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Schriftenreihe der GTZ, Nr. 270
Crisis Prevention and Conflict Managementin Technical Cooperation
Andreas MehlerClaude Ribaux
Crisis Prevention and Conflict Managementin Technical Cooperation
An Overview of the National and International Debate
Wiesbaden 2000
UniversumVerlagsanstalt GmbH KG
Published by: Deutsche Gesellschaft für
Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) GmbH
Postfach 5180 · 65726 Eschborn
Federal Republic of Germany
Internet: http://www.gtz.de
Responsible: Bernd Hoffmann, GTZ
Editors: Simone Kopfmüller, GTZ; Niels von Keyserlingk, GTZ
Research Manuela Leonhardt, International Alert
consultants: Dr. Reinhardt Rummel, Conflict Prevention Network (CPN)
Translator: John D. Cochrane
On the authors
Dr. Andreas MehlerPolitical scientist, research assistant at the Institute of African Affairs, Hamburg.Specialist areas: crisis prevention, democratisation processes and elections inFrench-speaking Africa; temporarily senior researcher at the Conflict PreventionNetwork (SWP-CPN) in Ebenhausen, co-author of the EU handbook “Peace-Building and Conflict Prevention in Developing Countries: A Practical Guide”and author of numerous scholarly works on the crisis prevention theme. Trainingcourses on peace-building for the EU Commission, consultant in the BMZ serial“Impacts of Development Cooperation in Conflict Situations” (1998/99), Rwandacase study (co-author).
Claude André RibauxSocial anthropologist, Director of the Support Organisation “GO!”, St. Gallen(Switzerland), providing services for project design and implementation, training(including conflict management), counselling and coaching. Experience asproject manager and interim head of department at Swiss Red Cross. Regionalspecialisation: Bangladesh, Nepal, India and Pakistan. Publications on self-helppromotion, organisation development and basic/primary health.
Die Deutsche Bibliothek – CIP Cataloguing-in-Publication-Data
A catalogue record for this publication is available from
Die Deutsche Bibliothek
ISBN 3-88085-527-7
Foreword
Since the early 90s,an intensive international and national debatehas been under way concerning the role and impact ofdevelopment cooperation in the context of violent conflicts. Theshock of the genocide in Rwanda in 1994 heightened the debate,revolving around two main questions: How and through whichinstruments can programmes and projects of developmentcooperation make a contribution to conflict management and crisisprevention? How can development organisations prevent theiractivities from themselves exacerbating the conflicts concerned?
Multi- and bilateral, governmental and non-governmentalorganisations currently attach high priority to answering thesedifficult questions. Presently in many institutions attempts arebeing made to develop strategies and possible solutions. Thisstatement also applies to GTZ and Technical Cooperation as awhole. It is,however,becoming increasingly difficult to keep pacewith the new developments and innovations,as well as to integratepositive results and experiences. Nevertheless, considering thefuture professional requirements for personnel working in TC, it isabsolutely essential that they take part in the international andnational expert debate,to foster their conceptual development andpositioning.
Through the present study,GTZ aims to help provide theoreticiansand practitioners with an overview of the current status of thatdebate. Given the speed of developments, the publication canprovide only a snapshot of the state-of-the-art. Further monitoringand exploration of the subjects discussed are a must.
Our thanks are due to the two authors of the publication, Dr.Andreas Mehler and Claude Ribaux. In a relatively short space oftime,they have succeeded in conducting numerous interviews,andin collecting and collating a wealth of information. The text isenriched by the authors’ own reflections and thoughtful remarks.We hope the publication will provide all readers with food forthought when shaping their own views.
Dr.Bernd Eisenblätter Bernd HoffmannDirector General Head of Division
Foreword
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Contents
List of Abbreviations and Acronyms 8Authors’ Preliminary Remarks 10Summary 12
1. The Current Importance of Crisis Prevention and Conflict Management 21
2. Crisis Prevention and Conflict Management in the Development-policy Debate 272.1 Distinctions 282.2 The Confusing Multitude of Terms 312.3 International Positions 362.4 Policy Frameworks in Germany 462.5 Principles of Intervention 512.6 Code of Conduct 55
3. Instruments 583.1 Early Warning, Reporting and Analysis
in Crisis Prevention 583.1.1 Early Warning 593.1.2 Information Flow and Reporting 643.1.3 Country and Regional Studies 683.1.4 Analytical Capacities 713.1.5 Analytical Instruments 723.2 Planning 743.2.1 Country Programmes 753.2.2 Financial Planning/Budgeting 783.3 Impact Assessment 803.3.1 Conflict Impact Assessment 803.3.2 Evaluations 863.4 Institutionalisation and Capacity Building 88
4. Areas of Activity 934.1 Reducing the Structural Causes of Conflicts
and Building Conflict Management Mechanisms 934.2 Participatory Rapid Appraisal and
Conflict Analysis 1024.3 Community-based Peace-building 105
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4.4 Promoting Local and Regional Conflict Management Initiatives 107
4.5 Media Support for Peace 1114.6 Education and Training for Peace 1134.7 Security-sector Reform 1154.8 Legal Assistance 1204.9 Promoting Democratic Transition 1224.10 Empowerment 1254.11 Conflict Management and Crisis Prevention
in the Reconstruction Process 1264.12 Trauma Healing and Reconciliation 1304.13 Gender Aspects in Crisis Prevention
and Conflict Management 134
5. Training for Crisis Prevention and Conflict Management 1375.1 Training of Personnel 1375.2 Experiences and Practice 1425.3 Training Local Actors 150
6. Outlook and Open Questions 1536.1 The Future 1536.2 Open Questions 156
7. Annex 1607.1 Literature 1607.2 Websites 1757.3 List of Interviewees 182
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List of Abbreviations and Acronyms
AGEH Association for Development Aid (Germany)AGKED Association of Church Development Services
(Germany)ASPR Austrian Study Centre for Peace and Conflict
ResolutionBICC Bonn International Centre for ConversionBMVg German Federal Ministry of DefenceBMZ German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation
and DevelopmentCIAS Conflict Impact AssessmentCIDA Canadian International Development AgencyCPN Conflict Prevention NetworkCPR Conflict Prevention and Post-Conflict Reconstruction
NetworkCPS Civil Peace ServiceDAC Development Assistance Committee of OECDDEA Development-oriented Emergency AidDED German Development ServiceDEZA Swiss Agency for Development and CooperationDFAIT Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade
(Canada)DFID Department for International Development (UK)DG Directorate-General (EU Commission))EAWARN The Network for the Ethnological Monitoring and
Early Warning of Conflict (Russia)ECHO European Community Humanitarian OfficeEU European Union EZE Protestant Central Agency for Development Aid
(Germany)FAST Early Recognition of Tension and Fact Finding (Swiss
Ministry of Foreign Affairs)FC Financial CooperationFES Friedrich Ebert Foundation (Germany)FEWER Forum on Early Warning and Early ResponseGTZ Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische
Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) GmbH (Germany)HEWS Humanitarian Early Warning System (UN Department
for Humanitarian Affairs)
List of Abbreviations and Acronyms
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IA International AlertICRC International Committee of the Red CrossIGAD Intergovernmental Authority on DevelopmentKAS Konrad Adenauer Foundation (Germany)KfW Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (Germany)LPI Life and Peace Institute (Sweden)NORDEM Norwegian Resource Bank for Democracy and
Human RightsNOVIB Nederlands Organisatie voor Internationale
OntwikkelingssamenwerkingNGO Non-governmental organisationNRC Norwegian Refugee CouncilNUPI Norwegian Institute of International AffairsOECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
DevelopmentPRA Participatory Rapid AppraisalSIDA Swedish International Development Cooperation
AgencySRC Swiss Red CrossTC Technical CooperationUMCOR United Methodist Committee on ReliefUN United NationsUNDP United Nations Development ProgrammeUN DPKO United Nations Department for Peacekeeping
OperationsUNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for RefugeesUNICEF United Nations Children’s FundUNOPS United Nations Office for Project ServicesUNOSOM United Nations Operation in SomaliaUNRISD United Nations Research Institute for Social
DevelopmentUSAID United States Agency for International DevelopmentWFP World Food ProgrammeWSP War-torn Societies Project
List of Abbreviations and Acronyms
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Authors’ Preliminary Remarks
The following findings, reflections, experiences and commentsfrom the domain of crisis prevention and conflict management inTechnical Cooperation are the combined result of our study ofdocuments, of interviews we held, of the analysis of our ownexperiences, and of our active discussions with a considerablenumber of persons.Staff members,managers and desk officers fromover 25 bilateral, multilateral and private organisations in over tencountries invested their valuable time in answering our questions,giving us tips and tracking down documents. We owe them oursincere thanks.Without their assistance,and the energetic supportof the staff of Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammen-arbeit (GTZ) GmbH, it would not have been possible in the timeavailable to gain a virtually complete picture of the situation in thisrapidly evolving field of discussion.
The methods applied in preparing the study comprised informaltalks, structured interviews, and study of the literature, brochuresand websites. In a first phase we contacted possible interviewees,and informed them in writing about GTZ’s project, the context ofthe study and the anticipated product. Informal talks were heldwherever possible. The structured interviews were held on thebasis of a questionnaire, developed in consultation with GTZ. Weasked questions concerning the activities of the interviewee’sorganisation in the fields of crisis prevention and conflictmanagement,the principles of action,and the planning of projects.We wanted to know how conflict analysis was enacted in crisis andpre-crisis situations, how crisis prevention and conflictmanagement structures became integral parts of institutions, andwhat funds were being made available. Since capacity building iskey to later results in any area of work,we also focused some of ourattention on this important issue, a line of enquiry which led usdirectly to the challenge of staff training. It was of course alsoimportant to learn how the various organisations assess theimportance of crisis prevention and conflict management now andin the future,and to find out where Technical Cooperation (TC) canhave recourse to comparative advantages. We supplemented theinformation thus obtained by studying written materials such asannual reports, brochures on the organisations, studies and
Authors’ Preliminary Remarks
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evaluations on specific themes,general literature,and presentationson the internet.
We had to complete the interviews, the reading,and the writingof the report within a few weeks. This meant that for practicalreasons we were unable to make a planned journey to NorthAmerica,which would have included visits to Canada and the USA,as well as further interviews that had been envisaged for Europe.The study thus represents a snapshot of the present status, with afocus on Europe. The analysis of the state-of-the-art of the NorthAmerican institutions was conducted through correspondence,and by studying the existing documentation. Unfortunately it wasnot possible to conduct interviews with organisations outside ofEurope,for instance with Japanese non-governmental organisations(NGOs).
In accordance with GTZ’s wishes, the scope of the study wasconfined to Technical Cooperation. Clearly, in certain areas theboundaries of TC are also permeable to other forms of activity,andvice versa.
To add some colour to the analysis,we have incorporated projectexamples into the text. It was, however, neither our task nor ourintention to evaluate or comment on the quality of these projectsin any way.
To enhance the utility of the text, we have attached an annexlisting the relevant websites. It includes the addresses of over 80homepages of organisations operating in the field of crisisprevention and conflict management. We decided to include thelist without comment, so that readers can form their ownimpression. The annex also contains references to a few keydocuments which we believe are particularly helpful in the contextof the current debate.
Andreas Mehler/Claude Ribaux, June 2000
Authors’ Preliminary Remarks
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Summary
Crisis prevention and conflict management are comparativelynew, but already prominent issues for national and international,and governmental and non-governmental organisations involved indevelopment cooperation.The current debate revolves around twoquestions of more or less equal importance:1. How and through which instruments can Technical Cooperation
(TC) help prevent crises?2. How can TC organisations prevent their own activities from also
unintentionally exacerbating the crisis?
At a concrete level a further question arises: How can TCorganisations better brief and prepare their staff for assignments tocountries in crisis, assignments which are becoming increasinglystandard?
To answer these questions, the study is broken down into fivesections.The first section elucidates the current importance of thedebate. It is followed by a discussion of the development-policydebate concerning crisis prevention and conflict management.Thethird section takes the reader from project planning to impactmonitoring,introducing the range of instruments currently used orunder discussion,from early warning to conflict impact assessment.The fourth section focuses on briefly describing and exemplifyinginnovative areas of activity.This is followed by a discussion of stafftraining, and a presentation of future options as well as openquestions.A list of key websites and a bibliography completes thereport.
The study also provides information on the current national andinternational professional debate, and explains the currentconceptual, analytical, institutional and operational approachesrelated to the issues at stake.
The Current Importance of the Subjects Discussed
Since the mid-1990s,the development-policy debate has been onthe move.The secular shock of the genocide in Rwanda in 1994 –Rwanda was a focal country for numerous donor organisations –triggered the new debate.International bodies increasingly turned
Summary
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their attention to violent conflicts. The conclusions they drew,coupled with public awareness-raising activities conducted byspecialised non-governmental organisations (NGOs),influenced allactors engaged in development cooperation.A marked increase inself-critical viewpoints ensued.At the same time, something like afiercely contested “market” emerged for crisis prevention andconflict management measures. This is indisputably linked toexplicit political directives on the part of national governments andinternational organisations,as well as to changes in budgeting.Theemergence and growth of networks of development organisationsand experts bears witness to the increasing significance of thediscussion of violent conflicts, and their prevention. In mostorganisations,the new requirement to act somewhat inconsistentlywith established practices, and real resistance within theinstitutional apparatus, have delayed an offensive treatment ofconflict-related challenges.
Crisis Prevention and Conflict Management in theDevelopment-policy Debate
From the international relations perspective, developmentcooperation is also seen as an instrument to influence (domestic)policymaking in partner countries,and this increasingly with a viewto preventing violent conflicts. Technical Cooperation has bothadvantages and disadvantages compared to Financial Cooperation,political dialogue,the work of political foundations or even militaryinterventions, when pursuing this objective. The reduction ofstructural disparities is one of its most obvious strengths.
The international debate is sometimes marred by the broaddiversity of terms used in discourse.The terms crisis prevention andconflict management have become the established standard in theGerman-speaking countries. Increasingly, the strengthening ofpeace constituencies is being specified as a strategic goal.
International Positions
The Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of theOrganisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
Summary
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(OECD), the European Union (EU) and a number of actors of theUN family have come forward with key conceptual approaches tocrisis prevention. Bilateral donors have in many cases adopted,filtered or combined those positions,and proceeded to apply themin their own work in a variety of concrete settings.Among the mostimportant,internationally acknowledged conceptual contributionsare the OECD-DAC Guidelines on Conflict,Peace and DevelopmentCo-operation of 1997, which are planned to be revised in the year2000. The concept of a “culture of prevention” has been stronglysupported by the UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan.If applied withconsistency this concept paves the way to seeing all kinds ofdevelopment projects as potentially helpful to prevent crises,provided that they are designed accordingly. Having said that, anumber of innovative activities may be more efficient thanmainstream development programmes tuned into crisis preventionand conflict management projects.Bilateral donors have addressedthe issue with various levels of intensity, with the UK, theNetherlands and Norway playing a prominent role in the Europeancontext.
Policy Frameworks in Germany
The German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation andDevelopment (BMZ) has been devoting increased attention to crisisprevention since the mid-1990s.The new German Government hasdevoted major prominence to this increasingly critical field. TheFederal Minister for Economic Cooperation and Development,Ms.Heidemarie Wieczorek-Zeul, has indicated that developmentcooperation must become more active in two main areas:1. To help eradicate the structural causes of violent conflicts by
improving economic, social, ecological and political conditionsin partner countries.
2. To help establish mechanisms of non-violent conflictmanagement.
The national debate has been stimulated by a widely circulatedevaluation of development cooperation programmes in sixcountries affected by crisis. Politically, new pressure is beingmounted due to an intensified discussion of the instrument of the
Summary
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“Civil Peace Service”(CPS). At the same time a list of crisis indicatorsis being tested in a pilot phase. Seen in a broad context, BMZ haspositioned itself closely in line with the mainstream strategic andconceptual approaches shared by the international community.
Principles of Intervention
The strategic and conceptual approach to crisis prevention andconflict management is characterised by a number of principles,with the “do no harm”principle enjoying the greatest prominence.Consequently, a critical look needs to be taken at the unintendedimpacts of humanitarian and development aid. The debate is alsomarked by a call for a willingness to take risks, and long-termcommitment. In a process of self-critical reflection by TC,codes ofconduct are being discussed which are designed to reduce thenegative side-effects of TC.
Instruments:Early Warning, Reporting and Analysis in Crisis Prevention
The first requirement for crisis-sensitivity is a knowledge of thecauses and risks of the conflict.Early warning is one dimension ofcrisis prevention that has received a comparatively large amount ofattention from the academic community, without any ready-madesolutions tailored to the practical requirements of TC having beenpromised. For an early warning system to have any prospect ofbeing applied, it must be tailored to the needs of the end user.TCinstitutions,which can be both beneficiaries and providers of earlywarning systems, and academics will no doubt also beexperimenting with various models in the future. One advantageof TC organisations with respect to information gathering is theirrelatively close contact with grass-roots target groups,giving themalmost exclusive access to knowledge on conflict situations incertain disadvantaged regions. To date, however, the reality ofdevelopment cooperation is that the flow of information has beendisrupted by numerous structurally-induced obstructions.
Analytical capacities are underdeveloped in almost all TCorganisations, with staff shortage usually being specified as the
Summary
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main reason. Attempts are made to compensate this by calling-inexternal expertise. In a number of cases, help desk functions areperformed externally,and country analyses are often commissionedto external third parties.In summary,country studies should displayfour strengths, although these are rarely likely to be achievedsimultaneously:
■ adequate overview of the situation on the ground;■ knowledge of the potentials for intervention, constraints and
budget lines of the commissioning party;■ general overview of the entire spectrum of crisis prevention
measures;■ clear recommendations on appropriate priority setting.
Planning
When cooperating with countries in crisis, a number oforganisations begin by designing their activities on the basis ofmore crisis-sensitive planning than in “normal cases” ofcooperation. This approach to project planning encounters thegeneral obstacle of rigid financing models; more flexibleprocedures (for instance conflict-related budget reserves) are onlygradually emerging. Explicit strategies for countries in crisis canraise awareness and promote sensitivity in this field.
Institutionalisation and Capacity Building
The institutionalisation of crisis prevention and conflictmanagement in TC organisations and responsible ministries varieswidely:entire departments on the one hand, the lone figure of theconflict advisor or loosely-structured working groups on the other.All these solutions have advantages and disadvantages, dependingon the requirements as well as the financial potentials.Having saidthat, a “narrow gauge” solution is unlikely to be the appropriateresponse to the numerous new challenges.
Summary
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Impact Assessment
So far there have been only few evaluations of TC in terms ofcrisis prevention. However, the major organisations are in theprocess of developing criteria and terms of reference for theirconsultants, in order to ensure a more systematic approach toconflict-related issues.
As with impact assessment in development cooperation ingeneral, conflict impact assessment (CIAS) also faces the basicproblem that it is very difficult to ascribe individual outcomes anddevelopments to specific causes,given the large number of actors,projects and other factors involved. Although CIAS is still beingdeveloped, it is already seen not as an end-result-orientedinstrument,but as a tool for in-process analysis,especially since theimpacts in question (trajectory of violent conflicts and peaceprocesses) are of a dynamic nature.
Areas of Activity
There is little certainty and barely any comparative studiesavailable on what practice will most likely yield the most promisingresults.However,there is a common understanding that governancemeasures are significantly conducive to peace. At the same time,the dominant view within TC organisations is that the same effectscan be achieved by applying the correct mix of measures from TC’sown broad repertoire. It is thus assumed that the issue of whetherproject impacts reduce or exacerbate a conflict cannot be assessedsimply on the basis of their sectoral focus.
Consequently, almost any traditional development project can,under certain circumstances, generate preventive impacts, orexacerbate tensions. The key approach here is to adapt measuresintelligently, gearing them explicitly to reducing the causes ofviolent conflicts (structural disparities,poor governance,pressureof migration etc.). Some activities that are conducive primarily –and not just incidentally – to crisis prevention can be identified.This is most evidently the case with security-sector reform (thetriad of the security forces,and the justice and penal systems),andcommunity-based peace-building. The latter is proposed in theincreasing number of cases of state collapse, focusing on support
Summary
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for traditional leaders at the local level and district councils formedon a “bottom-up”basis.These two approaches clearly illustrate thekey role played by the redefinition of the state in countries in crisis,with respect to TC. Furthermore, the promotion of local andregional initiatives for conflict management,support to the media,education and training for peace,legal assistance,democratisation,and trauma healing and reconciliation are certainly amongst thecore innovations in this field.Also relevant are specific measures topromote crisis prevention and conflict management within thereconstruction process,and a keen awareness of gender issues.Jointconflict analysis by the parties involved, resulting ideally in aconsensus on the causes and course of the conflict, can be a firststep towards overcoming social barriers, and facilitate theformulation of alternatives to armed conflict. In asymmetricalconflicts in particular, however, it is absolutely essential that theweaker side be empowered to articulate its own objectives first,otherwise there will be no “basis for negotiation”on which conflictmanagement can build.
Conflict management aims to bring about constructive solutions,where possible for all parties to the conflict,and therefore requiresa needs analysis.Many TC organisations claim to be “apolitical”.Thisphilosophy is an obstacle to conflict management, because TC isper se of a political nature. The numerous development projectsthat already exist around the world offer broad scope forconstructive conflict management,which could be better utilised.In a number of domains TC has strategic advantages, in that it hasalready gained experiences (community development, education,participatory planning, gender issues). It also often has thenecessary contacts on the ground, and enjoys the trust also of thepoorer sections of the population. But as in other areas, TCorganisations can be perceived primarily as sources of money,andbe instrumentalised by local partners for completely unsatisfactoryends.One challenge for conflict management is the fact that mostpromising initiatives operate locally and with a relatively smallnumber of people.How can small, isolated activities be harnessedto create a critical mass which might prevent the outbreak ofviolent conflict? Only a well thought-out overall scaling-up strategycan help achieve this.
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Staff Training
Work in conflict, crisis or post-war situations places highdemands on personnel. It requires a broad spectrum of technical,social and personal expertise.This includes for instance an abilityto analyse conflicts and accurately assess the risk, an ability toengage in intercultural communication, and stress managementskills. In recent years, organisations and institutions secondingcivilian personnel on peace missions have increasinglyacknowledged the need to improve the briefing and preparation ofthose personnel (development workers, peace experts etc.) forsuch assignments to zones of conflict or crisis. By contrast, TCorganisations as a whole still have work to do in this respect. Asituation is arising in which the expertise required for specificprogrammes and projects of crisis prevention, and especiallyconflict management, is more frequently to be found outside theexisting staffs of TC organisations than within them.Also,virtuallyno TC organisations conduct systematic debriefing of staffreturning from countries in crisis.
Summary Evaluation
Crisis prevention and conflict management are still relativelyrecent areas of TC activity. It is evident that TC has not yet fullyutilised its potential to positively influence conflicts and crises,whilst at the same time TC continues to exacerbate crisesunintentionally.The recent prominence of conflict-related issues indevelopment-policy discourse is only now beginning to result innew financial, conceptual, personnel policy and institutionalpriorities. A number of TC organisations are, however, makingconsiderable efforts in all these fields. Nevertheless, at present,existing tools are not being applied, and there is a lack of trainingand impact assessment. There is also a lack of coherence andcoordination with other policies (diplomacy,foreign trade,securitypolicy).It is quite obvious that political dialogue,political educationand crisis-sensitive TC can generate complementary effects.However, the harmonisation requirement is high, and is usuallypoorly served. This all the more so due to the fact that in partnercountries it would be necessary to coordinate the activities not only
Summary
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of one donor, but also those of a large number of internationalactors.A number of open questions remain.Numerous efforts stillhave to be undertaken if the universally manifest prominence ofthe new paradigm is to generate relevant impacts at the level ofproject implementation. The future credibility of TC anddevelopment cooperation as a whole will depend very much onthe results yielded by those efforts.
Summary
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1. The Current Importance of CrisisPrevention and Conflict Management
Since the mid-1990s, the development-policy scenehas seen dynamic conceptual changes and debates,fuelled by the secular shock of the genocide in Rwandain 1994. Rwanda was a focal country for numerousdonor organisations. International bodies increasinglyturned their attention to violent conflicts. Theconclusions they drew,coupled with public awareness-raising activities conducted by specialised non-governmental organisations (NGOs),changed the waysall the development actors were thinking. A markedincrease in self-critical viewpoints ensued.At the sametime, something like a fiercely contested “market”emerged for crisis prevention and conflict managementmeasures.This is indisputably linked to explicit politicaldirectives on the part of national governments andinternational organisations, as well as to changes inbudgeting. The emergence and growth of thematicnetworks of development cooperation organisationsand experts bears witness to the increasing significanceof the theme of violent conflicts, and how to preventthem.
In Germany the debate also gained key impetus fromthe strategic thinking of the new political leadership atthe German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperationand Development (BMZ), the results of a cross-sectionreport on evaluations of German developmentcooperation in six countries affected by crises,and theestablishment of a “Civil Peace Service”(cf.Section 2.4).
Development cooperation in general, and TechnicalCooperation (TC) in particular, do not per se preventcrises.Development cooperation is rather also a factortriggering conflicts, and indeed must be so if it is toachieve its declared aim of promoting development inpartner countries. For decades, the issue of how tomanage conflicts, and of whether or not they can beresolved peacefully, was debated only peripherally bydevelopment organisations. Today, development
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1. The Current Importance of Crisis Prevention and Conflict Management
Development
cooperation and
conflicts
professionals are intensively debating the positivecontributions their institutions and organisations canmake, and the conditions required for that.
Crisis prevention and conflict management are thuscomparatively new cross-cutting issues for TC.Althoughdevelopment cooperation came to see itself also aspeace work early on, it adopted a view which was notalways ideology-free: It was believed that, sinceTechnical Cooperation served the end of povertyalleviation, and since poverty was the basic cause ofcrises and conflicts, TC was therefore serving peace.Since the mid-1980s, new ways of thinking havebecome established, and some of the old certainties ofdevelopment cooperation have been called intoquestion.As the Cold War came to an end,self-imposedblinkers were cast off: Partner governments whichhad hitherto been unquestioningly considereddevelopment-oriented in many cases now came to beseen as key constraints to sustainable development.Shortly thereafter, donors admitted to themselves thattheir own instruments and behavioural patterns wereoften inadequately serving their proclaimed ends, andthat development cooperation might also be serving tosupport elites hostile to reform. Whilst initially thispolitico-social status quo was considered as inevitable,however much it might be constraining thedevelopment process,towards the mid-1990s it becameincreasingly clear that some of these elites were evensteering a direct political course towards civil war anddisintegration of the state (Annan 1998).
There are certainly various factors shapinginternational thinking on crises and conflicts. In anumber of cases the regional and internationaldimensions are undeniable (Kosovo, DemocraticRepublic of the Congo). Yet we observed the recenttendency to see under-development – and thedifficulties in the transition to systems of liberaldemocratic government – less as the result of a(sometimes poorly functioning) global political andeconomic system, and more as an internal problem of
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1. The Current Importance of Crisis Prevention and Conflict Management
Questioning old
certainties
Endogenous
processes....
national institutions and elites, or as a consequence ofendogenous modernisation processes. This led to astronger emphasis on support for human rights issues,the establishment of civil society and the promotion ofdemocracy. These aspects became – at least verbally –essential back-up components of structural adjustmentprogrammes.
Based on the assumption that development problemsare mainly of a local nature (Carnegie Commission1997),but cannot be solved by countries internally,overthe last 15 years an increasing number of externalinterventions were legitimated on the grounds that theywere preventing refugee flows, genocide or masskillings. TC needs to specifically address this changedconstellation. Whereas relations with the poorestcountries were formerly a privilege almost exclusivelyreserved for TC, diplomacy and the private sector, inrecent years a variety of new actors have entered thearena. They somehow compete on TC’s “traditionalterritory”,thus making it necessary for TC organisationsto consult the new actors and coordinate activities withthem. UN emergency aid operations (implemented inpart through TC agencies), peace-keeping missions,military operations,delegations of political parties andspontaneous local initiatives of concerned citizens inEurope and North America are factors and actors withwhich TC today has to live (or co-exist), and in somecases even extend support to. This trend, however, iscreating two problems for donors and implementingorganisations:1. Emergency and humanitarian aid are consuming
ever-increasing shares of the budget available fordevelopment assistance.
2. In light of the events around the refugee camps inthe Great Lakes region (following the genocide inRwanda), and perhaps also earlier events,emergency aid came in for massive public criticismfor its tendency to also exacerbate conflicts(Prendergast 1996, Joint Evaluation 1996, Jean1999).
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1. The Current Importance of Crisis Prevention and Conflict Management
... and external
interventions
So do traditional TC and emergency aid intheir present form contribute unintentionally toexacerbating conflicts,rather than preventing them? Inconflict situations, both positive and negative impactsof development cooperation can be identified.
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1. The Current Importance of Crisis Prevention and Conflict Management
Development
cooperation – a factor
exacerbating
conflicts?
Possible positive and negative impacts of developmentcooperation in conflict situations
Source: Stephan Klingebiel, Impact of Development Cooperation in ConflictSituations, Berlin 1999, p.25. The box there also includes a further columnspecifying “problematical” impacts.
Possible positiveimpacts/contributions
Eventual removal of causes ofconflicts (regional disparities,employment opportunities, defusingof conflicts over resources, etc.)
Political and social stabilisation in theshort and medium term due toreconstruction efforts
Political openness, participation,democratisation and increase inconflict awareness of societies andpolitical systems
Achievement of security andimproved human rights conditionsdue to the presence of developmentcooperation personnel
Removal of opportunities for self-enrichment and of clientele systemsby means of economic reformprogrammes/structural adjustment
Possible negativeimpacts/contributions
Direct support for and stabilisation ofthe government (through officialdevelopment cooperation), which isitself a party to the conflict
Wrong signals sent to the governmentand opposition forces through“omission” (e.g. failure to seizeopportunities during the policydialogue) and “approval”
Exacerbation of the conflict throughthe encouragement given to clientelesystems and opportunities forcorruption
Increased regional imbalancesthrough the promotion of certainregions to the ruling elite’s liking
Violent countermeasures taken by theregime as a result of pressure forpolitical reform (eventually, however,removal of potential for violence)
Easing of the pressure exerted bydevelopment cooperation for actionto deal with the causes of conflicts(“internationalisation” of governmenttasks)
Today, virtually all major multilateral and bilateralTechnical Cooperation agencies, church-baseddevelopment organisations, political foundations andNGOs are addressing these problems. The focus is ontwo questions of more or less equal significance:■ How,and with which instruments,can development
cooperation agencies help prevent crises? ■ And how can they prevent their inputs from
themselves unintentionally exacerbating theconflict?
At a practical level, the following questions quicklyemerge:■ How do institutions prepare their personnel for
assignments to countries in crisis? ■ Are they or their partners able to engage in
constructive conflict management?These questions logically imply a number of thoughts
concerning the correct institutional, analytical,conceptual and operational approaches to pursue.
In crisis-affected countries as well as in donorcountries a new field of activities is emerging; thatactivity area is engaging a whole range of actors outsideof Technical Cooperation, namely diplomats, themilitary and experts with different backgrounds ofexperience.Thus TC represents but one segment of thepotentials for influencing violent conflicts, and istherefore only one actor among many.
In view of this the conviction has emerged that onlya coherent approach harmonising diverse policy fields(security, foreign, trade and development policy) canhelp successfully prevent crises.Although TC’s relativecontribution to achieving that success is rateddifferently by different authors, nowhere in theliterature is it considered crucial. (No doubt the sameapplies to its relative responsibility for the unintentionalexacerbation of conflicts).Caution should be observedin avoiding exaggerated expectations. Nevertheless,first evaluations do indicate that measures specificallytailored to the conflict are very much more effective
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1. The Current Importance of Crisis Prevention and Conflict Management
The relative
contribution of TC to
crisis prevention
Coherence is a must
than a late and reactive response by TC to a violentconflict (Klingebiel 1999,Uvin 1999).
It is therefore time to determine more precisely theplace of TC within crisis prevention and conflictmanagement. The object of the present study is toexplicate the existing conceptual understanding, andthe present state of the debate concerning appropriateapproaches and real scope for action in this connection.
26
1. The Current Importance of Crisis Prevention and Conflict Management
2. Crisis Prevention and ConflictManagement in the Development-policy Debate
Since the mid-1990s,the issue of violent conflicts hasmoved sharply up the development-cooperationagenda. Inevitably, the specifics of TC have often beena secondary consideration, given the wider focus onoverall engagement. Possessing the capability to takeproactive action to remove causes of conflicts and topromote the non-violent settlement of conflicts is justas much in the interests of development organisationsas their ensuring that they do not unintentionallyexacerbate conflicts. The development community isstill far from having fully discussed the issue of how toachieve these twin objectives.
Peace studies and applied theory of internationalrelations have yielded a variety of entry points forpreventive action in practical development work(Ramersbotham/Woodhouse 1999). In the widercontext of international relations, developmentcooperation is also seen as an instrument for shapingpolicymaking, essentially in terms of politicalconditionality.
Having said that, “positive” conditionality isconsidered a more promising approach overall than“negative”conditionality (Uvin 1999).
27
2.Crisis Prevention and Conflict Management in the Development-policy Debate
Theory and practice
“We believe it is legitimate to use development aid as a “carrot” or “stick” toget parties to accept third-party mediation and, also, to change policies thatare increasing the risk of conflict. Before doing so, however, carefulassessment should be made of the likely effects on the parties concerned.”
Source: Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI), DevelopmentAssistance as a Means of Conflict Prevention, Oslo 1998, p.4.
Only after the genocide in Rwanda (1994) did someof the key actors in development cooperation embarkon an arduous process of filtering out feasible andcompatible approaches, and of coming to understandtheir own potentials and limits in this regard. Thatprocess is still far from complete.In most organisations,incompatibilities with established practices and realresistance within the institutional apparatus havedelayed any offensive tackling of this challenge.
2.1 Distinctions
At this point those features of Technical Cooperationthat distinguish it from other actors and forms ofintervention within the field of crisis prevention andconflict management will be identified.In doing so it ishoped to obtain some first knowledge on comparativeadvantages and drawbacks.
The most obvious approach for TC is to addressstructural disparities that might be considered causesof conflicts: the gap between rich and poor, regionalunderprivilege, urban bias etc. This is the traditionalfield of action of Technical and Financial Cooperation(FC),which the latter need share with barely any otheractors. NGO measures often differ from official TC inthat, increasingly, they are being applied in “difficult”regions (such as in “collapsed states” à la Somalia) orspecial fields (such as mediation) (Klingebiel 1999). Inboth cases, local capacity-building is a priority.
A second group of key factors causing conflictsinvolves poor governance in partner countries. Suchsituations can be influenced through political dialogueconducted jointly by diplomats and the centraladministration in the ministries responsible fordevelopment cooperation. Traditionally, politicalfoundations also operate in this domain by participatingin or initiating topical political debates, and bypromoting political education. Technical Cooperation
28
2. Crisis Prevention and Conflict Management in the Development-policy Debate
The place of TC
within crisis
prevention
Influencing
policymaking
has also for a long time been playing a role in supportinggood governance: it seeks to help bring goodgovernance about by seconding government advisorsto various ministries.
Compared to political dialogue proper, TC has thedisadvantage of lacking political leverage, but has theadvantage of a close relationship to target groups. It ispossible that potentials for constructively addressingconflicts might also emerge at the local level – forinstance in a natural resource management project –that are not always exhausted.
Compared to the work of political foundations, TChas the drawback of being closely tied to statestructures,but the advantage of a larger volume of fundsbeing available, which is needed for sustainablestructural reforms designed to secure peace (forinstance decentralisation). It is quite obvious thatpolitical dialogue, political education and crisis-sensitive TC can operate on a complementary basis.Having said that, the consultation and coordinationrequirement is high and is usually poorly met.This is allthe more so because it would be necessary in all partnercountries to coordinate not only the activities of onedonor, but those of a large number of internationalactors.
Military peace-keeping missions, which are usuallyconducted under a UN mandate, are rarely appliedpreventively in the true sense of the word.They usuallysecure peace accords designed to put an end to anescalation in violence.The efficiency of these missionsis itself the subject of a separate debate which cannotbe dealt with here. Military interventions and TC do,however,share the experience that the will to maintainpeace on the part of the parties to the conflict is crucialto the success of their own actions. In the domain ofcivil-military cooperation there are overlapping, jointobjectives and actions. Compared to TC, militaryinterventions are very much more costly – a soundargument for civil intervention, and especially forpreventive as opposed to post-conflict involvement.
29
2.1 Distinctions
Comparison with
political dialogue
Comparison with the
work of political
foundations
Military interventions
Compared to Financial Cooperation, TC has smallerbudgets to help bring about medium-term structuralchanges in specific sectors. Yet this need not be adisadvantage.Compared to FC,TC has the advantage ofhaving in its hands experts and its own analyticalcapability and,in the event of a crisis escalating,of beingmore readily able to re-orient projects. FC-financedlarge-scale projects (dams, roads) entail an unusuallyhigh risk of conflict, and can themselves evencontribute to the emergence of conflicts. Material andfinancial assistance promote partner governments –which can mean a needed boost to legitimacy (andreduce one factor causing crises),but at the same timecan also unleash means of oppression and warfare.Once money has been disbursed, FC has only limitedmeans to exert further influence, for instance byattaching conditionalities to further disbursements, orbenchmarking. However, FC too has addressed its newchallenges and is seeking both ways to limit damagingsecondary impacts,and to positively influence existingconflicts (KfW 1999). Partner governments often havea particularly strong interest in FC,which is why “a linkto political dialogue or to conditionalities may inprinciple be highly effective” (Klingebiel 1999, p. VII).TC also often involves a long-term commitment and aprofound understanding of partner structures,which inthe eventuality of rising tensions should provide asound data base permitting appropriate low-levelintervention.
The reconstruction of a war-torn society and itseconomy in particular requires a considerabledeployment of funds, which can help prevent crisesprovided that the key design faults in the structuresexisting prior to the escalation can be rectified. Anumber of observers therefore see TC’s contribution tocrisis prevention as being primarily in the domain ofpost-conflict reconstruction. In this case,what is beingprevented is a second escalation of violence.However,the need for macro-economic reforms in post-conflictsituations is often just as great as the need for technical
30
2 Crisis Prevention and Conflict Management in the Development-policy Debate
Comparison with
Financial Cooperation
Role in reconstruction
reconstruction assistance. Yet even the World Bank,which appeared to be specialised in this kind ofinvolvement, is now seeking ways to intervene in allphases of a conceivable conflict cycle (World Bank1998,Moyroud 1999).
2.2 The Confusing Multitude of Terms
The multitude of terms currently employed in thefield discussed is problematic.It makes it more difficultto reach a common understanding of what is actuallymeant:conflict resolution,conflict prevention,conflictmanagement,conflict transformation,crisis prevention,peace-keeping,preventive diplomacy,peace-building –these and other terms are sometimes usedinterchangeably, even though they are intended todesignate a precise segment of possible activities.Whereas conflict resolution focuses on ending theconflict, which usually cannot be brought about byexternal intervention, conflict prevention is a termliable to misinterpretation, as it seeks to prevent aviolent escalation of conflicts, but not the conflictsthemselves.
31
2.2 The Confusing Multitude of Terms
There are also a range of peace-related termscovering deep-rooted collective conflicts that either arebeing or may be settled by means of violence. Thetrichotomy first presented by the Norwegian peacestudies expert Johan Galtung is the one most commonlyused.
32
2. Crisis Prevention and Conflict Management in the Development-policy Debate
The confusing multitude of terms
Conflict resolution:
Conflict resolution understood in one sense aims to end a conflict byachieving a workable compromise or balance of opposing interests.Alternatively, the term can imply an emphasis on agreeing concretemeasures to help resolve the points at issue and consequences ofthe conflict.
Conflict prevention:
A much used but frequently misunderstood term, since as a rule it is not theconflict itself which can be prevented, but rather its destructive escalation orthe acute use of violence (= prevention of violence).
Mediation:
Various possibilities exist for third-party intervention in favour of conflictmanagement. These range from the political intervention of a powerfuloutsider with its own interests, to legal proceedings for arbitration and theadministration of justice, to diplomacy between the parties involved and“good services”. For constructive conflict management, all these methodscan be of benefit. Recently, however, the focus has been mainly on“mediation” in the strict sense, in which a neutral third party directs theprocess of conflict management and assists all parties involved in thedeclaration of their interests and the development of “inclusive solutions”. Atthe same time it strengthens the parties and helps them achieve mutualrecognition, so that they are increasingly able to regulate the conflictthemselves.
Source: GTZ, DEA Glossary (English)
In the European debate, the term peace-building hasbeen popularised to mean measures aimed at achievinglong-term development objectives. In the Germandebate, two terms have emerged. They provide apragmatic distinction covering all the activities in thefield: crisis prevention and conflict management.
The Deutsche Gesellschaft für TechnischeZusammenarbeit (GTZ) has published the followingdefinitions for its own use:
33
2.2 The Confusing Multitude of Terms
a) Peace-making: The political resolution of conflicts by legitimate or defacto governments. Normally process oriented, peace making can howeveralso include measures and agreements of a structural nature designed tosecure the peace, for instance power-sharing arrangements. In recent timesthe concept has been widened to cover measures on the social level such assupport to “peace constituencies”.
b) Peace-building: Peace-building concerns the whole process ofestablishing or re-establishing the network of social relations that facilitatethe peaceful resolution of a conflict. This may include measures to stimulateeconomic development or social justice as well as initiatives for thereconciliation of opposing parties and the strengthening of common loyalties,and projects to encourage cooperation and “inter-cultural learning”.
c) Peace-keeping: As a rule, peace-keeping means the military separation ofhostile parties after an armistice by blue-helmet troops, sometimes, in crisissituations, as a preventive measure. In a wider sense the term may be usedoccasionally for civil measures taken to secure the peace.
Source: GTZ, DEA Glossary (English)
Remember: Pursuant to Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,peace-enforcement refers to the Security Council’s right of resort to militaryaction against individual parties to a conflict, in order to guaranteeinternational peace and security.
In practice, the distinction between the two spheresis not always that clear. Institutional development forconflict management (such as support of the formallegal system) for instance is to be considered a TCmeasure for crisis prevention. At the project level, acombination of measures often ultimately serves bothobjectives.Through this definition,the identification ofgeneral goals of TC for crisis prevention and conflict
34
2. Crisis Prevention and Conflict Management in the Development-policy Debate
Crisis prevention comprises early, planned, systematic and coherent actionat various levels of government and society to prevent violent conflicts.Crisis-prevention measures aim to
■ reduce the potential for a violent conflict
■ encourage the establishment of institutions to resolve conflicts peacefully,before, during and after violent conflict.
Crisis prevention in Technical Cooperation comprises projects(programmes, projects and/or measures) and instruments which expresslyaim to make a contribution to the peaceful resolution of conflicts. Crisisprevention in Technical Cooperation also means designing projects such thatthey do not themselves encourage a violent escalation of existing conflicts.
Technical cooperation measures with a crisis-prevention nature target variouslevels of action and various phases of a conflict. Crisis-prevention measuresin Technical Cooperation are particularly important before and after violentconflicts.
Source: GTZ, DEA Glossary (English)
Conflict management is the attempt to exert influence on the way a conflictis acted out, so as to regulate it, prevent violence and put an end to anyexisting violence. Conflict management aims to achieve constructivesolutions which benefit all participants (...).
Source: GTZ, DEA Glossary (English)
35
management is largely pre-determined.In each specificcase the design of measures and their objectives mustbe carefully tailored to the local setting, but will fallwithin this given framework.
People and institutions that in conflict situationsemphasise the common ground rather than the dividinglines, and stand to profit from conflict resolution byreaching agreement, are the natural partners of TC forcrisis prevention and conflict management.This appliesespecially if they are networked and possess influence.These are the “local capacities for peace”(Anderson) or“peace constituencies”which should first be identified,then selectively promoted (cf. Section 2.5 and Section4.1).
Peace constituencies
and local capacities
for peace
2.2 The Confusing Multitude of Terms
The concept of “peace constituencies” was developed by John PaulLederach in contrast to “war constituencies”, the latter denoting a group ofpeople who profit from the spread of violence. This group includesentrepreneurs who exploit their own ethnicity for profit, the armed forces,weapons manufacturers, and the Mafia. Peace constituencies may comprisebusinesspersons who are dependent on stable trading conditions, religiousinstitutions, human rights organisations, peace initiatives, media,independent scholars, former members of the armed forces, local leaders,trade unions and representatives of the administration. Within thisheterogeneous structure, NGOs (understood in the broadest sense as highlyto less structured non-governmental organisations) may play an importantrole by mobilising and organising networks. In many places, local NGOs areperhaps still too weak to influence state policy. Yet they can act as catalystsand initiators in the emergence of peace constituencies, thus laying thefoundation for lasting peace. Since local NGOs are often seen as biased onaccount of their leaders’ allegiances or regional roots, they should notnecessarily be termed neutral. Nevertheless they can alter the conflict-relatedbehaviour of the party towards which they are biased. They are theprototypical semi-neutral actors at the middle or bottom level of society, andthus play an inestimable role in the long-term prevention of violence andcivilisation of the conflict cycle. (After Lederach 1995 b)
Spoilers/dividers – or expressed in terms of the samelogic capacities for war (Anderson)/war constituencies– are the converse of peace constituencies. Especiallyin more protracted armed conflicts, “markets” and“cultures of violence”emerge which are an obstacle topeaceful resolution. Facilitating the identification andpursuit of a way out of these structures is a further entrypoint for crisis prevention activities.
2.3 International Positions
The Development Assistance Committee (DAC) ofthe Organisation for Economic Co-operation andDevelopment (OECD), the European Union (EU) and anumber of actors of the UN family have come forwardwith key conceptual approaches to crisis prevention.Bilateral donors have in many cases adopted,filtered orcombined those positions, and proceeded to applythem in their own work fitting into a variety of concretesettings.
Among the most important, internationallyacknowledged conceptual contributions are the OECD-DAC Guidelines on Conflict, Peace and DevelopmentCo-operation of 1997,which are planned to be revisedin 2000. The DAC Guidelines define the role ofdevelopment cooperation for specific phases of aconflict (see Box), yet also assign functions when theconflict is at its peak. Whilst a broad range ofdevelopment cooperation activities are consideredpotentially appropriate for conflict reduction, specificprecautionary measures are recommended in the eventof a crisis: Development agencies must adapt theiractivities to unstable conditions, but should always beready to seize opportunities to end the conflict. Theyshould already be planning for the post-conflict phaseduring the hostilities.An elevated risk of error needs tobe taken into account here. The Guidelines call for afirm commitment to democratic structures as aprecondition for sustainable development and peace;
36
2. Crisis Prevention and Conflict Management in the Development-policy Debate
War constituencies
and capacities for war
DAC Guidelines
for a development of analytical capabilities in the donorcountries to help identify the causes of conflicts; andabove all they call for a more coherent approach andgreater coordination among actors.
37
2.3 International Positions
Roles of development assistancein different phases of conflict and peace
Before conflict flares: Within overall efforts by the international communityto promote peace building and conflict prevention, development assistanceprogrammes will find their most important role in promoting the democraticstability of societies. Where tensions have not escalated into violence, a greatnumber of possible measures can be geared to help defuse the potential forviolent conflict. These range from more traditional areas of assistance, suchas economic growth and poverty reduction programmes, to democratisation,good governance (including justice and security systems) and respect forhuman rights. There is growing interest in innovative activities to strengthenmechanisms for enhancing security at lower levels of armaments and militaryexpenditures.
In fragile transitional situations: Where organised armed violence haswound down but where it is still unclear if the situation will again deteriorate,it is important to move beyond saving lives to saving livelihoods and at thesame time help transform a fragile process into a sustainable, durable peacein which the causes of conflict are diminshed and incentives for peace arestrengthened. Where ethnic or even genocidal violence has occurred, con-certed effort will be needed to help overcome the enduring trauma, promotereconciliation, and help prevent renewed outbreaks of violent conflict.
After conflict: Post-conflict reconstruction is much more than just repairingphysical infrastructure. When civil authority has broken down, the first priorityis to restore a sense of security. This includes restoring legitimate govern-ment institutions that are regarded by citizens as serving all groups and thatare able to ally persisting tensions, while carrying out the challenging andcostly tasks of rebuilding. Efforts by developing countries and internationalassistance must fit within the context of a sound, even if rudimentary,macroeconomic stabilisation plan. Post-conflict situations often providespecial opportunities for political, legal, economic and administrative reformsto change past systems and structures which may have contributed toeconomic and social inequities and conflict. Initiatives for participatorydebate and assessment of the role of the military in relation to the state andcivil society have been productive in post-conflict settings. In the wake ofconflict, donors should seize opportunities to help promote and maintain themomentum for reconciliation and needed reforms. Continued on next page
The EU too is at an advanced stage of policydevelopment. As early as December 1995 a Councilpress release made reference to the crisis and conflictissue; in June 1996 a “common position” was adoptedconcerning “conflict prevention and resolution inAfrica”(Landgraf 1998).
Key EU documents are:■ 1891st Council Meeting: Press Release. Extract on
Preventive diplomacy, conflict resolution andpeacekeeping in Africa (4 December 1995),
■ Communication from the Commission to theCouncil: The European Union and the issueof conflicts in Africa: Peace-building, conflictprevention and beyond (6 March 1996),
■ Common Position of 2 June 1997 defined by theCouncil on the basis of Article J.2 of the Treaty onEuropean Union,concerning conflict prevention andresolution in Africa, Resolution on Coherence(excerpt) adopted by the Development Council on 5June 1997,
38
2. Crisis Prevention and Conflict Management in the Development-policy Debate
EU positions
Roles of development assistance in different phases of conflict and peace (continued)
In open conflict: In situations of open conflict, other policy instruments suchas humanitarian assistance, diplomatic initiatives and political or economicmeasures tend to move to the forefront of the international response.Contrary to many past assumptions, we have found that a sharp distinctionbetween short-term emergency relief and longer-term development aid israrely useful in planning support for countries in open conflict. Developmentco-operation agencies operating in conflict zones, respecting securityconcerns and the feasibility of operations, can continue to identify the scopefor supporting development processes even in the midst of crisis, beprepared to seize upon opportunities to contribute to conflict resolution, andcontinue to plan and prepare for post-conflict reconstruction.
Source: DAC Guidelines on Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operationon the Threshold of the 21st Century, Paris 1998, p. 7–8.
■ Conclusions of the Council and of theRepresentatives of the member states on the role ofdevelopment cooperation in strengthening peace-building, conflict prevention and resolution (30November 1998).
The EU uses the influential but often misunderstoodterm “structural stability”,which is seen as defining theultimate goal of measures to secure peace, and offersimplicit prospects for the place of TC in the canon ofco-ordinated lines of activities.
To a certain extent, the term structural stabilitycompetes with this other term from within the UNfamily. “Human security” has two main aspects: 1.Security against chronic threats such as hunger,diseaseand repression; and 2. Security against sudden threats
39
Human security –
a comprehensive
concept of security
2.3 International Positions
Structural stability
“Given the fact that (i) experience shows that lack of development is not theonly major source of violent conflict; that (ii) the EU policy aims concerningAfrica might be summarised as helping to foster peace and stability,development, democracy and the respect of human rights; that (iii) thoseaims are interdependent/mutually re-enforcing; and that (iv) sustaineddevelopment is often interpreted in a narrow economic sense, the ultimatepolicy goal could be summarised under the term structural stability.
Structural stability is to be understood as a term denoting a dynamic situa-tion, a situation of stability able to cope with the dynamics inherent in(emerging) democratic societies. Structural stability could thus be defined asa situation involving sustainable economic development, democracy andrespect for human rights, viable political structures, and healthy social andenvironmental conditions, with the capacity to manage change without toresort to violent conflict. Working towards structural stability would mean thetargeted reinforcement of those factors that enable peaceful change.”
Source: Communication from the Commission to the Council, The EuropeanUnion and the Issue of Conflicts in Africa: Peace-Building, Conflict Preventionand Beyond, 6. 3. 1996, p. 2.
in daily life (housing situation, job opportunities,community life). UNDP lists seven components ofhuman security, namely: economic security, foodsecurity, health security, environmental security,personal security, security of the community andpolitical security (UNDP 1994).
Another much-quoted conceptual source is the UNSecretary-General’s “The Causes of Conflict and thePromotion of Durable Peace and SustainableDevelopment in Africa”(Annan 1998),which followed-on from his predecessor’s “Agenda for Peace” (1992).This report provided key stimulus,above all through itsclear focus on the political causes of conflicts, and theunexpectedly strong emphasis of the responsibility oflocal political elites for the increasing disintegration ofthe state. In strategic terms, it also identifies relevantpositions for TC. The top priorities in post-conflictsituations are identified as reconciliation work andrespect for human rights. As de-escalation occurs,bilateral and multilateral development institutionscould then make a significant contribution bysupporting activities.However,the report then goes onto mention almost all the remaining developmentcooperation measures which, if applied appropriately,could be conducive to peace.This was followed in theautumn of 1999 by the brochure “Facing theHumanitarian Challenge. Towards a Culture ofPrevention”(Annan 1999), which places these ideas ina global context and adds the dimension of disasterprevention.Annan sees the lack of political will as themain obstacle to a “culture of prevention”.
This basic approach (Annan 1998) permeates mostof the strategy papers:Although governance measuresare seen as especially conducive to peace, a broadspectrum of TC measures would also be capable – ifappropriately applied – of generating such effects.Crisisprevention is therefore being discussed – to anincreasing extent in terms of a “culture of prevention”not only at the UN level (for instance: CarnegieCommission 1997). It is postulated that the conflict-
40
2. Crisis Prevention and Conflict Management in the Development-policy Debate
UN Secretary-General
Common basic
approach
reducing or –exacerbating effects of projects cannot beinferred from their nature. There are still only fewcomparative studies available on this issue. It can beassumed that a number of types of project, especiallythose with a high volume of funding, also involveincreased risks.
A glance at the basic concepts and orientations of anumber of bilateral donors sheds further light on thestatus of the debate (for more detailed comparisons seealso Walraven 1999, Smith 1999,Leonhardt 1999):
The Netherlands
Recognising the need for an integrated strategyembracing development cooperation, politicalmediation, emergency aid, economic sanctions andmilitary operations, the Netherlands Foreign Ministryinstituted a Conflict Management and Humanitarian AidDepartment as early as 1996. This unit is sub-dividedinto two Divisions, one of them being the CrisisManagement and Prevention Division.The goal of thisDivision is to realise a single, coherent policy; inpractice, it is responsible for demobilisation pro-grammes, the establishment of an independent radiostation (Liberia), financial support to the UN Secretary-General’s Special Envoy to the Great Lakes region, andsupport of a multi-ethnic police force in Bosnia (ForeignMinistry 1999). Seeking to promote good governance,the Netherlands opted early on for a restrictiveselection of partner countries.
Norway
Norway wishes to play a lead role in developing acomprehensive, integrated approach embracinghumanitarian assistance, peace and reconciliation, anddevelopment. Conflict prevention and the con-solidation of fragile peace processes have high priority
41
Bilateral donors
2.3 International Positions
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1999). According to anevaluation, in 1996 alone Norway implemented peace-building measures in 22 countries (Sørbø et al. 1999).Norway relies on its NGOs and policy advisors who arefirmly committed to the theme, and places strongemphasis on training measures and evaluations.
Sweden
The Swedish International Development Coope-ration Agency (SIDA) draws a distinction within thisthematic field between a) the promotion of dialogueprocesses (confidence-building, reduction of the cul-ture of violence etc.) and b) the promotion of physicalsecurity (civilian peace monitoring, demilitarisationand demobilisation, security-sector reform etc.). SIDAplaces strong emphasis on the ongoing review ofdevelopment cooperation in both the planning andimplementation phases regarding possible undesired,negative effects (conflict impact assessment). Onespecified focus of activity is the promotion of children’srights in armed conflicts (SIDA 1999).
Denmark
In addition to pointing out the moral dimension ofhelping prevent armed conflicts, the Danish Govern-ment has also expressed longer-term, pragmaticeconomic and security interests.A further declared aimis to prevent the destruction of developmentcooperation inputs. Danish inputs focus on helpingbuild local conflict management capacities (bypromoting institutions,democracy and civil society),oneradicating the structural causes of conflicts in the longterm,and on strengthening crisis response capabilitiesboth within developing countries and at the level of theinternational community. In 1999 Denmark set-up its
42
2. Crisis Prevention and Conflict Management in the Development-policy Debate
43
own Peace and Stability Fund (Ministry of ForeignAffairs n.d.).
UK
The British approach to the theme is indeed highlyadvanced:“...our development strategy and our conflictprevention strategy are one and the same”(Short 1999).Within the framework of a general developmentstrategy designed to reduce poverty,the Department forInternational Development (DFID) published a policystatement in early 1999 on the theme of “ConflictReduction and Humanitarian Assistance”(DFID 1999a).That statement identifies violent conflict as one of themain causes of poverty. The strategies it proposes foraddressing armed conflicts and building sustainablepeace are: a) promotion of social cohesiveness andinclusion, b) improvement of the internationalmechanisms for settling disputes and preventingconflict, c) assistance in the limitation of the means ofwaging war (weapons), d) support of security-sectorreform,e) promotion of the protection of human rightsin conflict situations f) support of post-conflict peace-building. The planned measures in the security sectorare particularly worthy of note.Here, all actors (i.e. theForeign and Commonwealth Office, the army and theprivate sector) have agreed to pursue an integratedapproach, designed to influence the partnergovernment such that a national security strategyemerges which can satisfy the criteria of goodgovernance.It is planned to involve the army,the policeforce,the customs authorities and other relevant socialactors.
2.3 International Positions
Switzerland
The Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation(DEZA) focuses its attention on the monitoring ofchanges relevant to development in partner countries.Whilst it has access to a range of instruments speciallydeveloped for this purpose, those instruments are notyet being applied to countries of Central Asia andEurope.To date,DEZA has continued to respond to thevery broad range of conflict and crisis situations in thevarious countries with small-scale projects that areclosely integrated into the respective social context,andwhich can be rapidly implemented. The SwissDepartment of Foreign Affairs is also supporting theFAST early warning project of the Swiss PeaceFoundation, designed to help provide betterinformation and greater stability in situations of risingtensions.
Canada
In Canada the subject is being addressed by twogovernmental organisations: Since 1996 there hasexisted within the Canadian International DevelopmentAgency (CIDA) a “Peace building Unit”which addressesissues of conflict prevention, conflict resolution andreconciliation. This unit focuses on the political andsocio-economic contexts of conflicts,rather than on themilitary or humanitarian aspects. Dialogue promotionand measures which help bring the parties to theconflict closer together are strengthened through localinitiatives. The Peace Building and Human SecurityDivision of the Department of Foreign Affairs andInternational Trade (DFAIT) was itself created in 1995,to strengthen Canada’s capability to contributeinternationally to conflict prevention, peace work anddemocracy promotion. The Division is both anorganisation for policy development, and an organi-sation for programme implementation. It addresses
44
2. Crisis Prevention and Conflict Management in the Development-policy Debate
conceptual issues of joint strategic development forconflict prevention, gender and peace-building,children in armed conflicts, and the control of lightweapons and small arms. The Peace Building Divisionis designed to complement the activities of CIDA.
A number of bilateral donors (for instance theNetherlands, Norway) have commissioned their thinktanks to design basic conceptual strategies.These thinktanks usually warn against developing unreasonableexpectations. In discussions with the major develop-ment institutions, it emerged that this very problem isseen as the greatest risk associated with TC’sinvolvement in crisis prevention:an over-estimation byTC institutions of their own ability to influence events,followed by disappointed expectations and ultimatelyentailing a loss of legitimacy (authors’interviews 1999).Yet this position can also conceal a lack of willingnessto take on additional tasks that are more sophisticated(and difficult).Because if it is the case that developmentcooperation (and TC) can (and sometimes must)exacerbate conflicts, then the management andprevention of the negative consequences which thenresult cannot simply be left to others. This leads tothe following twin imperatives for developmentcooperation and TC:■ First of all, do not contribute towards the violent
escalation of conflicts.■ Secondly,help prevent processes of escalation whose
causes lie outside of development cooperation (andTC). A sober assessment should be made of thedegree to which this objective can be achieved.
Especially where the definition of basic positions isconcerned,the relationship between governmental andnon-governmental actors is not always characterised bycompetition or rejection. In some cases, clearstatements on the theme by governmentalorganisations are held in high regard by NGOs. Thelatest strategy papers of DFID for instance, entitled
45
Warnings against
unreasonable
expectations
Non-governmental
actors
2.3 International Positions
“Conflict Reduction and Humanitarian Assistance”and“Poverty and the Security Sector”, have been praisedby British NGOs as key steps towards improvedcooperation between governmental and non-governmental organisations in this sector. Having saidthat, NGOs often also seek a further rationale for theirwork which mostly is rooted in their respective worldview.
2.4 Policy Frameworks in Germany
The German Federal Ministry for EconomicCooperation and Development (BMZ) has beendevoting increased attention to crisis prevention sincethe mid-1990s.
The new German Government has emphasised thesubject on several occasions, and the term “crisis
46
2. Crisis Prevention and Conflict Management in the Development-policy Debate
BMZ approach
“The question is not whether development aid can be apolitical in any strictsense of the term: it cannot. Rather, the question is how aid flows can beshaped and steered to provide extra political value to activities that alreadyhave their developmental value. In relation to democratisation and thepromotion of human rights this idea is no longer controversial. In relation tothe prevention of armed conflicts the question is new, however logical theidea. (...) Development aid is a slow-moving agent of change, and has no partto play in “fire-brigade” action. The report addresses how aid can be used tomitigate or remove the causes of an unresolved dispute which creates therisk of conflict. A distinction can be made between preventive efforts innormal times of peace and preventive measures when dangerous signs oftension emerge. The former may have a time horizon of many years or evendecades, while the time frame of the latter may be a year or two at most andis more likely to be measured in months or even weeks. In the latter case,measures must be undertaken with a proper sense of urgency: in suchsituations, the possibilities of using development aid are limited.”
Source: Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI), DevelopmentAssistance as a Means of Conflict Prevention, Oslo 1998, p. 2
prevention” occupies a prominent position in thecoalition agreements between the ruling parties. TheFederal Minister for Economic Cooperation andDevelopment, Ms. Heidemarie Wieczorek-Zeul, haspressed the importance of crisis prevention in speechesand interviews. From development cooperation sheexpects further results in two areas:1. Help in eradicating the structural causes of violent
conflicts by improving economic, social, ecologicaland political conditions in partner countries;
2. Help in establishing mechanisms of non-violentconflict management.
47
2.4 Policy Frameworks in Germany
The links between development policy and security policy
“The outlined tasks of helping eradicate the structural causes of conflicts,and promoting mechanisms of peaceful conflict resolution, do not constitutenew territory for development policy. Development policy is thereforeespecially well prepared to assume an important role within the overallstrategic approach to crisis prevention. But additional steps will be needed tostrengthen development policy’s peace-policy orientation.First of all, potential sites of conflict need to be identified more systematically.Work is currently under way at BMZ to develop corresponding indicators,which together with other sources such as the Federal Ministry of Defence(BMVg) crisis atlas are to be integrated into our country concepts and countrytalks.Secondly, in countries with a higher risk of conflict we must design ourcooperation to help eradicate the structural causes of conflicts.Thirdly, conflict management at the political and social levels needs to bestrengthened in the medium and long term. Governmental and non-governmental Technical Cooperation are especially suited to providingadditional inputs to this process. In this context, German development policyis establishing the Civil Peace Service (CPS).”
Source: German Federal Minister for Economic Cooperation andDevelopment, Ms. Heidemarie Wieczorek-Zeul, The Links betweenDevelopment Policy and Security Policy. Speech held at the closing sessionof the German Federal College of Security Policy Studies core seminar on 28May 1999
BMZ sees a need for development policy to act inthree fields of so-called “global structural policy”that arealso relevant to crisis prevention:1.strengthening of theUN system, establishment of regional structures forsecurity and cooperation, and especially thestrengthening of the constructive role of partnercountries in the global political system; 2. elaborationand implementation of global standards and rules,covering inter alia light weapons and small arms, childsoldiers, indigenous peoples and international criminaljurisdiction. Parallel to that, it is planned to helperadicate the global causes of violent conflicts (globaleconomy and environment). 3. participation in theestablishment of European and internationaldevelopment-policy networks for crisis prevention(Kloke-Lesch 1999).
BMZ has ambitious plans to mainstream crisisprevention within the development administration atthe political level, assuming that this will takeimmediate effect at the operative level.1. monitoring of the long-term trends of conflict within
societies, and improved information management;2. adjustment of BMZ’s country concepts, including –
where required – the preparation of key strategypapers for crisis prevention;
3. selection of key countries for targeted design ofdevelopment cooperation for crisis prevention. Afocus on approximately 10 countries is envisaged.Tothis end, a list of indicators is now being tested.Thislist was established by a study group commissionedby BMZ in 1998 (Spelten 1999).It has been pre-testedfor 95 countries by the German Overseas Institute(cf. Section 3.1.1).
4. ongoing development of the traditional instruments,alongside the establishment of a “Civil Peace Service”;
5. strengthened cooperation between institutionsinvolved in development cooperation (Kloke-Lesch1999).
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2. Crisis Prevention and Conflict Management in the Development-policy Debate
Global structural
policy
Mainstreaming
There are plans in the medium term to issueguidelines that are binding for the regional sections ofBMZ. BMZ sees a need to debate the issue of“sustainability in crisis situations”, and possibly also toreview other principles of development organisations(author’s interview 1999).
Ongoing conceptual work is required concerning anew BMZ instrument: the “Civil Peace Service” (CPS).Chaired by BMZ, a programme committee comprisingrepresentatives of BMZ, the Federal Foreign Office, theGerman Development Service (DED) and two selectedmembers of the “Civil Peace Service Consortium”(development services seconding personnel) meets onan irregular basis to discuss basic issues and to definethe scope of the instrument.
49
Civil Peace Service
2.4 Policy Frameworks in Germany
Civil Peace Service (CPS)“The basic concept behind the CPS is the deployment of appropriatelyqualified experts from the recognised development services. The tasksundertaken by the CPS differ from the traditional tasks of the developmentservices in that they involve targeted measures to promote the non-violenthandling of conflicts and potential for conflict. Experts working for the CPSwill – as is usual in the development services – be paid a sum sufficient tocover basic living expenses.
Tasks under the framework of the CPS involve the following areas inparticular:
■ strengthening the potential for peace; measures to encourage mutual trustbetween members of conflict parties; the development of structures andprogrammes for information and education to publicise and explain peaceactivities and to overcome prejudice and hostile images (e.g. peaceeducation);
■ mediation in conflicts between members of different interest groups,ethnic groups and religions; collaboration in the work of observingsituations in terms of respect for human rights and democracy andpromoting positive development in these areas;
■ contributions towards reconciliation and reconstruction (including supportfor administrative tasks at the municipal level)”.
Source: BMZ, Civil Peace Service – A new element of development co-operation (BMZ spezial; 6), Bonn 1999
The Civil Peace Service is already a reality: In a firstphase in 1999, from 40 submitted proposals BMZapproved 18 projects of organisations sendingpersonnel to crisis-prone countries. The funds thusappropriated amounted to DM 2.8/5.2 million for thefiscal years 1999/2000 respectively.A total of DM 17.5million has been allocated for CPS for the fiscal year2000.
Project examples of the Civil Peace Service inGuatemala:
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2. Crisis Prevention and Conflict Management in the Development-policy Debate
Support for the awareness-raising, research and training work of the Alianza Contra la Impunidad
The contribution made by DED comprises the delivery of methodological andlegal advisory services by two peace experts. The aim is to provideinformation, education and training to civil society organisations, enablingthem to implement the recommendations of the “Historical ClarificationCommission”, and to provide legal support for measures against impunity forthe perpetrators of human rights violations and acts of violence.
Source: Author’s interview, in-house DED project documents
Support for refugee resettlement in Huehuetenango
The partner organisation of Services Overseas had for many years beenactive in assisting refugees who had fled to Mexico to escape the civil war.Since the end of the war the organisation has been supporting theimplementation of the Guatemalan peace accord and its consolidation,primarily through development and education measures within the returneecommunities. Other problems involve land distribution, and reconciliationbetween the returnees and those who remained in Guatemala during the war.The seconded peace expert will be involved in the development and planningof integrated training and upgrading measures for staff of the partnerorganisation. This is a contribution to the process of rebuilding society,designed to help secure the historic peace accord.
Source: Press release of Services Overseas, 18 January 2000
BMZ draws on external expertise for planning andoperative tasks inter alia within the scope of its “crisisprevention and conflict management for development”working party,the structures of which are beginning toemerge. An informal “exchange of information andideas” with representatives of the developmentcooperation family and academics was held in February2000.
BMZ has thus completed the first tasks required tobecome professional in the field. Further experiencesneed to be gained, and the instruments may still needsome improvements. On the basis of these initiativesBMZ has positioned itself closely in line with themainstream ideas of the international community.
2.5 Principles of Intervention
The debate concerning crisis prevention is oftenconducted in ritualistic fashion, using a number ofbuzzwords. Not all of them appear useful under allcircumstances. Some of them are also mutuallycontradictory.
By far the most important basic rule for TC in crisissituation, and in crisis prevention and conflictmanagement, is the one popularised by Mary B.Anderson:do no harm (1996/99).A critical look needsto be taken at the unintended consequences ofhumanitarian and development assistance. Inter-national assistance can also negatively influence aviolent conflict, for instance through the inflow ofresources then utilised to maintain troops and topurchase weapons;local markets can be distorted by aidinputs; distribution efforts of TC can affect groups inconflict,and become the cause of conflict;internationalassistance also mobilises local funds for the conduct ofwarfare;it may possibly legitimate actors pursuing war-like ends.The nature of the assistance can also implicitlysend the wrong signals related to ethnicity. Andersonmakes a number of proposals concerning how to
51
BMZ working group
on crisis prevention
Do no harm
2.5 Principles of Intervention
prevent this, always bearing in mind the particularcontext: limitation of inflows, creation of distributioncommissions or administration committees comprisedof equal numbers of representatives from all groups,cancellation of goods promised for trade, sharing ofresponsibility etc.. In some cases, however, a completediscontinuation of assistance may be the only solutiongenerating less damage than benefit. A number ofauthors hold the “aid business” partly responsible forstructural violence as a point of departure for anescalation of open violence. These authors argue thatauthoritarian regimes displaying contempt for humanrights are directly or indirectly supported bydevelopment cooperation, or that the recruitment ofproject staff follows the established practice of givingpreference to certain sections of the population,or thatcorruption is tolerated (Uvin 1998, Klingebiel 1999,Brock 1999).
Whether in defence of the hitherto (unplanned)involvement of development organisations in highlyconflictual situations, or as a consequence of initialevaluations of a conscious reorientation, numerouspeople we spoke to saw a willingness to take risks asprerequisite to successful crisis prevention.They werereferring less to daring deeds by particular individuals,and more to the collective involvement in crisissituation where there is a fundamental risk of anescalation in violence.The development community, itis believed, must accept that the prospects for successunder these circumstances are limited,and bear this factin mind when planning and implementing projects.“...What Sierra Leone demonstrates is that manycountries are happy to sign up to conflict preventionand peace-building in theory, but deeply reluctant toengage in practice. This is because conflict is by itsnature risky, and development departments tend to berisk averse. But it is clear that the risks of non-engagement outweigh the risks of action. If we fail tosupport demobilisation and reintegration, we make itmore likely,not less,that Sierra Leone will slip back into
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2. Crisis Prevention and Conflict Management in the Development-policy Debate
Take risks
full-scale violence and civil war. And what is trueof Sierra Leone is true of many countries across theworld....”(Short 1999).The Canadian Government takesa very similar view. Its strategic approach also includesa section on risk assessment. The approach issummarised as follows: “While rapid action oftencarries a higher risk factor, it may outweigh the highcosts of inaction.Risk assessment will be undertaken incooperation with substantive desks and posts.”(http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca./cida_ind.nst/).
Attention is sometimes drawn to the value of sheerpresence as a way to protect human lives.However,thiscan hardly serve as the sole justification for costlyproject implementation. There are also specific formsof human rights and conflict monitoring which aredeliberately labelled “human shield”. TC is highlyunlikely to pursue this approach.The principle of takingrisks should not,however,be offset against the principleof doing no harm.
The term security first can imply two things, eitherhigh priority for involvement in the security sector or– more often – priority for the personal safety of thepersonnel deployed in crisis situations. This sense ofresponsibility to a certain extent runs counter to theprinciple of taking risks.
On of the key lessons learned in recent years – forinstance in Rwanda, Kosovo and East Timor – is thatwhat is lacking is not information on escalatingconflicts,but the political will to intervene preventivelyon a timely basis. This insight is often put forward toexplain why early warning (cf. Section 3.1.1) is notnecessary. Yet this view is not compelling: “Earlywarning and prevention are linked” (Eberwein/Chojnacki 1999). Consequently, this combination ofearly warning and prevention should be at the heart offuture efforts to improve the flow of information fromcountries affected by crisis (cf. Section 3.1.2).Development professionals have now extended thissequence, linking early warning to “the right earlyaction”, i.e. linking correct timing with the appropriate
53
Security first
Need for early action
2.5 Principles of Intervention
approach to the problem,the right mix of measures,theright counterparts etc..Harnessing what is often uniqueknowledge concerning the situation on the groundshould lead to local information being utilised in orderto identify realistic prospects for action.
In the first instance, the (violent) conflict is a matterfor the local parties to it. The EU and many nationalgovernments insist that, if it is to stand any chance ofsucceeding, conflict management must first be dealtwith locally by the actors concerned. In accordancewith the subsidiarity principle, regional organisationsare next in line to be called upon to intervene (CarnegieCommission 1997, Council of the European Union1998). Although this step is logical, it may lead todangerous delays in the planned early action beingtaken.
In all societies (at least according to Anderson1996/99), including those undergoing violent conflict,there are numerous aspects of life which bind peopletogether rather than separating them. A commonhistory, culture, language and experience, institutionsand values, economic interdependencies, as well asmechanisms, institutions and persons of conflictmanagement in the widest sense are often already inplace. These are the “local capacities for peace” or“peace constituencies” that should first be identified,then selectively promoted (cf. Section 2.2 and Section4.1).
War constituencies must also be taken into accountif crisis prevention is to be successfully pursued. Theaim here must be to help identify alternative economicprospects for warlords and their foot soldiers. Mostpeople we interviewed considered this eminentlyimportant,but conceded that there were risks.Materialinputs might possibly be created which could bemisunderstood as gratification, i.e. merely as an incen-tive to further violence.Entering into negotiation withwarlords also helps legitimate them.
Promoting peace is usually considered a dynamicprocess requiring long-term involvement. TC has
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2. Crisis Prevention and Conflict Management in the Development-policy Debate
Ownership of conflict
Strengthen peace
constituencies
Also take into
account the
“spoilers”
Long-term
involvement pays off
problems dealing with this fact, in that projects oftenhave rigid deadlines,whilst the peace process does notrespect the deadlines imposed by project cycles. Anumber of actors, for instance church-based organi-sations, draw attention to their long-term involvementalongside their local partners, and to the relationshipsof trust that have grown as a result. This might be anadvantage over governmental TC. On the other hand,such partners can also become problematic insituations of violent conflict – the role of some churchofficials in the genocide in Rwanda comes to mind.Blind solidarity is therefore inappropriate; thecontinued delivery of assistance may send the wrongsignals. The conclusion should be: adopt a long-termapproach, but remain capable of rapid response andchanges in the short term.
2.6 Code of Conduct
The (predominantly British and American) NGOsthat have been actively involved in conflictmanagement for years have been unable to avoid adiscussion of the less conscious aspects of theiractivities. In some cases they have been accused of(unintentionally) feeding the war. Also, some of theirambitious goals have been seen as creating unrealisticexpectations that have subsequently backfired on theorganisations themselves.Some donor evaluations havebeen highly critical, whilst at the same time allowingroom for improvement on the mistakes of the past. IfTC is to scale-up its involvement in this sector,it shouldlearn the lessons taught by these experiences ratherthan repeat the same mistakes. Criticism has also beenexpressed from within the ranks of the “conflictmanagers” themselves, specifically with regard to ■ a lack of contextualisation of the work, i.e. rigid
adherence to a standard procedure with no regard tothe need for an appropriate approach;
55
Critique and
self-critique
2.6 Code of Conduct
■ an avoidance of issues of justice in order to achievea swift peace accord;
■ an undermining of the state monopoly on coercioncaused by working exclusively with NGO partners;
■ an outmanoeuvring of NGOs from the South byNGOs of the North (or NGOs from the East by NGOsfrom the West);a basic refusal to enter into a divisionof labour/coordination with other governmental andnon-governmental and international actors, and in anumber of cases also
■ a lack of professionalism (inter alia Ropers 1999).
The British NGO International Alert has worked on aCode of Conduct for organisations active in conflictmanagement and crisis prevention.This code can alsobe understood as defining good practice. Most of theprinciples for action can certainly be adopted by TCorganisations. Human rights issues, and the issue ofrelations with the other actors in crisis regions, aregiven greater emphasis here than is usually the case inTC guidelines.
The basic approaches called for by InternationalAlert include ensuring that the affected population areinvolved in the process of conflict resolution. Theymust be the driving force behind the transformationprocess, and normally they do have the capacity tomake a contribution to the solution.Within this process,actors should give top priority to the humanitarianneeds of those worst hit by the conflict. At the sametime, it should be ensured that internationally-bindinghuman rights are upheld, and cultural, religious andsocial diversity respected.The special contributions tothe peace process made by women should be expresslyacknowledged.
Impartiality is a working principle of key importance,but one which is particularly problematic for govern-mental development cooperation. In this context itmeans involving all stakeholders or parties to theconflict in the planning and implementation process.Yet it will be very difficult for development cooperation
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2. Crisis Prevention and Conflict Management in the Development-policy Debate
Basic attitudes and
approaches
Impartiality
to refrain from promoting particularly disadvantagedsections of the population. At the same time,development cooperation is required to remainindependent of the parties to the conflict. Planningprocesses cannot be based solely on the informationsupplied by one party (even if that party is thegovernment); that development cooperation mustremain financially independent of the parties to theconflict goes without saying. Organisations should beheld accountable to the target population and donorsconcerning their activities and strategies.The nationallegislation in force should also be respected.
Conflict management must often maintain familiarrelations, and rely on individuals, organisations orgovernments that can make some contribution to theprocess. Here, partnership means providing long-termsupport doing justice to the real requirements of peaceprocesses. An organisation working towards conflicttransformation is also obliged to undergo organisationallearning. In other words evaluations, and workshopsproviding space for an exchange of expertise andconsultation with colleagues, are instruments whichneed to be systematically applied to strengthen thecollective memory.
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Partnership
2.6 Code of Conduct
3. Instruments
Crisis prevention and conflict management in TC areonly likely to be successful if their instruments areattuned to the tasks to be faced. This will involveprudent strategic management at all levels,as well as anappropriate form of analysis of the causes of conflicts,conflict-sensitive planning of sector management andprojects, appropriate project steering, conflict impactassessment,and high standards of professionalism.In allthese areas,certain agreed upon standards are currentlyemerging at the national and international levels.
New methods for approaching crisis preventionemerge not only on the ground during projectimplementation, but also at Head Offices, when theseinstruments are applied.Overall,experiences with newapproaches remain limited, not least because only feworganisations conduct intensive debriefing of staff upontheir return from crisis-torn countries. Specificexpertise and experiences are thus lost, and the bestpractices are not collated on a systematic basis.
3.1 Early Warning, Reporting and Analysis inCrisis Prevention
In many respects, knowledge management is a keyconcept in this field. For an organisation to be crisis-sensitive it must in the first instance be aware of therisks of conflict that are either dependent on, orindependent of, its own intervention. To this end, theinternational debate has centred on the issue of earlywarning.Furthermore, if crisis prevention and conflictmanagement are to be effective then general problemsof information flow from partner countries need to beaddressed, and the quality of background analyses hasto be re-assessed and ensured. Here too, the HeadOffices of TC organisations will require analyticalcapacities in order to manage inflowing informationappropriately.
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3. Instruments
Limited experience
3.1.1 Early Warning
Bearing in mind the fact that developmentcooperation is increasingly being blamed for alwaysacting too late, it is absolutely essential to address theissue of early warning. Early warning is one dimensionof crisis prevention that has received a comparativelylarge amount of attention from the academic com-munity,without any ready-made solutions tailored to thepractical requirements of TC having been promised. Inparticular, early warning systems that are sensitive tospecific regional circumstances would be appropriate.Yet this sensitivity is missing in systems claiminguniversal validity.Generally speaking,three qualities areexpected of early warning systems:■ easy to use■ ready availability of information related to selected
indicators ■ capable of generating sound prognoses
It is undisputed that crisis indicators must be used toidentify potential crises early on, if developmentcooperation is to be at all able to adjust its operationsappropriately and at all levels, from strategy papersthrough to project steering.To date,a number of highlycomplex model indicators have been developed, someof them tailored to specific forms of conflict(genocide). They provide a clear picture of the scope,nature and probable trajectories of a potential conflict,but are difficult if not impossible for practitioners touse.By contrast,short checklists of indicators entail therisk of whole problem areas going unnoticed.Yet onlythese checklists are ever likely to be regularly appliedby practitioners.A number of proposals have also comefrom the food security sector;countries of the Sahel andother dry zones can draw on experience with such earlywarning systems (such as the USAID “Famine EarlyWarning System”– FEWS).
The Clingendael Institute is currently developing apragmatic, “good enough” solution (on behalf of the
59
Identifying potential
crises
3.1.1 Early Warning
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands), i.e. onewhich does not claim to be absolutely complete orprecise.There is growing recognition of the fact that asystem of this kind immediately generates organisation-specific options for action, and is therefore bestdeveloped through close consultation and cooperationbetween academics and practitioners (Goor/Verstegen2000).
BMZ also addressed this subject early on in a researchproject on crisis indicators in development co-operation. This included a condensed list of questions(Spelten 1999), and was tested in a trial run. It is beingfurther developed on an ongoing basis; increasingly, itis evolving from an early warning mechanism into apolicy instrument to identify partner countries wherecrisis prevention can be planned and discussed openly.
Checklists are often applied in conjunction with therule that, once the indicators reveal rising tensions oran escalating conflict, a further qualitative analysis isthen required to provide more precise informationconcerning the immediate risks and the actorsinvolved. Multi-stage procedures of this kind at leastenable practitioners to swiftly assess less critical cases.However, in the growing number of countriesthreatened by crisis, a considerable amount of work isto be anticipated in a second phase. It is therefore allthe more important to focus on the top-priorityproblem areas, or those which are in a process ofdynamic development (cf. Section 3.1.5).
The subjective assessment of indicators by experts ortechnocrats is seen as a problem of qualitative analyticapproaches;this can be counteracted at least by havingquestionnaires filled in several times by differentindividuals, and comparing them at a later date. Themajor weak point of purely quantitative methods is thatof obtaining a reliable database, complete informationin crisis-torn countries often being especially difficultto obtain.
A procedure combining the quantitative andqualitative dimensions (such as the BMZ list of
60
3. Instruments
Multi-stage procedure
Subjectivity
indicators) is certainly methodologically problematic.It can,however,focus attention on countries in crisis atthe political or top administrative level.This last notiondemonstrates that early warning can indeed serve avariety of ends, including political ones.
Some indicator systems that are already in general usein TC may also require only slight adaptation to makethem appropriate for the purpose of crisis prevention.The Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation(DEZA) for instance has developed a system called“monitoring of development indicators”. This systemprovides Switzerland with a basis for its political,economic and development-oriented efforts, designedto facilitate coordinated changes in behaviour.
For the development practitioner, the most approp-riate early warning systems are those indicating whichof the means at TC’s disposal are likely to prevent orcurtail an escalation in tensions. In other words thereare strong arguments for providing an early warningsystem tailored to the needs of the end user(Goor/Verstegen 1999). At the same time, politicalinterests come into play: A harmonisation of earlywarning systems currently being tested might forinstance guarantee a standard response within aEuropean framework,assuming there were agreementson certain checklists. Scandinavian countries believethat UN provision for early warning is already adequate,and see no reason to develop their own systems (NUPI1998,Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1999, authors’interviews). Having said that, from a political angle itmay also be helpful to have two or more systemsoperating in parallel. If the two systems generate thesame results,this constitutes a compelling argument for(or against) intervention. If there is a discrepancybetween the results generated by the two systems,thenfurther qualitative analysis is required.
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Continuous
monitoring
User-oriented
systems
3.1.1 Early Warning
All the approaches designed more for practicalapplication now need to be considered in the contextof a polemicised debate:Critics like to keep remindingprofessionals that,in a number of recent cases of rapidlyescalating conflicts, there has been no lack of earlywarning signals, but merely a lack of early preventiveaction. The pragmatic answer has been that the gapbetween early warning and early action should beclosed. Yet the second step (early action) cannot betaken without the first (early warning).Early warning isa necessary prerequisite to targeted crisis prevention.This insight has led to almost all TC organisationscontinuing work on the first step. Checklists, whichinevitably simplify,are also being used by practitionersas an orientation for reporting.Consequently,checklists
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3. Instruments
Closing the gap
Early warning systems – some examples
Among others, the following organisations have developed or commissionedthe development of internationally acknowledged early warning models:
■ Forum on Early Warning and Early Response (FEWER): Analytical Model forEarly Warning and Response
■ The Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) ofCanada/Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA): CanadianPeace building Initiative Strategic Framework
■ The Swiss Peace Foundation, financed by the Swiss Department ofForeign Affairs: Early Recognition of Tension and Fact Finding (FAST beingthe German acronym)
■ United Nations Department for Humanitarian Affairs: Humanitarian EarlyWarning System (HEWS)
In addition to these, strictly academic models have been developed (well-known approaches are those of Gurr and Harff; cf. Hamm 1999 andKrummenacher et al. 1999), as have practice-oriented indicator modelswhose objectives extend beyond early warning (e.g. Spelten 1999). There arealso numerous proposals for checklists which have yet to be tested, or arenot being seriously considered.
are an important tool for mainstreaming conflictawareness within institutions.
It can be argued that, in order to achieve the desiredearly action, it is crucial that early warning provideinformation as to the most appropriate level (local,national, regional) for intervention. It should alsoindicate which actors, institutions or structures thataction should seek to influence.To date,no satisfactorymechanism for institutional integration of early warningsystems has been identified which can convincinglybridge the gap between local knowledge, and optionsfor action that are appropriate to organisations.
TC institutions can be both beneficiaries andproviders of early warning systems. The secondfunction can be performed for instance by staff ofUNHCR who to a certain extent have access toinformation at source in refugee camps.This will not bethe case across the board, but will differ from countryto country depending on the selected channel andcapacity available.The advantage of TC organisations istheir relatively close contact with grass-roots targetgroups, giving them almost exclusive access toknowledge on conflict situations in certain regions.
63
The correct level of
approach
3.1.1 Early Warning
Regional early warning mechanism for IGAD
Crisis prevention and conflict management are a key concern of theIntergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), a regional organisationin Africa. A project of cooperation between GTZ and the US Agency forInternational Development (USAID) is designed to support IGAD in developingand maintaining an early warning system, and mechanisms to prevent violentconflicts. Following comprehensive conflict analyses in the region and asurvey of existing early warning systems, a series of short- and long-termoptions are being jointly developed which will subsequently be incorporatedinto a concrete plan of implementation. FEWER (Forum on Early Warning andEarly Response) has been commissioned to elaborate an appropriate model.
Source: GTZ in-house working paper
Finally, TC can help establish regional early warningsystems.
In a number of partner countries,it is possible to relyon existing local structures or networks. One exampleis EAWARN, a country-wide network of universities inRussia, and a repository of corresponding information.One problem which arises here is that of“compatibility”. How can such information, processedby third parties and managed according to a number ofdifferent principles,be accessed by the Head Offices ofTC organisations? A second problem is the protectionof such information against possible dangers: thepossession and transfer of sensitive information to anearly warning system might put local providers inparticular at risk.
Amongst others,church-based organisations possessthe advantage of being able to perform early warningvia information channels that are regarded as reliable.The idea has already been aired for instance thatinformation be managed through the hierarchicallyorganised Catholic Bishops’ network (authors’interviews). Efforts to develop early warningmechanisms that are application-ready are, however,still at an early stage.
3.1.2 Information Flow and Reporting
The fact that reporting from countries in crisis needsto be improved has been undisputed in Germany sincepublication of the cross-section evaluation (Klingebiel1999) commissioned by BMZ in 1998. The report wasbased on country studies for Sri Lanka, El Salvador,Ethiopia,Kenya,Mali and Rwanda.
Information from crisis-prone countries flowsthrough a variety of channels. Alongside the standardreporting channels, informal routes of informationtransfer from the project to the Head Office level arecommon practice: Telephone conversations, andincreasingly e-mail correspondence can supplement
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3. Instruments
Utilising local
networks
Restricted flow of
information
and complete the picture conveyed via officialchannels. Information concerning conflicts can reachpoints within the development cooperationadministration that are capable of acting on it,not onlyvia the “official route” of the intra-organisationalhierarchy,but also horizontally across departments,andthrough other channels of communication.Often thesechannels are cut off,or are never even utilised in the firstplace. What is ultimately crucial to messages beingacted on, however, is often not the fact of informationtransfer itself, but the timeliness, the quality and theformal weight of the information. In this sense theargument that in the case of Rwanda,for instance,therewas no lack of information but merely a lack of politicalwill to intervene, is only partially correct (and only inrelation to some of the actors).
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3.1.2 Information Flow and Reporting
Problems of information transfer: Findings of the BMZ cross-section evaluation
“In the recording, forwarding and interpretation of information four problemscan be identified:
1. The system features a wealth of information and, above all, inconsistentinformation; actors may tend to eliminate inconsistencies by resorting tocertain mechanisms (e.g. selective perception) in their reporting(“cognitive dissonance”).
2. The “local” structures (...) tend to be reluctant to refer to conflictsituations.
3. Projects endeavour to shield themselves from the context of the conflict:staff do not want “their” project impaired by the unfavourableenvironment.
4. Development cooperation measures fail to forge a link between localconditions and the national or regional situation where a conflict isconcerned.”
Source: Stephan Klingebiel, Impact of Development Cooperation in ConflictSituations. Cross-section Report on Evaluations of German DevelopmentCooperation in Six Countries, Berlin 1999, p.II
In the real world of development cooperation, theflow of information is subject to numerous sources ofinterference or interruption.Information can already beincomplete when collected at the project level, forinstance when unpleasant messages (as often arise inthe event of a crisis) do not tally with the basic attitudeof optimism of the individual collating the information(“cognitive dissonance”).In such cases the informationis selectively perceived,subjectively processed and thenpassed on. Alternatively there may be a lack ofappropriate sensitivity to the warning signals amongstthe staff on the ground. In many organisations, thegathering of information is not considered a relevanttask, and therefore one which staff often have toperform in their spare time. Some personnel adopt anopenly rejective attitude (“We’re not the secretservice!”).Sometimes critical developments within theproject setting go unreported, as their disseminationmight put the further continuity of the project at risk,or in some cases could have material and socialconsequences for the author of the report, who mightbe worried about gaining a reputation for being“difficult”.At a higher level country and regional offices,and indeed entire TC organisations,might face financiallosses if the flow of funds is made dependent on themaintenance of a certain project scope.
These structural problems can, however, beaddressed. An improved flow of informationpresupposes vigilance against symptoms of crisis, andis unlikely to be achieved unless staff are sensitive in thisregard. The attention of staff can be focused onproblematic developments by applying specificreporting guidelines. Also proposed are incentivesystems conducive to the furnishing of information,designed to ensure that alert reporting is more of aboost than an obstacle to career development. Therelationship between TC implementing organisationsand their commissioning bodies should be one ofmutual trust that can be carefully fostered: on the onehand,faithful reporting on risks from the projects to the
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3. Instruments
Structural deficits
Reporting duties and
incentive systems
financing body, and on the other hand arrangementsensuring alternative uses for funds better not spent ina conflict-prone project.
The demand for accurate information in the partnercountry and the project can stimulate the exchange ofinformation. This can be organised in the form ofinternal conferences in country-specific workinggroups, and dialogue fora that also include externalexperts.
Finally,conflict-related information in the possessionof the local population can be better harnessed andutilised. The War-torn Societies Project (WSP) wasestablished in 1994, with the aim of providing theinternational community and national experts withinstruments enabling them to act more rapidly andeffectively in post-conflict societies. WSP has receivedsupport from 28 bilateral and multilateral organisations,and has been implemented by the United NationsResearch Institute for Social Development (UNRISD).Inthe year 2000 it is planned to transform the project intoan NGO with close links to the UN organisations.WSPclearly demonstrates that information procurementusing the participatory action research method can leadto a better and deeper understanding of complex post-conflict situations.Not only is the information checkedby the concerned actors themselves, but the contactsestablished can also serve as a basis for new forms ofdialogue (cf. Section 4.2). A similar approach is the“action research” method applied by the internationaland ecumenical Life and Peace Institute (LPI). TheInstitute’s experiences with the method have beengained primarily in the Horn of Africa (LPI 1999).
The question remains of what happens to internaland external information once it has been acquired.Information management is a sensitive task, and onewhich could be supported through appropriate intra-organisational communication systems.Emergency aidorganisations are particularly experienced in thisdomain. In the NORDEM project of the NorwegianInstitute of Human Rights in Kosovo (with UNHCR), it
67
Country-specific
working groups and
dialogue fora
Participatory action
research
Information
management
3.1.2 Information Flow and Reporting
proved possible to prevent the duplication of reportingwork by applying the appropriate technology.Each staffmember in the field had on-the-ground access to the PC-supported database being stored and used by theothers. In less critical cases it might be assumed thatsuch a system would meet with little approval, since itwill take up working time. In larger, multilateraloperations a system of this kind can also improvecoordination between the agencies.
3.1.3 Country and Regional Studies
Country and regional analyses are considered by theEU for instance as prerequisite to comprehensivestrategies.A strictly national focus should really be outof the question, since crises can be exacerbated byevents in neighbouring countries. For instance, trans-border refugee inflows may cause local destabilisation,or invasions by rebel armies from neighbouringcountries may occur. Such eventualities must be takeninto account.In some cases,(diplomatic) solutions maybe of a regional rather than a national nature. Havingsaid that, one has to be aware that governmental andmultilateral institutions almost always seek to deal withthe government of a country.
Technical Cooperation is seldom planned on atransboundary basis,even though projects located closeto a national border may for instance have specificimpacts on the environment or labour market of theneighbouring country. It may be the time and effortinvolved in ministries from two or more states engagingin negotiations that makes the regional perspectiveunlikely from the outset. Yet at the analytical level atleast, this perspective is absolutely essential.
Usually (but depending on the commissioning party),country and regional studies focus on the entire canonof possibilities for influencing emerging crises. Thisbroad approach is also thoroughly informative for TC,and should not necessarily be replaced by studies with
68
3. Instruments
Analysis –
a prerequisite
to action
Regional focus
a more narrow focus – i.e. involving exclusively theauthors’ own field of activity. To be efficient andeffective, it is crucial that TC should know its place inthe overall context of efforts for peace, and notoverestimate itself.Nevertheless, country desk officersfrequently point out that external experts often possessonly inadequate knowledge of intra-organisationalrestrictions. This results in available funds beingoverestimated, and inadequate account being taken ofthe range of existing TC activities.
Recommendations from country studies oftencontain lists of prioritised areas of intervention, andunder favourable circumstances also provide proposalsfor operationalisation. Corruption for instance canalmost always be combated through a series ofworkshops (a standard recommendation); but only aprofound understanding of the context can helpcorrectly identify entry points for the effective tacklingof the roots of the problem within an institution (e.g.court of audit, parliamentary budget committee etc.),or specify local focuses for an aid programme. Anevaluation of studies commissioned by the EUCommission,and delegated by the Conflict PreventionNetwork (CPN) to country experts,revealed (cf.Section3.1.4) that many recommendations were of a verygeneral nature, and focused strongly on policyframeworks: In pre-conflict phases, theserecommendations focused on promoting regionalcooperation, supporting civil society, buildingdemocratic institutions, protecting human rights andminorities, and supporting transparent and sociallycompatible economic reforms, utilising politicaldialogue and political conditionalities to promote thesettlement of disputes. In situations of post-conflictpeace-building,the recommendations aimed to achievesimultaneous reforms in the political and economicdomains,with clear emphasis on the security sector andon addressing the international dimensions in order tobuild a lasting peace (Eide/Smith 1999).
69
Recommendations
for action
3.1.3 Country and Regional Studies
To date, there is barely any indication of how suchrecommendations are to be put into practice, or whatactual effect they have in relation to conflicts.Countrystudies should display four strengths, although theseare rarely likely to be achieved simultaneously:■ adequate overview of the situation on the ground
(country expertise, where possible not just a deskstudy prepared without the author(s) having anopportunity to assess the field);
■ knowledge of the potentials for intervention,constraints and budget lines of the commissioningparty (this calls for close dialogue between authorsand commissioning bodies);
■ general overview of crisis prevention measures(recommendations not simply confined to a familiarsegment of the spectrum);
■ clear recommendations on how to set prioritieswithin the entire spectrum of potential inter-ventions.
Weaknesses of country analyses can be reduced byproducing appropriate terms of reference, throughconsultation with commissioning bodies and throughappropriate selection of personnel.The practicability ofresults will therefore be heavily dependent on theinterest and will of the commissioning institution.Country studies will gain practical value when theirrecommendations set clear priorities,with cost analysesand risks assessment.This also includes identifying therisks associated with not taking action.Finally, countrystudies need to be incorporated appropriately intoplanning and evaluation processes, as well as into theprofessional debate within the organisation.
70
3. Instruments
Practicability
3.1.4 Analytical Capacities
In almost all TC organisations, including bothgovernmental and non-governmental developmentinstitutions, conflict-related analytical capacities areunderdeveloped.Numerous organisations (e.g.politicalfoundations, church-based development services, theNorwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, LPI) drawattention to the expertise and grass-roots contacts oftheir local experts, and the representatives of theirdecentralised organisational structure: These organi-sations conduct their conflict-related analyses in thefield. Other institutions conduct such analyses inregional or country departments (e.g.Novib,the DanishMinistry of Foreign Affairs).Both models raise the issueof how to globally compare the used analytical criteria,and how to deal with the problem of restrictedcapability to learn from experiences in other countries– thus drawing attention to knowledge managementdeficits.A further problem is a poorly evolved sensitivityof their staff to crisis prevention. Orientation andtraining at the regional department and implementationlevel is still in the initial stage. A shortage of staff isspecified as the basic reason for the analytical deficitsat the central level. In some cases attempts are made tocompensate this by calling for external expertise.Thishas the advantage that multi-country, long-termcomparative analysis can at least take place.Having saidthat, it remains an open question whether the actorsfrom within the commissioning organisations willsupport the results. Cooperation in a spirit of trust,appropriate forms of presentation and dialogue withpractitioners are prerequisite to this.
Cooperation with external experts can take placeeither ad hoc,or within the scope of framework agree-ments with think tanks or regional institutions (interalia Norway, Sweden, the Netherlands). In the ConflictPrevention Network (CPN, currently affiliated to theStiftung Wissenschaft und Politik in Ebenhausen), theEU has continuous access to a network able to respond
71
Underdeveloped
resources
Cooperation with the
research community
3.1.4 Analytical Capacities
to enquiries both from individual DGs of theCommission, and from the EU Parliament, and toprovide expertise from an established pool ofpredominantly European specialists. In the past, it hasbeen precisely those bodies concerned with TC andemergency (DG VIII and ECHO) which have availedthemselves of this facility. The goals of the CPN are todeepen interdisciplinary dialogue,to support the EU indeveloping a joint foreign and security policy, to raiseawareness of the complex nature of violent conflicts,and to further develop methodologies on an ongoingbasis. The specific inputs offered by CPN include thepreparation of background studies and briefing papers,and the holding of workshops and seminars to developconcrete options for action.
3.1.5 Analytical Instruments
To speed-up and improve analysis, a number oforganisations (e.g.EU,DFAIT,BMZ) are testing analyticalinstruments designed to help identify as precisely aspossible actors and patterns of escalation, as well as toestablish a priority list of causal factors. To a certainextent these instruments are linked to well-knownmethods in development cooperation (objectives-oriented project planning, participatory rapidappraisal), but also go beyond them in seeking toidentify, speak out about and standardise criticalproblem areas.
One method is described in the draft guidelines of theEU Commission entitled “Peace-Building and ConflictPrevention in Developing Countries.A Practical Guide”(see also Section 3.3.1).In a first step,they recommendthat the applicants identify top-priority areas of activity.One stage below the “root causes”, worded in highlyabstract terms the “problem areas” are proposed andthen briefly brought forward under the headings“characterisation”, “potential consequences” and“patterns of escalation”. The practitioner is thus
72
3. Instruments
Identifying priorities
73
3.1.5 Analytical Instruments
RO
OT-
CA
US
E 1
Imb
alan
ce o
f pol
itica
l, so
cial
, eco
nom
ic a
nd
cultu
ral o
pp
ortu
nitie
s
1: S
ocio
-eco
nom
ic
ineq
ualit
ies
2: E
xclu
sive
gov
ernm
ent
elite
3: V
iola
tion
of p
oliti
cal
grou
p r
ight
s
4: D
esta
bili
satio
n b
y re
fuge
es a
nd in
tern
ally
dis
pla
ced
peo
ple
5: D
emog
rap
hic
pre
ssur
es
RO
OT-
CA
US
E 2
:
Illeg
itim
ate
non-
dem
ocra
tic
and
inef
fect
ive
gove
rnan
ce
6: L
egiti
mac
y d
efic
it of
gove
rnm
ent
and
pub
licin
stitu
tions
7: In
suffi
cien
t or
dec
linin
gp
ublic
ser
vice
s
8: C
rimin
ality
, soc
ial a
ndp
oliti
cal v
iole
nce
9: B
iase
d la
w a
pp
licat
ion
and
enf
orce
men
t b
y ju
stic
e an
d s
ecur
ity
serv
ices
RO
OT-
CA
US
E 4
:
Ab
senc
e of
an
activ
e an
dor
gani
sed
civ
il so
ciet
y
14: W
eak
civi
l soc
iety
orga
nisa
tions
15: A
bse
nce
of p
rofe
ssio
nal
and
ind
epen
den
t m
edia
16: L
ack
of e
cono
mic
“p
eace
inte
rest
s”
RO
OT-
CA
US
E 3
:
Ab
senc
e of
op
por
tuni
ties
for
the
pea
cefu
l con
cilia
tion
of g
roup
inte
rest
s an
d fo
r b
ridgi
ng d
ivid
ing
lines
b
etw
een
diff
eren
t id
entit
ygr
oup
s
10: A
bse
nce
of e
ffect
ive
dis
put
e re
solu
tion-
mec
hani
sms
11: A
bse
nce
ofp
lura
lism
/div
ersi
fied
d
ebat
e
12: D
istr
ust
amon
g id
entit
ygr
oup
s
13: W
eak
or h
arm
ing
exte
rnal
eng
agem
ent
Ro
ot
caus
es o
f vio
lent
co
nflic
t an
d r
elat
ed p
rob
lem
are
as
Sou
rce:
Mic
hael
Lun
d/A
ndre
as M
ehle
r (p
rinci
pal
con
trib
utor
s), P
eace
-Bui
ldin
g an
d C
onfli
ct P
reve
ntio
n in
Dev
elop
ing
Cou
ntrie
s.A
Pra
ctic
al G
uid
e. C
PN
Gui
deb
ook
(dra
ft d
ocum
ent)
1999
provided with a tool to help identify the keycomponents of what is usually an overwhelminglycomplex conflict situation.In a second step the analystis required to define a range of overall goals, fields ofintervention and concrete activities under the headingsof the 16 categories proposed, so that a selection canbe made. Finally, the activity preselected forimplementation is characterised,and a brief descriptionof its expected impact on the conflict presented, alsooutlining risks and existing experiences.
This procedure helps the practitioner not only toanalyse, but also to take swift action. Prescribedanalytical frameworks always involve the risk ofconstraining the practitioner’s own creative thinking.Within a given organisation, a joint conceptualframework for analysis can be promoted by providinga generally accepted manual.The prime objective of thiskind of instrument is to help select from the repertoireof activities available.
3.2 Planning
External interventions in conflicts taking place inaffected countries require careful planning. Inparticular the issues of prioritisation,coordination andharmonisation with third-party initiatives, and theintegration of TC into the wider strategy of theinternational community make planning a complexand time-consuming activity.At the same time, the bestuse should be made of the windows of opportunity,which is why rapid response is called for – a need thatcan be contradictory to the above statement.Nevertheless, most people we interviewed preferredthe careful planning process to “rushing things”,although some of them do make use of the analyticaltools described above which help speed-up planning.
The use of “crisis matrices”in the planning of all newprojects,analogous to the way the cross-cutting themesof environment and gender are addressed, is also being
74
3. Instruments
Planning in the event
of a crisis
debated.Within the scope of its environmental impactassessment, Austrian development cooperation has alist of questions on “socio-ecological conflicts” whichmight serve as a take-off point for such crisis-sensitiveplanning. Some interviewees had the impression thatthe willingness of practitioners to accept furtherassessment procedures in addition to their existingworkload was rather low.
3.2.1 Country Programmes
A number of ministries – such as BMZ or the DutchMinistry of Foreign Affairs – have made moves to designtheir technical and humanitarian assistance in selectedconflict-prone countries or countries in crisis on a moresensitive basis than in “normal cases”. Governmentalorganisations such as SIDA and DFID intend to make alltheir planning activities crisis-sensitive, even incountries where there are no visible signs of escalatingconflict.
The British Department for InternationalDevelopment (DFID) has also begun incorporatingwider objectives of conflict reduction into all itscountry, regional and global strategies. The countrypapers are based on an analysis of the potentials forconflict.This analysis provides information on affected
75
Country strategies
3.2.1 Country Programmes
“In all its country strategies and similar documents SIDA shall analyse the riskof conflicts and ongoing armed conflicts and give priority to projects andworking methods which reduce conflicts in society and prevent armedconflicts.”
Source: Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency, Strategyfor Conflict management and Peace-Building. A summary, Stockholm 1999
sections of the population, underlying and immediatecauses of potential conflicts, their intensity, trends,andpossible measures for significant conflict reduction.
Many development cooperation institutions,especially most of the German political foundations,have also made the incorporation of conflict-related
76
3. Instruments
BMZ terms
BMZ Country ConceptThe BMZ’s country concept is a key planning, management and steeringinstrument for its country-specific work. Alongside BMZ’s frameworkplanning, the country concept forms the basis for country-specificimplementation of BMZ’s development-policy objectives.
Country TalksThe country concepts are prepared in country talks, which provide not onlyother German Federal Ministries, but also the implementing organisations,non-governmental organisations (especially the church-based organisationsand political foundations) with an opportunity to contribute their experiencesand to voice their opinions.
Key Cooperation Sector StrategiesThe key cooperation sector strategies are designed to supplement thecountry concept, providing concrete details on the conceptual and technicalaspects of the respective sectoral or thematic focus (going into greater depththan is possible in the country concept). The key cooperation sectorstrategies aim to concretise the country concept, and are attached to it asannexes.
Sector ConceptsThe sector concepts – e.g. sector concepts on health, education, emergencyand refugee aid etc. – are directives for the design of country programmesand project work. The concepts are prepared (and revised and updated asappropriate) when development cooperation in a given sector is of aparticularly large order of magnitude, or if particularly difficult problems arisein that sector, or if the experiences gained call for significant amendments oraddenda.
Source: GTZ, “Country-specific and other cross-project papers – theirfunction and links”, work document dated 27 January 2000
issues mandatory in their country strategies, leavingbroad scope as to the form which that might take.Thistoo brings forward the issue of potential crisis to a newand prominent status, incorporating it into long-termplanning. One should not underestimate the role ofcountry and sector strategies in raising staff awareness.BMZ plans to introduce key cooperation sectorstrategies for crisis prevention (Kloke-Lesch 1999).However, these efforts are still at the initial stage.Although conflict analysis is often performed on ahighly systematic basis, country papers usually remainsilent with regard to the concrete activities that mightcontribute to conflict management.
Since the coordination of governmental andinternational TC organisations’ country strategies isusually subject to intensive discussion with thegovernments in the partner countries, the raising ofconflict-related issues may create ill feelings among thecounterparts. Consequently, it is essential that thisprocess be supported by political dialogue, so thatconflict-related objectives and measures contained in acountry concept are appropriate and mutuallyaccepted.
If tensions are rising in a country, one means ofpreparing for political dialogue is to convene a countryconference involving the concerned organisations andexternal experts. This conference should focus moreclosely than usual on the causes of the conflict and thefactors exacerbating the crisis. BMZ is planning such amechanism, and the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairsalready holds such talks.
Many organisations are still debating whether crisisprevention should be allocated a similar function inproject appraisal to other cross-sectoral issues such asgender and environment. On the one hand, a “crisismatrix”would also focus the attention of non-specialistson the subject. On the other hand it would be difficultto prevent such a mechanism being perceived as justanother onerous duty, leading to superficial treatment.
77
Country conferences
Project appraisal
3.2.1 Country Programmes
3.2.2 Financial Planning/Budgeting
Observers are unanimous in the view that thestandard financing models and budget lines of TC placestrong constraints on the requirement for rapidresponse to situations of crisis.Rigid financial planningis an obstacle to swift adjustment to changing needs(although such developments might in part beanticipated through appropriate planning). It is of keyimportance that donors keep promises made in thecontext of peace accords. It would be fatal if TC back-up measures (for instance involving the reintegration ofex-combatants) could not be implemented due tofinancial and administrative constraints.
Administrative procedures are rarely flexible.Severalconsequences can be drawn from this: Someorganisations have introduced special procedures withfewer accounting steps, to make funds available on amore flexible basis.Others are creating budget reservesthat also enable them to make funds available morequickly. At the meeting of the European Council inHelsinki in December 1999,the EU resolved to institute
78
3. Instruments
Flexibility is a must
Rationale of the Danish “Peace and Stability Fund”
“A further factor to be taken into account when organising transitionalassistance over a limited period of time is the question of when and how thework should be completed. In addition, there is a need for the transitionalprovision of flexible financing channels for assistance to countries when thisis called for by the consequences of a critical situation. In developingcountries the Environment, Peace and Stability Fund will be a supplement tocontributions financed via the regular development budget. At the same timeit will still be possible to initiate multi-annual reconstruction programmesfinanced exclusively via the Peace and Stability Fund. These contributionsshould, however, be coordinated with the general Danish assistanceprogramme, which should continue to constitute the backbone of Denmark’sdevelopment activities.”
Source: Royal Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Prevention and Resolutionof Violent Conflicts in Developing Countries, Summary of the Ministry ofForeign Affairs’ policy paper (draft))
a Rapid Reaction Fund. A few states have introducedbudget lines explicitly designated for crisis prevention.One example is Denmark. To date (1999), 27 millionDanish Krone have been made available in the “Peaceand Stability Fund”. It is planned to increase this figureto 100 million (2000), and further (focusing onSoutheast Europe).The Canadian Peace Building Fundis also worthy of mention in this context.
Decentralised cooperation offices or embassies in-country sometimes have a certain financial leeway,andare able to deliver support to promising small-scaleactivities unbureaucratically.A number of intervieweesexpressed the hope that priorities could be betteridentified and responded to more rapidly locally, incases where a certain financial liberty was permitted tothis level.Unfortunately it has so far been possible onlyin rare cases to scale-up such activities to relevant large-scale and long-term projects, for the very reasons thatthere were no global strategies to which the projectscould be related, or that conflict management has notyet been institutionalised.
Experience shows that sound financial managementcan make the delivery of funds more flexible.Throughtight financial controlling, DEZA’s Division forHumanitarian Cooperation is able to obtain an up-to-date overview of its financial status at any time.This hasconsiderably enhanced its capability to plan the use offunds.
Flexible financial planning is also required after thewindow of opportunity has closed, however. It mustalso be possible to complete a project, to freeze funds,or possibly even to wind down the overall scale ofcommitment to ensure that funds are not wasted orused to finance a war. One example of this is the so-called watching brief phase adopted by the World Bank.This phase is used to focus on social and institutionalassessments, so that World Bank is then well preparedto swiftly step-up its activities once the opportunitiesarise again.
79
Scope at the
local level
Exit strategy
3.2.2 Financial Planning/Budgeting
3.3 Impact Assessment
3.3.1 Conflict Impact Assessment
What impacts TC activities have on an existingconflict – positive or negative, slowing-down orspeeding-up the conflict – is a question which arisesconstantly,i.e.not just on completion of a project phase.Alongside early warning, conflict impact assessment(CIAS) is a tool in which many organisations haveshown keen interest, but with which virtually nopractical experience has yet been acquired.
A study commissioned by the OECD-DAC InformalTask Force on Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation (Uvin 1999) states unequivocally thatdevelopment cooperation always creates bothincentives and constraints to both violent and peacefulsettlement of conflicts. Consequently, the aim must beto isolate and reduce the negative effects, whilststrengthening and networking the positive impacts.Conflict impact assessment is designed to help servethis purpose.
80
3. Instruments
CIAS
TC and Conflict Impact Assessment (CIAS)
CIAS attempts to identify all the – intended and unintended – impacts of TCmeasures on the dynamics of a conflict and the peace-building process. Thisinstrument plays an important role throughout the project cycle, i.e. before,during and after the implementation of measures.
A distinction should be drawn between impacts at the macro level (i.e. thecombined effects of all TC measures on the conflict in the wider setting), andimpacts at the micro level (i.e. the effects of individual measures on theconflict within the project setting). Identifying impacts presentsmethodological difficulties. For instance, the effects of interventions cannotalways be clearly ascribed to a particular actor or measure.
Source: GTZ, DEA Glossary (English), 2nd edition (work in progress)
Should crisis prevention be understood in a verynarrow sense,this task would be virtually insoluble.Canthe causes of the non-occurrence of a (feared) event bemeasured? Is it possible to determine if and whenprecisely a violent conflict was “prevented”?
This appears to be the question addressed by“preventive diplomacy”, i.e. what is termed “lightconflict prevention”. With regard to TC and crisisprevention, the focus is likely to be less on a singleevent, and more on the reduction of wider potentialsfor conflict – what is termed “deep conflictprevention”. Here, links can be established with theexisting checklists used in early warning (cf. Section3.1.1). In methodological terms, application-orientedresearch for CIAS has only just begun.It is currently stillbeing debated which effects are to be measured, inorder to assess the efficiency of measures designed toprevent conflict. Here are some examples of the kindof questions which would be addressed:
Did implementation of the measure■ prevent the outbreak of specific, possibly imminent
acts of violence (i.e. the question which is“impossible” to verify)?
■ protect vulnerable groups against attack?■ reduce mutual fear between groups?■ re-establish broken lines of communication between
political actors?
81
Methodological
problems
3.3.1 Conflict Impact Assessment
“In order to know that a preventive measure, P, prevented an event, E, wehave to know that
1. E would have occurred in the absence of P
2. E did not occcur following the presence of P; and moreover
3. The presence of P is the agent, the explanation, for the non-occurence of E.”
Source: Hugh Miall, Preventing Potential Conflicts, Assessing the Impactof Light and Deep Conflict Prevention in Central and Eastern Europe and theBalkans, CPN Yearbook 1999/2000 (work in progress)
82
3. Instruments
For TC measures, however, such event-relatedquestions will be less relevant. More relevant will bequestions relating to potentials, for example:
Did the measure■ help reduce structural disparities between groups in
dispute, especially with respect to a more justdistribution of key goods and services?
■ contribute to the formation of autonomous spheresof social power outside the existing official andoppositional organisations (civil society)?
■ help improve the capabilities of actors whothemselves are significant players in the crisisprevention and reconciliation process? (after Lund1999)
As with impact assessment in developmentcooperation in general, CIAS also faces the basicproblem that it is very difficult to ascribe individualoutcomes and developments to specific causes withany precision,given the large number of actors,projectsand other factors involved. At the CPN AnnualConference in 1999, a review was conducted of thepresent status of efforts. It was found that impactassessment as yet plays barely any role in practice.Oneproposal made was the sequential analysis (comparisonof dates when conflict-related events first occur, anddates of targeted intervention),and/or the interviewingof the parties to the conflict.It is regularly proposed thatparticipatory impact assessment be made an integralcomponent of CIAS.Yet at the same time in this highly-sensitive situation it is less clear than in traditional TCwhether the publicly expressed view of the intervieweeis more likely to be simply their personal conviction,orwhether it represents “the truth”.To date there are fewmethods with any potential to generate certainties thatgo beyond plausible assumptions, particularly sinceCIAS still has to be applied in practice.
Plausibility as
opposed to certainty
83
CIAS is designed to identify the effects of develop-ment activities on conflicts on an ex ante and in-processbasis, rather than retrospectively as in traditionalevaluations. Some organisations have already taken afirm position on this.
To better localise impacts, lists of questions areusually proposed for thematic areas, for example:1. institutional capacity for conflict management andpeace-building; 2. military and physical security;3. political structures and processes; 4. economicstructures and processes; 5. social reconstruction andempowerment (Bush 1998).Also appropriate are the 16problem areas contained in the EU Guide (Lund/Mehler1999, cf. Section 3.1.5). It is less important what thecategories are called, and more important thatidentification of the key impacts is guaranteed.
With CIAS, a distinction can be drawn between themicro level of the project, and the macro level of TCinvolvement as a whole.A distinction should be drawnbetween the conflict-related impacts of a project toreintegrate ex-combatants in a village community, andthe impacts of a national demobilisation programme,orindeed the combined impacts of all TC activities in apartner country. Furthermore, these questions can beaddressed prospectively (ex ante) or retrospectively (expost), as well as on an in-process basis.
In-process
assessment
Micro and macro
levels
3.3.1 Conflict Impact Assessment
“All projects in SIDA’s international development cooperation shall be strictlyexamined during the planning and implementation stages in order to identifyundesirable and harmful effects. An analysis of the effects of the project onthe conflict shall be built into the regular project assessment work.”
Source: Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency, Strategy for Conflict management and Peace-Building. A summary,Stockholm 1999, p.5
On behalf of the Conflict Prevention Network, theorganisations Saferworld, International Alert andFEWER have prepared a complex list of question,basedon the 16 problem areas specified in theaforementioned Guide (see Table on next page showing“Problem Area 5:Demographic Pressures”).Prospectivelists of this kind can be seen as planning instrumentsfor crisis-related needs analysis; if applied repeatedly atrelatively short intervals,however, they should be seenin the context of impact assessment.
In crisis and pre-crisis situations,a tendency has beenobserved among the personnel of organisations to fillin such lists in the office, far away from events on theground.Under pressure of time and other organisationalconstraints, the standard local needs assessmentnormally performed in TC is easily avoided. Manysupport measures that were specifically designed toprevent crises, for instance in Bosnia, have been basedexclusively on external needs analyses in which theaffected groups were unable to participate.
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3. Instruments
Multi-ethnic cooperation and local conflict impact assessment,North-East India
The Protestant Central Agency for Development Aid (EZE) has for some yearsbeen providing support to marginalised sections of the population in theIndian state of Manipur, where violent clashes between members of variousmountain peoples continue to escalate. This has now motivated over 20NGOs to join forces in a United NGO called Mission to Manipur (UNMM), withthe purpose of implementing multi-ethnic programmes. Based on an analysisof its own needs UNMM, i.e. the local partner association, intends to scale-upits activities to assess the impacts of development projects on conflictsituations in the region.
Source: Association of Church Development Services (AGKED) 1999
85
3.3.1 Conflict Impact Assessment
Pro
ble
m A
rea
5: D
emo
gra
phi
c p
ress
ures
Def
initi
on: I
n a
cont
ext o
f sca
rcity
and
unf
avou
rab
le e
nviro
nmen
tal c
ond
ition
s, d
emog
rap
hic
pre
ssur
es o
n av
aila
ble
phy
sica
l and
soc
ial r
esou
rces
suc
h as
thos
e ca
used
by
mig
ratio
n,hi
gh fe
rtili
ty ra
tes
and
larg
e nu
mb
ers
of y
outh
, may
incr
ease
the
pot
entia
l for
vio
lent
con
flict
. Whe
n la
nd is
sca
rce,
eac
h ad
diti
onal
mou
th is
diff
icul
t to
feed
. Mig
ratio
n to
urb
an a
reas
or n
eigh
bou
ring
pro
vinc
es o
r cou
ntrie
s is
not
a v
iab
le s
olut
ion
if th
ese
des
tinat
ions
ar n
ot p
rep
ared
to re
ceiv
e p
eop
le a
nd p
rovi
de
econ
omic
op
por
tuni
ties.
Lac
k of
job
s an
d e
duc
atio
nal
opp
ortu
nitie
s op
pos
es th
e yo
unge
r ge
nera
tion’
s ex
pec
tatio
ns fo
r so
cial
ad
vanc
emen
t.
Illus
trat
ive
linka
ges:
Dem
ogra
phi
c p
ress
ues
may
be
the
cons
eque
nce
of s
ocio
-eco
nom
ic in
equa
litie
s (p
rob
lem
are
a 1)
and
of d
eclin
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serv
ices
(pro
ble
m a
rea
7) a
nd m
ay le
adto
des
tab
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m a
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4) a
nd d
istr
ust
amon
g id
entit
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oup
s (p
rob
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are
a 12
).S
tate
men
t/co
nclu
sion
s
Col
um
n A
Co
mp
one
nts
of
pro
ble
mar
eas
Col
um
n B
Po
ssib
le m
anife
stat
ions
of
the
pro
ble
m w
hich
ind
icat
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gni
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f th
e p
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aC
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cori
ng1
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w
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m is
:(+
) int
ensi
-fy
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or
(-)
dec
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en-
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nific
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pro
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mar
eaYe
s o
r N
o
To w
hat
deg
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and
unf
avou
rab
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nmen
tal c
ond
ition
sp
lace
pre
ssur
es o
n th
eb
asic
req
uire
men
ts fo
rsu
stai
nab
le li
velih
ood
s?
■S
carc
ity m
ay le
ad t
o so
cial
dis
inte
grat
ion,
for
inst
ace,
whe
n m
en a
re a
ble
to
take
up
lab
our
and
inco
me
opp
ortu
nitie
s in
oth
er lo
catio
ns (l
ead
ing
for
exam
ple
, to
imp
over
ishm
ent
or fe
mal
e-he
aded
hous
ehol
ds
and
/or
low
deg
ree
of s
upp
ort
for
child
ren
and
you
th)
■G
over
nmen
ts o
r lo
cal a
dm
inis
trat
ion
may
be
unab
le o
r un
will
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to p
rovi
de
adeq
uate
and
acc
essi
ble
alte
rnat
ives
to
scar
ce r
esou
rces
■In
equi
tab
le s
ocia
l op
por
tuni
ties
bet
wee
n m
en a
nd w
omen
at
fam
ily le
vel m
ay b
e tr
ansl
ated
into
incr
ease
d le
vels
of d
omes
tic v
iole
nce
and
mar
gina
lisat
ion
of w
omen
■Fr
agile
live
lihoo
ds
are
incr
easi
ngly
thr
eate
ned
by
com
pet
ition
for
scar
ce r
esou
rces
+
-
To w
hat e
xten
t doe
s th
e go
v-er
nmen
t hav
e th
e ca
paci
ty to
resp
ond
to a
n in
crea
sing
de-
man
d fo
r goo
ds a
nd s
ervi
ces?
■Th
e la
ck o
f a s
tab
le m
acro
-eco
nom
ic fr
amew
ork
may
pre
vent
pro
visi
on o
f vita
l ser
vice
s■
The
educ
atio
n sy
stem
may
not
mee
t th
e ne
eds
of a
rap
idly
cha
ngin
g ec
onom
y■
The
gove
rnm
ent/
auth
oriti
es u
se in
crea
sing
ly r
epre
ssiv
e m
eans
to
conf
ront
exp
ress
ions
of d
isco
nten
t■
Gov
ernm
ent
or a
utho
ritie
s in
crea
sing
ly “
bla
me”
par
ticul
ar id
entit
y gr
oup
s fo
r in
equi
tab
le a
cces
s
+
-
To w
hat
exte
nt d
o p
oliti
cal
lead
ers
exp
loit
fear
s of
dem
ogra
phi
c ch
ange
for
pol
itica
l gai
n?
■A
lack
of i
ndep
end
ent
med
ia a
nd a
ctiv
e ci
vil s
ocie
ty c
apab
le o
f cou
nter
-bal
anci
ng e
xtre
me
pol
itica
lp
rop
agan
da
allo
ws
tens
ions
to
rise
■In
crea
sing
ly u
nche
cked
leve
ls o
f int
er-c
omm
unal
dis
trus
t an
d t
ensi
on■
Eco
nom
ic s
hock
s or
ref
orm
s in
crea
sing
ly le
ad t
o gr
oup
s fe
elin
g in
secu
re a
bou
t th
e fu
ture
■In
crea
sed
man
ipul
atio
n of
pol
itica
l and
eco
nom
ic id
entit
y b
y le
ader
s
+
-
To w
hat
exte
nt is
sca
rcity
per
ceiv
ed t
o b
e th
e ou
t-co
me
of in
app
rop
riate
or
del
iber
ate
pol
icie
s b
yne
ighb
ourin
g co
mm
uniti
esor
gov
ernm
ent?
■La
ck o
f mea
ns b
y w
hich
gov
ernm
ent
add
ress
es t
he c
ause
s of
sca
rcity
e.g
. by
imp
rovi
ngen
viro
nmen
tal m
onito
ring
or t
hrou
gh la
nd r
efor
m■
Gov
ernm
ent/
loca
l aut
horit
ies
do
not
und
erta
ke m
easu
res
to m
edia
te in
ter-
com
mun
al r
elat
ions
and
faci
litat
e re
sour
ce s
harin
g to
pre
vent
vio
lent
com
pet
ition
from
dam
agin
g liv
elih
ood
s■
Gov
ernm
ents
or
alte
rnat
ive
auth
oriti
es e
nour
age
over
-exp
loita
tion
of a
vaila
ble
res
ourc
es le
adin
g to
envi
ronm
enta
l dam
age
and
sho
rtag
es■
The
gove
rnm
ent
or a
utho
rity
uses
sca
rcity
as
a le
ver
for
cont
rol e
.g. b
y co
ntro
lling
food
and
dev
elop
men
t ai
d
+
-
A p
rob
lem
are
a w
ith a
tot
al s
core
of 1
2 or
mor
e sh
ould
be
trea
ted
as
sign
ifica
nt. A
com
pon
ent
of a
pro
ble
m a
rea
with
a s
core
of 3
+ s
houl
d b
e tr
eate
d a
s si
gnifi
cant
.S
ourc
e: S
WP
-CP
N, C
onfli
ct Im
pac
t A
sses
smen
t. A
Pra
ctic
al W
orki
ng T
ool f
or P
riorit
isin
g D
evel
opm
ent
Ass
ista
nce
in U
nsta
ble
Situ
atio
ns (C
PN
gui
de)
, Bru
ssel
s/E
ben
haus
enO
ctob
er 1
999
3.3.2 Evaluations
Inevitably,the focus on crisis prevention and conflictmanagement will have consequences for traditionalevaluation work. Major organisations are currentlyengaged in designing modified criteria and terms ofreference for their consultants, incorporating conflict-related issues.Even in the 1990s,most evaluations of TCin crisis-affected countries did not explicitly address theimpacts of a violent conflict on TC or,vice versa,of TCon the conflict (Leonhardt 1999). There are, however,some notable exceptions.
One notable evaluation is the aforementioned OECDstudy (Uvin 1999), the conclusions of which have far-reaching consequences, and which is based on fourcountry studies: Afghanistan, Bosnia, Rwanda and SriLanka. The World Bank’s post-conflict unit has alsopublished an evaluation of experiences in post-conflictreconstruction in nine states (Bosnia and Herzegovina,Cambodia, El Salvador, Eritrea, Haiti, Lebanon, Rwanda,Sri Lanka and Uganda). The World Bank study makesonly very abstract reference to its own omissions.Nevertheless, its conclusions have been very positivelyreceived.BMZ has published (Klingebiel 1999) a cross-section report on evaluations of German developmentcooperation in six countries (El Salvador, Ethiopia,Kenya, Mali, Rwanda, Sri Lanka), not including thecountry studies themselves. This study generated keystimulus for the debate within Germany. A desk studysynthesising the lessons of experience gained fromNorwegian assistance to countries in conflict (Burundi,Guatemala,Mali,Mozambique,Rwanda,Sudan) has alsobeen published (Sørbø et al. 1999), again based ondetailed evaluations. Although these studies reach anumber of similar conclusions concerning the impactsof the respective activities evaluated,the measures hadnot been designed explicitly to prevent conflict.Consequently there is still little information available asto the value of explicitly preventive action in TC.Clear
86
3. Instruments
Modified TORs
First evaluations
information is available on conflict management (e.g.Duffield in Sørbø et al. 1997).
The new approaches to CIAS are – as indicated above– conceptually broader than evaluations conducted expost. This is closely linked to the insight that crisisprevention work cannot follow a linear trajectory inpursuit of strictly defined ultimate objectives,but mustalways focus its attention on the process itself.Conflictsand crises are dynamic phenomena. TC shouldtherefore provide correspondingly dynamic, flexiblemeasures in response.
It is especially important to bear in mind unintendedimpacts of TC that may possibly exacerbate a conflict.Published guides have already discussed specific –positive and problematic – conflict-related experienceswith certain activities (Creative Associates International1997, Lund/Mehler 1999). In principle, this kind ofevaluation is appropriate not only for the project level,but also for the sector level and for overall involvementat the national level. It could also be argued that thecross-sectoral perspective is also of key significance forthe evaluation of individual projects.This because whenassessing the impacts of a project on a conflict – forinstance a water management project with a multi-ethnic steering committee – knowing whether themeasures are working at the project level and havingthe desired impacts on multi-ethnic cooperation is notthe only relevant issue. If a pilot project of this kind isused as an alibi,whilst wider measures of reconciliationbetween hostile groups are absent, its impacts at thenational level might even become dysfunctional.
A wary approach should also be taken towards thewish for premature disengagement. The sudden exitfrom an unsuccessful project might also exacerbate aconflict: Jobs would be lost, a sense of hopelessnessmight be created, and in certain situation of risingtension rebels might interpret this as a signal thatregime is now also considered by donors to be a “softtarget”. If necessary, the exit should be prepared by
87
Evaluations should
not just be ex post
All impacts should
be considered
3.3.2 Evaluations
designing– where possible at the planning stage – aprudent,phase-by-phase exit strategy.
3.4 Institutionalisation and Capacity Building
In almost all development cooperation organisationsthe additional work being invested in crisis prevention,
88
3. Instruments
Conflict unit
Advantages and disadvantages of the institutionalisation of crisis prevention and conflict management
Institutional solution Advantages Disadvantages
Department or unit
Conflict advisor
Task force –staff fromregional andsectoraldepartments
None no contact person, nostrategic organisationdevelopment, expertisenot evident to observersoutside the organisation
appeals to staffmembers’ sense ofpersonal responsibility
avoidance ofresponsibility, additionalwork without specialremuneration despiteexisting constraints onworking time
lightweight structure,able to influence variousactivity areas within theorganisation, suitable foraddressing problemsarising on a one-off basis
mainstreaming, productdevelopment and“helpline” duties likely toovertax a singleindividual
lightweight structure,usually a high degree ofacceptance amongregional and sectoraldepartments, permanentcontact person
resistance from regionalor sectoral departments,considerable financingrequirement
sufficient humanresources, capacities forproduct and organisationdevelopment as well as“helpline”, possibledivision of labour, specialexpertise immediatelyevident to observersoutside the organisation,potential for coordinationof multi-sectoral projects
coupled with the interest in institutionalising thetheme, had led to a debate on the establishment ofspecialised units or divisions. The World Bank’s post-conflict unit,which hopes at some point to make itselfsuperfluous,is an example often mentioned.So,is therea need for a “crisis prevention unit”? The advantages anddisadvantages need to be carefully considered.
To date, only very few organisations have had theirown crisis prevention unit (DFAIT, Dutch Ministry ofForeign Affairs, DFID). At the ministerial level, thesubject has usually been dealt with by units with abroader mandate – although correspondingdesignations have been gaining prominence inestablishment plans. TC organisations have eitherattached a conflict advisor to an existing unit (SIDA,Finland), allowed themselves the luxury of a separatedesk,or operate with task forces or theme teams (NRC,GTZ). All these solutions have advantages anddisadvantages,as is becoming increasingly evident,andmust be adapted to the requirements and not least tothe financial constraints of organisations.Hybrid formsare also conceivable (permanent conflict advisor, andin case of acute need ad hoc working groups).
Beyond these concrete forms, the conceptualfoundations of crisis prevention should also bereflected at the institutional level. A recent study thatalso provides an overview of forms of institutiona-lisation (Leonhardt 1999) identifies a number ofrelevant points as criteria for successful involvement incrisis prevention and conflict management. Thesefindings can be considered in the light of the followingquestions of institutional logic:
89
3.4 Institutionalisation and Capacity Building
90
3. Instruments
Findings Institutional problems within (cf. Leonhardt 1999/2000) development/TC organisations
Which position within the institutionensures an appropriate deployment ofhuman and financial resources?
Adequate instruments and toolsshould be made available, as wellas intensive back-up support forthose who work in conflict situationsand their wider setting.
At which level – within the hierarchy –must decisions be taken concerningstrategic priorities?
A self-assessment as to whereconstructive action for crisisprevention and conflictmanagement can be taken by anorganisation is a matter of interestto any donor. This is the only meansto ensure that funds are employedefficiently, and strategiccomparative advantages utilisedappropriately.
Which institutional solution isconducive to flexibility and a long-term approach?
The organisation must be aware ofthe fact that peace processes takelonger than normal TC processes.This must also be reflected inmanagement procedures. Flexibilityand a long-term perspective arerequired.
What status does the TCrepresentative need in order tocredibly act as contact personvis-à-vis sectoral ministries?
The actions of the organisation mustbe integrated into a strategicframework guided by ground rules,and embracing policymaking, TC,foreign trade and the army.
Which individual or unit should beresponsible for this mainstreaming?
It is necessary for the (TC)organisation to make the theme of“conflict” explicit, and to address it.In many cases the theme still goesunmentioned in project documents,evaluations, debriefing guidelines,country programmes etc..
In the light of the above,a “narrow gauge”solution isclearly inappropriate. Organisations dealing with theissue only peripherally and within the scope of theirnormal activities are highly unlikely to possess theexpertise needed to deploy the required instruments ona timely and target-group-oriented basis.Where countrydesks or divisions are the lead decision-makers, it willbe appropriate to position crisis prevention andconflict management at least in such a way that veryclose cooperation between these country desks,country desks for affected neighbouring states,and staffunits, is possible. For organisations with experience ofinstitutionalising cross-sectoral subjects (e.g. in theform of sectoral divisions),the creation of a more or lessindependent unit seems an obvious option.If the sectorhas a separate budget line,even a small one,this will alsobe an appropriate option.This will enhance the statusof the unit within the organisation, and give it broaderscope for action. At the same time, a small budget willstrengthen the need to cooperate with otherdepartments when tested pilot measures are to beupscaled. Systematic mainstreaming of the issue
91
Solutions adapted to
the organisation, but
appropriate to the
problem
3.4 Institutionalisation and Capacity Building
Findings Institutional problems within (cf. Leonhardt 1999/2000) development/TC organisations
What institutional solutions will ensurepresence and reputable status oninternational committees as well as inconflict areas?
The organisation must closelycoordinate and bring its activitiesinto line with those of other actors.This applies both to internationaland to local actors.
Which institutional links andnetworking are required so that suchrisks can be taken?
Risk assessment and theacceptance of risks are criticalcharacteristics for an organisationthat intends to achieve positiveresults in the conflict sector.
throughout the entire organisation will then becomeinevitable.
Capacity building and institutional learning areprerequisite to reputable work and a credible “marketoffering” in the crisis prevention sector.This issue canbe tackled through staff training, and the recruitmentof new staff.Some interviewees considered it necessarythat 10-20 percent of the staff of an organisation receivecorresponding training.Another approach would be tooutsource this expertise. SIDA recently commencedimplementation of a framework agreement with avariety of university faculties: Faculty staff makeavailable a fixed amount of working time per term,during which they can prepare country studies, orserve as a help desk if the officers responsible for theproject require consultancy services.Other models areconceivable.There is broad consensus on the fact thatthe external expertise required goes far beyond what isavailable within the existing pool of generalist TCconsultants.
Key capacity building inputs could be made throughintelligent knowledge management methods.Frequentrotation in some organisations leads to a loss ofexperience. Accessing information and documents(often unreliably collected) from files in archives islaborious. These operations can be better performedusing computer-based systems. It goes without sayingthat all approaches identified in the business worldunder the heading “organisational learning/learningorganisation” can be useful (Kline/Saunders 1998,Argyris 1999).
92
3. Instruments
Capacity building
4. Areas of Activity
4.1 Reducing the Structural Causes of Conflictsand Building Conflict ManagementMechanisms
What might be the specific input of TC in situationsof crisis? Critics have cautioned against an over-estimation of TC’s capacity in this regard (Musto 2000).At the same time, it is considered certain that TC is farfrom harnessing all its potentials. In the numerous TCprojects around the world, scope for furtheringconstructive conflict management undoubtedly exists.Some people even believe that the developmentworker can be turned into a “peace field diplomat”. Inprinciple,any TC project can generate impacts that helpprevent crises. Yet this will only be convincing iftraditional measures are carefully assessed, possiblysupplemented by new components and implementedwith the explicit aim of helping prevent crises.Havingsaid that,the present set of TC measures will have to becomplemented by innovative activities in areas thatwere previously neglected.This addition will need to besupported by appropriate training of TC personnel.Knowing that any development project can, undercertain circumstances, also exacerbate tensions,innovative measures must gain more prominence.TC asa whole will have to become politically more sensitiveand conscious, in order to meet the above challenges.
Structural stability is a comprehensive goal ofdevelopment cooperation, and at the same timerequires numerous internal and external inputs.Exerting a positive influence on structural causes ofconflicts, and strengthening mechanisms for peacefulconflict management, are the twin pillars ofdevelopment cooperation activities geared to thisobjective. Preventive impacts can occur, whenstructural activities are designed to
93
Specific inputs of TC
Structural stability
4.1 Reducing the Structural Causes of Conflicts
■ reduce economic underdevelopment and regionaldisparities
■ create balanced political and social opportunities■ combat deterioration in the natural resource base
which affects people’s lives■ alleviate population pressure ■ reduce educational deficits.
Traditionally, TC has had a strong footing in areaswhich make it eminently suited to supporting this viewof structural stability. These include: Protection andconservation of natural resources, food security, familyplanning, and the strategic goal of poverty alleviation.In practice, such projects can only be effective inreducing the potential for violent conflicts if theyare designed with an explicit focus on addressingthe causes of crises. Furthermore they must beimplemented with the strategic aim of helping achievestructural stability.
Traditional TC activities are frequently linked topotential conflict situations.The better known includewater management, NRM and rural developmentprojects (De Soysa/Gleditsch 1999).
The gradual exacerbation of conflicts in manypartner countries is causing a change in the projectsetting, and is creating a need for highly specific
94
4. Areas of Activity
Conflict management in a rural development project: Rio Peixe, North-Eastern Brazil
Rio Peixe is an alternative development project with and for small farmers,amidst large-scale agro-industrial projects producing soybean for export. Theproject aims to help achieve comprehensive agrarian reform to benefitfarmers, in the face of land speculators seeking to increase their returns, andcorruption among decision-makers. Land conflicts are being peacefullyaddressed through dialogue with powerful individuals from the public andprivate sectors. The dialogue is based on cartographic analyses of land titlesand the illegal sale of land. The lobbying and campaign work is seen as a keyfactor in the success of the dialogue.
Source: Gröss 1999 (Association for Development Aid and the Catholic RuralPeople’s Movement)
interventions in existing “traditional”projects.The firstand least adjustment to such a situation will involveensuring that the projects do not exacerbate conflicts– the do no harm principle. Secondly, componentsaimed at reducing crises can be added-on to existingprojects.Finally,carefully-designed new projects in lesstraditional areas of activity may be of particular value inpeace-building.
Operating with an additional conflict managementcomponent can contribute to peacefully resolvingconflicts emerging in the project setting at the locallevel. One conceivable option would be to establishdialogue forums between rival target groups. This isalready an innovative approach.In the case of a projectdelivering advisory services to a government,the TORsof the seconded experts can be broadened to includeaspects of peaceful conflict management (given theappropriate expertise,and subject to agreement by thepartner side).
A few years ago, TC discovered the demobilisationand reintegration of ex-combatants as one of itsactivities. The results of these projects are obviouslypreventive. Yet the argument can be turned around:Demobilisation and reintegration projects are highlyconflict-sensitive – and the success of a project can bereversible in the event of a renewed escalation ofviolence. Similar arguments apply to demilitarisationproper,although here too it may be possible to achievesustainable results, by combining traditional TCactivities with new components.
There are also a number of activities designedprimarily, and not just secondarily or incidentally, tohelp prevent crises. Most organisations have yet todraw-up a list of best practices for crisis prevention.Thefollowing areas of activity seem particularly important:■ participatory information gathering and conflict
analysis■ community-based peace-building■ promotion of local and regional conflict management
initiatives
95
Additional
components
Established conflict-
related activities
Innovative core areas
of crisis prevention in
TC
4.1 Reducing the Structural Causes of Conflicts
■ support to the media for peace■ education and training for peace■ security-sector reform■ legal assistance■ promotion of democracy■ empowerment■ conflict management and crisis prevention in the
post-conflict reconstruction process■ trauma healing and reconciliation ■ gender aspects in crisis prevention and conflict
management
The strategic objective of many project proposals forcrisis prevention is to promote peace constituencies.Inaddition to the aforementioned war constituencies, i.e.the winners of armed conflicts,militia leaders,the hard-liners of a regime and those who profit from generallack of security, there are presumably always groupswith an interest in peace (cf. Section 2.2 and Section2.5).
A peace constituency is designed to systematicallycounteract, on a broad basis, those profiting from war.Peace constituencies can be local or regional networksof individuals,and governmental and non-governmentalinstitutions within the field of conflict.They are personswho have a long-term interest in preventing violenceand pursuing peaceful conflict management. Inaddition, they possess the influence and capability toalso realise this interest (Ropers 2000).
According to this definition it is clear that anintervention in support of such objectives must beformulated in highly context-specific terms. Certaingroups (e.g.women merchants,trade unions,traditionaland religious leaders) may in particular cases belegitimate and organised groups with a political,economic, social or cultural interest in peace, but inother cases similar groups may even be party to theconflict. A broad diversity of projects may also beappropriate for promoting this strategic objective.
96
4. Areas of Activity
Strategic objective:
promoting peace
constituencies
Peace constituency
networks
Similar approaches also exist in other regions:Supported by the Austrian Ministry of Foreign Affairs,the Austrian Study Centre for Peace and ConflictResolution (ASPR) has conducted workshops on“preventive diplomacy and peace-building” in threeregions of Africa. In addition to joint conflict analysis,these workshops aimed at regional networking.For theSouthern African Development Community (SADC)region,the foundations have been laid for establishmentof an NGO platform for conflict prevention (ASPR1999).
As with all TC projects, the issue of critical massultimately cannot be avoided: How can isolated, small-scale activities actually generate significant impactsthat prevent or delay the outbreak of violent conflicts?What is required here is not only a strategic vision withclear objectives, but also an awareness of the fact that
97
Being a part
of the whole
4.1 Reducing the Structural Causes of Conflicts
Tajik-Kyrgyz community-based crisis prevention project
Along the border between Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan – for instance in theFerghana valley – violent inter-ethnic clashes occur repeatedly, usually overthe use of water resources. DEZA is supporting a Tajik and a Kyrgyz NGO(Itifaak and the Foundation for Harmony and Tolerance), which are jointlyimplementing the “conflict prevention” project. The project aims to exploreand utilise local methods of consensus-building, with a view to resolving inter-ethnic conflicts at the local level. To this end local opinion-makers, i.e.teachers, village chiefs, religious authorities etc. are being trained in conflictanalysis methods, conflict resolution techniques and mutually satisfactoryconsensus-building procedures. Role play and conflict analysis can beapplied to concrete situations of local conflict. To disseminate constructiveideas on conflict resolution, the two NGOs are jointly exhibiting examples ofsuccessful joint water management in 20 situations of conflict over resourcesfrom around the world. The project is also thinking of establishing a “CentralAsian network of ambassadors of good will”, bringing together influential andrespected personalities from the region and providing them with ongoingtraining in peaceful conflict management methods, analogous to the“International Negotiation Network” developed by the Carter Centre.
Source: Slim 1999
an activity is laying at most one foundation stone in the“architecture of peace”.And to continue the image:It isthen just as important to know which other stones arealready being or will be laid by other actors,so that thestructure can be properly cemented.
Violent conflicts have a tendency to become self-perpetuating and to gain complexity. Consequentlythere is also a tendency to address the complexrelationships through complex, integrated projectsinvolving a variety of partners and objectives. Thebenefits of addressing the causes of conflictssimultaneously should be weighed against theincreased need for steering inputs, given that littleexperience has so far been gained on the basis of whichthe likelihood of success could be assessed.
For analytical reasons, the phases of a conflict areoften identified within the framework of a “conflictcycle”. Only in a pre-conflict phase can conflict
98
4. Areas of Activity
Do complex conflicts
require equally
complex project
approaches?
The conflict cycle
“Paths to Peace” in the Urabá region
The number of flagrant human rights violations in Colombia is continuing toincrease. The Urabá region in the North-West of the country is considered themost violent zone of Colombia. During the 1990s, it had the highest rate ofhomicide in the world. The population is socio-culturally highlyheterogeneous, with a very high proportion of families living in absolutepoverty. Increasingly, the civilian population is being caught in the crossfire;combatants on both sides each suspect civilians of supporting the other side,and at the same time coerce civilians into providing such support.
The goal of the GTZ project is to strengthen the interventions of the non-governmental human rights organisation CINEP (the Jesuit adult educationorganisation) and “Viva la Ciudadania” (an association of eight NGOs seekingto help build a democratic culture), which in turn are supporting democraticprocesses to help resolve the problems of the region. The project hasstrengthened municipal organisations in developing democratic and efficientadministrations, and has improved the situation of displaced persons bycreating “peace villages”. Further components of the project include anutrition and a health programme.
Source: GTZ in-house working paper
prevention be performed in the strict sense.Having saidthat, preventive action can also be taken in a post-conflict phase, to prevent a second escalation. Whenassessing the capability of TC organisations to act, it isimportant to understand the dynamic trends at work.It is generally accepted that opportunities forintervention decrease sharply, the further a conflictescalates.
From the local cooperative to the Security Council ofthe United Nations,all types of organisation have begunto define their role in conflict management.This trendis more than just a fashion.At the same time, the claimis exaggerated that while budgets for other items havebeen reduced,appropriations have been increased onlyfor conflict management, thus creating lucrativeopportunities. The trend is rather a response to thechanged perception of the changing setting ofdevelopment cooperation (Carl 1996). This certainlymeans an upward swing for conflict management,which is also bringing in new actors.
On the other hand, it should be emphasised thatconflict management is not a new field. AmnestyInternational, the Red Cross, Quaker Peace Service (toname but a few) have long been engaged in findingways to redefine the roles and relationships betweenpeople and organisations across national borders. Anumber of NGOs specialised in conflict managementhave already become established internationally. Allmajor NGOs in development cooperation,as well as thegovernmental agencies involved in emergency aid andTechnical Cooperation, are now making significantefforts, or have become new actors in this field.Theremay also be traditions and institutions at the local levelwhich are allocated this task.
Conflicts are managed in all societies of the world,but in diverse ways. To cite one example, the AsiaFoundation has financed a series of workshops onexisting mechanisms of conflict management. In thisconnection, a large number of indigenous conflictmanagement initiatives located on all continents were
99
Promoting conflict
management
mechanisms: old
ground, new actors
Tradition of conflict
management
Strengthening
existing conflict
management
mechanisms
4.1 Reducing the Structural Causes of Conflicts
identified.Of these institutions only a few have receivedany external support at all.Some of these initiatives aresuitable either as primary partners for new small-scaleprojects,or as additional partners for new componentswithin existing programmes.
The methods applied in the field of conflictmanagement range from community-level mediation,tolocal reconciliation techniques, to informal arbitrationtribunals, and to religious forms of mediation andreconciliation. Even training in techniques ofnegotiation with multinational companies, seeking toconserve and protect natural resources, falls withinthis domain. All these approaches have two thingsin common: they are non-violent, and inclusive(Jandt/Pedersen 1996).
A strategic advantage of TC lies in the identificationof existing conflict management mechanisms. TC hasthe necessary contacts on the ground,and often enjoysconfidence and trust even among the poorer sectionsof the population.As with other tasks in which they areinvolved,however,TC organisations also run the risk inthis field of being perceived purely in their function asdonors. Today, increasing numbers of NGOs areemerging motivated predominantly by lucrative self-interest, and without any substantial experience inconflict management.
Indigenous conflict management methods contrastwith the methods from which international actorsmake their selection. Internationally activeorganisations often start from the assumption that thereare universally applicable models of conflictmanagement. Sometimes, these choices based on theprinciple of universality are dominated by excessiveoptimism concerning the potentials of socialengineering.
Current conflict management practice often paysinadequate attention to the structural causes of conflict– such as socio-economic disadvantage or poorgovernance.Conflict management strategies are for themost part designed on the hypothesis that social
100
4. Areas of Activity
Strategic advantages
of TC
“External” conflict
management
Structural change
versus psychosocial
conflict management
behaviour and existing mentalities are basicallysusceptible to change.Sometimes over-enthusiasticallyoptimistic assumptions concerning the time required tobring about change make such designs extremelyunrealistic. Instability is interpreted in terms of socialpsychology. Conflict is then the result of a dissonancebetween views,or a break in communication betweenindividuals and groups. According to this view, armedconflicts (of a cyclical nature) are dysfunctional events.And corresponding conflict management is seen as ameans to create order. At the very least, this is aproblematic view.
Conferences or workshops bringing together peoplefrom different ethnic backgrounds or countries areoften based on the assumption that tensions can bereduced by applying psychosocial techniques tocorrect false mutual perceptions. Conflict is then seenas an “error”, for which both parties to the conflict, orboth “perpetrator”and “victim”,are equally responsible.Here, a word of caution is necessary. It goes withoutsaying that conflicts also have psychosocial causes.Equally, measures to help alleviate inappropriateperceptions undoubtedly make a positive contribution.But at the same time the underlying structural andpolitical causes of armed conflicts should not be lostsight of.
Even when agreeing to social engineering, a naiveapproach is out of the question. Any attempt offurthering peace in a situation of escalating conflict isfaced with the challenge of either accepting thephysical separation of the parties by keeping themapart, in order to reduce the risk of violentconfrontation, or seeking to bring aboutcommunication between the parties throughencounter, dialogue and cooperation. This challengearises in particular when dealing with refugees anddisplaced persons, especially in the planning ofreintegration programmes. In the long term, however,only such attempts that try to re-unite the parties arelikely to foster sustainable peace-building, although
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Physical separation
versus encounter
4.1 Reducing the Structural Causes of Conflicts
physical separation may be appropriate in the short andmedium term (after Ropers 2000).
Seeking to bring about structural change throughsocial engineering always borders on the presumptive,and side-effects are easily lost sight of. The frame ofreference of such an approach should be retained,however:One key strategic objective for developmentcooperation to pursue in crisis prevention is to nurturea variety of overlapping social alliances which areexpected then to form a counter-force to the risk ofpolitical mobilisation along ethnic, religious or otheridentity-defining lines.In other words,the strategic goalis to influence the social process so that socialrelationships extend out of the purely one-dimensionaltowards a multi-dimensional perspective.
The intention of bringing about structural changealways bears the danger of over-estimating one’scapabilities to exert influence.
4.2 Participatory Rapid Appraisal and ConflictAnalysis
Beyond being the basis for appropriate planning,participatory rapid appraisal and above all participatoryconflict analysis can generate positive impacts onexisting conflicts. Participatory conflict analysis is perse a political activity,which is why incompatibilities canarise with the dominant philosophies (or mandates) ofthe many TC organisations which see themselves as“apolitical”.
It is often conceded that there is a lack of accurateand useful information on armed conflicts. Yet at thesame time,existing participatory information gatheringmethods developed in non-violent situations are notapplied to any significant extent in conflict situations,allegedly due to the shortage of time and acute natureof the problem. Where people are dying or starving,suffering from disease or being displaced, there seemsto be little time for participatory workshops or a
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4. Areas of Activity
Strategic objectives
and social
engineering
Information and
analysis
comparison of TC organisations’ own views with localperspectives and capabilities.
Nevertheless, the process by which one attempts tounderstand the conflict is often the first clear responseto it – in other words it is a first intervention.Dependingon how this diagnosis is conducted, it can strengthenor weaken local (war or peace) constituencies. It istherefore highly appropriate to put emphasis onparticipatory procedures in violent conflicts.
In crisis situations,TC and above all emergency aid isoften delivered on the basis of deliberatemisinformation, which leads to massive errors inassessment. One example is the unquestionedpreferential treatment given to leaders of the Rwandanancien régime in the Goma (ex-Zaire) refugee camps.The fact that these leaders were used in the distributionof food automatically led to a strengthening of theirposition. Thus precisely those groups responsible forthe genocide were supported.
By contrast, participatory conflict analysis in theoryat least offers opportunities to help the local populationdevelop a collective understanding of the situation,which is prerequisite to a functioning society.Utilisingparticipatory methods for conflict analysis is not new.What is new is the insight that this kind of analysis orplanning can itself be an instrument of conflictmanagement. Participatory analysis and planning forconflict management can be applied at two levels:■ at the political level – to create a climate in which
different groups can begin to jointly discuss future-related issues; and
■ at the technical level – to develop methods forimproved participation by hitherto “silent”groups.Conflict analysis in one form or another is key to the
transformation of violence.The first step comprises the critical evaluation of
information. Opportunities for a peaceful or non-peaceful future are often constrained by rumours, ortales of unrepresentative individual experiences.Rarelyis information available that might be analysed and
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Do no harm by
conducting
appropriate analyses
Participatory conflict
analysis
Sound information
rather than rumours
4.2 Participatory Rapid Appraisal and Conflict Analysis
verified in dialogue with others. Seldom are thereopportunities to compare and discuss conflictingexperiences. Misinformation is even an instrumentdeliberately chosen by parties to mobilise support,confuse opponents, create chaos and trigger panic,which in many cases leads to “the enemy” no longerbeing perceived as human beings. In such contexts,sound information can be a powerful instrument forpushing ahead efforts for peace, reconciliation and anend to war.
A second step is a joint analysis of the availableinformation and interpretations.Here,TC’s methods canbe used to best effect:A joint analysis which ideally endsin a consensus concerning the causes and trajectoriesof conflicts,and the process leading to such an analysis,can be key steps in overcoming social barriers,comingto see former enemies as human beings once again,andidentifying alternative options to armed conflict. TheNGO Conciliation Resources for instance supportscorresponding workshops, seminars, internationalexchange etc. with local civil society groups.A furtherstep can be the joint publication of the results of theanalysis.
104
4. Areas of Activity
Joint analysis rather
than prejudice
Improved understanding of the dynamics of a conflictthanks to joint publication
The publication “Accord. An International Review of Peace Initiatives”initiated by Conciliation Resources aims to disseminate information onconflicts which has been jointly gathered and collated by the various partiesto the conflicts. To date, seven issues have appeared. They are designed tohelp groups involved in a conflict identify more clearly their position, andserve as a means of comparison for people in other violent conflicts. Thuseach issue is more than just a publication; it is rather more of a peace-building measure.
Source: Author’s interview
Based on experiences in four countries, the UN War-torn Societies Project (WSP, cf. Section 3.1.2) reachedthree conclusions relevant to participatory planning:
The selection of issues on which data are collectedin conflict situations should be made exclusively by thetarget population themselves.There will then be greateropportunities to discuss the issues truly relevant to themanagement of the conflict. WSP sees its role in theproject planning process exclusively as one offacilitation,neither promising nor delivering any inputsat all, but merely creating scope for the appropriateprocesses.
Persons taking part in participatory rapid appraisal(PRA) should always be drawn from different social andethnic backgrounds. The form of data gathering towhich TC is accustomed usually occurs within anarrow,directly affected target group.Such an appraisalrarely leads to an analysis of project impacts cuttingacross all the social strata.
PRA processes can also become a kind of mediation.Where generally accepted authorities integrate groupsin a consensus-building process, mediation is takingplace. PRA facilitators trained in communicationtechniques and mediation skills might better utilise theopportunities to facilitate constructive conflictmanagement in each individual PRA process. It istherefore appropriate in zones of conflict tosupplement training in PRA methods withcorresponding training in conflict management(Tschirgi 1999).
4.3 Community-based Peace-building
The belief in the necessity of participation is also thebasis for the heavily propagated community-basedpeace-building approach.The concept of this approachhas embraced a wide range of empowerment andcapacity building measures for various social groups. Itstarts from the plausible assumption that peace
105
Self-determination
in the selection of
issues
Comprehensive
participation
PRA as mediation
4.3 Community-based Peace-building
processes only have a chance when they are promotedby local actors.Prerequisite to an approach of this kindare close contacts with local grass-roots groups,and anintimate understanding of the local conflict situation.One outstanding example is the support of traditionalleaders at the local level and district councils formedon a “bottom-up” basis in Somalia following thewithdrawal of the UNOSOM Mission (Heinrich 1997).
Somalia is considered a “collapsed state”;consequently, there was no real alternative to anapproach of this kind.Yet the advocates of “community-based peace-building”are making a virtue of necessity:They argue that the state which existed prior to itscollapse was nothing but a repressive mechanism, andthat ultimately the new approach amounts to a form ofcommunity-based state-building. This assumption hasfar-reaching implications which have not beensufficiently discussed to date:1. A narrow or exclusive focus on governmental
partners in development cooperation is called intoquestion – local, traditional and informally organisedsocieties should be considered the better partners.
106
4. Areas of Activity
Collapse of the state
and crisis prevention
Community-based peace-building in the Horn of Africa
The Somalia Programme of the Life and Peace Institute began in 1992, anddeveloped into a civic education programme for local officials on districtcouncils, teachers, police officers, journalists and women’s groups. Peaceinitiatives at grass-roots levels are promoted in order to support localcommunities and strengthen traditional conflict management methods. Asimilar programme was launched in 1998 for Southern Sudan.
Source: Life and Peace Institute 1999
2. The collapse of states in crisis need not be prevented,since a “better state” cannot emerge until thatcollapse has taken place.
Although Somalia has not yet risen from the ashes(although a non-recognised state has – “Somaliland”–inthe former British territory),it is also not clear whethernew states will be formed from the regions and districts.Nevertheless,a number of zones of the country can beconsidered to be at relative peace, and economicallyfunctional. It remains very unclear whether the moremodern “quasi-governmental” and civil societyorganisations (district councils, police forces, humanrights and women’s organisations) will be able to co-exist with the traditional structures (council of villageelders, Sharia courts) in the long term. The potentialsfor military defence of the peaceful zones in a highlyconflict-prone region of the world are certainly limited.Critics therefore ask how stable and crisis-resistant thenew arrangement is. One particular feature ofcommunity based peace-building is that it can alreadybe launched during wartime.Clearly,non-governmentalactors are the obvious choice for the implementationof this approach.
4.4. Promoting Local and Regional ConflictManagement Initiatives
When conflicts have escalated to the degree that theyreach international attention, responses almostexclusively are addressed to the needs of the conflict’svictims,and the deeds of those inciting the conflict.Thismeans that barely any time or funding are left to supportthe role of unarmed civilians in transforming theconflict. Civilian initiatives often require internationalsupport, because of their extreme vulnerability withintheir own social setting, since they are calling intoquestion the existence and actions of armed groups.
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Somalia – a role
model?
4.4 Promoting Local and Regional Conflict Management Initiatives
One key to “civilising”conflicts is to strengthen thosegroups at the grass roots of society which profit directlyfrom peace. These include civil society organisationswhich are engaged in conflict management. However,here too interventions should be planned with greatcaution, not forgetting that governmental institutionsshould also be trained in dealing with the growingcomplexity of civil society and its increasing claims onparticipation. In many countries, TC also faces theproblem of competition between various NGOs andother civil society organisations for influence andexternal support. This competition can also bear thepotential of conflict.
Local and indigenous potentials for paving the wayto sustainable peace should not be overestimated,
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4. Areas of Activity
Civil society
approaches
Limits to indigenous
approaches
Sierra Leone – mediation work
The London-based NGO Conciliation Resources seconded a coordinator toSierra Leone who possessed close links to the country and a network ofcontacts. This created scope for a multifaceted programme to strengthenlocal organisations.
The programme included the following components:
■ strengthening the national programme of the Catholic Church forreconciliation and trauma healing
■ conflict analysis: workshop with national and international NGOs
■ mediation and negotiation skills: workshop for religious leaders, tradeunion representatives, representatives of women’s organisations andindividual peace activists
■ reporting on the elections: training for members of the national journalists’association
■ team-building workshop for the national women’s peace movement
■ peace-building workshop at the community level
Source: Author’s interview
however, especially in a post-conflict phase. Althoughthey are a necessary precondition, they are notsufficient for “managing”a conflict,since the traditionalmanagement methods have already failed, at the pointwhere escalation into armed conflict should have beenprevented. Many of the traditional approaches tomanaging conflicts and social differences reinforceundemocratic patron-client relationships, and haveperhaps contributed to the emergence and spread ofthe conflict.Very recent studies (Hamid 1996,Blanchet1996, Roy 1996, Burling 1997) have shown that sometraditional rural courts are dominated by men, andalmost always reach decisions that are against theinterests of women. In view of this the fashionableembrace of traditional approaches should always be
109
4.4 Promoting Local and Regional Conflict Management Initiatives
Bangladesh: Cooperation between competing NGOs
The Swiss Red Cross (SRC) was involved in conflict management inBangladesh while implementing a health programme with local NGOs.Proceeding on the assumption that local NGOs were to a certain extentcompeting with one another, and understanding that a collective action toimprove the poorly functioning public health service was not possible, theSRC developed a procedure in 1989-1995 which brought the organisationstogether under a common objective. The following moderation and conflictmanagement tools were used:
■ workshops to create a climate of mutual respect between the NGOs
■ elaboration of joint visions
■ exchange of personnel
■ mutual professional consultation
■ networking of staff at the second and third management levels, with a viewto in turn influencing the top management level where rivalries wereparticularly pronounced
The personal relationships and joint visions proved to be the strongestbinding elements.
Source: Ribaux/Barua: 1995 and 1999
critically questioned, though by no means generallyavoided.
Potentials for support emerge above all in the formof funds,training measures,consultancy and exchange.The specialisation of a number of NGOs in multi-ethniccommunity-based conflict management projectscreates interesting partners. Key to the success ofprojects here is the process-orientation, i.e. the abilityto respond flexibly to changing constellations in theconflict (Ropers 2000).
Very limited is the scope for influencing regional andinternational factors, such as political and militaryinterventions or the arms trade, from the local level.Traditional and indigenous conflict managementmethods are therefore not always compatible with thedemands of today’s conflicts. Warranted though theinterest in strengthening local institutions andcapacities may be, the wider context must not be lostsight of. Governmental institutions too perform a key
110
4. Areas of Activity
Cooperation between
civil society and the
state
Fiji: Constitutional reform against racism
The history of Fiji is characterised by racial division, which has a stronginfluence on the country’s social and political institutions. On the initiative ofthe Citizens’ Constitutional Forums, a progressive civil society group seekingdemocratic change and forms of government, Conciliation Resources hasprovided support to create space for dialogue on constitutional reform.According to the revised constitution, specific social groups should no longerbe excluded from the life of society. This initiative alone has led to dialoguebetween various social groups on power-sharing, civil rights, minority rights,land reform, electoral reform and institutional reforms which would nototherwise have been possible. When the project was launched the conflictwas evident, but had not escalated into violence. The language of “conflict”has been avoided wherever possible, focusing instead on discourses of inter-cultural understanding and the promotion of human rights. External supporthas been provided for strategic planning, international fund-raising,identification and exchange of international resource people, communicationsadvice, research, dissemination of information on the constitutional andpolitical process.
Source: Author’s interview, Conciliation Resources website
function in managing local conflicts. Supporting localpeace initiatives can also include promoting democraticelection procedures, reforms of the legal system, theestablishment of integrated education systems,appropriate language policies and human rightslegislation.
4.5 Media Support for Peace
Independent media are considered prerequisite tothe open discussion of conflicts. When the media arecensored or controlled, then dissident opinions canonly be expressed through an element of force. Mediareports can often significantly change public opinionon conflicts – positively or negatively. Pluralisticallyconstituted supervisory committees which couldconstructively influence these processes are seldomfound in countries in crisis. Material assistance forrepresentatives of the government press, which isalways welcome,should only be provided either wheredemocratic standards are observed, or in conjunctionwith corresponding promotional measures.
The avoidance of stereotypical and polarisingrepresentations in the media is one goal of TC in thisdomain. Another is compliance with standards ofprofessionalism in the reporting of sensitive issues.Wherever possible, efforts should be made to help
111
Strengthening
professional
standards
4.5 Media Support for Peace
Sensitisation in election coverage
In the run-up to the 1997 elections in Mali the Friedrich Ebert Foundation(FES), funded by the EU, held a series of workshops on election-relatedproblems which focused on the difference between (often unintentional)irregularities and the deliberate manipulation of elections. The media in factthen went on to avoid expressing any irresponsible criticism when, in theheated post-election atmosphere, a number of opposition parties madeserious allegations.
Source: Mehler 1998
establish a code of conduct for journalists and, in thejournalists’own interests, to press for compliance withthe code. Personnel development workshops forfurthering the promotion of professional journalists’associations and sensitisation measures can be appliedto raise professional standards and promote aprofessional ethos.
Experiences with “hate media”, for instance in theGreat Lakes region or in the Balkans,have nurtured theidea that the targeted deployment of an independentnews channel which avoids the dramatisation of eventscan create a balanced picture. Measures to this effecthave often been implemented in conjunction with UNpeacekeeping missions, namely in Namibia, Haiti,former Yugoslavia, Cambodia, Angola, Somalia,Mozambique, Rwanda, El Salvador, Central AfricanRepublic – in some cases with tangible success. Forinstance,Radio MINURCA became the most listened-toradio channel in the Central African Republic onaccount of its acknowledged independent reporting.Thus independence was also utilised to sensitise theelectorate. The creation of a mixed editorial teamcomposed of members from hostile groups has been astandard approach in this field inspired by the model
112
4. Areas of Activity
Radio for peace
Star Radio, Liberia
On the initiative of the NGO Fondation Hirondelle (Switzerland), and financedby USAID, Star Radio went on the air in 1997. Following reports on acts ofviolence by the government, the station was repeatedly threatened with beingclosed down. Donor pressure enabled it to resume work on several occasions(although it was suspended again in March 2000). The station not onlyprovided reliable information of national importance, but also produced aversion of Gogol’s play “The Government Inspector” adapted for radio, inLiberian Pidgin. Radio Star has received several international and nationalawards.
Source: Jörg Becker, Promoting an active contribution by the media towardsthe formation of a peace constituency, GTZ working paper, March 2000 draft
“Radio Ijambo”project of the NGO Search for CommonGround in Burundi. The success of the project isdifficult to demonstrate in this instance, however, inlight of the ongoing civil war. It is obviously still easierto incite conflict through the media than it is to nurturepeace.
Audio-visual media are considered effective materialsfor education.The goals of education for peace can forinstance be conveyed through soap operas. It isimportant here to take into account the respectivecultural tradition. The use of local languages, localtheatre groups and universally popular actors are likelyto produce positive results.
4.6 Education and Training for Peace
Although media work in the context of education forpeace should be considered a separate field, it is notalways entirely distinct from education projects proper.Education and training are among the traditionalactivities of TC (Isaac 1999).A debate has been ongoingfor some time concerning the role of education andtraining in the peace process and in conflict resolution.Can education for peace be provided externally? Howcan peace be incorporated into curricula?
According to the present understanding, educationfor peace comprises all activities which improveattitudes, knowledge and capabilities for conflictmanagement. People of all ages should be shown howto alter their conflict-related behaviour, how tocounteract the escalation of violence and how topromote conflict resolution.Thus peace education is ameasure which creates the social preconditions forpeaceful co-existence.
Overall,little knowledge and very few evaluations areavailable on the impacts of education for peace. Howdoes it influence the political, social and economicfactors that have contributed or may in the futurecontribute to war? There are, however, sufficient
113
Production of
programmes
providing education
for peace
Education for peace
4.6 Education and Training for Peace
examples of projects of education for peace, andprojects integrating conflict handling into the formaleducation system. Even in industrialised countriesschool mediation is gaining a higher profile in thecontext of “violence in schools” and how to deal withit.
Young people are the future of any society, and it isin most of the “young”societies in developing countrieswhere the under-16s make up a majority of thepopulation. It is crucial to the future of peace that thisgroup recognise the societal value of peaceful co-existence, and receive an education conducive to therealisation of their material and social desires.This is ofcourse especially relevant to former child soldiers whoare to be socially re-integrated. In the strict sense,education for peace means learning how to co-exist andcooperate with members of other social groups.Whatare the lessons learned from experiences to date by TC?
114
4. Areas of Activity
Youth and education
for peace
Projects for children in conflict zones – “Good practice”in the formal education sector
1. Basic education must be inclusive: Primary school education should bemade available for all children, i.e. regardless of social class, religion andregion, and where possible in the languages of the main populationgroups.
2. Teachers should be trained especially in developmental psychology andgeneral education theory.
3. New curricula should incorporate conflict-specific themes such ascommunication, cooperation, reconciliation and problem-solving (includingthe methods needed for their introduction: role play, music, stories etc.).
4. New textbooks should draw attention to the underlying causes of poverty,illiteracy, racism, patriarchy etc., and prompt processes of refection onthem. They should create an understanding of the socio-culturalunderpinnings of rival identity groups.
Source: Annette Isaac, Education and Peace Building – A PreliminaryOperational Framework. CIDA, Quebec 1998
A number of principles for TC education projects withchildren in conflict situations can be formulated:
Apart from the formal school system, non-formaleducation is also important.This, too can be promotedby TC through appropriate project activities:■ Youth camps, youth groups, sport and recreation
programmes: Such activities help motivate youngpeople from diverse backgrounds to engage in jointactivities. This breaks down old cultural barriers. Atthe same time,recreational activities are designed toreplace the “culture of violence”which can be highlyattractive to young people in the absence ofalternative options.
■ Education programmes for adults and youth: Long-term advice and support for parents and childrenwho never had an opportunity to obtain a full schooleducation.
■ Training for community leaders on all aspects ofeducation for peace and crisis prevention. Thistraining is important especially for leaders who arehighly respected by young people.
■ Development of courses and teaching materialswhich explicitly address the problems of childrenand young people. This aims to prevent theemergence of youth gangs willing to use violence.
Young people per se do not constitute a “securityrisk”, although the systematic neglect of their interestsdoes.
4.7 Security-sector Reform
Security-sector reform can be considered aninnovative field combining both technical and politicalinvolvement. It involves the reform of key institutionsof the state: security forces (police force, but also thearmy and paramilitary forces where they are involvedin internal security),and the justice and penal systems.
115
Non-formal education
and training
4.7 Security-sector Reform
116
4. Areas of Activity
The focus of TC activities in this regard are likely to varyfrom country to country.
Whilst it is undisputed that poor functioning withinthe above three institutions can contribute significantlyto the escalation of conflicts, it remains a largely openquestion whether the great number of conceivable butto date rarely seriously tested interventions actuallyachieve their objective.
This new field of activities is also a reflection of thestatus of the international debate on the notion ofsecurity.Based on the concepts of human security andstructural stability,a comprehensive security concept isthe foundation of security-sector reform.Since the endof the Cold War,international bodies have been less andless concerned with the external and territorial securityof nation states. Not external aggression, but thephysical, material and social security of citizens hasbeen at the heart of the new debate. Also, externalthreats are becoming less significant than internal risks.Therefore, activities of reform focus on security-sectorinstitutions which fail to properly discharge theirmandates, or even increase rather than decreasesecurity risks.
Little experience
available
Comprehensive
security concept
“A well-functioning security sector instils in the population a sufficient senseof security and trust in existing structures to keep them from choosing alter-native mechanisms for conflict resolution. Moreover, a well-functioningsecurity sector is more likely to be perceived as a legitimate part of agenerally accepted social order. In that way, security sector reform alsoconcerns the creation of a new political culture in which differences aresettled through discussion, accomodation, and sound civil institutions.”
Source: NUPI Working Group on Security Sector reform, Security SectorReform As a Development Issue, Room Document n° 7, OECD/DAC TaskForce on Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation, Paris 2-3 June1999
Development cooperation, and TC in particular, haslong shied away from the subject of security. At most,TC was willing to become involved in the reform oflegal systems. Involvement in the security sector wasconsidered “too political”,and this view was also sharedin some quarters well outside of TC, in politicaldiplomacy. If we agree that any form of involvement incrisis prevention does have political impacts, then thedecision in favour of involvement in security-sectorreform is no longer so spectacular.Concern for physicalsecurity is a core element of crisis prevention.
Projects in this sector are indeed highly sensitive;they are perhaps the most “political”of all conceivableinterventions, with potentially the most far-reachingresults. The proposed measures include theestablishment of parliamentary control over defenceforces, the professional training of police forces, theestablishment of neutral recruitment to the securityservices, human rights courses for prison staff,separation of powers between the judiciary and theexecutive, and many more. It is only too obvious thatsome go far beyond the scope of TC.
The proposed levels for TC involvement in thesecurity sector are:■ The political level: strengthening of parliament and
civilian institutions of government in their capacityas monitoring, decision-making and control bodieswith a key role in planning and budgetary control.Support and professionalisation of NGOs and thepress engaged in this area.
■ The economic level: disarmament and conversion,demobilisation and reintegration of ex-combatants,utilisation of resources formerly used for militarypurposes (e.g. real estate).
■ The social level: strengthening of public security,assessment of citizens’security needs,control of armstransfers, especially small arms and light weapons(after Wulf 2000).
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Wrong to shy away
from political themes
Levels of involvement
4.7 Security-sector Reform
The professionalisation of the security forces isconsidered a more specialised task which is not withinthe competences of the traditional actors of TC, andwhich is often to be seen in conjunction with otherobjectives (establishment of regional crisis-responseforces).
Research reports have identified the followinglessons learned:■ It is not possible to reform individual components of
the whole complex (the triad of the security forces,and the judicial and penal systems),but only all threesimultaneously. At the same time, a key objective ofreform is to separate these three domains.
■ Equally important is recognition of the fact thatreform activities of this kind require political willcoupled with scope for action on the part of alegitimate partner government,as well as the feelingof ownership – conditions which unfortunately areoften not in place in countries with the greatest needfor reform.
■ Security-sector reform is likely to be most easilyimplemented in post-conflict situations,since radicalsteps are then likely to encounter less resistance onall sides (NUPI 1999).One of the top priorities in the security field is the
strengthening of civil bodies in their monitoring andcontrol of the security forces.This is a possible area ofactivity for TC.
Little attention has been paid to the fact that aWestern understanding of the nature and role of thestate has dominated the design of measures for thesecurity sector. Adaptation to other socio-economicand cultural models might achieve positive results. Forinstance, it is not to be predicted that the dualism of“modern” and “traditional” law will simply disappearfollowing a reform of the legal system.This would meanthat either a clear division of competences or,conversely,a broad integration of the two spheres of lawshould then be aspired to. Other Western ideas alsoneed to be reviewed: The unbroken continuity in the
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4. Areas of Activity
Lessons learned
Supervisory bodies
a priority
Different
understandings
of the nature and
role of the state
use of prisons for punishment and as a pool of forcedlabour since the colonial period – as opposed to use forre-education and rehabilitation purposes – (Bernault2000) – means that reforms in this sub-sector have todate met with very little sensitivity in many partnercountries. Local resistance is often considerable.
British development cooperation has led the way infacing the challenge of security-sector reform in partnercountries. Former Secretary of State Clare Shortdescribed security-sector reform as part of the goodgovernance agenda, and at the same time as a keycomponent of poverty alleviation.For the poor,physicalsecurity and the security of property are prerequisiteto leaving poverty behind (Short 2000). This link wasunderlined by a study on Bangladesh. It demonstratesthat,even in apparently “peaceful times”, in 30 percentof cases the lack of social security was the reason whypoor households could not improve their economicposition (Bangladesh Institute for Development Studies1991).
A very recent discussion going beyond security-sector reform is the debate on the linkages betweeninternational military interventions and developmentactivities (after Hendrickson 1999). There is now aglobal consensus that coordination between militaryactors and development organisations – at least in post-conflict situations (the NATO CIMIC Programme in the
119
Civil-military
cooperation
4.7 Security-sector Reform
“ … it requires significant institutional reform and upgrading the skills ofcivilians tasked to manage and monitor the security forces within thegovernment of partner countries (for example, in the ministries of finance,defence, internal or home affairs, and justice; offices of the bugdet, auditorgeneral, and the national security adviser; parliamentary committees forforeign affairs, defence, public accounts/appropriations, and auditing; thecourt system; and human rights ombudsmen; and strong support to capacitybuilding among members of civil society and civil society organisations).”
Source: Nicole Ball, Spreading good practices in security sector reform:Policy options for the British government (Saferworld Report), London, p. III
Balkans leaps to mind) – needs to be strengthened.Thisapplies all the more to cooperation between civil andmilitary actors within partner countries.
4.8 Legal Assistance
Conflict management should certainly first take placein the institutions created for the purpose,including thejustice system.In countries in crisis,however,access tothe legal system is often a major problem for purelygeographical, financial, political and socio-culturalreasons. In the long term, this undermines thelegitimacy of the state, since conflicting interestscannot be resolved by the state justice system. Thus itis no longer able to ensure law and justice. Judges andlawyers are inadequately trained, or are corrupted andintimidated. Crisis prevention can then comprisesupport for judicial reforms to counteract these deficits.
With regard to conflict management, existing legalsystems often make no provision for the peacefulsettlement and resolution of conflicts. In projects oflegal assistance (e.g. legal aid fund for vulnerable
120
4. Areas of Activity
The problem of
access to the legal
system
Civil-military cooperation in South Africa
In the “Training for Peace in Southern Africa” project involving Norway’s NUPIand the South African partners ACCORD and IDP, the key aim to is buildstand-by peace-keeping capacities in Southern Africa. NGOs and civilianpersonnel are also involved, however. A further aim is to build constructiveworking relations by establishing contacts between the military forces of theRepublic of South Africa, long isolated by the decades of apartheid, and themilitary of neighbouring states.
Source: NUPI 1995/97
groups), TC can help provide professional legalcounselling in critical cases;this strengthens the formallegal system.One option is to train para-legals who canhelp clarify legal issues and thus promoteempowerment, without undermining the formalsystem.
Where the traditional legal and conflict managementsystem has survived being taken over by colonial ormodern systems, and where it enjoys popularconsensus, it would also be appropriate to explorepotentials for support in this domain.Here too politicalsensitivity is required, since traditional legal systemsmay support or undermine structures of domination,and may disadvantage certain sections of thepopulation (e.g.women) (cf. Section 4.1).
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4.8 Legal Assistance
Legal aid in Kivu
In Kivu in the East of the Congo, prior to the disaster in neighbouring Rwandaa legal aid association entitled “Héritiers de la Justice” (heirs of justice) hadbeen founded under the auspices of the regional secretariat of the “Eglise duChrist au Zaire”. Its aim was to promote the local population’s understandingof legal issues. With funds provided by EZE (the German Protestant CentralAgency for Development Aid), a “mediation committee” composed ofprominent local citizens to act as arbitrators for dispute settlement was setup. They also organised so-called bazars juridiques, regular fora on legalissues for the local population. The methodology usually applied by themediation committees was to begin with principles of African wisdom such asproverbs, before proceeding to explain Western concepts of modern law.Members of the committees held regular consultation hours for those seekingadvice (pharmacies de droit/“legal dispensaries”).
Source: EZE, work report 1998/99, Bonn 1999, p.12
4.9 Promoting Democratic Transition
The political causes of crises and conflicts –legitimacy and efficiency deficits of a government,deliberate exclusion of sections of the population,systematic human rights violations,corruption etc.– areattracting increasing attention. One obvious option istherefore to take preventive action in the sphere ofgovernance, even though resistance by partnergovernments may in some cases be strong. In itsstrongest form this may even be the explicit demand formeasures to improve governance. Even multilateralorganisations such as UNDP, which has in the pastshown marked restraint in adopting a higher profile,might do so at least if the views of reformers within theorganisation gain support.
In Germany, the political foundations are activelyengaged in innovative projects to promote goodgovernance,with relatively low funding.Having alwayspromoted democracy, the foundations claim to havebeen involved in crisis prevention for some time.
The pushing of democratic transition has to takeaccount of two distinct dimensions.The governmentaldimension involves institutional reform and thepromotion of good governance, whereas the non-
122
4. Areas of Activity
Governance
Two dimensions
“UNDP should make governance work in post conflict situations its centralactivity in CPC (crisis/post conflict). This focus would build on UNDP’s talentsand fills a major need in CPC work. It would include pre-governance work,including consensus-building, and programmes to create space for civilsociety and government to meet and rebuild trust and local capacity fordevelopment. Other key governance areas should be rule-of-law and reformof the security sector (...).”
Source: UNDP in Crisis, post conflict and prevention. Recommendations forchange. Report of the Transition Team to the Administrator of UNDP,November 1, 1999
governmental dimension involves the support of civilsociety organisations and democratic political parties.
The positive links between democratisation andcrisis prevention are a result of a) the effects of politicalreforms on good governance, b) the promotion ofdisadvantaged sections of the population (reduction ofstructural disparities, combined with empowerment),and c) the effects of strengthening civil societyassociations on a culture of dialogue, which is key inconflict situations. Factors a) and b) have a bearing onthe structural causes of conflicts, whilst factors a) andc) affect procedural preconditions for conflictmanagement (Mehler 1998).Democratisation measuresare thus often located at the interface between crisisprevention and conflict management.
There will without a doubt always be debates aboutwhich kind of democracy people mean when theyadvocate democratisation. The existence of a multi-party system alone is certainly an insufficient criterionfor democracy, even though no single- or no-partysystem to date has been able to achieve or sustaindemocratic standards in the long run.On the one hand,the aim cannot be to simply transfer a comprehensiveinstitutional package (“democracy for export”) distilledfrom the experiences of the home country of the TCorganisation.On the other hand, there are a number ofuniversal standards which can be transferred locally andinstitutionalised: free political competition andparticipation by the people, as well as a guarantee forall basic civil rights and liberties.The structural stabilityargument is that democracy can help build a society’scapacity to manage social change peacefully. To thisend, measures are implemented embracing theimprovement of political education, electoralawareness-raising and support for local electionmonitoring, networking, advocacy work fordisadvantaged sections of the population, and thefacilitation of communication between political actors.Needs will, however, vary according to the phase of
123
Which democracy is
to be promoted?
4.9 Promoting Democratic Transition
democratic transition: liberalisation, democratisation,consolidation (Erdmann 1999).
In the absence of genuine demand and socialcapacities, it makes little sense to foster democratictransition.This restriction,however,applies to all formsof involvement by development cooperation.
To promote democratic transition, the politicalfoundations primarily support measures of politicaleducation,hold seminars with middle- and senior-levelleaders from political parties and the administration,and run media campaigns. One key problem withpromoting democratic transition is the possibility thata crisis may be exacerbated in the short term,though itmay be reduced in the medium to long term. It isconceivable, and even intentional, that politicaleducation and empowerment will help hithertodisadvantaged groups to become more capable ofhandling conflicts. This, in turn, can trigger repressivemeasures by an authoritarian regime.Support measuresshould be skilfully timed to avoid escalating violence.
124
4. Areas of Activity
Political education
Support for the creation of a national election monitoringnetwork in Benin
The support provided by the Konrad Adenauer Foundation (KAS) in the“birth” of the “Network of NGOs for peaceful and transparent elections” inBenin was of national significance. The “network” was an association ofNGOs which monitored the parliamentary elections of 28 March 1995. Indoing this it was supported by KAS. Without the initiative of KAS, and its roleas mediator between NGOs competing due to different party-politicalbackgrounds, the involvement of civil society to this degree would not havebeen possible. As a result, although KAS was not the main partner financially,it was the main provider of conceptual inputs (to the strategic debate) andtechnical inputs (to the training workshops). Finally, in the eyes of politiciansfrom across the party-political spectrum, the network had a direct influenceon the proper conduct of the parliamentary elections.
Source: Mehler 1998
In the longer term, however, this “upgrading” of pro-democratic groups and disadvantaged sections of thepopulation is a prerequisite for dialogue between equalpartners, and thus for constructive conflictmanagement.
4.10 Empowerment
Many conflicts are asymmetrically structured interms of the distribution of power and resourcesbetween the parties. This can be one of the causes ofthe conflict, for instance if particular groups are sub-ject to massive economic, cultural or politicaldiscrimination. Where conflicts are heavilyasymmetrical,it is especially important that the weakerside be supported first in formulating their ownobjectives, as there will otherwise be no “basis fornegotiation”from which to address the conflict.But thestronger party also requires empowerment.In this case,however,the aim must be to raise awareness of the factthat integration of the disadvantaged groups is also inthe objective interests of the stronger party.
The term empowerment refers to support measureswhich enable individuals or groups to gain control overtheir own lives and their social relationships. Thisconcept is based on the insight that well-being dependsessentially on the existence and accessibility of socialresources (networks,support systems).In developmentcooperation, empowerment occurs in the context ofstrengthening disadvantaged, weak or powerlessgroups. What is often lost sight of are the impacts ofempowering individual groups on the system as awhole.It should be remembered that an increase in thepower of the formerly disadvantaged generates“interference” in the existing social system, thuscreating fresh conflicts that may even lead to violence.For conflict management, one implication is asomewhat different use of the term. Empowerment inthis context denotes a process through which the
125
Balancing
asymmetries in initial
bargaining positions
Empowerment in
conflict management
4.10 Empowerment
parties to the conflict and their representatives reach aclearer awareness of their own goals and needs.
4.11 Conflict Management and Crisis Preventionin the Reconstruction Process
In the ideal-type conflict cycle,major attention wouldbe focused on rehabilitation during a post-conflictphase. In this situation, TC organisations considerthemselves competent and are more willing to becomeinvolved than in a pre-conflict phase. The newbeginning is also an opportunity to avoid replication ofold mistakes. When building institutions and physicalinfrastructure, preventive effects can be generated byconsidering from the outset what the possible impactson a conflict situation might be. For instance, what isthe significance of a passable road between locations Aand B:market integration that is conducive to peace,ora deployment route for combatants? What form mustthe control committee for the new national radiostation take, in order to ensure that broadcasts can nolonger be so easily used to incite war? These and similarquestions should be addressed.
Not every context is suitable for any form of conflictmanagement.In immediate post-conflict situations,therifts in society can be so great that for instance a naivelyplanned dialogue forum between members of mutuallyhostile groups can have counterproductive effects,andtrigger inter-group dynamics that are difficult tocontrol. Joint action may be prerequisite to a jointcoming to terms with the past.
The reconciliation-oriented reconstruction activitiesof Caritas Switzerland in Bosnia have gained a highprofile.The so-called “roof over our heads” project hasprovided municipalities with materials in situationswhere the majority were jointly involved with theminority in reconstruction activities. This is a form ofconditionality designed to promote peace, which also
126
4. Areas of Activity
Post-conflict
conflict management
Peace conditionality
reflects the do no harm principle as applied to theeffects of an organisation’s actions on a conflict.
A reconstruction for peace approach of this kind isbeing promoted for instance by the World Bank. Theintegration of conflict management elements into thereconstruction process is even being considered as acriterion for lending. Measures must, however, be
127
4.11 Conflict Management and Crisis Prevention in the Reconstruction Process
The Atlas Reconstruction for Peace Project in Bosnia
During the reconstruction process in Bosnia, UNOPS assisted municipalitiesin Bosnia in drawing up an atlas documenting their painful recent history, theongoing development efforts and various projects. The issue at stake was“reconstructing society”: decentralised cooperation for human development.As information was being gathered for the atlas, people from diversebackgrounds came together to document their reconstruction activities.First of all, within the municipalities themselves this created a need forcoordination and helped build relationships from the bottom-up.Secondly, it generated networking between the municipalities.
The atlas project demonstrates how diverse groups in a former war zone canprofit from international assistance, whilst in the process of rebuilding andreconstructing their social networks – in a spirit of peaceful co-existence andwith a desire for development and democracy.
Source: Atlas of Decentralised Cooperation for Human Development. UNOPSSarajevo 1998
Joint production as a framework for inter-religious dialoguein Tajikistan
In Tajikistan, Caritas is bringing together mutually hostile groups in aproduction shop for roof tiles. Measures are dependent on the local context,and therefore vary. The general aim is to mobilise parties to the conflict injoint activities, and promote inter-religious dialogue. Hence this dialogue isnot an exclusively problem-oriented approach, but is also of widersignificance in itself.
Source: Authors’ interviews
adapted to local circumstances.Personnel seconded toreconstruction projects for instance require advice offurther training, in order to be able to recognise theopportunities and risks of conflict management.Mediation itself can only be performed by TC inexceptional cases. Ultimately, TC organisations oftenlack political leverage, and at the present point in timealso professional expertise in mediation at the very locallevel focussed on by project implementation.TC has tobecome aware of its opportunities to prepare theground for negotiations.
Typically, the political foundations deal with themiddle and grass-roots management levels withinparties.These are also the levels of leadership at whichconflict management is focused. The middle level isoften comprised of influential individuals in particularsectors or regions.These may also include religious ortraditional leaders, or important officials in theadministration,in the media,in the education system orin the arts. All experiences with complex conflicts todate indicate that inclusion of the middle and lowerlevels of party leadership in conflict management isprerequisite to sustainable conflict resolution (seechart).
128
4. Areas of Activity
Middle and grass-
roots party level
managers as target
groups
The particular contribution made by political foundations topeace processes
In both South Africa and Chile, German political foundations of variouspolitical backgrounds have, in the course of seminars and intensivediscussions, stimulated debates in the parties ideologically closest to them,and suggested the idea of compensation. Helpful in this context was theparallel approach pursued by the different organisations, in order from theoutset not to undermine the trust between the parties to the conflict and theirexternal partners. This highly specific input is seen in both cases as a keycontribution to the success of the respective peace processes.
Source: Authors’ interviews
129
4.11 Conflict Management and Crisis Prevention in the Reconstruction Process
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4.12 Trauma Healing and Reconciliation
In post-war societies,conflict management means onthe one hand healing the wounds of the past, and onthe other hand searching for a viable common future.Traumatised individuals must receive therapy. At thesame time, justice requires that those who havecommitted crimes during war be brought to accountand convicted in a court of law, so that civilised co-existence is once again made possible. In other words,a careful balance must be sought between possiblereconciliation, and justice. In many cases it is evennecessary to punish crimes against humanity so thattrauma healing can take place. Work with severelytraumatised refugees who have fled from violencedemonstrates in particular that information on eachunpunished crime reawakens a victim’s memories oftheir own pain, and can lead to flashbacks and re-traumatisation.Seen in this light,the call for justice takeson a new dimension.
130
4. Areas of Activity
Dealing with past injustice
Dealing with past injustice in peace processes is a difficult topic. To achievedialogue between parties to a conflict and a peace accord, it is often firstnecessary to grant at least temporary impunity to the negotiating partners,and to release prisoners of war or political prisoners from captivity.
However, if past injustice remains entirely unaddressed, then natural justiceand violence may quickly flare up again. As long as militias and securityforces are able to feel safe in the knowledge that their crimes will gounpunished, it will be impossible to break the culture of violence and counter-violence. Impunity undermines the confidence and trust of citizens in the(new) government’s ability to ensure law and order, and exercise control overtheir own security forces.
Source: Gunnar Theissen/Georg Grossmann, Reconciliation work followingviolent conflicts, GTZ working paper, draft of 03.03.2000
Processes of psychosocial traumatisation always havea concrete social, political and cultural background. Ifthe respective background is not taken into account,then the trauma cannot be healed,because not only thetraumatic experiences themselves,but also the differentforms of dealing with them are culture-specific.Irrespective of that, the following measures can beenvisaged by TC:■ sensitisation in the care of sections of the population
traumatised by physical threat;■ training in the care of specific traumatised groups (for
instance women,children and especially former childsoldiers);
■ network development and advocacy work;■ support in the establishment of specialist
associations.Originally,reconciliation as an instrument of conflict
management and crisis prevention was defined andshaped by creed-based or religiously-motivated NGOs.The concept varied, according to the religiouspersuasion. Thus there are considerable differencesbetween the definitions put forward by Islamic-,Hindu-,Confucian-, Buddhist- or Christian-influenced NGOs.The definitions produced by all the religiously-basedNGOs do have one thing in common, however: Theirperspective is to a certain extent driven by a logic thatruns counter to the more technocratic, social-science-oriented perception presently favoured by bilateral andmultilateral TC organisations.
In the Roman Catholic (Christian) milieu, forexample, the concept of reconciliation is captured forinstance in the apothegm “make peace in time of war”,which comes from the New Testament. In contrast tomany other attempts made for instance by bilateral andmultilateral organisations to induce perpetrators toacknowledge the error of their ways,Christian teachingassumes that reconciliation must begin with the victim.In the view of the Catholic NGOs, this notioncorresponds to the idea that God hears and respondsto the voice of the oppressed and poor first.Within this
131
Reconciliation as an
instrument of TC
A Christian view
4.12 Trauma Healing and Reconciliation
world view,God gives back to the victims their life,theirdignity and their humanity which the perpetratorsattempted to take away.Through their wicked deeds theperpetrators have injured the dignity not only of thevictims, but also of their own lives. From a Catholicviewpoint, this requires the creation of new life, sincethe normal human measures of forgiveness andpunishment cannot be sufficient to rectify the injusticecommitted.The resurrection of Christ is the symbol ofreconciliation:God achieves it not through the negationor rejection of evil, but by defeating it from within.Closely related to this concept are notions such asgrace, forgiveness, repentance, justice and truth.
For the current form of conflict management in TC,this notion of forgiveness plays a threefold role forNGOs of a Christian persuasion:■ By focusing on the victims, it helps bring support to
those who need it most.■ Thanks to its spiritual dimension, it sheds some light
on the atrocity and scale of past events,whilst at thesame time creating room for hope.
■ By focussing on the recreation of humanity, it lookstowards the future without forgetting the past which,due to the orientation towards the victims, is alwayspresent.Other religiously-founded perspectives, especially
local variations on the subject of atonement andpurgation, cannot be ignored either. Against thebackground of such perspectives, the view held by anumber of professional organisations, namely thatreconciliation is universally “feasible”,should be seen asproblematic.Caution at least is appropriate.
Essentially, three activity areas can be identified forreconciliation work and dealing with past injustice:■ advisory services for legislation and administrative
practice when dealing with past injustice;■ support for truth and reconciliation commissions;■ support for the criminal prosecution of perpetrators
of past injustice.
132
4. Areas of Activity
Activity areas for
dealing with the past
It is conceivable, however, that without a com-prehensive strategy and judicious action, only someactors will actually be able to deal with their past.
Caution is also the method of choice for anotherreason: The concept of “reconciliation” is sometimesused as a pretext to reject the legitimate claims ofconcerned individuals and groups. Whether TCmeasures in this field actually promote reconciliation(for instance in the support of truth and reconciliationcommissions) is very often dependent on the context.Perpetrators often see a risk in their crimes beingexposed, whilst other target groups see precisely thisexposure, coupled with acknowledgement of theinjustice they have suffered, as preconditions forreconciliation.No exposure of the crime and thereforeno acknowledgement of regret, means no recon-ciliation! The role of TC here can only be to facilitateconducive frameworks, and stimulate endogenousprocesses.
133
Risks associated with
the reconciliation
approach
4.12 Trauma Healing and Reconciliation
Joint encounter of rape victims of opposing groupsin Georgia
Following an armed conflict in Georgia, the United Methodist Committee onRelief (UMCOR) brought together Abkhasian and Georgian women. A neutrallocation in Armenia was chosen for the encounter, where the women – in twoseparate groups – were provided with quarters. There was, however, a doorbetween the two sections of the building. After a certain period, the womencame to better understand the suffering of the other group, and the door waskept open. Person-to-person encounters took place across the bridge ofgroup affiliation.
Source: Caritas Internationalis, Working for Reconciliation. A CaritasHandbook, Vatican City 1999
4.13 Gender Aspects in Crisis Prevention andConflict Management
The issue of gender requires specific attention notonly in TC in general,but also in the particular contextof armed conflicts (Reimann 1999). Additionalcomponents for existing activities are worthconsidering. Gender aspects are strongly linked tospecific events in various phases of a conflict. Theseaspects are therefore dealt with in detail below, byphase.
In early stages of violent conflicts,the mobilisation ofsoldiers can mean increased commercial sex trade,including child prostitution. In this phase TCorganisations can extend support to advocacyorganisations specialised in this field. Health measurescan also be adjusted to the specific needs of women,forinstance in the form of AIDS information and education.As tensions rise,political propaganda usually reinforcesexisting gender stereotypes, and pressure is oftenplaced on women to produce more offspring. It is alsonot automatically ensured that human rights areunderstood to include women’s rights.Nevertheless,inthis phase it is often possible for women’s groups orcommitted mothers to raise their voice against armedactivity, even when other political activities are beingrepressed.TC has an important role to play here.Thanksto their years of presence on the ground, TCorganisations are familiar with these groups,have builtrelationships of trust with them, and can thereforeprovide subtle support (Spearman 1999, Woroniuk1999).
During wartime,although the majority of soldiers aremen, women are also conscripted for armed service.Women and girls now often become the victims ofsexual violence, for instance rape, sexual humiliation,forced prostitution, physical torture or mutilation. Inwar, the old social networks no longer operate,sometimes not even within families. The traditionaldivision of labour also comes under pressure. Women
134
4. Areas of Activity
Support before the
outbreak of war
During the war
are suddenly responsible for significantly moredependants.As the societal capacities to care for othersbecome scarcer, girls are burdened with additionalworkloads.During peace negotiations,women are oftenexcluded. During this stage, TC can play an advocacyrole for women’s rights (Spearman 1999, Woroniuk1999).
Once armed conflicts have come to an end, womenare often only marginally involved in political decision-making concerning reconstruction. Reconstructionprogrammes sometimes ignore the specific interests ofwomen – for instance health needs.Women also oftenlack access to the media. It is also just as difficult toestablish contacts among external representatives of aidorganisations or peace-keeping missions, because thelatter are not trained in gender-specific approaches.
From this analysis, the following list of key genderissues for TC organisations in armed conflict can beproposed. Addressing these issues should be declaredgood practice for TC.
Other vulnerable groups that are not described herecertainly also experience highly specific threats insituations of crisis. Personnel should at least besensitised to the possible negative side-effects of TCprojects on vulnerable groups.
135
During the
rehabilitation phase
Good practice
4.13 Gender Aspects in Crisis Prevention and Conflict Management
136
4. Areas of Activity
Good practice when addressing gender issues in situations of crisis
Gender issues should be systemically incorporated into the monitoring andplanning process at a wide variety of levels, by women who are well prepared forthis task.
Institutional capacities for conflict management and peace-building:Is there support for the role of women in peace-building? Are women involved inearly warning mechanisms? Do women receive training in mediation andalternative conflict resolution to the same degree as men? Are there analyses ofobstacles which prevent women from participating in peace initiatives? Are local and international organisations able to address gender-specific issues,and appropriately manage the gathered data? Do ex post investigations of warcrimes for instance take a precise look at crimes committed specifically againstwomen? Do the organisations working with refugees possess the expertise toimplement the UNHCR recommendations?
Security: Is the individual physical security of women and girls guaranteed? Hasthe fact that women and girls are at greater risk than men been taken note of?Does a female definition of security appear anywhere in the planning of securityprecautions? Can women contact public security personnel in case of need?
Political structures and processes: Does the project support the participation ofwomen and their decision-making capability within the political structures? Whatabout women’s participation in aid organisations? Do women’s organisations haveopportunities to articulate new political objectives?
Human rights: Do all human rights initiatives include support for the promotion ofwomen’s rights?
Legal system: Does the legal system comply with international norms? Do womenhave access to the formal legal system?
State structures: Do women have the same rights and the same access to stateappointments?
Economic structures and processes in economic reconstruction: Areprogrammes designed such that women can participate on an equal footing? Isthe productive role of women strengthened by these programmes?
Social reconstruction and empowerment: This is where TC must providesupport to help maintain the benefits which women have worked towards andgained during the crisis: In certain conflict situations, women take up occupationsthat they were formerly unable to pursue. TC can play a role here by maintainingthis new scope so that positive developments are not reversed. To this end,women’s organisations can be supported in their work to create legal and socialacceptance of the new occupations. The question to be asked here is: Is theresupport for the empowerment of women?
After Spearman 1999, Woroniuk 1999
5. Training for Crisis Prevention andConflict Management
5.1 Training of Personnel
Work in conflict, crisis or post-war situations placeshigh demands on personnel. It requires a broadspectrum of technical, social and personal expertise.This includes for instance an ability to analyse conflictsand accurately assess the risk, an ability to engage inintercultural communication, and stress managementskills. In recent years, organisations and institutionsseconding civilian personnel on peace missions haveincreasingly acknowledged the need to improve thebriefing and preparation of those personnel (develop-ment workers, peace experts etc.) before assigningthem to zones of conflict or crisis. By contrast, TCorganisations as a whole still have work to do in thisrespect. This is leading to a situation in which theexpertise required for specific programmes andprojects of crisis prevention, and especially conflictmanagement,is more frequently to be found outside theexisting staffs of TC organisations than within them.
In response to these new needs, governmental andnon-governmental training activities in numerouscountries have been improved, broadened or newlycreated (Benkler 1999). A study presented at the 5thMeeting of the Conflict Prevention and Post ConflictReconstruction Network (Nov. 1999), which surveyedthe training activities offered by both national andinternational organisations, came to the conclusion“... that there is a growing number of conflict-relatedtraining activities under way ...” (UNDP/USAID 1999).
This tendency is still too minor in TC organisations.To increase the skills of their staff in the implementationof programmes and projects of crisis prevention andconflict management,and to prepare them for personalencounter with conflicts and crises,some organisationshave incorporated corresponding modules or coursesinto their standard training programme for field staff
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5.1 Training of Personnel
Demands on
personnel
Preparation and
briefing
(e.g. DEZA 2000 training programme, courseprogrammes of INTRAC). Yet the interface between“standard”preparation for a TC assignment,and trainingwith a specific conflict- or crisis-orientation remainsrelatively unclear. Where specialised, conflict-orientedtraining activities do exist, participation in thesetraining modules is in some cases compulsory, but isusually optional.Only few TC organisations today tendto train all staff in basic conflict- and crisis-related skillson a standardised basis before they send them out toconflict or crisis conditions.
However,the training requirement is not confined tofield staff. Head Office staff too must be trained inconflict analysis, and be familiar with the instrumentsof conflict management. Despite this need, conflict-related issues remain the exception in the trainingprogrammes of TC organisations. Responsible projectofficers, desk officers and task managers in particularhave a significant need for action-oriented expertise onthe “do no harm”approach,on CIAS,on gender-specificprevention and conflict management, as well as onconstructive conflict management instruments ingeneral. Opinions diverge as to what constitutes theoptimum training of staff not located directly on theground: DFID for instance trains its staff in theirrespective teams (country sections, regional sections),to guarantee maximum relevance to project im-plementation, whereas others (e.g. DEZA) offerstandardised courses in which staff from a broaddiversity of backgrounds can participate.
Good briefing for an assignment also includesoverlapping for the incoming individual with his or herpredecessor. This ensures that the institutionalexpertise is retained. The process of reflection whenpredecessor and successor overlap is also consideredby many as a first step in the debriefing of the returningstaff member,and of the analysis of his/her assignment.
The support of field staff on assignment in regions ofcrisis or conflict remains an enormous challenge to themajor TC organisations.Although many apply the model
138
Coaching and
supervision
5. Training for Crisis Prevention and Conflict Management
139
of “cooperative” or “participatory” management, theinstruments of coaching and supervision for instanceare not yet broadly disseminated. In addition, theirapplication also requires an understanding of roles anda division of functions between desk officer and fieldstaff member which are not necessarily compatiblewith the administrative procedures and hierarchicalregulations of many organisations (e.g. the need toseparate the function of superior from theconfidentiality involved in a coaching relationship).Specific training courses in coaching or psychologicallyoriented supervision need to be designed tosupplement the existing consultancy expertise withinTC organisations. What is required is on the one handthe transfer of coaching skills, and on the other handstructural and organisational measures designed toensure that the relationships between all concerned aredefined based on transparent rules.
The experience of the International Committee ofthe Red Cross (ICRC) and many other organisations inBosnia demonstrates that there is a strong demand forthe assignment of individuals with psychologicaltraining and a sensitivity for conflicts. However, onlyfew TC organisations have either trained personnel onthe ground,or psychologists whom they could secondfrom their Head Offices to local situations of need(exceptions are for instance GTZ and ICRC).
Since the personnel requirement for TC missions inpost-war societies is considerable, there is a risk that infuture many inexperienced individuals may beassigned, especially in emergency-oriented develop-ment aid, without having had the opportunity forproper preparation.Mechanisms for on-the-job training,for instance mentoring or coaching as used by the NGOInternational Alert for its own personnel in London,should be put into application more frequently. Forspecial supplementary training,cooperation should besought with other actors in war-torn societies, forinstance with UNDP and ICRC, in order to be able toprofit from their respective local expertise.
5.1 Training of Personnel
140
Debriefing
Selection of
personnel
5. Training for Crisis Prevention and Conflict Management
Debriefing that follows assignments to zones ofconflict and crisis is considered by the TC institutionssending personnel to be highly important. The staffmember is to be given an opportunity to reflect uponhis or her assignment on a personal and professionallevel. Secondly, debriefing sessions can fulfil thefunction of supporting the expert in reintegrating intohis or her previous life and professional setting.A finalaim is that the experiences gained be fed back into theintra-organisational pool of expertise, and thus are notdissipated or lost.
These expectations often contrast starkly with actualpractice,where time or financial constraints often leaveno scope for debriefing or in-depth analysis ofexperiences.Only rarely are psychologists available fordebriefing. Unfortunately, almost all TC organisationsomit systematic debriefing of returning staff.
Changed project types or conditions in the countriesof crisis or pre-crisis create new requirement profiles.So far,the competences required for work in conflict orcrisis situations appear only in the questionnaires usedat the time of recruitment, and they are identical withthe standard recruitment criteria. The organisationsinterviewed specified the following categories, eachweighting the criteria differently:■ strong commitment to the goals of the project and
the organisation (“no 8-hour day”);■ ability to identify, address and manage risks;■ capacity for analytical and systemic thinking;■ political maturity and acumen,as well as sensitivity;■ creativity in dealing with constantly changing
situations and conditions;■ intercultural communication skills;■ ability to work in a team, and a will to be actively
involved in team development;■ ability to communicate;■ capacity to learn.
Most of these requirements could also be demandedof average TC staff. It is important to remember,
however, that under conditions of conflict, the risks ofpolitically inept behaviour or culturally insensitivebehaviour are accentuated. In other words: Several ofthe areas of expertise and capabilities normally requiredof TC staff must be especially pronounced in staffrecruited for work in crisis and conflict situations.These staff must be specialists in the requirementslisted above. Increasingly, a further requirement is thatstaff also possess additional skills in applying themethods of crisis prevention and conflict management.
For the UN organisations it is proposed that a UN-wide system be created to serve as a pool for therecruitment of personnel to work in crisis zones or post-conflict societies. The Norwegian Refugee Councilcurrently has a pool of approximately 700 individualswho are deployed primarily in missions of UNHCR, aswell as those of other UN organisations (the HumanResources Stand-by Force), whilst the NorwegianInstitute of Human Rights has approximately 120individuals specifically for human rights ombudsman
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Pool-building
5.1 Training of Personnel
Strategic goals of personnel planning
Following a workshop conducted by the UNRISD War-torn Societies Projectin Bossey on the theme “Practical recommendations for managers ofmultilateral and bilateral aid agencies” (June 1998), representatives ofmultilateral and bilateral organisations (for instance UNDP, USAID, UNICEF,GTZ) issued a statement setting new goals for personnel planning: “We needto review personnel procedures and practices with a view to recruiting,training and promoting exceptional and excellent staff for post-conflict work,while rewarding achievements and sanctioning incompetence. We recognisethat necessary skills include maturity, political acumen, analytical ability andgood judgement, commitment, creativity, and the ability to fit into a team.”
Source: WSP, Bossey Statement 1998
duties. It should be mentioned in this context that theGerman Federal Foreign Office has also beguncoordinating training activities for a pool of expertswithin the scope of a training programme entitled“civilian personnel on peace assignments”(Kühne/Benkler 1999). At the same time the “CivilPeace Service” is drawing on the services of “doublyqualified”experts (TC and conflict management) usingBMZ funds (cf. Section 2.4). The TC organisations wecontacted did not, however, see any explicit need toestablish further pools.
Furthermore, the Bossey Statement (see box above)calls for the creation of administrative scope within theUN system for the recruitment of exceptionallyqualified external staff, who should be rewarded forachievement. In the countries of assignment a teamstructure is planned with clear procedures for thetraining of juniors. The provision of sufficiently stableteam situations for the inexperienced is prerequisite tosuccessful work in complex emergencies.A change inorganisational culture is designed to ensure thatachievement, especially in crisis situations, isdemonstrably rewarded. Not least the ability to fit intoa team and address conflicts must be valued especiallyhighly and made conducive to further careerdevelopment.
5.2 Experiences and Practice
On the basis of the interviews conducted, trainingmeasures can be divided into three main categories:a) on-the-job coaching and training;b)conventional training courses taking place within a
fixed time frame;c) institutional learning.
Very little experience is available as yet concerningon-the-job training in crisis prevention and conflictmanagement. Some organisations in the English-speaking countries train their personnel on the job in
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5. Training for Crisis Prevention and Conflict Management
Types of training
measures
On-the-job coaching
and training
so-called reflection workshops.They, for instance,holdclosed conferences at six-monthly intervals, businesslunches or similarly structured events to facilitate anexchange of experiences. These are designed to giveparticipants an opportunity to reflect on their work ina rather different, unfamiliar setting. TC organisationsbasically agree that considerable efforts still need to bemade with regard to staff training.The view also prevailsthat on-the-job training combined with professionalmentoring or coaching is often more appropriate thantime-consuming training courses, which as a ruleremain theoretical.
Whilst practicable models for on-the-job trainingremain rare, sufficient expertise is available on howconventionally designed training measures should bestructured. Usually, basic expertise is transferred in afirst phase, after which practical exposure is followedby more in-depth training or specialisation.Beyond that,specially adapted preparatory briefing measures shouldalso be planned for country assignments. Diringer forinstance seeks to identify four types of trainingprogramme (cf. p. 144) as state-of-the-art (Diringer2000).
As regards institutional learning,recent managementthinking on the subject of the learning organisationdoes not yet seem to have gained a foothold in TC.Thecomments made by the individuals interviewed suggestthat, in the context of crisis prevention and conflictmanagement in particular,the issue of defensive routineneeds to be closely addressed. It must be assumed thatin many TC organisations, defensive routine is a keyfactor constraining organisational learning (cf. Section3.1.2). Defensive routine denotes behaviours whichprotect the agent against “uncomfortable” situations:Unpleasant information is not passed on, divergentopinions or views are not expressed (Argyris 1998).Defensive behaviour is not appropriate in situationswhere partnership and cooperation are key criteria forpositive results. For organisations engaged in crisisprevention and constructive conflict management, the
143
5.2 Experiences and Practice
Conventional training
courses
Institutional learning
144
5. Training for Crisis Prevention and Conflict Management
Basic training/induction courses
In basic training/induction courses, basic knowledge and methodologicalexpertise is transferred. Trainees also gain experience in reaching a correct,situation-specific and balanced selection from the available instruments andmethods of conflict management. Not least, application of analytical skillsand the practice of thinking in complex systems needs to be provided.Furthermore the development of personal and social skills is a keyprerequisite for an individual’s capability to intervene when the opportunity forconflict management arises.
Specialised, subject-specific or supplementary courses
In courses of this kind, which supplement basic training, specific technical ormethodological aspects of conflict management are covered in greater detail.
Country- or project-specific induction courses
These courses prepare staff members for work on specific assignments, inspecific regions, in concrete project settings, and in the situations of socialconflict which prevail there.
Training of trainers programmes
One special case are the training of trainers programmes, in whichparticipants are introduced to and trained in the role, function and specificmethodological expertise of the trainer. The aim of such programmes is toenable participants to run and implement training courses responsibly andprofessionally. Since the use of external trainers can only be the first step inestablishing a training programme for conflict management in conflict andcrisis regions, these training of trainers programmes are also implemented inconflict regions at the local level and/or often in cooperation with localorganisations. The aim of such measures is to train and/or upgrade a pool ofnational trainers who will gradually assume full responsibility for trainingmeasures within their region.
Source: Diringer 2000
identification and conscious eradication of suchroutines is a question of credibility and effectivity.This means that during training, coaching, andthe establishment of computer-based knowledgemanagement systems,staff should reflect upon whetherand to what extent authentically perceived informationis being fed into the system.
Today, actual training in mediation or the transfer ofbasic skills for constructive conflict management, forinstance active listening, reframing etc., for the mostpart need to be bought-in by TC organisations on theopen market.Consequently, these measures are usuallytailored to the needs of Western societies. There areindividual institutions which also offer training in theseareas in conflict regions (for instance the Asian Institutefor Responding to Conflict and Development, India).
145
5.2 Experiences and Practice
Specialised training
measures
Training via the Internet
The Internet too now offers a diverse range of training opportunities. USAIDfor instance offers a course in conflict management. The Centre for ConflictResolution (CCR) at the University of Bradford is currently establishing adistance learning course on the “Introduction to Conflict Resolution”. Thepilot course comprises six units:
1. What is conflict resolution?
2. History of conflict resolution;
3. New developments in conflict resolution;
4. Analysing contemporary conflicts;
5. Conflict resolution in war zones;
6. Post-settlement peace-building and reconciliation.
Source: UNDP, USAID 1999 and CCR,http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/confres/dislearn/dislearn.html
In many cases, church-based institutions offertraining for peace work,which are strongly influencedby the Christian notion of reconciliation (for instancethe Caritas Internationalis Handbook 1999, cf. alsoSection 4.12).
The provisional UNDP and USAID report on trainingdocuments a range of content and forms of training.Thequintessence of the report is that workshops,seminarsand short training courses are held in the followingareas:
Although the structure of training measures varieswidely in terms of course content, it is possible toidentify a core of six components common to thevarious curricula and schedules. These core compo-nents can be assembled as modules, to suit the giventime frame and target group (after Ropers 2000):■ personal skills,■ basic social skills;■ general ability to communicate and interact;■ skills in working with groups,within a team and with
organisations;■ conflict analysis and contextualisation skills;■ conflict management skills.
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5. Training for Crisis Prevention and Conflict Management
The spectrum of
course content
Training course content
Conflict prevention, conflict policy, early warning/early action, emergency aidand mitigation, children and conflict, children’s rights, work in unstableenvironments, emergency aid management training, micro-finance in post-conflict situations, environmental management, transition from war to peace,project cycle management and conflict resolution, early warning andpreventive measures: capacity building in UN organisations; regionalworkshops on human rights and country-specific workshops in Africa on thethemes of conflict management and peace-building; gender awareness formilitary and civilian personnel on peace-keeping missions
Source: UNDP & USAID 1999
What can TC learn from this example for futuretraining measures? The lessons learned involve thecomposition of course groups, and the integratedpractice-orientation.
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SRC capacity building
In 1997, the Swiss Red Cross (SRC) decided to implement an intensive,challenging capacity building programme to train personnel in conflictmanagement and crisis prevention. Characteristic elements of thisprogramme were:
■ Practical orientation: major importance was given to practical experienceof conflict management projects. The criterion for award of the trainingcertificate was the proven ability to design a project of constructive conflictmanagement.
■ Institutionalisation within everyday organisational procedures: participantswere obliged to implement pilot projects; supervised in doing so by in-house supervisors, quality circle.
■ Integration into organisational feedback culture: culture of intensive andprofessional feedback and consultation (intervision, coaching).
■ Organisational learning: mix of home-country social workers and field-oriented TC staff.
■ Cost recovery: some course participants from outside the organisation(7 out of a total of 29) on the basis of financial contributions.
■ Expert network for intercultural mediation and conflict management: Theaim was to create a network of individuals (multipliers) trained inintercultural mediation and conflict management. They were supposed tobe able to identify potential applications or interventions in their workingarea on their own initiative, as well as to plan and initiate such ideas in theform of projects.
Source: Ribaux 3/1999
5.2 Experiences and Practice
The mixture of staff working in TC, and staffemployed as social workers in Switzerland, provedunfavourable. The training needs of social workersrelate to their face-to-face dealings with individuals inconflict, whereas TC staff approach conflictmanagement and crisis prevention from a greaterdistance, and from a highly systematic and group-oriented perspective.
Project managers require expertise on specificmeasures and conceptual approaches that can beincorporated into their projects, whereas socialworkers want training most of all in interculturalmediation between individuals.This distinction shouldalso be borne in mind with respect to the training offield staff and local employees of partner organisationsin TC project countries. Desk officers andrepresentatives of donor organisations require differenttraining than their field staff. Whilst face-to-facecommunication, mediation, and practice with instru-ments such as “organising a round table”need to be onthe training schedule for field staff, desk officers needto focus on reflecting on their own handling ofconflicts, and on the integration of conflict manage-ment methods into TC projects.
Overall, the mixture of internal and externalparticipants proved highly productive. Through jointbrainstorming, the externals were able to benefit fromthe broad range of potential applications.The internalswere able to gain an external perspective on their ownapproach. The detailed discussion of organisationalproblems within the institution sometimes provedproblematic.
DFID takes an entirely different view concerning thecomposition of training course participants. There,training and capacity building on conflict-related issuesis conducted separately for specific departments. Thiscreates an opportunity for joint work on projects. Jointconsultation and quality circle functions can thus beperformed by the team in part at relatively low cost.
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5. Training for Crisis Prevention and Conflict Management
Mixture of home-
country social
workers and field-
oriented TC staff
Mixture of external
and internal course
participants
The decision to require the participants to apply theskills acquired during the training course by designinga pilot project proved correct, but difficult to imple-ment. There was a discrepancy between the need fortraining, and the reality of the organisation. There wasa major resource problem:During the training cycle,nofunding was provided for any of the proposedinternational projects. Consequently, the graduationrequirement that course participants launch a pilotproject had to be reduced.
Hence: Training which aims to produce concretepractical results for TC can only be successfullyimplemented if financial resources and time budgets aremade available in support of that aim.
Concerning training and teaching materials the jointstudy by UNDO and USAID came to the conclusion thata wealth of materials are available which are almostimpossible to survey. According to the study, manypublications are very similar or cover the same subjects.Rarely are materials jointly developed. Teaching meth-ods are highly diverse: They range from brief presen-tations designed to stimulate group discussion, to roleplay or case analyses (UNDP/USAID 1999).
No doubt there are also numerous materials availablein TC on resource-oriented training or participatorysituation analyses (e.g. Subedi 1997, Srinivasan 1993,Pretty et al. 1995). Simulation games in which partici-pants learn to deal with complexity (such as “Sim City”)can also be utilised for training in constructive conflictmanagement. Having said that, there is a lack ofsimulated scenarios geared specifically to conflictmanagement in TC. Such simulated cases could helpparticipants learn to manage complexity,stress and thereal conflict situation. (Author’s interview withRopers).
As is customary in adult education, most trainingprogrammes for conflict management are geared to aninteractive, participatory approach and a holisticlearning model. The selection of methods is also
149
5.2 Experiences and Practice
Practical orientation
of the training
Teaching materials/
methodological
principles
determined by the objective of creating maximumopportunity for experiential learning. The range ofmethods comprises individual work,various graduatedmodes of work in small groups, as well as plenarypresentations,discussions,simulation exercises and roleplay. The area of conflict management is developedwhile reflecting on concrete examples from practice.Thus a balanced mix is offered of theory and practice,and action and reflection.
5.3 Training Local Actors
Ropers points out that a distinction needs to bedrawn between training measures for individuals whoare remote from the conflict (external TC experts),andtraining measures for internal (partisan) actors. Whilstthe types of training should not differ in principle,certain items might be inappropriate for experts orrepresentatives of administrations and NGOs, or forvarious other groups in a region of conflict or crisis(Ropers 2000).
For participants from zones of conflict, the primarymodes of training provided so far are a) Problem-solvingworkshops with training elements and b) Planning andcapacity-building workshops with training elements.
Problem-solving workshops bring representatives ofparties in conflict together for an integrated jointlearning and working process. Such a process isdesigned to increase the likelihood of raising theirinterest in understanding peaceful conflict resolution.Workshops of this kind can also include trainingelements,for instance role play enabling participants toswitch perceptual perspectives.
Planning and capacity-building workshops aim atstrengthening the action and negotiation capabilities ofindividual partners. The incorporation of trainingelements for conflict management can assume a widevariety of forms.
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5. Training for Crisis Prevention and Conflict Management
Problem-solving
workshops
Capacity-building
workshops
According to Lederach (1995), the analyticaldistinction between “implicit”and “explicit”knowledgehas become relevant in the planning of activities topromote internal actors’ conflict managementexpertise and capabilities. Implicit knowledge isunderstood as the body of everyday, culturally-influenced experiences in dealing with conflicts. It isusually accepted as self-evident. By contrast, explicitknowledge is the product of a conscious effort to gaininsight on the basis of practical experiences andtheoretical reflection (Diringer 2000).
This leads to a further distinction in training andupgrading types.Prescriptive training programmes seekto transfer explicit knowledge and develop skills bymaking available professional trainers with appropriatequalifications in the given field. It deals therefore withexpertise that can be transferred. Elicitive trainingprogrammes view training as an emerging creativeprocess,and seek to elicit the implicit knowledge fromthe participants. These training programmes create aspace into which the participants can bring forwardtheir experiences and expertise in conflict manage-ment.They can relate to their knowledge interactively,and jointly reflect on experiences. In doing so thecourse itself becomes a real locus of interculturalconflict management (Diringer 2000).Elicitive trainingmethods pursue an approach similar to the parti-cipatory planning and appraisal methods practised byTC in recent years. Their key characteristic is theattempt made to motivate the actors of the develop-ment process to identify and utilise their ownresources.
When planning local training measures, it isfundamentally important to bear in mind thecomposition of the participant group,mainly in relationto their belonging to a specific conflict party. If,duringthe training sessions, case studies that relate to theactual conflict are used to train or demonstrate,there isa real risk that traumatic experiences may re-surface,and negatively affect further learning during the course,
151
5.3 Training Local Actors
Prescriptive versus
elicitive training
Risks
even when the seminar takes place in a protectedspace. In regions of generalised violence, the potentialrisk of re-activating traumatic experiences amongparticipants requires especially responsible handling ofthis problem.
In summary, the aim is to develop the capacities andstrengthen the conflict management skills of bothoutsiders, i. e. individuals not involved in the conflict,and of persons involved in the conflict. There is, asalways, a need to suit the issue of capacity building tospecific needs and preferences of the target group.
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5. Training for Crisis Prevention and Conflict Management
6. Outlook and Open Questions
6.1 The Future
The concluding chapter of a report is not supposedto simply repeat all the problems and opportunitiesdiscussed in the study.The points to be discussed hereare cross-sectoral issues and general contradictions thatemerged from the interviews conducted and literaturestudied. Also we consider it appropriate to reflect onthe present state of the art from an imagined point inthe future.
Based on the opinions expressed by the persons weinterviewed, we will now take the liberty of engagingin a bold speculation.Let’s imagine a time two decadesfrom now.Seen from there,the present debate on crisisprevention and conflict management in TC will beconsidered one of the most significant debates indevelopment cooperation. This is because what is atstake is the fundamental issue of credibility, and this ina business that claims the moral high ground. In thefuture,TC organisations will be measured against theircompliance with a conflict-specific code of conduct orother ethical rules, against their analytical expertise,their demonstrated capacities in developing andapplying methods of conflict impact assessment, andtheir field delivery related to conflict management andcrisis prevention. For many donors, this will havebecome a crucial issue in the award of contracts.
Also significant will be the challenge to show cost-efficiency: Will TC have made a demonstrablecontribution to preventing the escalation of violentconflicts, thus averting considerably more costly mili-tary measures or warfare? Will it also have prevented theneed for the costly process of reconstruction? Thisremains to be seen.
At this point in time it is difficult to forecast furtherdevelopments.The interviews revealed a wide range ofanswers as to the question of the ideal phase and point
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6.1 The Future
A look back
from the future
Preference for
specific conflict
phases
in time at which intervention or action should belaunched (pre-conflict, open conflict, post-conflict orrefinements of this model). The usefulness of thisidealised model of the crisis cycle was questioned. Forgood reasons, some respondents disputed its explana-tory force.But in many more cases it was conceded thatinvolvement in the post-conflict phase was muchsimpler and more promising for TC. This because:a) Everything needs to be reconstructed anew and thereis no resistance to starting everything afresh,and b) Therelevance of involvement in crisis prevention in acountry that is demonstrably in the midst of a crisis isno longer a matter of any dispute. Other intervieweespointed out that opportunities to intervene during oneof the windows of opportunity might arise during anyphase of a conflict, and therefore they advocated thatTC at least “keep its foot behind the door” until theconflict escalates. Others saw the advantage of pre-conflict involvement in the better opportunities toachieve peaceful resolution before the conflictescalates.
In the future the issue of coordination between thevarious actors will remain a key challenge. At a verygeneral level, far from the realities of specific countriesin crisis, there is already a strong willingness to pursuecooperation and exchange. Examples of this willinclude:■ The Conflict Prevention and Post-Conflict Recon-
struction (CPR) Network, driven primarily by WorldBank,USAID and CIDA,and in which all major multi-and bilateral organisations are involved;
■ The OECD-DAC Informal Task Force on Conflict,Peace and Development Co-operation.Further non-regular coordination occurs bilaterally
between specific units of the participating institutions,for instance between EU and World Bank.Left out of thisprocess are the numerous NGOs with particularexperience in local conflict management.The presentstudy has so far not discussed the fact that, until veryrecently, human rights issues and advocacy work were
154
6. Outlook and Open Questions
Coordination
Respect for
specialised NGOs
dealt with almost exclusively in the domain ofspecialised NGOs. It is therefore understandable whenrepresentatives of civil society respond togovernmental development organisations’ entry intothe arena of crisis- and conflict-related issues withscepticism. Undoubtedly it is at this point that theseriousness of TC organisations’ involvement inconflict-related issues in (civil) war zones will bemeasured. The way they manage to deal withcoordination within their own society will be the mostimportant indicator in this regard.A definition of theirown activities in terms of complementarity, modestyrelated to the whole conflict system,and respect whendealing with other specialised groups will most likelybecome the model for actors in the conflict zonesthemselves. The arrangements for strategic andpractical coordination, and strategic coherencecurrently in place within war-torn countries varywidely. They range between a) donor countries withclose coordination being practiced between thepolitical and development-oriented actors in theimplementation of individual projects only, and b)donor countries where the governmental developmentorganisation has assumed a credible lead role, and isaccepted in that capacity by the majority of NGOsbecause of a clearly stated strategy and the leadorganisation’s ensuring of complementarity to othergroups. The credibility of governmental TC organi-sations is particularly enhanced by an active discourseconducted with new actors on the scene – securityforces, weapons manufacturers and industrialassociations – as occurs in the UK for instance.
Even further from a solution is the problem ofcoordination between the various donor structures inthe crisis-torn countries. Some of the responsibility forthis deficit rests with the slow decision-makingprocesses within the TC organisations themselves.Evenmore important, however, is the broad range of(legitimate) organisational differences in the assess-ment of a particular crisis, i.e. of the ability of partner
155
6.1 The Future
Is a concerted donor
strategy possible?
governments to manage such crises, or of the actualcauses of the conflict. The objectives of the variouspolicies can also vary widely.This led the authors of anOECD-DAC synthesis study to conclude that aconcerted donor strategy to create incentives anddisincentives for peace is barely feasible (Uvin 1999).As a result, coordination at this level is currentlyconfined to harmonising abstract principles, and toexchanging information and analytical tools. However,there is barely any doubt that the need for coordinationis much greater.
Impact assessment of country strategies, of pro-grammes and of projects planned to prevent crises isstill at a rudimentary stage.The methodology of conflictimpact assessment as a whole is in its infancy, and isbased on assumptions of plausibility. In practice thismeans that it is not yet possible to draft any “iron laws”of Technical Cooperation in crisis situations.
6.2 Open Questions
The following problems in particular are not likely toyield any simple answers.
1. Inevitable Partisanship versus the Need forNeutralityTC often cannot avoid taking sides:Whether support
goes to inefficient or even war-mongering elites of agovernment, or whether poverty alleviation andemergency aid are supporting disadvantaged victims oradversaries, the adoption of a partisan position isproblematic in either case. This even more so in viewof the fact that TC organisations are seeking at the sametime to act as neutral conflict mediators. A number oforganisations have therefore decided to pursue in agiven country X either one option (traditional TC andemergency aid) or the other (conflict management).Others see traditional TC rather as a prerequisite to
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6. Outlook and Open Questions
No simple answers
conflict management,but then often rule out mediationin the strict sense.
2. Reconciliation versus JusticeThe key aim of conflict management is to achieve a
reconciliation of interests between the parties to aconflict. Once violence has been used, this becomesextremely difficult:Victims have a legitimate interest injustice, and indeed sustainable peace may only beginonce a “culture of impunity”has been brought to an end.Yet how this can be best achieved remains debatable.Considering the fact that some peace negotiations canonly take place subject to some degree of amnesty, thisbecomes even more questionable.
3. Humanitarian Duty versus Feeding the War and“Fungibility”Moving far beyond the domain of emergency aid,and
deep into the domain of TC,development cooperationalso feels committed to humanitarian goals (“povertyalleviation”). The unintentional exacerbation of con-flicts resulting from an (again unintentional) feeding ofconflict-generating structures (or even parties to theconflict), hitherto accepted as a lesser evil in thecontext of activities actually oriented towards thecommon good, is increasingly being perceived as aproblem by an interested public.There is also a risk thatTC might relieve a government of its actual tasks in thesocial sector, to such an extent that it can use theresources made available for repression and warfare.
4. “Sustainability” versus “Buying Time”Profound planning and analysis, including
participatory needs analysis, is also considered a keycondition for sustainable results in the context of crisisprevention activities. Yet when tensions escalate, timeruns out.There is barely any clear indication as to whentime can (still) be taken for intensive planning.One wayout of this dilemma might be a division of labourbetween TC organisations: whilst one organisation
157
6.2 Open Questions
takes care of short-term stabilisation measures,anotherplans sustainable peace-building by addressingstructural causes of the conflict.There are virtually noexamples of close strategic coordination,which ideallywould require a joint analysis of the causes of theconflict.The second option is the coordinated sequenc-ing of chronologically overlapping measures by one andthe same or various organisations, an idea which isalready built into the concept of development-orientedemergency aid.
5. Loyalty to Principles and Credibility versusFlexibility and Scope for ActionConflict management – especially mediation –
requires trust, and a clear commitment to ethicalstandards and transparent principles. There again, theimperative of preventive action often requires deviationfrom rigid and accepted rules. These two imperativessometimes clash, because they may not always becompatible.
6. Need to Avoid and Criticise Defective StateStructures versus Damaging and Underminingof State AuthorityThe increasingly problematic cooperation with
moribund state structures in development cooperationas a whole has to be seen in a new aggravateddimension in the context of crisis prevention andconflict management.On the one hand the state (i.e.thejustice and security apparatus) has in such cases almostinvariable already failed to resolve the conflict, whilston the other hand development cooperation canfurther contribute to its weakening if it reliesexclusively on traditionally existing mechanisms or civilsociety.
7. “Culture of Prevention” versus Preference forInvolvement in the Post-Conflict-PhaseLargely for reasons of self-legitimation, but also due
to a number of comparative advantages on the part of
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6. Outlook and Open Questions
larger (governmental) TC organisations, a cleartendency towards post-conflict situations is evident inthe ways TC selects countries for cooperation.Yet thisoccurs despite the fact that crisis prevention involves,as the term implies,the prevention of suffering,and theprotection of achievements of development coopera-tion,which in turn saves tax monies.
8. “Structural Optimism” of DevelopmentCooperation versus Ruthless Assessment ofTC’s own Potentials to Positively InfluenceDevelopmentsThe warning against TC over-estimating its own
capability to influence events cannot be repeated oftenenough. On the other hand, TC needs its “structuraloptimism”if it is to do anything at all.
Obviously there are no simple answers to thesequestions.But dilemmas of this kind demonstrate threethings:1. There is a need for transparent decision-making
rationales for Technical Cooperation in situations ofcrisis, and for ongoing impact assessment. Unavoid-able negative side-effects (and the prevention ofavoidable effects) should be taken account of fromthe outset in strategic planning.
2. Any assessment of activities must be conducted on acase-by-case basis, and can lead to very differentresults.Blueprints are often entirely inappropriate.
3. A targeted division of roles between different actorscan often help TC meet conflicting requirements.
Finally,the present study has not yet drawn attentionto the potentials for influencing violent conflicts inpartner countries through activities in the donorcountries themselves:Advocacy and campaign work onthe one hand, and the staging of dialogue fora on theother, may be two activities barely ever looked at byTechnical Cooperation.But they are significant from theglobal perspective, and for one-off cooperation.
159
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Advocacy work and
dialogue fora in donor
countries
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Smith,Anne-Marie:A Summary of Projects Completed by Granteesand Fellows 1997-99 (United States Institute of Peace:Contributions to the Study of Peacemaking,Vol.6),Washington,D.C.2000
Smith, Julianne: Instruments for Peace-Building and ConflictPrevention.Learning from Other Actors for the European Union,(CPN Ad hoc Briefing Paper), 30 April 1999
Sørbø, Gunnar M./ Vale, Peter (ed.): Out of Conflict. From War toPeace in Africa,Uppsala 1997
Sørbø, Gunnar M./ Hauge, Wenche/Hybertsen, Bente/Smith, Dan.:Norwegian Assistance to Countries in Conflict. The Lesson of
7.1 Literature
171
Experience from Guatemala, Mali, Mozambique, Sudan, Rwandaand Burundi (CMI/PRIO),Oslo 1999
Sørbø,Gunnar M./ Macrae,Joanna /Wohlgemuth,Lennart:NGOs inConflict – an Evaluation of International Alert (Chr. MichelsenInstitute), Fantoft-Bergen 1997
Soerensen,Birgitte:Women and Post-Conflict Reconstruction,TheWar-torn Societies Project Occasional Paper No.3,Geneva 1998.
Spearman,Diane:Performance and Impact Indicators for EvaluatingProjects and Pogress Towards Meeting the Commitments toWomen, 1999-2001 – Annex to WFP Commitments to Women:Mid-Term Review of Implementation.World Food Program 1999
Spelten, Angelika: Gewaltprävention. Eine neue Aufgabe auch fürdie Entwicklungspolitik?, in: SFK/SFS (eds.): Theorie und Praxisziviler Konfliktbearbeitung,Chur/Zürich 1996,p.237–248
Spelten, Angelika: Instrumente zur Erfassung von Konflikt- undKrisenpotentialen in Partnerländern der Entwicklungpolitik,(Forschungsberichte des BMZ;126),Munich/Bonn/London 1999
Srinivasan, Lyra: Tools for Community Participation. A Manual forTraining Trainers in Participatory Techniques (UNDP TechnicalSeries Involving women in Water and Sanitation),New York 1993
Stedman, Stephen John: Conflict and Conciliation in Sub-SaharanAfrica, in: Michael E.Brown (ed.):The International Dimensionsof Internal Conflict,Cambridge,Mass.1996,p.235–265
Subedi, Nani Ram: Participatory Rural Appraisal for CommunityDevelopment.A Training Manual Based on Experiences in Nepal,CARE International,Kathmandu 1997
Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA):Strategy for Conflict Management and Peace-Building. Asummary, Stockholm 1999
Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA):Evaluating Project Proposals from a Gender Perspective.Extractfrom: Overview: Gender Equality and Emergency Assistance/Conflict Resolution.1999
Swiss Angency for Development and Cooperation: PromotingHuman Rights in Development Cooperation, Guidelines, Zurich1998
Theissen, Gunnar/Grossmann, Georg S.: Versöhnungsarbeit nachgewalttätigen Konflikten,GTZ-Arbeitspapier,draft, 03.03.2000
7. Annex
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Tschirgi, Necla: The War-Torn Societies Project and Third PartyNeutral Models of Conflict Management. Fen Osler HampsonCarleton University (IDRC Working Paper No.3),May 1999
United Nations Department for Economic and Social Informationand Policy Analysis:An Inventory of Post-Conflict Peace-BuildingActivities,New York 1996
United Nations Department for Peacekeeping Operations/LessonsLearned Unit:Disarmament,Demobilization and Reintegration ofEx-Combatants in a Peacekeeping Environment (Revised Draft),New York 1999
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP): HumanDevelopment Report 1994,New York 1994
UNDP: UNDP in Crisis, Post Conflict and Prevention. Recom-mendations for Change (Report of the Transition Team to theAdministrator of UNDP),n.p.1999
UNDP: Emergency Response Division and USAID, Office ofTransition Initiatives: An Initial Survey of Conflict-RelatedTraining.Presented at the fifth meeting of the Conflict Preventionand Post-conflict Reconstruction (CPR) Network,4–5 November1999,UNICEF New York
United Nations Research Institute for Social Development: TheChallenge of Rebuilding War-torn Societies. Report on theWorking Seminar at Cartigny, Geneva, November 29 toDecember 1,1994,Geneva 1994
United Nations Research Institute for Social Development:Rebuilding War-torn Societies. Problems of InternationalAssistance in Conflict and Post-Conflict Situations,Geneva 1994
Uvin, Peter: The Influence of Aid in Situations of Violent Conflict.A synthesis and a commentary on the lessons learned from casestudies on the limits and scope for the use of developmentassistance incentives and disincentives for influencing conflictsituations. (DAC Informal Task Force on Conflict, Peace andDevelopment Co-operation),Paris 1999 at (www.oecd.org/dac)
Uvin, Peter: Aiding Violence. The Development Enterprise inRwanda,West Hartford 1998
Walraven,Klaas van/Netherlands Institute of International Relations(Clingendael):Conflict Policy in Some Western Countries:SomeExplorative Notes,The Hague 1999
War-Torn Societies Project: Improving external assistance to war-torn societies: the Bossey statement,Bossey 29.6.1998
7.1 Literature
173
Weiss Fagen, Patricia with the assistance of Uimonen, Paula: Afterthe conflict.A review of selected sources on rebuilding war-tornsocieties, War-torn Societies Project Occasional Paper No. 1,Geneva 1995
Wieczorek-Zeul, Heidemarie: Sicherheitspolitische Bezüge derEntwicklungspolitik, Rede zur Abschlussveranstaltung desKernseminars der Bundesakademie für Sicherheitspolitik,28.5.1999
Wilton Park Special Conference: Aid under Fire: RedefiningRelief/Development Assistance in Unstable Situations (AidAction and Overseas Development Institute, April 7–9, 1995),Wilton Park 1995
Wissing, Thomas: Mögliche Beiträge der Entwicklungszusam-menarbeit zur Krisenprävention. Eine Literaturauswertung(Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik. Berichte undGutachten 8/1995),Berlin 1995
World Bank: Conflict Prevention & Post-Conflict Reconstruction.Perspectives and Prospects,Washinton,D.C.1998
World Bank.Operations Evaluation Department:The World Bank‘sExperience with Post-Conflict Reconstruction,Washington/D.C.1998
Woroniuk, Beth: Gender Equality & Peace building: A DraftOperational Framework. (CIDA)1999
Wulff,Herbert:Security-Sector Reform in Developing Countries.AnAnalysis of the International Debate and Potentials forImplementing Reforms with Recommendations for TechnicalCooperation,GTZ working paper,draft,March 2000
Zartman, William I. (ed.): Governance as Conflict Management:Politics and Violence in West Africa (The Brooking Institution’sConflict Resolution in Africa Project),Washington/D.C.1997
7. Annex
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7.2. Websites
When using the following list, please remember that websiteaddreses can change very quickly.
Accord, South Africahttp://www.accord.org.za
Amnesty Internationalhttp://www.amnesty.org
Association of Church Development Services (AGKED), Germanyhttp://www.ekd.de/agked/welcome.html
Arbeitsgemeinschaft Kriegsursachenforschung (AKUF),University of Hamburghttp://www.sozialwiss.uni-hamburg.de/Ipw/Akuf/home.html
Austrian Federal Ministry for Foreign Affairs,development cooperation pagehttp://www.bmaa.gv.at/aussenpolitik/ezaindex.html.de
Austrian Study Centre for Peace and Conflict Resolution (ASPR)European University Centre for Peace Studies http://www.aspr.ac.at/
Berghof Research Centtre for Constructive Conflict Management,Germanyhttp://www.b.shuttle.de/berghof/index.htm
Bonn International Center for Conversion (BICC), Deutschlandhttp://www.bicc.de
Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA)http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/cidapo-e.htm
Canadian International Peacekeeping Centrehttp://www.cdnpeacekeeping.ns.ca/
7.2 Websites
175
Caritas Switzerlandhttp://www.caritas.ch/
Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflicthttp://www.ccpdc.org/
Carter Center, USAhttp://www.cartercenter.org/
Center for Conflict Resolution (CCR), University of Bradford, UKhttp://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/confres/dislearn/dislearn.html
Center for Development Research, Denmarkhttp://www.cdr.dk/
Center for Peace Research and Strategic Studies, Belgiumhttp://www.kuleuven.ac.be/facdep/social/pol/cvo/cvo.htm
Chr. Michelsen Institute, Norwayhttp://www.cmi.no
Conciliation Resources, UKhttp://www.c-r.org
Conflictnet, USAhttp://www.igc.org/igc/gateway/prindex.html
Conflict Prevention and Post-Conflict Reconstruction (CPR)Network (currently accessible via World Bank website)http://www.worldbank.org/peace building
Conflict Prevention Network (CPN), Germanyhttp://www.lrz-muenchen.de/~cpn
Conflict Research Unit, Clingendael-Institut, Netherlandshttp://www.clingendael.nl/cru/index.htm
Creative Associates International/Conflict Prevention Net, USAhttp://www.caii-dc.com/ghai
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Danish Institute of International Affairs (DUPI)http://www.dupi.dk
Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, development cooperation pagehttp://www.um.dk/udenrigspolitik/udviklingspolitik/
Department for International Development (DFID), UKhttp://www.dfid.gov.uk/
Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Canadahttp://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca
Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ)GmbHhttp://www.gtz.de
Development Assistance Committee (DAC) OECDhttp://www.oecd.org/dac/index.htm
Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, development cooperation pagehttp://www.bz.minbuza.nl/English/f_sumdevelopment14.html
European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO)http://europa.eu.int/comm/echo/en/index.html
European Platform for Conflict Prevention and Transformationhttp://www.euconflict.org
EU Commission Directorate-General Developmenthttp://europa.eu.int/comm/development/index_en.htm
EU Commission Directorate-General Relexhttp://europa.eu.int/comm/dgs/external_relations/index_en.htm
Friedrich Ebert Foundation (FES) Germanyhttp://www.fes.de/subjects_gr.html
German Development Service (DED)http://www.ded.de
7.2 Websites
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German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation andDevelopment (BMZ),http://www.government.de/bmz
German Overseas Institute (DÜI)http://www.rrz.uni-hamburg.de/duei
Global Peace building Network (GPN);Website Work Programmeof the CPR Networkhttp://www.worldbank.org/peace building
GTZ see Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit
Guide to the law of war and peace, USAhttp://www.hg.org/war.html
Hanns Seidel Foundation (HSS), Germanyhttp://www.hanns-seidel-stiftung.de/default.de
Heidelberg Institute of International Conflict Researchhttp://www.conflict.com/hiik
Heinrich Böll Foundation (HBS), Germanyhttp://www.boell.de
Human Rights Watch, USAhttp://www.hrw.org/home.html
Institute for Development Research Centre (IDRC) Canadahttp://www.idrc.ca/index_e.html
International Alert, UKhttp://www.international-alert.org/
International Crisis Group, USAhttp://www.intl-crisis-group.org
International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societieshttp://www.ifrc.org/news/dftf/
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International Freedom of Expression Exchange (IFEX), Canadahttp://www.ifex.org
International Peace Academy (IPA), USAhttp://www.ipacademy.org/
Konrad Adenauer Foundation (KAS), Germanyhttp://www.kas.de
Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (KfW), Germanyhttp://www.kfw.de
Life and Peace Institute (LPI), Swedenhttp://www.life-peace.org
Minorities at Risk Project, USAhttp://www.bsos.umd.edu/cidcm/mar
Norwegian Institute of Human Rights der Universität Oslo http://www.humanrights/uio./no/indexeng.htm
Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI)http://www.nupi.no/default-e.htm
Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA)http://www.npaid.org/
Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC)http://www.nrc.no/engindex.htm
Peace Research Institute Frankfurt (PRIF), Germanyhttp://www.hsfk.de
(International) Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO)http://www.prio.no
ReliefWeb Home Pagehttp://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf
7.2 Websites
179
Reuter Foundation AlertNethttp://www.alertnet.org/alertnet.nsf/?OpenDatabase
Saferworld, UKhttp://www.gn.apc.org/SWORLD/index.html
Search for Common Ground, USA, Belgiumhttp://www.sfcg.org/
Development and Peace Foundation (SEF), Germanyhttp://www.sef-bonn.org/
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)http://www.sipri.se
Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA)http://www.sida se
Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (DEZA)http://194.230.65.134/dezaweb2/home.asp
Swiss Peace Foundationhttp://www.swisspeace.ch
Swiss Red Cross http://www.redcross.ch
United Nations Development Program (UNDP)http://www.undp.org/erd/
UNESCO, Culture of Peace Projecthttp://www.unesco.org/cpp/
UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCHR)http://www.unhchr.ch
UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)http://www.unhcr.ch/
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UN Office for Project Services (UNOPS)http://www.unops.org
UN Security Council Documentshttp://www.un.org/Docs/sc.htm
UN Volunteershttp://www.unv.org
United States Agency for International Development (USAID),Office of Transition Initiativeshttp://www.info.usaid.gov/hum_response/oti/
War-torn Societies Project, UNhttp://www.unrisd.org/wsp/wsp.htm
World Bank, Economies of Conflict, Crime and Violence Researchhttp://www.worldbank.org/research/conflict/index.htm
World Bank, Post Conflict Unithttp://www.worldbank.org/postconflict
7.2 Websites
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7.3. List of Interviewees
Country Abbr. Organisation Interviewee(s) Date
Germany BMZ German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development Adolf Kloke-Lesch 18.10.99
GTZ Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit Bernd Hoffmann several
occasionsKAS Konrad-Adenauer-Foundation Monika Baumhauer,
Michael Plesch 26.10.99FES Friedrich-Ebert-Foundation Jörg Bergstermann 18.10.99HBS Heinrich-Böll-Foundation Annekathrin Linck 04.12.99AGKED Association of Church
Development Services Wolfgang Heinrich 18.11.99SEF Development and Peace
Foundation Tobias Debiel 26.10.99DED German Development Service Volker Kasch 20.10.99Berghof Berghof Research Center for Con-Center structive Conflict Management Norbert Ropers 20.10.99EZE Protestant Central Agency for
Development Aid Jürgen Reichel 26.10.99
Austria AA Federal Ministry for Foreign Affairs Doris Danler
Sigrid Boyer tel. 16.12.99ASPR Austrian Study Centre for Peace
and Conflict Resolution Arno Truger tel. 20.12.99
Switzerland EDA Department of Foreign Affairs Peter Reinhardt 27.10.99SRK Swiss Red Cross Anne Gloor
(ex-staff member) 08.11.99DEZA Swiss Agency for Development Gerhard Pfister
and Cooperation Daniel Maselli 28.10.99Caritas Caritas Thomas Gass
Geert van Dok 09.11.99HEKS Hilfswerk Evangelischer
Kirchen Schweiz Arne Engele 27.10.99OeME Office for Ecumenical Affairs Beat Dietschy 27.10.99
UK DFID Department for International Development Sarah Beeching 2.11.99Saferworld Paul Eavis 4.11.99
SRC Swiss Red Cross Arnold Boulter 4.11.99IA International Alert Martin Honeywell
Manuela Leonhardt Tony Jackson Eugenia Piza-Lopes 3.11.99
CR Conciliation Resources Andy CarlGuus Meijer 3.11.99
Netherlands Novib Nederlands Organisatie voorInternationale Ontwikkelingssamenwerking Mario Weima 15.11.99
Clingen- Netherlands Institute of Georg E. Frerksdael International Relations Luc van de Goor
S.Verstegen 15.11.99AA Ministry of Foreign Affairs Caroline Poldermans15.11.99
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Country Abbr. Organisation Interviewee(s) Date
Belgium CPRS Centre for Peace Research and Strategic Studies Luc Reychler 25.10.99
Sweden SIDA Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency David Wiking 25.11.99
LPI Life and Peace Institute Mark SalterMats Lundström 25.11.99
Norway AA Foreign Ministry Rolf Christian Ree 26.11.99NORDEM Norwegian Institute of
Human Rights Kristin Hogdahl 26.11.99NRC Norwegian Refugee Council Stein Stoa 26.11.99NUPI Norwegian Institute of
Internatinal Affairs Torunn L.TryggestadEspen Barth Eide 26.11.99
NPA Norwegian People’s Aid Kai Jacobsen 26.11.99PRIO International Peace Research
Institute, Oslo Dan Smith,Wenche Haugge 26.11.99
Denmark DANIDA/ Foreign Ministry Signe Röpke,Gert Meinecke 24.11.99
CDR Center for Development Research Gorm Rye Olsen 24.11.99
DUPI Danish Institute of International Affairs Bertel Hiurlin 24.11.99
USA CDA Collaborative for Development Action Mary Andersson 19.11.99
UN UNHCR UN High Commissioner for Refugees M. Pirolet 9.11.99
UNDP UN Development Programme correspondence with Le Moyne
UNOPS United Nations Office for Project Services Bernhard Schlachter 29.10.99
UNRISD War-torn Societies Project Agneta JohanssonCatherine Boullé-Weber 29.10.99
EU ECHO EU Commission Humanitarian Office Peter Billing 16.11.99
EU EU Commission, Ex-DG VIII/2 Martin Landgraf 25.10.99SRC Service Commun –
Evaluation Unit Helena Laakso 25.10.99Relex External Relations Directorate-
General of the European Commission Peter Meyer 09.11.99
CPN Conflict Prevention Network, SWP Reinhardt Rummel 09.11.99
FEWER Forum for Early Warning and Early Response Eugenia Piza-Lopez 03.11.99
7.3 List of Interviewees
183