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KRIPKE’S NAMING & NECESSITY
Or, an excursus into one of the most influential philosophical texts of the previous century,rejecting descriptivism, and a causal ‘story’ of names,
WHERE ARE WE?
o The Naïve Theory, as we discussed it, was unable to solve any puzzles.
o Frege has a nice system which easily accounts for the first three puzzles. However, he has trouble with (5). Plus, his view forces us into postulating senses.
o Russell’s system looks grand and has no problem with the puzzles, but he seems to stumble when it comes to referential uses of definite descriptions.
WHERE ARE WE?There is a kind of unifying thesis, underlying both
Frege & Russell’s views on singular terms:
A singular term links up with its referent or has the semantic value it does in virtue of describing it’s
referent
Frege: the mode of presentation captured in the sense determines the referent
Russell: the ‘singular term’ just is a description, and the referent is the thing that fits the description
WHERE ARE WE?We might say that both ascribed to The Description Theory of Names (a.k.a.
descriptivism), which says that each name N has the semantic value of some description (be it a
logical one, as for Russell, or a mode of presentation, as for Frege).
It really is a nice theory. The only defect I think it has is probably common to all philosophical theories. It’s wrong. You may suspect me of
proposing another theory in its place; but I hope not, because I’m sure it’s wrong too, if it’s a theory.
[Kripke N&N p. 64.]
THE PLAN1. 3 + 1 (Kripkean) Distinctions
2. Descriptivism Detailed
3. Descriptivism Destroyedi. Modal objectionii. Semantic Objectioniii. Knowledge Objection
4. Kripke’s Positive Account
3 + 1 DISTINCTIONSA priori versus A posteriori
Epistemic, not metaphysical or semantic
a priori: a statement is a priori iff it can be known independently of any experience A stronger notion Kripke rejects: a priori = can only
be known independently of experience
a posteriori: a statement is a posteriori iff it is not a priori, i.e. if it must be known via experience
3 + 1 DISTINCTIONSNecessary versus Contingent
Metaphysical, not epistemic or semantic
Necessary: a statement is necessary iff it couldn’t have been false Often discussed as truth in all possible worlds
Contingent: a statement is contingent iff it could have been false
3 + 1 DISTINCTIONSAnalytic versus Synthetic
Semantic, not epistemic or metaphysical
Analytic: a statement is analytic iff it’s true in virtue of its meaning
Synthetic: a statement is synthetic iff it’s not analytic
3 + 1 DISTINCTIONSKant distinguished analyticity from a priority and said that certain judgments were a priori but not
analytic:
Every event has a cause Nothing can be red all over and green all over All triangles contain 180°
analytic synthetica posteriori EMPTY Everything
elsea priori logic,
definitionsphysics,
philosophy, maths
3 + 1 DISTINCTIONSKripke distinguishes necessity from a priority and
says that certain statements are a priori but contingent, others necessary but a posteriori:
Necessary Contingenta posteriori ‘Hesperus =
Phosphorus’‘My shirt is
black’a priori ‘Hesperus =
Hesperus’‘Stick S is 1 meter long’
3 + 1 DISTINCTIONSMeaning-giving vs. Reference-fixing
Fixing the reference of a term is not always the same as giving its meaning!
If ‘the D’ gives the meaning of ‘a’, then ‘the D’ (maybe together with context) also fixes the
reference of ‘a’, but ‘the D’ can fix the reference of ‘a’ without giving its meaning
E.g. reference of ‘one meter’ was originally fixed as the length of a certain stick (‘the length of Stick S at time t0’), but the meaning of ‘one
meter’ is not the same as ‘the length of Stick S at time t0’
3 + 1 DISTINCTIONSI. Stick S is one meter long at t0
II. Stick S could have been slightly longer than one meter at t0
If the meaning of ‘one meter’ is ‘the length of Stick S at t0’, then I is analytic & necessary, and II is false
If the reference of ‘one meter’ is fixed as ‘the length of Stick S at t0’ but the latter does not give the meaning, then I is not analytic, and II is true
3 + 1 DISTINCTIONSThree dimensions upon which statements can
vary:
Semantic – Analytic vs. Synthetic Epistemic – A priori vs. A posteriori Metaphysical – Necessary vs. Contingent
Two roles descriptions can play:
Fixing reference of singular terms Giving meaning of singular terms
THE PLAN1. 3 + 1 (Kripkean) Distinctions
2. Descriptivism Detailed
3. Descriptivism Destroyedi. Modal objectionii. Semantic Objectioniii. Knowledge Objection
4. Kripke’s Positive Account
DESCRIPTIVISM DETAILEDBasic idea
DES: the semantic content of a proper name n is the connotation provided by a description d associated with n
‘Aristotle’ = ‘The teacher of Alexander the Great’
‘Bucephalus’ = ‘The favorite horse of Alexander’
‘Keanu’ = ‘The sad guy on the park bench’
DESCRIPTIVISM DETAILED‘Keanu’ means ‘The sad guy on the park bench’
Problem: Suppose that Keanu wasn’t sad & didn’t sit on the bench. Wouldn’t ‘Keanu’ still refer to Keanu?
Related: Is it analytic that Keanu sat on the
bench looking sad?
Further: Is it a priori that Keanu sat on the bench looking sad?
DESCRIPTIVISM DETAILEDDES: the semantic content of a proper name n is the connotation provided by a description d that is associated with n
DESSD: The semantic content of a proper name n is the connotation provided by a single description ‘the F’ that is associated with n (Frege, Russell)
DESCD: The semantic content of a proper name n is the connotation provided by a cluster of descriptions ‘the F, the G, and the H’ that is associated with n (Searle)
DESCRIPTIVISM DETAILEDAgainst DESSD: If we associate a singular description ‘the F’ with a name n, then the statement ‘n is the F’ is a necessary truth that is a priori knowable.
But ‘n is the F’ isn’t always a necessary truth that is a priori knowable!
Bucephalus & his being Alexander’s favorite horse!
Aristotle & his being Alexander’s teacher!
Therefore, DESSD is false – there isn’t always a single description associated with a name
DESCRIPTIVISM DETAILEDDescriptivist theory of proper names :
(1)Every name ‘n’ is associated with a cluster of properties that x believes are true of n (DESCD)
(2)Speaker x believes that these properties pick out a unique individual (otherwise, n wouldn’t be a proper name!)
(3)If y has most of these properties, then y is the referent of ‘n’ (from DESCD)
(4)If nothing has most of these properties, ‘n’ doesn’t refer (think of Russell on definite descriptions)
DESCRIPTIVISM DETAILED(5)The sentence ‘n has most of these properties’
is known a priori by x
i. ‘n’ has the same semantic content as ‘The thing that has most of these properties’
ii. Therefore, ‘n has most of these properties’ means the same as ‘the thing that has most of these properties has most of these properties’
iii. The statement ‘the thing that has most of these properties has most of these properties’ is a priori!
iv. Therefore, (5)!
DESCRIPTIVISM DETAILED(6)The sentence ‘n has most of these properties’
as uttered by x expresses a necessary truth
i. ‘n’ has the same semantic content as ‘The thing that has most of these properties’
ii. Therefore, ‘n has most of these properties’ means the same as ‘the thing that has most of these properties has most of these properties’
iii. The statement ‘the thing that has most of these properties has most of these properties’ is necessary!
iv. Therefore, (6)!
DESCRIPTIVISM DETAILED(C) These properties must be chosen in such a way that there is no circularity (i.e. no use of the
notion of reference)
CIR: For any theory of proper names T, if T tells us that a name n is associated with a description d that expresses a cluster of properties φ, either:
(i) φ must not include the property being called n,
(ii) φ does include the property being called n but it is possible to eliminate being called n from φ, or
(iii) T is circular
DESCRIPTIVISM DETAILEDIf φ includes the property is called the name ‘n’,
then that theory would amount to telling us that a person P has the property is called the name ‘n’
just in case S is the referent of n
Aristotle is called ‘Aristotle’ iff he’s called ‘Aristotle’
If one was determining the referent of a name like ‘Glunk’ to himself and made the following decision, ‘I shall use the
term ‘Glunk’ to refer to the man that I call ‘Glunk’,’, this would get one nowhere. One had better have some
independent determination of the referent of ‘Glunk’. [Kripke, N&N, p. 295]
DESCRIPTIVISM DETAILED
So, (1) – (6) are commitments of Descriptivism, (C) is a requirement any Descriptivist account must satisfy
Note: we could re-write (1) – (6) using a non-cluster Descriptivism; i.e. in terms of DESSD
Now that we’ve built up Descriptivism, Kripke is going to tear it down…
THE PLAN1. 3 + 1 (Kripkean) Distinctions
2. Descriptivism Detailed
3. Descriptivism Destroyedi. Modal objectionii. Semantic Objectioniii. Knowledge Objection
4. Kripke’s Positive Account
MODAL OBJECTION TO (6)Suppose Joe associates ‘Aristotle’ with the description ‘the teacher of Alexander the Great’. Joe says:
A Aristotle taught Alexander the Great.
Given (6), A expresses a necessary truth.
But A isn’t a necessary truth – Aristotle could have never gone into pedagogy
(note: this was the objection to DESSD!)
MODAL OBJECTION TO (6)More generally: ‘it is a contingent fact that Aristotle ever did any of the things commonly attributed to him today, any of these great achievements that we so much admire’ [Kripke N&N, p. 296]
i. Given (6), Aristotle necessarily satisfies our descriptionii. Possibly, Aristotle died in infancyiii. If so, it would follow that he didn’t do the things built
into his description (e.g. being the founder of formal logic; the greatest student of Plato; the teacher of Alexander; …)
iv. Therefore, Aristotle only contingently satisfies our description
v. Therefore, (6) is false!
MODAL OBJECTION TO (6)i. If a description d gives the semantic content
of a proper name n, then the proposition expressed by the sentence ‘if n exists, then n is d’ is necessary
ii. There are counterfactual situations where n exists but fails to be d
iii. Therefore, ‘if n exists, then n is d’ is contingent
iv. Therefore, description d fails to give the semantic content of proper name n
AGAINST THE MODAL OBJECTION?Serena Williams
Youngest sibling Tennis player
Won 4 Olympic Gold Medals Born in Michigan
There’s a possible world were she’s not the
youngest, doesn’t play tennis, won no medals, and wasn’t born in Michigan. For example:
AGAINST THE MODAL OBJECTION?World W1:
Middle Child Actress
No Olympic appearances Born in Indiana
But it’s still Serena!
AGAINST THE MODAL OBJECTION?World W2:
Actor No Olympic Appearances
Born in Canada Male!
But still Serena!
AGAINST THE MODAL OBJECTION?World W3:
Not a child at all Toaster!
No Olympic Medals Not born, manufactured
But still Serena!
AGAINST THE MODAL OBJECTION?Potential Objection:
How do we talk about ‘Serena’ in another possible world? Given descriptivism, wouldn’t I have to first provide a qualitative description of
the world, then find out which (if any) of the things there is ‘Serena’?
Kripke’s Reply:Step 1: Proper names (like ‘Serena’) are rigid designators; (most) descriptions are non-rigid
An expression e is a rigid designator iff e refers to the same object in all possible worlds
AGAINST THE MODAL OBJECTION?Aside on a potential confusion:
To say that ‘Serena’ is a rigid designator is not to say that Serena couldn’t have had a different name.
Serena could have been named ‘Monica’, and when used by the inhabitants of the possible world where that’s so, the name ‘Serena’ doesn’t refer to Serena.
Kripke’s Idea: when we use the name ‘Serena’, we refer to the same individual in any possible world where that individual exists
AGAINST THE MODAL OBJECTION?Aside on a potential confusion:
Take world (w4) where the guy we call Nixon is named ‘Humphrey’ & the guy we call Humphrey
is named ‘Nixon’, but where the winner & loser of the 1970 US Presidential election is the same.
The following are true about w4:
(1) Nixon won the 1970 election – Our idiolect(2) Humphrey lost the 1970 election – Our idiolect(3) The winner of the 1970 election was named
‘Humphrey’ – Their idiolect(4) The loser of the 1970 election was named
‘Nixon’ – Their idiolect
AGAINST THE MODAL OBJECTION?Step 2: Possible Worlds aren’t discovered!
...it seems to me not to be the right way of thinking about the possible worlds. A possible
world isn't a distant country that we are coming across, or viewing through a telescope. Generally
speaking, another possible world is too far away. ...A possible world is given by the
descriptive conditions we associate with it... ‘Possible worlds’ are stipulated, not discovered by
powerful telescopes. There is no reason why we cannot stipulate that, in talking about what would
have happened to Nixon in a certain counterfactual situation, we are talking about
what would have happened to him (N&N p. 43-4)
AGAINST THE MODAL OBJECTION?Second Potential Objection:
Worlds like W3 above are too weird – it genuinely isn’t possible for Serena to have been a toaster!
There are no worlds where Serena fails to be human.
Kripke’s Reply:You must specify a description that uniquely picks
out Serena; being human isn’t going to cut it. Specify the particular properties – I’ll bet they
aren’t unique!
There might be necessary, but no sufficient qualitative limits on how things might have
been
THE PLAN1. 3 + 1 (Kripkean) Distinctions
2. Descriptivism Detailed
3. Descriptivism Destroyedi. Modal objectionii. Semantic Objectioniii. Knowledge Objection
4. Kripke’s Positive Account
SEMANTIC OBJECTION TO (3)(3) If y has most of these properties, then y is the referent of ‘n’ (from DESCD)
‘Kurt Gödel’ ‘The man who proved the
incompleteness of arithmetic’
SEMANTIC OBJECTION TO (3)Suppose, unbeknownst to us all, the incompleteness of arithmetic was actually proven by Schmidt,a friend of Gödel’s,who’s body was found in Vienna under mysteriouscircumstances…
SEMANTIC OBJECTION TO (3)Since the man who discovered the incompleteness of arithmetic is in fact Schmidt, when we talk about ‘Gödel’, we’re in fact always referring to Schmidt!
‘The man who proved the ‘Kurt Gödel’ incompleteness of
arithmetic’
SEMANTIC OBJECTION TO (3)But it seems to me that we are not. [N&N, p. 298]
Gödel
Schmidt
SEMANTIC OBJECTION TO (3)i. From (3), if a description d gives the semantic
content of a proper name n, then the thing that satisfies most of the d must be the referent of n
ii. There are situations where an object a satisfies most of d, but is not the referent of n; instead, object b is the referent of n
iii. Therefore, what satisfies most of d might not be the referent of n
iv. Therefore, (3) is false
THE PLAN1. 3 + 1 (Kripkean) Distinctions
2. Descriptivism Detailed
3. Descriptivism Destroyedi. Modal objectionii. Semantic Objectioniii. Knowledge Objection
4. Kripke’s Positive Account
KNOWLEDGE OBJECTION TO (2), (4), & (5)(5) The sentence ‘n has most of these properties’ is known a priori by x
If anyone is Gödel, he (uniquely) discovered the incompleteness of arithmetic
If anyone (uniquely) discovered the incompleteness of arithmetic, Gödel did
Both should be truths any competent user of ‘Gödel’ should be in a position to know a priori
KNOWLEDGE OBJECTION TO (5), (4), & (2)But even if we are competent users of the name, we’re not in a position to know the following a priori:
If anyone is Gödel, he (uniquely) discovered the incompleteness of arithmetic
If anyone (uniquely) discovered the incompleteness of arithmetic, Gödel did
Suppose (again) that the discovery of the arithmetical incompleteness is due to Schmidt, whom Gödel murdered and stole the proof from!
This (plausible) situation flatly contradicts (5)
KNOWLEDGE OBJECTION TO (2), (4), & (5)(4) If nothing has most of these properties, ‘n’
doesn’t refer
It doesn’t seem to be the case – Gödel could still exist (and ‘Gödel’ still refer), even if nobody proved the incompleteness of arithmetic!
It seems possible that the referent of ‘n’ exists despite the fact that there is nothing that has most of the properties built into the description
KNOWLEDGE OBJECTION TO (2), (4), & (5)(2) Speaker x believes that these properties pick out a unique individual
How much do we know about Richard Feynman?
F ‘Feynman’ means ‘The famous physicist’
Fails to distinguish Feynman uniquely from Einstein, Gell-Mann, Hawking, etc.
The description ‘the physicist named ‘Feynman’’ would pick him out uniquely, but it violates (C)!
KNOWLEDGE OBJECTION TO (2), (4), & (5)Carly Rae Jepsen
The singer of ‘Call Me Maybe’
KNOWLEDGE OBJECTION TO (2), (4), & (5)The singer of ‘Call Me Maybe’
Against (5): Did you know a priori that CRJ sang ‘Call Me Maybe’?
Against (4): Even if nobody ever sang ‘Call Me Maybe’, ‘CRJ’
would refer to CRJ!
Against (2): Does the singer of ‘Call Me Maybe’ uniquely pick out CRJ?(Have you ever sung it out loud?)
THE CONSEQUENCESDescriptivist theory of proper names :
(1)Every name ‘n’ is associated with a cluster of properties that x believes are true of n
(2)Speaker x believes that these properties pick out a unique individual
(3)If y has most of these properties, then y is the referent of ‘n’
(4)If nothing has most of these properties, ‘n’ doesn’t refer
(5)The sentence ‘n has most of these properties’ is known a priori by x
(6)The sentence ‘n has most of these properties’ as uttered by x expresses a necessary truth
– Epistemic Argument
– Epistemic Argument
– Epistemic Argument
– Semantic Argument
– Modal Argument
So, why accept the descriptivist theory of proper names?
THE PLAN1. 3 + 1 (Kripkean) Distinctions
2. Descriptivism Detailed
3. Descriptivism Destroyedi. Modal objectionii. Semantic Objectioniii. Knowledge Objection
4. Kripke’s Positive Account
WHERE FROM HERE?If descriptivism is wrong, two new questions:
Reference: What determines what (if anything) a name refers to? The causal theory of reference
Meaning: What is the meaning of a name? Names are rigid designators
CAUSAL THEORY OF REFERENCEThe referent of a name is fixed by a causal
history:It’s in virtue of our connection with other
speakers in the community, going back to the referent himself, that we refer to a certain man
Baptism: how a name first comes to refer to a thing: by ostension – point at it and say ‘I name that
‘n’’ by description – describe it (a la ‘Hesperus’)
The causal chain: after baptism, the name can be transmitted to others via suitable causal links
CAUSAL THEORY OF REFERENCEThe causal picture of reference:
An utterance of a proper name ‘n’ refers to x iff the utterance is at the end of a sequence of
utterances of ‘n’ the first member of which is an initial baptism of ‘n’ and every other member of
which is ‘properly linked’ via a causal chain to the previous member
Example: Feynman was named by his parents, who then transmitted his name to others, who then transmitted it to others, who then (eventually) transmitted it to us!
BACK TO THE BEGINNINGThe necessary a posteriori
The ancients believed the Morning Star (Phosphorous) and the Evening Star (Hesperus) were distinct stars, though they are the planet Venus.
‘Hesperus is Phosphorous’ is a posteriori It took empirical investigation to discover it’s truth
‘Hesperus is Phosphorous’ is necessary The names are rigid designators, and if two names
are rigid designators and have the same referents, then they necessarily co-refer
BACK TO THE BEGINNINGPerhaps the ancient Babylonians said:
P It might be false that Hesperus is Phosphorous
S is epistemically possible for y iff y’s evidence doesn’t rule it out
S is metaphysically possible iff S might be the case
When the Babylonians say P, they mean that for all they know, it might be false that Hesperus is Phosphorous – their evidence doesn’t rule it out; that doesn’t mean it is metaphysically possible
BACK TO THE BEGINNINGThe contingent a priori
Suppose we take a certain stick S and stipulatively fix the reference of ‘meter’ by claiming that 1 meter is the length of S at t0.
It is a priori that S is 1 meter long – ‘1 meter’ is a rigid designator, the reference of which is fixed as the (actual) length of S at t0!
It is contingent that S is 1 meter long – S could have been longer or shorter than it actually is at t0!
WHAT HAVE WE LEARNED?
Distinguished our three distinctions
Offered three significant objections to the descriptivist account of singular terms
Introduced to Kripkean notion of rigid designation
Sketched Kripkean causal theory of reference
QUESTIONS FOR NEXT TIME
1) How can Kripke’s account handle the puzzles?
2) Would the failure of Kripke’s account to handle the puzzles undercut his objections to descriptivism?
Next Week: Kripke’s A Puzzle About Belief
It’s already uploaded to the webpage. Note that the last seven pages are footnotes – feel free to skip them
