management systems and structures were heavily dictated by the flood as a recurring phenomenon undermining other hazards like earthquake, drought, landslides, GLOF, tsunami etc. The legal framework on disaster management included: West Pakistan National Calamities (Prevention and Relief) Act 1958 (as amended upto 1959)12; Civil Defense Act 1952 (as amended upto 1953) and the Local Government Ordinance, 2001.

The term ‘disaster’ varies in four different laws. The National Calamities (Prevention and Relief Act (1958) used ‘calamity’ and there is no mention of ‘disaster’ in this premier Act. This Act enlists flood, famine, locust or any other pest, hailstorm, fire, epidemic or any other calamity which, in the opinion of Government warrants action under this

BBB: Post-2005 Earthquake

Reconstruction following the October 2005 earthquake in Pakistan is widely recognised amongst shelter sector actors, donor agencies and the Pakistani Government as one of the most successful examples of owner-driven reconstruction. In rural areas, this decentralised programme has resulted in high levels of reconstruction, good occupancy rates and satisfaction levels, as well as in the adaptation of indigenous housing technology, facilitating widespread and sustainable vulnerability reduction. In contrast, the Urban Development Strategy has been unable to overcome the complexities of coordinating housing construction with services and infrastructure and, in some cases, resettlement. Thus, urban dwellers did not receive the same level of efficient reconstruction response as rural counterparts. There has been rural-urban dichotomy in post-earthquake reconstruction in Pakistan. Some reports have investigated the achievements and difficulties faced in the rural housing reconstruction programme, and analysed the barriers to implementation of decentralised, people-centred reconstruction in urban areas.

11 http://practicalaction.org/access-to-services/docs/ia3/building-back-better-lyons-schilderman.pdf

12 The Act covers only post-disaster relief measures; there are no provisions for early warning systems, capacity building of the communities and related departments towards disaster prevention. The Act is also silent on rehabilitation of the disaster hit areas.

DRM System in Pakistan

1958: West Pakistan Calamities Act1971: Emergency Relief Cell at Cabinet Division2005: Earthquake Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Authority2007: National Disaster Management Ordinance2007: National Disaster Management Commission2007: National Disaster Management Authority2007: National Disaster Risk Management Framework2010: National Disaster Management Act2010: National Disaster Response Plan2012: National Disaster Management Plan (2012-2022)2013: National Disaster Risk Reduction Policy2014: National Policy Guidelines on Vulnerable Groups in Disasters2014: Guidelines and Framework for Action on Separated,

Figure 3: DRM System in Pakistan



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Act.13 The ‘opinion of Government’ in this Act leads to arbitrariness without giving a solid basis and reasons for the holding of such an opinion. It also opens room for controversies and inconsistence as it lacks a conclusive definition of a disaster or a calamity.

The Local Government Ordinance 2001 defines disaster “including14 famine, flood, cyclone, fire, earthquake, drought, and damage caused by force majeure”. The definition equates hazard with disaster without qualifying the effects of hazard (famine, flood, fire etc).

According to the National Disaster Management Ordinance 2006 (adopted as an Act in 2010) disaster means, “a catastrophe or a calamity in an affected area arising from natural or man-made causes or by accident which results in substantial loss of life or human suffering or damage to, and destruction of, property.”15 The term “substantial” remains unsubstantiated in the Act.

The NDM Act 2010 enlists preparedness, response, recovery and rehabilitation, and reconstruction but there is no mention of ‘disaster risk reduction’ while defining disaster management in legal lingo. Also, the Act remains vague on declaration and definition of “affected area”. While Earthquake Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Act 2011 defined “affected areas” as areas affected by the earthquake and its aftershocks and notified as such by the Federal Government16.

Post-Earthquake 2005 ReformsThe intensity and magnitude of the 2005 earthquake, resulting in a wide range of associated losses and operational challenges once again underscored the grave need of a robust and comprehensive disaster risk management system in the country. The same year witnessed the global community agreeing on and adopting the Hyogo Framework for Action, to which Pakistan is also a signatory. After the earthquake, the immediate action in Pakistan was establishing the Earthquake Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Authority (ERRA) in 2005. Responding to the need of a comprehensive system, the National Disaster Management Ordinance of 2007 (later converted to National Disaster Management Act 2010) was introduced by the Government of Pakistan.

The Act establishes three tiers for the disaster management system: i.e., national, provincial and district levels. Under the Act, the National Disaster Management Commission (NDMC) was established at the national level, and has the responsibility for laying down policies and guidelines for disaster risk management and approval of the National Plan. The National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA) was established in 2007 in line with the Ordinance (now Act), and serves as the implementing, coordinating and monitoring body for disaster risk management at the national level. The National Disaster Risk Management Framework (NDRMF) was prepared by the NDMA in March 2007, which serves as an overall guideline for disaster risk management at national, provincial and district levels. In March 2010, the NDMA formulated the National Disaster Response Plan(NDRP) identifying specific roles and responsibilities of the relevant stakeholders in emergency response including Standard Operation Procedures (SOPs)”17.

13 Section 3, The National Calamities (Prevention and Relief Act (1958)

14 Section Ix, Local Government Ordinance 2001.

15 Section 2 (a), (b) and (c), National Disaster Management Act 2010.

16 Section 2 (a), Earthquake Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Act 2011.

17 NDMA Pakistan. National Disaster Management Plan 2012. http://www.ndma.gov.pk/plans/NDMP-Main%20Vol.pdf

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To extend the DRM system down to the provincial and district levels, Provincial Disaster Management Commissions (PDMC) as well as Provincial and District Disaster Management Authorities (PDMA & DDMA) were also established (Figure 4). The plans and policies at national level were trickled down to provincial and district levels through a number of response, relief, contingency and management plans as well as through SOPs. In addition, yearly National Monsoon Contingency Plans have been regularly prepared since 2008 and disseminated among all the relevant stakeholders for better planning, preparedness and response to any floods during the monsoon season.

In 2012, a comprehensive ten-year National Disaster Management Plan (NDMP) was prepared to enhance the capacity of Pakistan’s DRM system. To assist the Government of Pakistan and NDMA, this exercise was led by the Japan International Cooperation (JICA) in consultation with national and international stakeholders. “The components of NDMP published in one main document with three supporting volumes, besides the Executive Summary, are”18:

• National Disaster Management Plan: Main Plan

• Human Resource Development Plan on Disaster Management: Vol. I

• Multi-Hazard Early Warning System Plan: Vol. II

• Instructors’ Guidelines on Community Based Disaster Risk Management: Vol. III

The NDMP was followed by National Disaster Risk Reduction Policy 2013, National Policy Guidelines on Vulnerable Groups in Disasters 2014, and by Guidelines and Framework for Action on Separated, Unaccompanied, and Missing Children in Disasters 2014. While focusing on capacity building and trainings of relevant stakeholders for informed management of disaster risks and responses, the National Institute of Disaster Management (NIDM) was established in 2010 with an objective “to plan and promote training and research in the field of disaster management, develop core competencies of government officials and develop a national level information base relating to disaster management policies, prevention

13 Section 3, The National Calamities (Prevention and Relief Act (1958)

18 Ibid



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mechanism and mitigation measures”19. To cater for the financing requirements for the national and provincial disaster management programmes, a National Disaster Management Fund was also established under the statutory cover of National Disaster Management Act of 2010.

Overall, it has to be appreciated that during the last decade (2005-2015) Pakistan has made significant progress in improving its DRM system by introducing and/or modifying a number of legislations, institutions, policies, frameworks and guidelines at national, provincial and district levels. It has also followed principally, and to a fair extent practically, the guidelines of Hyogo Framework for Action since 2005 and then its successor instrument, the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction. Having said that, there is still a significant need to take concrete steps in terms of on-ground implementation of plans and policies, especially at the district level, by promoting institutional awareness among the responsible state departments as well as by strengthening the networking among all the relevant stakeholders.

Recurring Floods – The Living DilemmaWith six major rivers and a large number of small rivers and tributaries, one of the constant hazards faced by Pakistan is the recurring riverine floods, especially in the monsoon season (Jul-Oct). The extreme weathers in the country, coupled with changing climate, also results in heavy snow-melt downstream from big mountains as well as sporadic rain hill torrents causing flash floods even outside the monsoon season. The poor drainage systems, besides encroachment of waterways in form of construction of housing and commercial buildings, also is a major cause of urban flooding in case of heavy rains in the urban centres. The southern regions of the country, including riverine districts from South Punjab and Upper Sindh are usually the most affected by frequent floods. These recurring floods have been causing continuous misery and devastation for the affected population in form of human casualties, internal displacement, structural damages to buildings and shelters, cattle fatality and economic losses in billions of dollars. “Pakistan

19 NIDM Pakistan. http://www.nidm.gov.pk/About/Mission

Figure 5: Pakistan Flood Hazard Map - 2015

Source: ReliefwebInt

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has suffered a cumulative financial loss of more than US$ 38.165 billion during the past 68 years. Around 12,177 people lost their lives, some 197,230 villages damaged/ destroyed and an area more than 616,598 Sq.km was affected due to 23 major flood events. The 2010 floods saw the worst flooding for the past 80 years in the region”20.

Since 2010, monsoon floods have become an annual dreadful phenomenon for the country and for the vulnerable population at risk (Table 121).The unfortunate drill of displacement, waiting for arrival of rescue and relief, helplessly watching the floods take away loved ones and life-long savings, and then reconstructing and recomposing life is a living dilemma that the poor population, with extremely weak resilience, have to go through every year. From the data given here, it is clear that almost half of the direct losses calculated for past 68 years were sustained during the last six years. Similarly, the floods in these six years took the toll on human lives equivalent to one third of the total human lives lost to floods in 68 years. While it can be attributed presumably to a weak system of loss assessment and data collection in early years, the frequency and intensity of the floods are also attributed to changing patterns in the regional and national climate, and hence raise the need of a matching effort to prevent and manage such disasters with an efficient and effective system of disaster risk reduction and management.

According to a World Bank Report of 201522, approximately 3 million people are affected every year by natural disasters in Pakistan and it has been ascertained by analysing historical data since 1977 that approximately 77 percent of the affected population has been impacted by floods. While discussing the impacts of disasters on the fiscal health of Pakistan, the same report highlights that flooding causes an estimated annual economic impact of 3-4 percent of the federal budget, i.e., an estimated US$1.2 billion to US$1.8 billion, equivalent to 0.5–0.8 percent of national gross domestic product (GDP).

Within the administrative structure and system to cope with floods in the country, a Federal Flood Commission (FFC) is also available. The FFC was established in 1977 for country-wide integrated flood management. The functions of FFC are mainly focused on flood prevention and control. Ten-year flood protection plans are prepared by FFC, which are then supposed to be implemented by provincial governments with federal government providing the resources for meeting the costs23.

It has been recognised by the global community for years now that while disasters bring devastation in many forms, it should also be seen as an opportunity to learn pragmatic lessons from them and to use the same wealth of knowledge in “building back better”.

20 Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Water and Power. Annual Flood Report 2015.

21 Data Source: Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Water and Power. Annual Flood Report 2015.

22 World Bank Group; Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery. 2015. Fiscal Disaster Risk Assessment Options for Consideration: Pakistan. World Bank, Washington, DC. © World Bank. https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/21920 License: CC BY 3.0 IGO


Table 1: Pakistan Floods Losses 2010-2015

Pakistan Floods Losses (2010-2015

Year Direct losses (US$ million)

Lost lives (No) Affected villages (No)

Flooded Area (Sq-km)

2010 10,000 1,985 17,553 160,000

2011 3,730 516 38,700 27,581

2012 2,640 571 14,159 4,746

2013 2,000 333 8,297 4,483

2014 440 367 4,065 9,779

2015 170 238 4,634 2,877

Total 18,980 4,010 87,408 209,466



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24 https://www.thethirdpole.net/2014/08/27/pakistani-architect-pioneers-fresh-approach-to-disaster-relief/

Build Back Better: Rediscovering an indigenous architecture24

Yasmeen Lari, Pakistan’s celebrated architect has built over 40,000 low-cost shelters using just mud, lime and bamboo. “You don’t need wood, cement and steel to build strong homes,” she says.

Lari was the first woman to qualify as an architect in Pakistan and now directs a local humanitarian NGO, the Heritage Foundation. Her team of architects and engineers started experimenting with new materials in disaster relief after the great flood of 2010 submerged a fifth of Pakistan, left 2,000 people dead and thousands of people homeless. Their shelters in Sindh Province, says Lari, have since withstood year after year of flooding.

Later she visited Darya Khan Sheikh, a village on the banks of the Indus River, which the Heritage Foundation helped to rebuild after the 2010 devastation. “The village was flooded with up to four feet of water but the houses were intact, their grain and water was safe,” Lari told thethirdpole.net. “Only a little plaster had come off the walls.”

Established by Lari in 1980, the Heritage Foundation’s original mandate was conservation of cultural sites. But it turned to post-disaster reconstruction after a 7.8 magnitude earthquake devastated Pakistan-administered Kashmir and the adjoining North West Frontier Province in 2005.

The materials used by Lari’s team are local, cheap and have a low-carbon footprint. “Mud is recyclable and it’s everywhere; bamboo is very strong and environmentally sustainable and you can get a new bamboo crop every two years,” she explains. “Lime is the only material that requires small amount of fuel to heat it, but twigs are enough and so there is no need to chop mature trees or burn any fossil fuel.”

Lari has designed some of Karachi’s biggest buildings – her signature glass and granite edifices have a distinctive mark, though she says she wouldn’t build much of it again. After more than 30 years as a commercial architect Lari gave it up in 2000 to devote her time to writing. “I am no longer tied to what the client wants; it has freed me,” she says.

Her new clients are the poor and disenfranchised. “I have always maintained that they need to be given the same degree of importance as is given to corporate clients,” she says. Her aim is to teach villagers how to “make their buildings long-lasting”.

“You cannot come out of poverty if you keep re-building every year. The only way forward is to build the technical capability of communities and improve their earning capacity so that they can fend for themselves when disaster strikes,” she says.

Unsustainable disaster relief

With increasingly erratic weather patterns the world is growing more vulnerable to extreme weather events and Pakistan is one of the world’s most vulnerable countries. Paradoxically, those coming forward to provide humanitarian aid after extreme events promote construction with steel and cement thereby increasing carbon emissions and contributing to the climate change that triggers these events.

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Lari argues the current model of disaster relief work will have to change: “There are scores of NGOs and international organisations that come with good intentions to rebuild but in the process leave a huge carbon imprint.”

Disasters affect communities’ food security and education as well as infrastructure, and the response should reflect this, believes Lari. Her team is working with 12 villages of between 100 to 300 people in two districts of Sindh, Mirpur Khas and Tando Allahyar, to make everything flood resistant. They are building safe shelters, eco toilets and raised earthen platforms to place grain, potable water, livestock and fodder during floods. The organisation is also training people to grow vegetables on rooftops, make compost out of human and livestock excreta, purify water with sunlight and make organic soap.

“We ensure the community is motivated enough to send their kids to school, empowered to pressure the teacher to turn up, and that if there is a government health facility, its dispensary is not only equipped with drugs but that absenteeism of the staff is duly reported,” she says.

Focus on women

Empowering women is at the centre of this strategy, and perhaps the reason for the project’s quick success.

For many villagers, says Lari, the most prized structure is the raised stove and small outdoor kitchen area designed by the Heritage Foundation. “People don’t know what a woman goes through while cooking,” says Lari. “It’s our most popular product and has been transformative for the family.”

The design team, she says, took time to really understand the needs of village women. The twin burner stove is fuel-efficient and the attached chimney allows smoke to leave the house. “Because it is built on a raised platform, it automatically gives the woman an elevated position, as if she is sitting on a throne,” says Lari. Crucially, the height also protects the stove from flood waters.

Best of all, there are now trained stove makers in each village. These “barefoot entrepreneurs”, as Lari calls them, teach others for a charge of Rs 200 (US$2). Local women have also learned how to make mud bricks. “We are happy because the construction is better and the techniques are shared and adopted; they are happy because they are making money in the process,” says Lari



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Building Back Better – As guided by the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk ReductionAlthough it is too early to gauge Pakistan’s performance against the actions and activities recommended by SFDRR, yet the country has made considerable progress in line with some of the key dimensions of building back better over the last decade. A quick analysis of the progress so far is discussed in the following paragraphs.

Disaster Preparedness - Contingency Policies, Plans and Programmes

“During the 2010 floods, NDMC became irrelevant as the Council of Common Interests took key decisions on compensation and recons¬truction strategy. Additionally, another body, the National Oversight Disaster Management Council, was established in August 2010 in a bid to ensure transparency in aid distribution. Damage assessment of the 2010 floods was steered by the provincial governments, while NDMA was sidestepped by the Planning Commission in flood reconstruction and rehabilitation planning and execution. After the 2008 earthquake in Balochistan the provincial Social Welfare Department took the lead in relief coordination. Awaran was taken over by security forces after the 2013 earthquake. During the IDP crisis in KP in 2010, the role of the PDMA was replaced with the temporary Provincial Emergency Response Unit and the NDMA was by-passed by the federal-level Special Support Group, led by the law-enforcement agencies”25.

Disaster preparedness and planning at District Level also remains critically insufficient. While some of the districts in the country have disaster management and flood contingency plans

available, many are lagging behind with no plans. Out of the total 148 districts, DRM plans for only 29 are available on NDMA website. Another serious concern is that even after so many years of adopting the new DRM structure, District Disaster Management Authorities (DDMAs) in many districts have not been practically established and are believed to be available on paper only26. It is very alarming for reasons that DDMAs are supposed to be the first responder in terms of DRR and DRM activities. In such areas, the general district authorities (e.g., Office of Deputy Commissioner) are burdened with DRR and DRM activities in addition to their district management responsibilities. Adding more to the on-ground vulnerability, the newly elected (2015-16) local government representatives have overall no clue of their responsibilities with respect to their DRM responsibility, under the respective Provincial Local Government Acts, and about mainstreaming DRR into development programs.

The economic losses due to disasters, especially by repeated losses due to floods every year, is one of the major impediments in improving the livelihood and socio-economic status of the already vulnerable and impoverished population in Pakistan. For now, there is no major public plan or programme for disaster risk financing and / or insurance in the country, however progress has been made on the subject. Upon request from the Government of Pakistan, the World Bank conducted a study in 2015 and presented a “series of complementary options for development of a national disaster-risk financing strategy, based on a preliminary fiscal risk analysis and a preliminary review of the current budget management related to disasters in Pakistan” (Table 2)27. Subsequent to this report, Pakistan has recently signed an agreement with the Asian Development Bank for establishing a National Disaster Risk Management Fund (NDRMF) with a “total outlay of $3 billion of which the ADB will provide $1bn in five tranches. The Australian government will co-finance the fund and other donors

25 Bhatti A. Risk Governance. DAWN. July 2015. http://www.dawn.com/news/1196987

26 Wasif S. Calamitous: Many Disaster Bodies Exist on Paper Only. The Express Tribune. January 2017.

27 World Bank Group; Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery. 2015. Fiscal Disaster Risk Assessment Options for Consideration: Pakistan. World Bank, Washington, DC. © World Bank. https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/21920 License: CC BY 3.0 IGO

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such as Norway, Belgium and Switzerland also expressed interest in making contributions to it”28. This Fund is “being established as a government-owned non-bank financial intermediary with a corporate structure. The NDRMF will reduce the socio-economic and fiscal vulnerability of the country and its population to natural hazards by prioritising and financing investments in disaster risk reduction and preparedness that have high economic benefits, taking into account climate change, as well as disaster risks and their impacts”29. The proposed financial mechanisms can bring benefits to multiple beneficiaries, especially the poor and farmers (Table 3).

28 Ahmed A. Govt to Establish Fund for Disaster Management. DAWN. December 2016. http://www.dawn.com/news/1300181

29 Asian Development Bank. Pakistan: National Disaster Risk Management Fund. 2016. https://www.adb.org/projects/50316-001/main

Table 2: Options for a National Disaster-Risk Financing Strategy in Pakistan

Time Frame Options for Disaster Risk Financing

Short term Develop a central database of disaster losses and expenditures to better predict future financial costs of disasters

Short term Operationalize the National and Provincial Disaster Management Authorities (NDMA and PDMAs)

Short term Clarify contingent liability associated with post-disaster cash transfer programs, and restructure their financing sources to ensure efficient access to funds in the event of a disaster

Short to medium term Develop financial disaster risk assessment tools, including development of financial catastrophe risk models for the Ministry of Finance

Short to medium term Develop a national disaster risk financing strategy that proposes models for improving financial response capacity to disasters

Medium term Establish a robust catastrophe risk insurance program for public assets

Medium to long term Promote property catastrophe risk insurance for private dwellings

Source: World Bank Report



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Table 3. Disaster Risk Financing and Insurance Policy Areas and Benefits

Policy Area Beneficiaries Benefits

Sovereign Disaster Risk Financing

Governments Increases financial response and reconstruction capacity by improving• Resource mobilisation, allocation, and execution;

• Insurance of public assets; and

• Social safety net financing.

Protects the stability of public finances by reducing the financial volatility in public expenditure generated by disasters

• Clarifies the government’s contingent liability following disasters in terms of public assets, the private sector and state-owned enterprises, and the poor

• Provides incentives for public investment in risk reduction measures

PropertyCatastropheRisk Insurance

Homeownersand SMEs

• Provides access to compensation for physical property damage and indirect losses arising from that damage

• Increases awareness and understanding of financial vulnerability to disasters

• Helps distribute risk and burden of recovery between public and private sectors

• Can incentivise investment in risk reduction by business and households

AgriculturalInsurance

Farmers • Provides access to compensation for production losses and damage to productive assets

• Helps distribute risk and burden of recovery between public and private sectors

• Increases awareness and understanding of financial vulnerability to agricultural risks

• Encourages farmers to invest more in risk reduction measures

• Allows for the adoption of higher-yielding, but riskier, farming methods

• Increases access to financial services and markets for low-income households (insurance, banking, savings)

Disaster-LinkedSocial Protection

The poorest • Mitigates financial shocks by providing compensation for livelihood or asset losses through flexible social safety nets

• Increases awareness and understanding of vulnerability to disasters

• Can incentivise investment in risk reduction by the government or the at-risk affected population

• Safeguards vulnerable people from falling into poverty

Source: World Bank, Financial Protection against Natural Disasters: An Operational Framework for Financial Risk Financing and Insurance, Working Paper 94988 (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2014).

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Overview of agricultural insurance: Pakistan30

Agricultural insurance is relatively undeveloped in Pakistan. Livestock insurance was first introduced on a pilot basis in 1983 by two private insurers, Adanijcer Insurance Company and the Eastern Federal Union Insurance Company. Crop insurance is new and was introduced in 2008 under a public private partnership for a national (in scope) crop loan insurance scheme. Livestock and poultry insurance has been written on a small-scale in the past by various private insurance companies Since Rabi31 season 2008/09 a group of ten insurance companies in conjunction with 20 commercial banks have been involved in the implementation of the national crop loan insurance scheme. The insurers include New Jubilee, EFU General, East West, National Insurance Company, UBL, Adamjee, United, Silver Star, Atlas and Alfalah.

Agricultural insurance products available

Livestock insurance is available on a limited basis and includes both livestock cattle, buffalo, small ruminants and poultry insurance. Since rabi 2008/09 individual grower multiple peril crop insurance has been available for field cereal crops and sugar cane. The policy adopts a unique two-trigger indemnity procedure: 1) catastrophe losses as a result of an insured peril that exceeds 50 percent of the normal average regional area yield must first be declared by a competent authority, and 2) this opens the policy for a loss adjustment at the individual farmer level.

Delivery channels

For crop insurance, the most important delivery channel is through linkage to agricultural credit for farmers through the banks.

Voluntary versus compulsory insurance

Agricultural insurance is compulsory for farmers who have taken seasonal loans from the banks.

Agricultural reinsurance

The scheme carries a maximum agreed indemnity limit of 300 percent loss ratio. There is a stop loss reinsurance cover that is placed with international reinsurers. It is understood that on account of the very severe flooding in 2010 the stop loss reinsurance programme has incurred high losses. No further details of the stop loss treaty are available.

Public support for agricultural insurance

The crop loan insurance scheme attracts premium subsidy support from government (SBP, 2010).

Premium subsidies

According to SBP (2010), in 2008/09 the government reimbursed the banks Rs 183 million (US$2.2 million) for the cost of premium subsidies to subsistence farmers. This would be equivalent to a premium subsidy level of 58 percent.

30 https://agrihunt.com/articles/pak-agri-outlook/overview-of-agricultural-insurance-pakistan/

31 Rabi season is the Winter cropping season that takes place from October to March



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Five-year results

The crop loan insurance scheme has only been operating for the past two years. According to SBP (2010), in 2008/09 the scheme written premium was US$3.8 million against paid claims up to December 2009 of US$0.28 million with an implied loss ratio of about 73 percent. In 2010, Pakistan incurred devastating flooding that destroyed much of the kharif 2010 crop. It is understood that the 2009/10 premium may be in the order of about US$6 to 8 million, and that the value of crop losses resulting from these floods may be as high as between US$10 to 20 million. However, these preliminary and informal estimates need to be confirmed. It is also understood that there have been severe flood losses in the livestock and poultry sectors in 2010 and that at least part of these losses are insured. No further details are available.

Crop Loan Insurance Framework in Pakistan

In spite of various initiatives taken in the past to introduce crop insurance, no fruitful result could seen, mainly due to low involvement of private sector insurance companies and non-availability of reliable data on calamities, cropping pattern, etc. As such, the risk of losses from natural calamities to the farming community remained without insurance cover. Additionally banks considered agri. credit a high risk and non-viable business which hampered the expansion of credit to the farming community. Therefore, in order to improve access to credit for the farming community especially to the small farmers, SBP initiated the task of development of a crop loan insurance framework with the help of stakeholders. The member insurance companies of the Working Group reviewed the existing structure of agri. financing and various schemes and products of agricultural production loans with the objective of perspective risk portfolio and size of the business to develop a workable market based insurance framework.

The biggest challenge was the acquisition of data on calamities, district wise & crop wise agricultural disbursements/recoveries, NPLs, cropping cycles, etc. The required data was collected and compiled by SBP to facilitate insurance companies in assessing potential risks and negotiating with reinsurers abroad. Insurance companies also reviewed the crop loan insurance schemes offered by two insurance companies viz. East West Insurance and United Insurance to the agricultural borrowers of The Bank of Punjab and Askari Bank Ltd. respectively. Based on the information provided by SBP, banks and negotiations with reinsurers, a well-structured & comprehensive framework was jointly prepared by the member insurance companies of the Working Group. The framework covered all dimensions of crop loan insurance which, inter alia, include crops to be covered, insured risks, maximum sum insured per borrower, maximum rate of premium, indemnities, etc. It was also suggested that in order to save time and effort, the insurance companies could jointly reinsure the entire portfolio of agricultural crop production loans but the suggestion was not supported by insurance companies as most of them have developed their own products based on the State Bank of Pakistan (SBP) framework.

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Early Warning Systems and Communication Mechanisms

Weather data and flood flow information is collected and forecasts are prepared by the Flood Forecasting Division of the Pakistan Meteorological Department32 with the help of technical equipment and models, including weather radars, satellite stations, and weather forecasting computer models. The information is disseminated to relevant stakeholders in the government system. Flood alerts are then passed-on to communities at risk through national and local media, and announcements at local mosques and by sounding sirens by the Civil Defence Department. In recent years, flood alerts have also been communicated by Short Messaging Service (SMS) with the help of telecom companies and was found helpful in providing quick information to the communities. One of the important limitation of the Met Department is the non-availability of early warning system for flash floods in hill torrents, whereas the “deficiency as well as old vintage of meteorological and hydrological sensors has a bearing on qualitative, quantitative and precision of weather forecast, especially against erratic weather pattern viz-a-viz climate change phenomenon”33.

Recognising the existing weaknesses and the imminent requirement of a robust system, a complete volume of the National Disaster Management Plan 2012 was dedicated to development of multi-hazard early warning and evacuation systems over a period of ten years (2012-22). The plan, focuses on four major components, including strengthening of forecasting and early warning system, preparing hazard maps at local scale in targeted locations, strengthening early warning dissemination systems, and developing capacity of early warning and evacuation systems. “The multi-hazard early warning system plan contains an exclusive investment of PKR 50 billion (approx. $

0.5 billion) for flood control on country-wide basis. A few projects under the NDMP stand already approved/under approval by the concerned agencies include in-particular the following:

a) Short & Medium Range Forecasting (all four provinces, federal capital);

b) Up-gradation of Islamabad Weather Surveillance Radar;

c) Up-gradation of Karachi Weather Surveillance Radar;

d) Satellite based Integrated Flood Alert System for flash floods.”34

32 Pakistan Meteorological Department. http://www.pmd.gov.pk/PMD/pmdinfo.html

33 NDMA. National Monsoon Contingency Response Directive. 2016. http://www.ndma.gov.pk/plans.php

34 NDMA. National progress report on the implementation of the Hyogo Framework for Action (2013-2015). http://www.preventionweb.net/files/42312_PAK_NationalHFAprogress_2013-15.pdf



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35 UNISDR. UNISDR Scientific and Technical Advisory Group Report 2013. Case Study 3: Flood Early Warning in Bangladesh. http://www.preventionweb.net/files/workspace/7935_casestudy3.pdf

Experience of a monsoon flood forecasting model

An extremely pertinent case study that may be followed by Pakistan is a monsoon flood forecast model developed and being used successfully in Bangladesh. “A project to develop and apply monsoon flood forecasts was undertaken in 2000-09 within the Climate Forecast Applications Network (CFAN), a consortium of international and Bangladeshi organisations and institutes. The resulting forecast system uses a variety of data including: weather forecast data from a European climate model; satellite and surface precipitation data from US satellites and local data collection; daily measures of the Ganges and Brahmaputra streamflow and meteorological data such as wind, humidity and temperature. Since 2004, the Bangladesh Flood Forecasting and Warning Centre (FFWC), with support from CFAN and later the Regional Integrated Multi-Hazard Early Warning System (RIMES), has been using its model to produce daily, 7-10-day flood forecasts. The forecasts are integrated into Bangladesh’s disaster-management protocol by local experts. In 2007, six flood-prone unions (equivalent to counties) were developed as pilot sites for community-level use of the forecasts. Community leaders were trained to receive forecasts by cell phone and to use local landmarks to express the likely level of flooding in terms that are clear and useful for villagers. Community leaders advise action such as telling farmers to harvest their crops or take cattle to safety, and telling households to store water, food and personal belongings ahead of a flood”35. The role, education, and training of community leaders and the population at large is pivotal for the success of any early warning system and hence must be given due importance in Pakistan also.

Figure 6: Results of Case Study: Flood Early Warning in Bangladesh

Did it make a difference?

Bangladesh experienced three major floods in 2007 and 2008. Each was forecast successfully 10 days in advance and action was taken. Communities moved to evacuation points in advance, fisheries were protected by nets, crops were harvested early ahead of impending floods, households were warned to store food and drink in advance, and mechanised boats were readied in case evacuation of farmers on river islands became necessary.

Speaking of the 2008 floods, the Imam from Sirajgong District tells: “In my field, T. Aman [a type of rice] was at seedling and transplanting stage, I used the flood forecast information for harvesting crops and making decisions for seedling and transplantation of T. Aman...Also we saved household assets.”

One analysis concluded that approximately US$40 was saved for every dollar invested in the regional forecasting and warning system. The Asian Disaster Preparedness Center estimated that the average savings were US$400-500 per affected household. Preventing the loss of one livestock animal, for instance, was shown to save a household around US$500: about one year’s income in Bangladesh.

Source: UNISDR Scientific and Technical Advisory Group Report 2013. Case Study 3

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Ensuring Resilience of New and Existing Critical InfrastructureEnsuring disaster resilience of critical public infrastructure is a highly challenging undertaking for any country, much less for a developing country like Pakistan. The scope of critical sectoral infrastructure – including transportation, communication, power and energy, educational and health sector services, water and sanitation services, and housing – is massive and daunting. “Making infrastructure resilient calls for engineering and non-engineering measures that take into account the links between built and natural environments and among institutional frameworks. Careful consideration of development goals, prevailing situations, resources, and opportunities is needed to push the resilience agenda forward. Given the multifaceted dimensions of resilience, coordinated action from various sectors and stakeholders is imperative for achieving a safer future”36.

Pakistan’s National DRR Policy 2013 adopts “strengthening the structural and non-structural resilience of key infrastructure and lifelines in Pakistan” as one of its objectives. The National Disaster Management Plan also sets an intervention for infrastructure development for DRR with following five strategy points:

• Strategy-1: Develop schools, hospitals and other important public facilities to be safe against

• disasters.

• Strategy-2: Develop important coastal facilities to be safe (i.e., ports and industrial facilities) against disasters taking into consideration climate change (sea level rising, increment of intensity of cyclones, etc.).

• Strategy-3: Enforce the building code in construction of buildings.

• Strategy-4: Implement appropriate structural and non-structural measures in flood prone areas taking into account comprehensive and integrated flood management plans.

• Strategy-5: Enhance disaster risk management capacity including fire in urban areas.

The plan and strategy is, however, silent on the importance of ensuring resilience for power, water supply, transportation and communication sectors and facilities, the presence of which is vital in quick and effective disaster response.

In addition to all the relevant DRR and DRM activities, there is a dire need to undertake all possible measures for integrated flood and water management in rivers and linked waterways to prevent the outflow of floods to the adjacent rural and urban areas. The Federal Flood Commission (FFC) in Pakistan holds this responsibility and works through a wide range of federal and provincial government departments to conduct its functions. Since 1977 the FFC has implemented three flood protection plans, i.e. 1978-88, 1988-98 and 1998-2008. The Commission reports37 in 2015 that the plan for 2008-18 “could not be approved for implementation at that time due to the low priority given to the Flood Sector”. This decision in a flood-prone country, during times when National Disaster Risk Management Framework was being adopted, was certainly surprising. The super-floods of 2010 shattered the wishful assumptions of all those at the helm of affairs but even then, preparation of the next flood protection plan started only in 2013 and plans for 2015-25 came into shape. The same report states that for years 2009 to 2015, an allocation of PKR 3.91 billion (approx. $ 38.71 million) was made by the Government of Pakistan against a demand of PKR 24.50 billion (approx. $242.57 million) for flood protection schemes. On

36 Asian Development Bank. Making Infrastructure Disaster-Resilient. 2013. https://www.adb.org/documents/making-infrastructure-disaster-resilient




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average this amounts to a meagre $6.5 million per year which by any means is not sufficient for enhancing the flood protection structures in the country. Despite the national fiscal limitation in Pakistan’s developing economy, it would be prudent enough to allocate a reasonable amount to ensure preventive investment instead of post-disaster spending of billions on rescue, relief, and reconstruction.

Huge infrastructure losses were incurred due to repeated floods in the last 5-6 years, which also provided an opportunity to incorporate hazard resilient elements in the recovery and reconstruction. A flood assessment report in 2014 estimated recovery needs at around $440 million, including $56 million for building resilience of the affected population and their productive assets38.

The challenges, however, remain in putting policy to practice. Weak governance, lack of monitoring, un-willingness and low interest of the affected population in adhering to the policies, regulations, and guidelines kept the country far from achieving the goal of DRM integrated recovery and reconstruction. This aspect of building back better cannot be exercised as a stand-alone measure and is closely linked to awareness raising, education

and training of relevant stakeholders, particularly including the vulnerable communities.

Capacity Building, DRR Education and Knowledge SharingPakistan’s National Disaster Management Plan contains a complete volume on the Human Resource Development Plan. As part of following the plan, the National Institute of Disaster Management has been established which “will provide facilities for planning, promoting training, research and developing core competencies in the area of disaster management. It is also responsible for documentation and development of national level information base relating to disaster management policies, prevention mechanisms and mitigation measures”39. Over a period of six years (2010 to June 2015), the NIDM has provided training to 4,968 participants through 138 training courses.

The NGOs and CSOs in the country have a significant contribution in developing training material and providing trainings on Community Based Disaster Risk Management and Child Centred Disaster Risk Management as part of major programmes or stand-

38 http://reliefweb.int/report/pakistan/adb-220-million-aid-help-pakistan-build-hazard-resilient-infrastructure

39 NDMA. National progress report on the implementation of the Hyogo Framework for Action (2013-2015). http://www.preventionweb.net/files/42312_PAK_NationalHFAprogress_2013-15.pdf

Figure 7: Number of Training Courses by NIDM (Source: NIDM)

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alone projects. The participation of women and girls are ensured in these trainings. It may be recommended that all such intervention by donors and NGOs should be made in consultation and coordination with NIDM so that the trainings are well directed according to the needs of the relevant areas, and also to ensure the best use of scarce resources.

To bring DRM into mainstream education, a few universities in the Country, including Quaid-e-Azam University, University of Peshawar, NED University of Engineering and Technology, Karachi, University of Engineering and Technology, Lahore, Karakoram International University, and Preston University offer research courses in disaster risk management, safer structural engineering, climate change, and environment. Some of NGOs and CSOs also provide trainings to school children and college youth but these are not sufficient for a population of 189 million. To enhance the outreach of DRM education and training, it needs to be incorporated in the syllabus of schools and colleges across the Country.

Women, Children and Vulnerable Groups

The effects of disasters may be bleaker for women, children, elderly and persons living with disabilities, especially in a particular environment, culture, or society. These groups in our societies have special and separate needs as well as a number of vulnerabilities during any calamitous situation. At the same time the role and equal participation of women is extremely important in successful DRR and DRM planning and implementation in a particular community, society, and country.

In Pakistan, gender equality and empowerment is promoted and treated as a cross-cutting subject for any programme or project on any theme, including disaster risk reduction, management, and response. The National Disaster Management Act and the National Disaster Risk Management Framework also purposes to “integrate the needs of vulnerable groups in planning and implementation, capacity building, and mainstreaming the considerations of vulnerable

Pakistan Flood—Gender-Inclusive Needs Assessment40

The Asian Development Bank and the World Bank led a gender-inclusive damage and needs assessment following the massive flooding across Pakistan in 2010. The needs assessment examined the devastation and identified major needs for recovery and rehabilitation. The assessment was based on data collected from separate focus group discussions with displaced women and men living in relief camps, along with interviews with key observers such as teachers, humanitarian workers, village leaders, and representatives from non-governmental organisations.

Post-disaster needs confirmed that pre-existing gender inequalities in Pakistan had exacerbated after the floods and that the trend was expected to continue. In particular, the assessment identified that (i) many women and girls felt a loss of honour and dignity due to lack of privacy in the camps; (ii) several suffered from severe malnutrition and poor hygiene conditions; (iii) women had limited access to incomes, assets, or livelihoods; and (iv) they faced an increased vulnerability to violence against women and girls.

On the basis of the findings of the needs assessment, the following gender issues emerged for post-flood reconstruction: (a) women’s inclusion in the reconstruction process, (b) professional jobs for women, (c) gender-sensitive facilities such as vocational schools for women and health clinics, and (d) land acquisition by women.

40 http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/gender-inclusive-disaster-risk-management_0.pdf



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communities at all levels”41. To enhance particular focus on gender empowerment and to give special attention to the needs of women, children, elderly and special persons, a Gender and Child Cell was established under NDMA in 2010. After extensive consultations with stakeholders from government, donor organisations and NGOs, the Cell prepared National Policy Guidelines on Vulnerable Groups in Disasters in 2014 to present a particular framework to ensure the inclusiveness of said groups of the society. This was followed, in the same year, by SOPs on Separated, Unaccompanied and Missing Children in Disasters.

To build on these policies and frameworks, concrete implementation plans and monitoring mechanisms needs to established to ensure the desired results. “Women groups from both rural and urban areas in Pakistan should be included in the disaster management decision-making cycle. At the sub-national and operational levels, women should particularly be recognised as ‘agents of change’ and be utilised in risk reduction, preparedness and inducted as rescue and relief workers. The capacity of female local enumerators should be built to enable needs assessment, as well as design, planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of DRR and DRM programmes and strategies. Local capacities of women and women’s organisations, as well as other actors at grassroots level, should also be supported to enable effective gender-based violence prevention and response in times of crisis”42.

41 NDMA. National Policy Guidelines on Vulnerable Groups in Disasters. 2014. http://www.ndma.gov.pk/plans/gcc_policy.pdf

42 UN Women, Care International in Pakistan, Gender Equality and Governance Group. Pakistan Statement on Gender Equality and Gender Based Violence towards the World Humanitarian Summit 2016. (Conference Paper).

43 http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/gender-inclusive-disaster-risk-management_0.pdf

Pakistan—Empowering Women through Post-Disaster Housing Reconstruction43

Following the 2005 Pakistan earthquake, the Asian Development Bank’s Earthquake-Displaced People Livelihood Restoration Program helped rebuild permanent seismic-compliant homes for 2.7 million people, of which 55,000 belonged to households headed by women. More than 20,000 women were trained in building houses to withstand future earthquakes. While most families did not build the houses themselves, the training helped them ensure that their new homes met the recommended standards.

Local customs denied women the right to own or inherit property, limiting women’s access to emergency supplies, reconstruction initiatives, and other services due to lack of identity papers, land title documents, and banking experience. The programme initiated mobile registration services as well as legal aid centers in the most remote areas. As a result, women, particularly households headed by women, gained land titles that were traditionally held almost exclusively by men.

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Conclusion and Recommendations • Evident disconnects between horizontal and

vertical policy coordination and absence of convergence point on disaster risk reduction are some of the core issues emerging from current systems and structures of disaster management in Pakistan.44 These policy and institutional discords need to be bridged through inter-governmental consensus-building.

• Currently there are four federal laws and five (subordinate) provincial laws dealing with various dimensions of disaster management in Pakistan.45 There is one national commission and four provincial commissions functioning as governing bodies of the national and provincial disaster management authorities. The district disaster management authorities are supposed to be established by each district – some districts have notified these authorities ‘on paper’ without giving them any substantial authority to regulate disaster risk reduction at the local level. Local level authorities need to be empowered and resourced to undertake DRR and BBB initiatives.

• At the federal level, both the NDMA and ERRA are attached to the Prime Minister’s Secretariat; however, they have different governing bodies. The NDMA is governed by the 16-member National Disaster Management Commission (NDMC) headed by the Prime Minister, while the ERRA is governed by its 7-member Council also headed by the Prime Minister. There is another federal body, Emergency Relief Cell attached to the Cabinet Division, which was sidestepped in the reforms introduced after the 2005 October

Earthquake when a temporary Federal Relief Commission was established which was subsequently merged with the ERRA. Institutional overlaps need to be addressed through a coordinated policy framework. A study has recommended, “it is important to provide greater clarity about the specific roles of NDMA and PDMAs to avoid friction among them and to properly align the NDMA Act with the (18th) constitutional devolution amendment (DEC, 2012).46

• DDMAs are assigned with 33 functions regarding disaster management. However, DDMAs remain ad hoc bodies without any dedicated office, staff, resources or executive authority and technical competence to undertake disaster risk reduction measures at the local levels. DDMAs need to be linked with the local government system for a substantive contribution in DRR and BBB.

• Despite the existence of elected local government systems in all four provinces including Islamabad Capital Territory (ICT), the DDMAs are headed by administrative heads (DCOs) which creates a conflict between already existing district development committees (DDCs) headed by the elected representatives of Provincial or National Assembly.47 The District Development Committee makes decisions about the approval of annual development plans, schemes and projects at the district level, while the DDMAs are assigned to review the development projects with disaster risk perspective. DDMAs cannot effectively influence the decision of DDCs because of overlapping membership and weak

44 Federal Emergency Relief Cell was the lead organisation for disaster management, yet it is still operational with no distinct role to perform. There exists a long list of responding agencies in case of a disaster including Civil Defence, Fire Fighting, Army, Police Emergency, Pakistan Red Crescent Society (PRCS) etc. Same gap exists in relation to institutionalising early warning and information management by addressing to the linkages of NDMA with organisations like Pakistan Meteorological Department and SUPARCO. Other important institutions which are not formally linked with the National Disaster Management System include: Federal Flood Commission, Dams Safety Council, and Geographical Survey of Pakistan etc.

45 West Pakistan National Calamities (Prevention and Relief) Act 1858; Civil Defense Act 1952 (as amended up to 1953) ; National Disaster Management Act 2010, Earthquake Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Act 2011; Punjab Emergency Service Act 2006.

46 DEC. (2012). “Disaster Risk Reduction in Pakistan: The Contribution of DEC Member Agencies, 2010-2012” URL: http://www.dec.org.uk/sites/default/files/files/Evaluations/Pakistan/DEC%20Pakistan%20DRR%20Report.pdf

47 This is more relevant to the Province of Punjab as the Provincial Government of Punjab has notified District Development Committees on the basis of rotating chairpersonship given to the elected representatives of treasury benches.



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composition of the DDMA. A harmonious role is required at the local level for an effective DRR and BBB.

• Literature on disaster risk reduction recognises that hazards are being reshaped and new hazards introduced by contemporary development trends. Recent studies have indicated that a new trend of development-induced disasters is emerging in developing countries.49 Left Bank Outfall Drain (LBOD), Right Bank Outfall Drain (RBOD), Chashma Right Bank Canal Irrigation Project (CRBCIP), Taunsa Barrage Remodeling and Rehabilitation Project (TBRRP) are some oft-cited examples of disasters caused by mega development in drainage and irrigation sectors in Pakistan. Some analysts have termed 2010 Flood at Taunsa (South Punjab) as a result of ‘engineering failures’50 because the very structures meant to control flooding

48 UNDP. (2004). “Reducing Disaster Risk, A Global Report”. Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery, UNDP, New York.

49 Manila-based NGO Forum on ADB (Asian Development Bank), reflects some of this thinking.URL: <http://www.forum-adb.org/>

50 Mushatq Gadi. (2010). “Engineering failures”, Daily Dawn. URL: <http://archives.dawn.com/archives/30546>

51 Ibid

have caused and exacerbated the flood problem itself.51

• Existing disaster management systems do not seem to have taken development-induced disasters into account. The NDMO 2006, NDRMF 2007 and NDMA 2011 does not provide for any preventive or punitive clauses to address the whole spectrum of disasters induced by ill-designed development projects. Disaster-development linkages need to be recognised in future development and making new developments more risk-responsive as a key element of BBB.

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Sindh, Pakistan: “The Survival Within”

Dera Ghazi Khan, Pakistan: “The Misery of Losing Everything”

Rajanpur, Pakistan: “Vulnerability Defined” Ghotki, Pakistan: “No Home Again”

Dera Ghazi Khan, Pakistan: “Helpless and Hopeful”

Ghotki, Pakistan: “Living Flood to Flood”

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Build Back Better and the Experience of Landslide Management

in Sri LankaBy Menake Wijesinghe1

1 Disaster Response and Resilience Advisor, Plan International, Sri Lanka. Formerly Senior Manager, Disaster Risk Reduction / Climate Change Adaptation, Janathakshan GTE Ltd. Member of Duryog Nivaran

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Disaster Management in Sri Lanka – Country ContextSri Lanka, being an Island nation in the Indian Ocean has a history of many hazards. Droughts, epidemics, floods and a tsunami are some of the hazards recorded in a few of the nation’s leading historical documents. The Mahavansa, the great historical chronicle of Sri Lanka, mentions the work of early rulers in building massive tanks in the north and north central plains of the island to conserve water to cope with drought. Furthermore, the Mahavansa mentions a great sea-surge (probably a tsunami) on the western coast during the time of the king ‘Tissa’ (160 BC) ruler of Kelaniya - a city situated a few miles inwards from the west coast. As per the Mahavansa, this phenomenon compelled the king to sacrifice his daughter ‘Devi’ to ‘sea-gods’ to stop the sea overflow the land2. In the same way, local folk tales and legends speak of a few occasions when some human habitats were changed due to epidemics such as malaria. More recent documented history of Sri Lanka records several major malaria epidemics. The most devastating of these was the epidemic of 1934 – 1935 during which the districts in the wet zone and the intermediate zone experienced high incidence resulting in nearly 1.5 million patients and 80,000 deaths3. However, when going through the history of coastal hazards and floods, the recorded number of casualties or damage is low until the last half century. Such records of lower hazard impacts could be the result of smaller human populations along the coastal line and community preparedness for seasonal flooding. Before the great Indian Ocean Tsunami (2004), considerably devastative4 hazards were the cyclone in 1978 (with 720 deaths), floods in 1986 (with 320 deaths), and floods and landslides in 2003.

In 1996, Sri Lanka established the National Disaster Management Centre (NDMC) under the Ministry of Social Services to respond to disasters. The key

focus of the NDMC was to counter post disaster situations so that affected communities will receive immediate assistance. Therefore, relief was the main involvement of the NDMC. At present, the same institute functions as the National Disaster Relief Services Centre under the Ministry of Disaster Management. Following the impacts of the catastrophic 2004 tsunami, the Government of Sri Lanka was compelled to take on far more active role in disaster management. The Disaster Management Act No. 13 of 2005, passed by the Parliament of Sri Lanka on 13th May 2005, was therefore the key policy document in the nation’s history of disaster management. It paved the way for the establishment of the Disaster Management Centre (DMC) under the guidance of National Council for Disaster Management (NCDM). The NCDM was envisaged as the country’s decision making pinnacle for disaster management. By default its chair is the President of the country, with the Prime-minster and some cabinet ministers representing relevant Ministries functioning as members5. A per the Act, the NCDM should provide guidance to the Disaster Management Centre. It is expected to be the prompt decision making body during major emergencies nevertheless having the authority of declaration of National Emergencies. However, gaps were identified in the functioning and actions of this pinnacle body. For example, as per the Act, the NCDM has not been convened when there were national emergencies (i.e. floods and landslide in May 2016) and the decisions it has taken for effective disaster risk reduction appears ambiguous as no document on its decisions were published.

Following the establishment of the DMC, each district (25) of the country received a disaster management coordinating unit or what was commonly known as a District Disaster Management Coordination Unit (DDMCU). Each DDMCU was attached to the District Secretariat of the respective District. The DDMCU is headed

2 http://mahavamsa.org/ (2007), last accessed in 2017

3 http://www.malariacampaign.gov.lk/precentation/AboutUs.aspx

4 http://www.desinventar.lk/

5 http://www.disastermin.gov.lk/web/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=54&Itemid=78&lang=en

Build Back Better and the Experience of

Landslide Management in Sri Lanka

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by an Assistant Director, Disaster Management who reports to the District Secretary. At present, most of the disaster risk reduction activities at the district level are conducted with the consent of the DDMCU.

As a requirement of the Disaster Management Act, a Disaster Management Policy was published in 2013. In addition, a National Disaster Management Plan for 2014 to 2018 was published by the Disaster Management Centre. The Disaster Management Act requests all other Government Ministries represented at the NCDM to prepare their Disaster Management Plans. The DMC has the mandate of facilitating this process. For example, the Ministry of Education developed a National Guideline for School Disaster Safety in 2008 and through a Ministerial Circular requested all government schools to have disaster management plans.

There were large scale investments for Disaster Risk Reduction in Sri Lanka under different Government Ministries. The Disaster Management Centre has published hazard profiles covering the entire country and addressing all major hazards. Simultaneously, the National Building Research Organisation has developed Hazard Zonation Maps for landslide prone districts. Such maps are accessible online. Apart from government

agencies, many other organisations such as INGOs, the Sri Lanka Red Cross Society, NGOs and UN agencies supported Disaster Risk Reduction measures of the DMC. Particularly, preparedness planning for disasters at the community level was done through the networks and financial supports of such agencies. The DMC made some efforts to establish community level disaster response units or Village Disaster Management Committees (VDMCs). However, considering the experiences of recent disasters the sustainability of such VDMCs is questionable.

Landslides as a Major Hazard in Sri Lanka

Demographic changes and diverse land-use practices together with changes in climate have escalated the frequency and impacts of landslide disasters in Sri Lanka. Figure 1 clearly shows the increase in the number and intensity of landslides during last three decades. Excluding the tsunami of 2004, landslides have been the cause of the highest number of deaths (650) due to natural disasters in Sri Lanka since the year 2000, and have affected more than 142,680 people and is expected to impact many more in the future. (Disaster Management Centre, n/d)

The reason that landslides are considered a major hazard is because nearly 20,000 km2 covering 10 districts are prone to landslides. This is about 30% of Sri Lanka’s land area (Bandara, 2005). However,

Figure 1: Incidences of Landslides in Sri Lanka (1981 – 2015)

Source: Disaster Management Centre (n/d).

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this does not mean that 30% of the country is landslide prone but that this areas could have many critically vulnerable locations and therefore vulnerable populations. Landslides in Sri Lanka occur mostly in mountainous districts (Badulla, Kandy, Kegalle, Mathale, Nuwara Eliya, and Rathnapura). However, the adjoining slopes of surrounding districts (Galle, Hambanthota, Kaluthara, Kurunegala, and Mathara) have also reported landslides (figure 2).

Landslides are isolated events specifically dependent on unique geo-physical factors of a given point (Arambepola et al., 1997). In Sri Lanka, landslides are not seismic related and are triggered by rain coupled with other underlying geographical features. Situated off the southern tip of the South Indian sub-continent, Sri Lanka receives rains from the south-western and north-eastern monsoons precipitating mainly on its western and eastern mountain slopes. Inter-monsoonal torrential rains also contribute to precipitation, so that at any time of the year, there is a probability for heavy rain and subsequently landslides. However, it is during the months of May – July and November – January at the onset of the two monsoons that the most number of landslides are reported. Correlating with land occupation patterns and population growth in mountainous regions the

numbers of harmful landslides are becoming more frequent in the island. Sri Lanka has also been categorised as a global landslide hotspot along with the southern coast of India (UNISDR, 2005). In effect, the form of landslides seen in Sri Lanka have a two in one (floods and landslides) effect resulting in a double impact.

The most recent landslide in the country was the devastating landslide of 18th May 2016 at Aranayake in the Kegalle District with estimated deaths of over 150 (District Disaster Management Unit, Kegalle, 2016). Controversially, in this case, the largest number of deaths were reported in a low risk area as per the Hazard Zonation Maps of the NBRO. Previously at another landslide (29th October 2014) in Meeriyabedde, in the Badulla District, almost 37people were buried alive (District Disaster Management Unit, Badulla, 2016). The solution to ensuring people’s safety requires a mix of solutions of preparedness, prompt and effective early warning methods, structural mitigation measures, support for recovery and effective relocation options. This chapter draws from recent experiences in Sri Lanka, especially the case of the Meeriyabedde landside (of 2014) to illustrate the impacts of the current disaster

Figure 2: Percentage spread of areas with including identified landslide locations in mountainous districts in Sri Lanka

Source: Derived by the author with data from National Building Research Organisationwww.nbro.gov.lk



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management system. The chapter goes on to offer some recommendations to build back better in landslide prone areas.

Current Landslide Management Strategies and Actions

The key agency dealing with landslides in Sri Lanka is the National Building Research Organisation (NBRO), under the Ministry of Disaster Management. The Ministry of Disaster Management oversees the NBRO, the Disaster Management Center (DMC), and the Department of Meteorology (DOM). The three organizations fulfill specific roles and collaborate with each other to deal with landslide hazards. At the same time, when implementation of the guidelines or technical decisions given by the above agencies is required, the local administrative bodies, provincial and local governing bodies (provincial councils and local councils) play vital roles.

The NBRO is a research and development institute established in 1984. The NBRO consists of several divisions that provide services for construction and land development. The ‘Landslide Research and Risk Management Division (LLRMD)’ is mandated to be the focal point for landslides in the country. The LLRMD provides Landslide Risk Management Services, develops landslide hazard zonation mapping, identifies landslide hazards and assesses landslide risks. Given that many of the landslides are aggravated by cutting failures, the NBRO has developed guidelines for construction and land use planning in hilly areas and is authorised to see that construction clearance is obtained before building on mountain slopes. In 2005, the NBRO’s landslide zonation maps were used by the National Physical Planning Department in the formulation of the National Physical Planning Policy of Sri Lanka. Based on the hazard maps, the central hills were demarcated as a fragile and environmentally sensitive area where further settlements are not recommended (Sugathapala, 2010).

While progress has been made to improve disaster management in Sri Lanka, the focus has been on putting in place systems and processes to manage the disaster and also to deal with

the relief stages of the disaster event. However, some work has been done on risk assessment and mitigation. Mitigation action has taken place along with assessment of elements at risk, such as the population (people, who either live, work, or spend some time in the area affected by landslides), buildings and engineering works, economic activities, public service utilities (such as water or electricity supply) and infrastructure (roads and communication facilities) in the area potentially affected by landslides(Sri Lankan Geotechnical Society, 2005).

Some mitigation measures put in place include all or a combination of activities such as building retaining walls, ground anchors (soil nails), proper surface water drains and sloping of surface to prevent pounding of water, filling of ground cracks with clay soils, or revalidation of slopes (Ratnayake and Herath, 2005). One example is the surface draining system used in Beragala, along the Avissawella – Wellavaya (A4) road. Here major construction has taken place using large concrete structures. Another such system can be seen in Gampola, just beyond the Gampola town along the A5 road. Here too, a surface draining system was built with concrete gutters to avoid surface water reaching the spaces between layers of soil, which could eventually trigger landslides (Bandara, 2009). The Peradeniya Landslide mitigation site gives us yet another example of mitigation measures. This project was started to prevent further escalation of the disaster following the Peradeniya landslide which blocked the main Colombo–Kandy (A1) road in 2006. The mitigation work was completed in June 2013.

Several other mitigation measures were undertaken for sites in the Nuwara Eliya district as well. The cost for such mitigation is immense: for example, the mitigation in Peradeniya was Rs. 51.38 Million (USD 0.35 million), Mahaweva Rs. 441 million (USD 3.06 million), and several millions of rupees spent for small mitigation sites in Matale and Badulla (NBRO, 2016). Much of the mitigation has taken place to protect the major roads – sometimes funded through donor funds or loans. However, this may not apply to a range of smaller mitigation measures especially those that protect poorer communities. Such measures have to be considered and budgeted into the action plans of both the Ministry of Disaster Management as well as other agencies (i.e. the National Housing

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Development Authority (NHDA), the Department of Irrigation, the Health sector etc.).

Efforts to carry out landslide mitigation on roads can be linked to large economic losses incurred with the destruction of the roads. However, the high costs of landslide mitigation increases the probability for mitigation projects to be delayed or de-prioritised. A landslide would not affect a large number (a maximum of several hundred) of people. Flood mitigation would benefit many thousands and secure vital economic centers. Therefore, when allocating funds from limited budgets provided by the government, large (flood mitigation or road development) projects get prioritised over landslide mitigation. As a result, many communities especially the poor living on vulnerable slopes may have to live with high risks for many years.

In the context of mitigation and averting risks, one area still lagging behind is that of relocation and resettlement. Presently landslide resettlement in Sri Lanka focuses mainly on post disaster resettlement. For instance, the Meeriyabedda area where a massive landslide occurred in October 2015 had been declared fragile in 2005, but a plan to relocate the community had not been put in place (Somarathne 2016). Despite being warned that they were in danger of a landslide people did not move due to complex socio economic reasons. The case study of the Meeriyabedde landslide that follows illustrates the ground situation especially in relation to relocation, a key aspect of landslide risk management.

Case Study: The Story of Meeriyabedda At 7.30am on October 29, 2014, the people of Meeriyabedda in the Haldummulla division, were suddenly engulfed in an influx of soil, boulders and rubble as they faced one of the most severe landslides to affect Sri Lanka. The landslide was triggered by monsoon rains and was about 3 kilometres (1.9 miles) in length (DMC,2014). According to the NBRO, it had issued a warning of possible landslides on the night of 28 October, 2014 and the DMC had communicated this warning to the vulnerable communities. In fact, before this event, several warnings had been issued and the people asked to relocate. However, the

people had not been able to move. Eventually the disaster they faced, affected 330 people in 57 families, damaged 150 houses and left 75 children orphaned (DMC, 2016). Further, damage was caused to a range of infrastructure – the Kovil, the community centre and livelihood structures such as dairy collection centres, shops and communication facilities that the community had invested in over time (ibid).

The 75 families affected were living in the Ampitakanda tea estate of the Maskeliya Plantation Company. They are part of Sri Lanka’s “estate” community– a group of people brought to Sri Lanka as bonded labour during the British colonial era. They are tied to the tea estate as their place of work and place of residence. They were living in “line rooms” that are built, owned and maintained by the plantation company. From those affected,10 households had individuals working for the Maskeliya Plantation. A majority were born on the estate, but were working outside the estate as casual labourers, but some also did casual work for the estate. Many of the youth have migrated to other areas in search of jobs. The community do not own these houses but earn the right to live in them – if at least one member of the family works for the plantation company. This rule is not enforced rigorously as can be seen in this estate, and families stay on due to the historic links to the estate, but also because they have no access to land elsewhere and have community/family ties in the area.

The Relief Stage

In the immediate aftermath of the landslide, rescue and relief operations fell into place. The Ministry of Disaster Management led rescue and relief operations with the support of the Provincial and District political and administrative arms, and sectoral agencies such as the health sector, the armed forces and the police. Temporary shelters were set up in two local schools and supplies (food, rations, clothes etc.) came pouring in through state structures, civil society and the general public.

In October 2014, the two relief centres were taking care of 839 people. This number included



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not just the affected people but also others who evacuated after the event, based on warnings issued by the NBRO (DMC, 2014). According to newspaper reports in 2015, 91 families were still in crammed temporary shelters (Nagraj, 2015) and in 2016, 2 years after the disaster, 75 families continued to live in the Mahakanda tea factory, each family in a single small room (Kaviratne, 2016). The living conditions were extremely poor, with limited rations and the uncertainty of when they could restart their lives hanging over their heads.

“We lost everything, our loved ones, earnings throughout our lives, and now we are left with no choice but to be crammed in together with minimum basic facilities, and barely able to survive with the rations given to us”,

A person affected by the landslide, Meeriyabedde still living in a temporary shelter in 2016 (quoted in Kaviratne, 2016)

This quote highlights the plight people face over a long period of time when such disasters take place and the recovery interventions are not swiftly implemented. People cannot manage with the rations provided and are unable to restart their livelihoods which could provide a supplementary income to the hand-outs. Some also incur unanticipated rental costs and have therefore taken the decision to move back.

“Many of them live in rented houses, and are considering a protest to make their voices heard. Many have returned to line houses, with no water or electricity, and live under abhorrent conditions.”(quoted in Kaviratne, 2016)

In terms of housing and resettlement, the DMC committed to building a “Hazard Resilient Village” for this community – post landslide with the technical assistance and supervision of the NBRO (DMC 2014). The plan included providing basic furniture, water and sanitary facilities, and basic amenities, as well as support such as rain gauges for community based early warning systems and community facilities (e.g. a religious

centre, community centre and health care centre) (DMC, 2014).The “Hazard Resilient Village” plan also mentions assistance for the orphaned children (accommodation, supplies, schooling) as well as livelihoods support although specific details are not available (DMC, 2014). In February 2015, the Ministry of Hill Country New Villages, Infrastructure and Community Development, together with the Sri Lanka Army, the Urban Development Authority, and the NBRO, commenced work on the housing scheme. On the 22nd of October 2016, after more than 2 years in transition shelters, the new houses with basic infrastructure were ceremoniously handed over to the affected families by the Minister of Disaster Management with several other local politicians in attendance.

The Relocation – What Has Taken Place

On a visit to this location the author met with the community and local officials to gauge their reaction and perceptions of the disaster management process they experienced. The focus was primarily on resettlement.

The houses were built on land belonging to the Maskeliya Plantation Company. Each family was given a house with approximately 7 perches of land. A housing unit has a veranda, living area, two rooms, a kitchen and a toilet with water and electricity (see picture 1 and 2). They also received compensation of Rs. 100,000 for each family member who had died. Hence, they were compensated for the 37 deaths. The circular on resettlement does not say that a victim is entitled to both a house and compensation but in this case, they received both. A special cabinet approval was given to pay the compensation. In addition, each family has received 25,000 to aid them with the relocation, while certain households received some goods as well. As the former houses were ‘line rooms’, that were old and not well maintained, those who participated in the discussion expressed their satisfaction at the improved housing conditions. As the line rooms belonged to the estate, the fact that they received ownership of the new houses was also greatly appreciated.

There were, however, some concerns about the small size of the toilet as well as the lack of privacy in how the toilets are positioned (see picture 3 and 4).

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As the houses are all built on an incline soil erosion is already visible. While some efforts are being made by the District DMC – Badulla to carry out some soil erosion protection (See Picture 5), residents would have to build their own soil protection barriers, which has not been part of the housing construction. The children continue to attend the two government schools functioning on the estate premises that they attended before the landslide. The schools are about 1 and ½ km from the new houses.

The relocation has created some problems in terms of livelihoods. The housing units are 5km away from Koslanda (the closest small town on the Beragala – Wellavaya road) and not close to an urban centre or other forms of employment. Therefore, they have to travel a long distance to find work. The community also expressed their concern with the lack of space for home gardens. Before the disaster many households were rearing livestock (fowl, goats and cattle) and almost all families had a small home garden in which they grew vegetables as supplementary income.

“We used to have a small home garden in front of our house. I planted vegetables. Some in my community were breeding animals such as goats and chicken. Here there is not much space to have a garden except for few plants. Cannot breed animals as we don’t have common areas” (Female, home owner)

The Plantation Company had informed the relocated community that they were not entitled to any extra land and the use of the land given to them for these purposes would disqualify from the housing scheme. This has an impact on the household’s income and nutrition status and a lifestyle that they had got used to. In addition, they are facing a new threat due to the fact that the houses have been constructed in close proximity to an elephant corridor.

The community expressed their gratitude to the Sri Lanka Army unit from Diyathalawa who provided food and other supplies and medical care while they were in the transition camps and for building the housing units. However, one of the changes they are facing now is that after two years they have stopped receiving free supplies and are facing some difficulty due to a lack of income and the lack of a proper plan for making a

living. In addition, there is no waste management system introduced to the community. The urban council which collects garbage does not cover the new location. Subsequently, many individuals are polluting the surrounding forests and water ways by dumping garbage. This could escalate environmental damage and water pollution in the highlands and also have repercussions in the lowlands.

Managing the Process of Resettlement

Administrative hurdles were faced from the initial stages of the housing construction. Community participation was low in terms of the design of the houses and community voice also seems to be less effective on administrative decisions. For example, in the transit shelters, in some cases, three families were forced to live in single partitioned room of 10 x 10 feet. They faced sanitary issues, lack of storage space, and severe privacy issues with no avenues for recourse. At the time of allocating houses, proving their identity or justifying the state of victimisation was difficult due to a lack of proper documentation. In one case, a female protested against her disqualification for a house. Her father, mother and the sister were killed in the landslide, but at the time of the landslide this lady was working in Dubai and her daughter was being looked after by her parents. As she was not living in the line homes she was disqualified by the authorities without much consideration. However, she is now in a vulnerable situation needing to care for her daughter and needing a place to live. The community also mentioned that they received threats or harsh words from the authorities asking them to stop creating ‘problems’ by demanding various things. They also complained about the lack of transparency on the sum spent on rehabilitation and housing. The Divisional Secretariat had also requested them to sign documents that are in the Sinhala Language (instead of Tamil) which some could not read or understand (see picture 6). As described by the home owner below, and as can be seen in picture 6, the documentation on the house is not a regular deed to a house. This has created doubts among the community about the relocation process.



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“there were many forms to be signed. Some authorities said that we need to sign all, if not we would not get houses. I can understand Sinhalese. But most of us living here cannot. I too don’t understand big words. However, there was no government logo in the document given to sign as the deed of the house. We don’t understand the legality of those documents. Now the estate officials are warning us that these lands belong to the estate, therefore, we should comply with the estate rules or would lose our houses” Male, house owner

Moving forward the community members do not know whom to contact for certain requirements. They are not clear who or what organisation manages the premises. The role of the government in the land owned by the plantation is not clear. Houses were handed over to the heads of the households. But the document given to the incumbents as the deed of the house does not have clauses ensuring fully legal rights to the land ownership. The land where the housing units were built is owned by the plantation company and the housing construction was done as per a memorandum of understanding between the plantation company and the central government.

Challenges to Landslide Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) in Sri Lanka

Soon after the Meeriyabadde incident,the issuing of early warnings became a prominent topic of discussion. There were some allegations levelled at the DMC, that it failed to issue an early warning. However, that was not the case. The District DMC Badulla, did issue warnings but the victimised families did not evacuate from the area. This was an eye opener to the analysis of factors behind unsuccessful relocation efforts.

When trying to understand why this community did not heed the warnings to move, it is important to examine the circumstances of their lives. Given that the community were relying on the line rooms for housing, did not have access to other lands or the means to buy land or rent houses, and as their livelihoods were also linked to the estates or in the vicinity, they were not in a position to move.

Further, the estate who are responsible to maintain the houses, made no effort of its own before the landslide to facilitate the relocation of the workers. While taking up issues related to getting better quality housing for workers is also within the mandate of the trade unions, relocation due to landslides was not an issue they pursued.

The estate community is also one of the poorest groups in Sri Lanka with little savings and disposable income. Haldamulla and the Grama Niladari (GN) division (Kotabakma) where Meeriayabedde is located was classified in 2006 by the Department of Census and Statistics as among the poorest DS and GN divisions in Sri Lanka. Hence, in such a situation the capacity of the local authorities to carry out mitigation and assisted relocation is doubtful. Additionally, issues of ethnic identity and cultural acceptance restrict the ability of the estate community to relocate unassisted. The warnings itself are issued by authorities in Colombo or agencies at a distance from the site of the landslide. However, landslides are local incidents that depend on many local conditions related to weather and geography. Hence, the need of establishing local early warning systems was highlighted.

To implement landslide disaster risk reduction measures, it is necessary to overcome complex administrative red tape, long preparatory procedures, as well as social and economic hurdles (Bandara, 2009). As the key agency responding to landslides, the NBRO has taken structural landslide mitigation measures. But with budgetary limitations and many hundreds of identified landslide sites; applying such structural mitigations would be a long or somewhat impossible process.

Furthermore, local authorities in landslide prone areas are instructed to take steps to relocate families under threat. In some instances, families were to be given substitute locations. However, the relocation of houses in the landslide prone areas of the country has reportedly not been completed despite a circular sent by the Disaster Management Ministry in February, 2011 (Kumar, 2011). Complex administrative arrangements and lack of funding or political interests could be undermining the slow process of relocation. At present, the majority of threatened communities

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living on vulnerable slopes do not have relocation plans. Furthermore, relocating of populations could be impractical and may lead to unfavourable economic and social consequences (Sugathapala and Prasanna, 2009). Relocation involves opportunity costs such as, compromising existing relationships of extended families, matters related to children and peer groups, education institutes, mental and physical hardship of being in temporary relocation shelters over an extended period of time, challenges in establishing new businesses, transportation to workplaces and schools, recognition and social cohesion in a new society, cost of living in new areas, availability of essential resources, and climate. Such aspects sometimes convince communities to live with risk or to have a ‘risk culture’ rather than move away from risk (of landslide).

Present government initiatives on relocation also seem mismatched with such standards. As the Sri Lanka government’s Ministry of Finance Circular NBC 152E/2011 –‘Guidelines for Provisions of Relief to the Public in an Emergency Disaster Situation and Restoration of Damaged’, elaborates on provision for relocation due to disasters and states that a maximum of Rs. 100,000.00 is given to those who lost houses with a certification from the Grama Niladhari. In addition, a family will receive a maximum of 20 perches of land. The latter will depend on land availability in the relevant Division. The procedure becomes somewhat complicated when the family to be relocated has to go through legalities to prove ownership status and/or occupancy – as experienced by the community in Meeriyabedda. Complex procedures and red tape obviously make relocation a long wait. The option of relocation has its unique problems. Some of which are:

1. Relocation requires suitable lands and finding lands is extremely difficult.

2. Finding solutions for many socio-economic requirements related to relocation is complex. If such requirements are not met it would generate further complicated social problems such as increased poverty and environmental exploitation.

3. People have strong links with their native lands. They compare the benefits with prevailing threats and conclude that living on their own land outweighs the risk of disaster.

4. There cannot be forced relocation in a democratic nation (unless you are an illegal encroacher) and communities need to be convinced to migrate.

Simultaneously, communities believe that they would lose some benefits if they relocate. They have seen the opportunities of living with the known risks and circumstances over losing them because of relocation. This is mainly due to:

1. The lack of assurance that they will have at least similar living conditions after relocation. New lands could be far away from urban centres and with less conveniences.

2. Lack of resources/capital to acquire land with similar or better conditions such as adequate space, water, fauna and fertile soil etc. and having to accept land offered by the government even if conditions are poor.

3. Difficulties of adjusting to new environments and social networks.

4. Psychological factors of not having experienced frequent catastrophic landslides as these are rare events.

People living in mountainous terrain practice traditional measures to prevent soil erosion and to avoid the sliding of soil masses. During the colonial era, such systems were put in place in the tea and rubber estates. Building structural barriers with stones, constructing surface drainage systems, and demarcating forested areas on slopes and valleys were some measures practiced by the colonial planters. The post-colonial era has seen a rapidly increasing land utilisation rate with utilisation overtaking the threshold of balanced soil structures in many ecosystems. (Wickramasekara and Sinnathambi, 1996).

Conducting mitigation activities for landslides could become an issue of cost-benefit especially when allocating budgets from the National Treasury with comparisons being drawn between the costs required for landslide mitigation and other disaster mitigation. When comparing the cost and the number of beneficiaries per landslide mitigation project and the costs of mitigation projects of





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other disasters (such as floods and drought which serves a large number of people), the ratio of cost and number of beneficiaries is much lower in landslide mitigation projects. Hence, conducting such mitigation activities in all or most of the landslide disaster prone areas maybe unfeasible. This presents the practical dilemma of ensuring that adequate mitigation measures are in place for all landslide sites.

Recommendations for Build Back Better in Relation to LandslidesThe initial challenge of build back better is that the measures have to be location and disaster specific. The types of vulnerabilities are also linked to the socio-cultural practices of the communities. Hence a localised targeted approach is needed. Following are some of the suggestions:

1. Efficient land-use planning

In landslide prone districts, all Local Councils (as the agency responsible for approving private buildings within local boundaries) and Divisional Secretariats (as the agency responsible for land management) should refer Hazard Zonation Maps developed by the technical agency (i.e. NBRO in Sri Lanka) in the approval process. New plans should be subjected to technical advice from the technical agency. In Sri Lanka, this process is happening and it is mandatory in the building approval process.

2. Disaster risk reduction and legal background

The Disaster Management Center is responsible to respond different hazards in the country. However, when it comes to implementation, government administration (especially at District and Divisional levels), and provincial and local governance structures play a crucial role. Therefore, having the Disaster Risk Reduction as a mandatory subject of the government officers in local levels would help the coordination between

DMC and local administration. For example, when it comes to early warning the Divisional Admiration is expected to have local emergency response mechanisms in place, evacuate people or find safe locations for people who evacuate as per early warning. Currently the role and the coordination of DMC and local administration has gaps due to the lack of proper role identification.

3. Moving to Risk Maps from Hazard Maps The hazard zonation maps developed by technical agencies should be used as a base to develop ‘risk maps’ taking into consideration vulnerability factors. Risk maps would be more appropriate to develop strategies for ‘risk reduction’ among communities living in mountainous areas. Appropriate awareness or early warning systems targeting particular communities at risk could be developed. Risk mapping should bring in the socio-cultural practices of the area, the livelihoods that will determine how people are affected and how they can cope.

4. Comprehensive relocation planningMost relocation happens following catastrophic incidents. However, investing in long-term relocation plans for critically threatened areas before disastrous incidents take place, would save lives, property, relief costs, compensation costs for victims, rehabilitation and reconstruction costs. Such relocation should consider the present lifestyles of dwellers in identified areas. They should gain or should be assured of better benefits after relocation compared to their current state of living. The decision for voluntary relocation(r) would take place when a person’s perception of risk (PR) (by understanding the hazard and level of vulnerability) surpasses the perceived value of benefits(PB) that he receives by living in a particular area. This could be described as: r= ƒ (PR, PB),if PR> PB=>r

Therefore, in addition to providing risk information, relocation plans should demonstrate their benefits to the vulnerable communities so that they can make a more informed decision to leave their homes and property. As most democratic countries are unable to use force

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for relocation, such relocation proposals should consider livelihoods, amenities such as access to energy sources and water-sanitation and social infrastructure. Investing in social research as well as town and country planning would be needed to avoid landslides in future settlements. For those who are socially and economically vulnerable, the need for an assisted process is crucial.

5. Community based early warningCommunity based early warning is an option that could prepare communities to live with hazards. This involves making communities aware of risk and planning for emergency response following early warnings generated at local level. Though early warnings cannot lead to evading the onset of a disaster, it would minimise the harm on human lives and property. Compared with other available options for landslide threats, early warning dissemination is an effective solution which allows populations to live with the threat. Particularly, because there is no system of issuing location and time specific warnings for landslides other than a ‘blanket’ warning for an entire area (usually done by the NBRO through the DMC in Sri Lanka). To address this issue in local landslide scenarios, it is best to have a system through which a particular community or group of houses could specifically be aware of the state of their vulnerability.

Sri Lanka has tested a Community Based Early Warning method that uses portable simple rain gauges with community preparedness for evacuation. In this method, identified communities with landslide threats were facilitated to conduct risk-mapping in their communities and to make preparedness plans to act in case of an early warning. Such communities will prepare maps with evacuation paths and safe locations so that they could evacuate during an emergency. At the same time, communities will have a system where portable rain gauges are used to measure rain fall and issue local early warnings based on the reading. This method has proven to be successful (Wijesinghe, 2016). It is cost effective, sustainable and easy to apply. This would be an option when relocation schemes or structural mitigation takes place.

6. Preparing for the worse caseDespite early warning there could still be victims of landslides who would need quick attention. Local disaster response services should be strengthened to coordinate with each agency through which effective services could be delivered. Contingency planning should be done with the participation of different government agencies and other relief services. Standard Operation Procedures (SOPs) to attend to such scenarios should be developed, agreed and tested. Annual or bi-annual table top exercises should be conducted. At risk communities, should be made aware and community-based drills should be conducted.

Sri Lanka is facing a severe threat of landslides and the threat is increasing. While Sri Lanka has been categorised as a ‘global hotspot’ for landslides it has a low capability of recovery from major events in comparison with countries that have strong economies and reserves (United Nations, 2015). The increasing threat of landslides is demanding risk reduction measures as more and more people and infrastructure become vulnerable. There is bound to be an ever increasing number of requests for funding for landslide mitigation each year for long-term relocation plans with adequate socio-economic infrastructure. As an island, with a higher population density, it would be hard to find land for relocation for hundreds of communities. At the same time, complex socio-economic matters related to relocation would be more challenging. However, as an immediate solution, landslide preparedness planning with effective landslide early warning would be a lifesaving strategy but it also needs to be accompanied by a more long-term strategic plan to invest in landslide mitigation, and relocation schemes.



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Photo DocumentationPicture 1: The model house ceremonially opened by the Minister of Disaster Management

Picture 2: A View of the housing units/scheme constructed for Meeriyabedda landslide victims

Picture 3: Very small space in the toilet for washing, bathing and

sanitary purposes

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Picture 4: At the back of each house, the door to the toilet is outside the main house and the women expressed the lack of privacy in the way the toilets are placed.

Picture 5: Some actions taken by the Disaster

Management Unit – Badulla to reduce soil erosion in the housing

scheme

Picture 6: The document given to prove the ownership of the housing unit.



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References 1. Arambepola, N.M.S.I., Pallewala, P.P.D.H., and Bandara, R.M.S., (1997) ‘Landslide Hazards Zonation

Mapping and Geo-Environmental Problems Associated with the Occurrence of Landslides’. Proceedings of the Natural Hazards in the Urban Habitat, NBRO, Colombo.

2. Bandara, R.M.S. (2005) ‘Landslides in Sri Lanka’ Vidurava Vol. 22, No. 2.

3. Disaster Management Centre (2014) Strategies to Address the Needs of the Victims of Meeriyabedda, Landslide at Haldumulla in Badulla District 29 October 2014. Available at: www.dmc.gov.lk.(accessed online 12/9/2016).

4. Disaster Management Centre (n/d), Disaster Information Management System, available at: http://www.desinventar.lk (accessed online 12/9/2016).

5. Kaviratne, I. Y. (2016) ‘Meeriyabedda, Aranayaka, Salawa: Divergent Destinies’. Sunday Observer, 19 June 2016, (accessed online 31/10/ 2016).

6. Kumar, M. S. (2011)‘Slow relocation of houses from landslide-prone areas’ Sunday Times, Online Edition, 21 August, 2011, Available at: http://www.sundaytimes.lk/110821/News/nws_048.html

7. Nagraj, V. (2015), ‘A story of being homeless and helpless’. Sunday Observer, 15 November 2015. Available at: http://archives.sundayobserver.lk/2001/pix/PrintPage.asp?REF=/2015/11/15/fea11.asp(accessed online 31/10/ 2016).

8. Ratnayake, U. and Herath, S. (2005), ‘Changing Rainfall and its Impact on Landslides in Sri Lanka’, Journal of Mountain Science, Vol. 02.

9. Somarathna, M. Geological Society of Sri Lanka. Available at: http://www.gsslweb.org/challenges-to-overcome-an-overview-of-koslanda-landslide/ (accessed online 12/9/2016).

10. Sri Lankan Geotechnical Society (2005), Geotechnical Journal Vol.3, No.1. October 2005.

11. Sugathapala, K. and Prasanna, J. (2009) Issues in Implementation of Landslide Mitigation Programmes in Landslide Vulnerable areas of Sri Lanka: Special Reference to Hanguranketha Landslide Area, Human Settlements Division, National Building Research Organisation, Publications of symposium 2009.

12. UNISDR (2005) Hyogo Framework for Action 2005-2015: ISDR, International Strategy for Disaster Reduction, Available at: www.unisdr.org/wcdr. (accessed online 12/9/2016).

13. Wickramasekara, K.and Sinnathamby, R. (1996), Some Landslides of Sri Lanka Criteria for Early Warning, NBRO Publications, NBRO.

14. Wijesinghe, M.R. (2016), Community Based Early Warning System for Landslides The Case of Four Grama Niladhari Divisions of Matale District, Sri Lanka, 6th International Disaster and Risk Conference IDRC Davos 2016 in Davos, Switzerland.

15. United Nations (2015), Global Assessment Report on Disaster Risk Reduction 2015.

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Protecting Cultural Heritage from

Disasters: Recent Initiatives in South Asia

By Rohit Jigyasu1 and Vanicka Arora2

1 UNESCO Chair/Professor, Institute of Disaster Mitigation for Urban Cultural Heritage, Ritsumeikan University, Kyoto, Japan and Senior Advisor at the Indian Institute for Human Settlements (IIHS) and President of ICOMOS-India.

2 Consultant - Heritage Management, for National Disaster Management Authority, India and the Development and Research Organisation for Nature, Arts and Heritage (DRONAH).

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IntroductionSouth Asia boasts of a rich tangible and intangible cultural heritage ranging from monuments, archaeological sites, sacred sites, cultural landscapes, museum collections as well as living skills, crafts, rituals and practices. Many of these cultural heritage assets represent the shared past of our region and thrust a collective responsibility upon us to protect and manage them for future generations. Much of this heritage plays a role in the lives of ordinary people, not just tourists or scholars. Heritage gives a sense of identity, is a starting point for early education through school field trips and visits, and some heritage sites offer places of quiet recreation and contemplation to families and individuals. Thus, the protection of cultural heritage sites as well as whether, and above all, how they are restored, must be vital issues for disaster risk reduction.

Unfortunately, the region is also vulnerable to disasters caused by natural and human induced hazards such as earthquakes, landslides, tsunamis, floods, cyclones and fires that have caused enormous damage to cultural heritage assets. On 26th April 2016, a fire in the National Museum of Natural History in Delhi gutted almost the entire organic collection. Two devastating earthquakes in Nepal on 26th April and 12th May 2015 and many aftershocks that followed have caused significant loss to over 700 listed cultural heritage sites such as temples, palaces, squares, museums and libraries, including those listed on the UNESCO World Heritage List in the Kathmandu Valley. Flash floods and accompanying landslides in Uttarakhand State in India in 2013 caused enormous damage to the vernacular and sacred heritage of the area. In 2012, a fire destroyed historic Wangduephodrang Dzong in Bhutan, which is on the tentative UNESCO World Heritage List. The 2010 floods in Pakistan affected many archaeological sites and vernacular settlements along River Indus.

Cultural heritage sites are also increasingly the target of violent extremism, that destroy not only the symbols of history but also result in the killing of pilgrims and visitors through senseless acts of terrorism. Attacks on shrines such as Rehman Baba, Data Ganj Bakhsh and the most recent attack on the 800-year-old shrine of Lal Shehbaz Qalandar in Sindh, Pakistan illustrate

this pressing challenge, requiring the need to undertake measures to reduce disaster risks from natural hazards as well as human actions.

Rapid urbanisation in the region, increasing populations and climate change are increasing the vulnerability of South Asian countries to disasters thereby posing greater risks to cultural heritage than ever before. Poverty, lack of protection, maintenance and monitoring and insufficient institutional capacity are other factors contributing towards the increasing vulnerability of cultural heritage. However, there are countless examples of traditional knowledge evolved in communities through a series of trials and errors that demonstrate that cultural heritage can be an effective source of resilience. Through this accumulated wisdom these communities have developed effective indigenous mechanisms of dealing with earthquakes and floods rather than trying to only resist them through technocratic measures. This is well illustrated by many traditional buildings in Bhutan, Kashmir and Gujarat that survived the earthquakes of 2009, 2005 and 2001.

Recent approaches internationally, mark a significant shift towards the inclusion of cultural heritage as an aspect to be considered within the ambit of disaster risk management. In 2005, the Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA 2005-15) mentioned the potential role of ‘traditional and indigenous knowledge and cultural heritage’ and the need to account for culture for disaster risk reduction processes. A decade later, the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction (SFDRR 2015-30) has explicitly articulated cultural heritage concerns by calling the States Parties to “protect or support the protection of cultural and collecting institutions and other sites of historical, cultural heritage and religious interest”. The SFDRR also advocates systematically evaluating, recording, sharing and publicly accounting of cultural heritage impacts, as appropriate, in the context of event-specific hazard-exposure and vulnerability information.

During recent years, countries in the South Asian region have undertaken some pioneering initiatives

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towards disaster risk management of cultural heritage, which are briefly summarised below:

India

Recent policy initiatives in India reflect the growing concern for including cultural heritage within the overall purview of disaster risk reduction. The National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA), under the Government of India has been in the process of developing draft National Guidelines on Disaster Risk Management for Museums since July 2016, following extensive consultation processes among experts and professionals in the field. The approach of these guidelines is to serve as a template to museums and cultural heritage sites and precincts to develop their own disaster risk management plans and strategies through risk assessment, risk reduction measures, preparedness and emergency response measures and planning for post-disaster recovery. The objective is not to be prohibitive, but rather enable heritage professionals to integrate disaster risk management within the overall management of heritage sites, collections and visitors.

Within these policy initiatives, several workshops to generate awareness and build capacity have also been organised in collaboration with institutions such as the National Institute of Disaster Management (NIDM) and the National Museum Institute (NMI) along with Central Museums such as the Indian Museum and the Victoria Memorial Museum in Kolkata, the National Museum in Delhi and the Salar Jung Museum in Hyderabad. The last few years have also witnessed the formulation and implementation of comprehensive disaster risk management plans for City Palace Museums in Jaipur and the World Heritage Site of Jantar Mantar in Jaipur and Jaisalmer Fort. As part of these plans, emergency drills have also been conducted for developing standard operating procedures for emergency responses in these heritage sites.

As a result of these activities a network of trained professionals has been established and future training programmes are currently being planned for the next two years in collaboration with national and international agencies.

Nepal

A few weeks after the 2015 earthquakes, the International Centre for the Study of Restoration and Preservation of Cultural Property (ICCROM) based in Rome, in collaboration with Nepal’s Department of Archaeology (DoA), International Council on Museums (ICOM), Risk Preparedness Committee of International Council on Monuments and Sites (ICOMOS-ICORP), and the Smithsonian Institution based in the US, led a joint initial damage assessment mission and carried out in-field training for evacuation, salvage and stabilisation of movable and immovable heritage. It is worth noting that besides heritage professionals, onsite training on preliminary documentation, handling and salvage of fragments from collapsed or damaged heritage buildings as well as collections was also imparted to civic defence agencies such as Army and Police, as well as volunteers from local community based organisations. This was first time that such a concentrated effort for cultural heritage in post disaster situation was undertaken in the region through collaboration between national and international organisations. Also for the first time, cultural heritage was included as an essential component in the post disaster needs assessment (PDNA).

In February 2016, at the request of DOA, ICCROM in collaboration with ICOMOS Nepal, and with the support of the Norwegian Ministry of Climate and Environment carried out another set of workshops on post-disaster recovery of movable and immovable heritage. The primary goal was to enhance the capacity of the Department of Archaeology (DoA) for leading the systematic recovery of cultural heritage sites and collections, and for incorporating risk management in every day practice.

As part of this training and a follow up project initiated by the local museum staff, the salvaged collection from the damaged national museum was given emergency treatment and put up in temporary storage cum display to ensure business continuity of the museums during the recovery process.

One year later in February 2017, another workshop on post disaster recovery of cultural heritage was organised by the DoA in cooperation with Ritsumeikan University, Kyoto, Japan to build further capacity of

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the freshly recruited staff of DoA on the decision-making process for the recovery of monuments and cultural heritage sites.

Bhutan

In December 2010, the Ministry of Home and Cultural Affairs of the Royal Government of Bhutan, convened an International Conference on Disaster Management and Cultural Heritage: Living in Harmony with the Four Elements in Thimphu, Bhutan, with financial and technical support from the Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery, World Bank, SIDA, UNDP, UNESCO and UNISDR. The Conference gathered 153 participants, 55 international participants from 23 countries and 98 participants from Bhutan, including experts and field practitioners involved in various fields of disaster management to reflect on the following five themes:

a. Policy and Institutional Framework for Disaster Management

b. Technical Aspects of Disaster Management

c. Traditional Practices for Disaster Risk Reduction

d. Post-Disaster Recovery of Cultural Heritage

e. Capacity Building and Networking

During intensive conference deliberations, the participants discussed the linkages between disaster management and cultural heritage under each of the five conference themes. The Thimphu Declaration was adopted as the outcome of this international conference for the first time in South Asian region.

Bangladesh

A training workshop on disaster risk management of cultural heritage was organised by Bangladesh University of Engineering and Technology (BUET) in cooperation with ICOMOS-Bangladesh in May 2016. The five-day workshop trained managers of heritage sites ranging from the Department of Archaeology, architects, and engineers in private practice as well as representatives of local NGOs to undertake comprehensive risk assessment and develop integrated disaster risk management plans for cultural heritage sites and museums in Bangladesh.Pakistan

The National Disaster Management Authority is contemplating development of policies and capacity building initiatives for disaster risk management of cultural heritage in cooperation with the Department of Archaeology. Such initiatives will go a long way in protecting rich cultural heritage from disasters.

Conclusions and Recommendations The recent initiatives outlined above, only mark the starting point for a long and challenging endeavour aimed at making our irreplaceable cultural assets safe from disasters so that future generations can cherish them as sources of identity and resilience. Some of the key areas that require sustained research and action are:

• Streamlining post-disaster reconstruction of heritage sites into overall rehabilitation processes nationally, and reconciling the theoretical frameworks for cultural heritage that are sometimes at odds with the idea of Build Back Better. However the critical challenge is to reduce vulnerability of cultural heritage while retaining the heritage values to the maximum possible extent. This would require a multi-disciplinary dialogue involving conservation and disaster management professionals. Current reconstruction in Nepal and Myanmar highlight these debates and offer the opportunity to investigate ways via which reconstruction of heritage sites can provide a safe and secure future for communities while reinforcing their social and cultural identity.

• Mainstreaming cultural heritage into overall sustainable development agendas so that it may feature more cohesively within reconstruction and rehabilitation frameworks that exist nationally as well as internationally. Given the significant contribution made by cultural heritage towards building resilience of communities for mitigating disasters as well as recovering from them through livelihood opportunities, integrating heritage within overall recovery plans is a critical area

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that needs to be examined. The inclusion of cultural heritage in the new Urban Heritage Agenda and the Sustainable Development Goals also provides an unique opportunity to advance efforts in this area

• There is immense potential for South Asian networks to be developed so that countries may learn from each other and that capacity may be built at a regional level through joint workshops, long term collaborations and exchanges. For instance, India’s recent policy initiatives can be used as an important opportunity to create a dialogue within South Asia through inter-governmental cooperation. SAARC nations and the SAARC Centre for Disaster Management should take up cultural heritage as a priority area and potentially establish a regional working group on protecting heritage from disasters. This can be achieved by engaging with existing international networks and institutions of cultural heritage such as ICOMOS (International Council on Monuments and Sites) and ICCROM (International Centre for the Study of Preservation and Restoration of Cultural Property) as well as disaster management organisations such as the UNISDR (United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction).

• Campaigns for awareness and raising the profile of cultural heritage need to be carried out at a larger scale to make an impact within South Asia. Existing efforts by individual institutions should be used to create new partnerships across borders in order to achieve this goal by creating synergies.

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133


Building Back Better: Lessons from South

Asia ConclusionsBy Ben Wisner1 and Mihir R. Bhatt2

1 Visiting Professor, Institute for Risk and Disaster Reduction, University College London, UK and Technical and Editorial Advisor to Duryog NIvaran on past and the current SADR.


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The case studies presented in this report, distill and discuss BBB in the context of the 2015 earthquake in Nepal in 2015, a deadly landslide

in Sri Lanka in 2014, floods and cyclones affecting India in 2013, cyclones with which Bangladeshis had to cope in 2007 and 2011, and the monsoon floods in Pakistan in 2012 and 2013. Reflecting the rich recovery experience provided by these preceding chapters, the recovery experiences of five South Asian countries carry lessons in three areas: Planning and Community Participation, Livelihoods and Resource Management, Coordination and Risk Governance.

Lessons for Planning and Community Participation• Continued Learning. Post-disaster response

and recovery interventions should have disaster-resistant features integrated into them. The focus should be on expanding the existing knowledge base and use of time-tested methods on one hand as well as continuous modernisation of the working methods and adoption of new and innovative ecosystem based technologies and construction materials. This implies the need for constant dialogue among those working in mainsteam development, risk reduction and recovery. Both vertical and lateral learning, make recovery more sustainable.

• Integrated Planning. Disaster preparedness and response requires integrated planning and action. An increasing number of plans - national to local – are being prepared now and their performance is also being monitored. What will help is quantifying these plans and the results they achieve on the ground. The focus on poor and anti-poverty initiatives is highly important. Recovery is an exploration of intimacies, boundary making and breaking, and porousness of the planning process through which the poor and victims come to be connected with the rest of the society.

• Community Involvement. Communities need to be involved in the design of preparedness systems. This includes involvement of children and women and other excluded groups. However, attention must be directed to the

sustainability and continuity of community-based groups that often rely on a few active people with little time to spare. It is important for agencies to start from where people are instead of where agencies are. For effective community engagement - leadership, a strategic approach to engaging partners, and a wide spectrum of public engagement events, can be key factors that enable community engagement that support the BBB and building community resilience.

• Utilisation of All Capacities. The capacities of various stakeholders must be assessed and addressed for the whole system to adequately and appropriately respond. Sectoral views of capacities helps for taking action, but for a longer direction what is needed is a whole system view.

• Action Channels. Planning and implementation channels for preparedness – between governments, NGOs and communities – need to be formalised. Government institutions should encourage humanitarian organisations to be prepared for long-term resilience building work whereas development agencies should be prepared for emergency works as well.

• Communication Channels. Channels for information dissemination are needed that allow the wider humanitarian community to learn and adapt from innovative, experimental approaches to integrated action. For example, effective governance is critical to ensure proper implementation of shelter programmes. For shelter, it is important that the government defines and supports a clear strategy underlining the role of each stakeholder, including of the home owner and the local private sector.

• Leadership. For response and recovery programming, community participation, in fact leadership, with a focus on vulnerable groups (especially women), is an important priority. It is particularly important to consider vulnerability for shelter construction processes to give women complete ownership and accountability of their shelters.

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Lessons for Livelihoods, Social Protection and Resource Management• Everyday Disaster. Extreme poverty,

marginalisation and physical isolation add burdens of “everyday disaster” such as poor health, food insecurity and lack of clean water to the challenge of recovery.

• Cash and Risk Transfer. Moving from cash transfer to risk transfer will aid BBB to move towards long term proactive measures. This implies development of accessible insurance and micro-insurance systems. Insurance and other ex-ante mechanisms are crucial to manage disaster risk and adapt to climate change. Risk transfer and insurance is of the utmost importance for poor and vulnerable populations to break the vicious cycle of poverty.

• Business Continuity. Rebuilding micro and small enterprises are needed to assist the vulnerable to recover. Micro and small enterprises are often among the worst victims of disasters. Continuity of their businesses is crucial for promoting a speedy and lasting community recovery. However, limited knowledge exists on how disasters affect them and what measures are needed to increase resilience. Further focus is required to understand and consider using market based solutions emerging for recovery, and study why and how they perform.

• Vital Role of Schools. Along with socially and economically disadvantaged and/or excluded groups such as the elderly and disabled, children remain most vulnerable and suffer the most in disaster situations. Disasters can have several direct as well as indirect negative effects on children. Long-term needs of children following a disaster include continued support for education, immunization and nutritional diets, including development of child-friendly infrastructure and adequate provision of WASH facilities. But all of these require detailed assessment of children

specific needs and data. Similarly, school safety audits are necessary to protect children from disaster risks. Children and education are one of the first priorities of a relief and recovery agenda.

• Development-Induced Disaster. Mega-project investments do not necessarily benefit the poorest people or cohere well in recovery efforts. Care should be taken by government authorities and NGO watchdogs to assure that big projects do not create new risks. Adequate social and environmental impact studies and monitoring is essential. Post disaster rehabilitation programmes must consider potential long-term events like climate change and interrelated hazards while building livelihoods and infrastructure for the communities and households.

• Land Use and Hazard Mapping. Local land use mapping and mapping of hazard and risk are keys to future early warning and risk reduction. This implies building institutional capacity at district and local scale.

• Sustainable Development. The role of actors to promote and strengthen the usage of renewable energy and sustainable forestry; stronger gender focus within programming and implementation related to climate change adaptation; programmes with dedicated finance support for gender in climate change adaptation and mitigation; and linkages for sustainable practices at the household and community level for the implementation are also important factors that have to considered when thinking of long term recovery programmes.

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Lessons for Coordination and Risk Governance• Clear Mandates. Multiple government bodies

often exist at national scale with overlapping missions. Clarity about their responsibilities and coordination among them is required.

• Transparency. Confidence in a national government’s role in recovery is increased if there are strong and transparent systems of accountability for use of disaster recovery funds.

• Missing Links. Gaps often exist at the sub-national (district) scale, where capacity and resources for DRR and BBB implementation maybe weak.

• Advocacy and Voice. The role of NGOs and corporate entities need to be directly focused on ensuring equitable delivery to the most vulnerable and less about the delivery of infrastructure and housing at a large scale. Both can bring in key actors and missing voices of the victims, especially the poor and women.

Is South Asia Building Back Better?If one returns to the summary of the UNISDR’s 16 BBB components presented in the Introduction to this report, the answer becomes apparent: Yes, countries are moving in the right direction, but more progress is needed. As highlighted in the introduction, these components were condensed into six categories.

• Government: National institutions and legislation exists, but there is some overlap and confusion about the mission and responsibilities of national institutions, and there are gaps at the sub-national scale where implementation may break down. Transparency and coordination could be improved. Development sectors must be aware that they are legally mandated to address the need of reconstruction in the sectoral development programme.

• Economy: There are few insurance or micro-insurance systems. Resettlement and relocation

of people displaced by disaster does not adequately address the recovery of sustainable livelihoods. BBB is a transformative opportunity to move to shared prosperity.

• Ecology: There are efforts at forest and coastal wetland vegetation, reafforestation and use of renewable sources of energy; however, these are scattered and not linked up with recovery programmes.

• Human Settlement: There are limited attempts to enforce building codes in the region’s large informal urban settlements. Urbanisation and climate change seem set to accelerate faster than efforts to control dumping of solid waste and expansion of self-built housing into flood prone areas. Much more effort is required.

• Safety Nets and Essential Services: Some school and hospital vulnerability assessments are done, but many essential services remain exposed to disruption.

• Vulnerable Groups: Elderly people, people living with disabilities, ethnic and religious minorities, children and women so far lack sufficient attention and recognition – attention to their specific needs in recovery and recognition of their unique skills and what they can bring to community-based recovery planning and action.

Finally, BBB depends on looking out for what works, who makes things work, and what is needed to make things work; an appreciation of the efforts of all the actors is needed. Collaborate and synergies among a whole host of actors far beyond the official disaster management machinery is needed to reach the ambitious objective of building resilient communities and ensuring that the poor and vulnerable are protected.

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SADR

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sia Disaster R

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Lessons from South Asia

Are we Building Back Better?

Contact details:Duryog NivaranW| www.duryognivaran.orgE| [email protected]| +92 51 285 4783

Regional Secretariat:

T| Chair: +919824051148

Pakistan

Country Coordinating points: India +919824051148

+88029854374+97714423639

+94112829412/+94774391575

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